Does the Fact That Speciesist Practices Are Traditions Show That We Should Respect Them?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume I, p. 29 of the PDF edition · English translation

9.1. A double standard depending on the victims' species

Animals are exploited for the most diverse purposes, which means that they usually have a life full of suffering, in addition to being killed. Moreover, when they are victims of natural processes such as hunger, thirst, disease, and natural disasters, the standard view is that we should let nature take its course, without helping them. However, such attitudes would never be considered acceptable if the victims were human. In fact, if the victims were human, such attitudes would be considered monstrous. Many people believe there is nothing wrong with this double standard of treatment based on the victims' species. But is it possible to justify this disparity?

9.2. The appeal to tradition

It is sometimes argued that common attitudes toward nonhuman animals are justified because they are traditional, that is, they have been cultivated for a long time, passed down from generation to generation. For example, the use of nonhuman animals for the most diverse purposes is traditional in a wide variety of cultures. Appeals to respect for traditions and cultures are very common. However, this does not make them free of problems. Below we will look at some of these problems³².

9.3. The appeal to tradition could not justify anthropocentrism

The first problem is that the argument has the opposite implication from the one it intends. The argument aims to explain why exploiting nonhuman animals is just, whereas doing the same to humans would not be. However, if the fact that a practice is traditional made it just, then it would equally have to be said that racism, sexism, and even human slavery are just practices, since they are traditional practices.

9.4. Not every tradition is just

The second problem is that the argument does not explain why the fact that a practice is traditional would make it just. There are countless examples of practices that were (and some still are) deeply traditional in many societies and are also highly unjust and even heinous: human slavery, human sacrifice, burning people accused of witchcraft, throwing people to the lions, female genital mutilation, crucifixion, impalement, marriages between adults and children, and so on.

9.5. Discussing the defenses of the claim that traditions should be respected

The third problem is that there seem to be only two ways of defending the claim that we should respect traditions, but neither would support the claim that we should respect traditions that create victims, as speciesist practices do. Let us see:

9.5.1. The defense that traditions are good because they benefit individuals

One way to defend the claim that we should respect traditions is to point to the benefit they bring to individuals. For example, one could point to the benefits that animal exploitation provides to humans.

However, if the benefit a tradition brings to certain individuals is a reason in its favor, then it would be arbitrary not to count the harms it causes to other individuals as a reason against it. And in the case of speciesist practices and of other traditions that create victims (such as those listed above), the harm they cause to the victims is vastly greater than the benefit they produce. In the case of speciesist practices, there is the further aggravating factor that the number of victims is enormously greater than the number of beneficiaries.

Moreover, such practices would never be considered just by their proponents if they did not know whether they would be among those who benefit from them or among those harmed by them. This is a sign that not even they themselves believe that the benefit these practices produce could justify the harm they cause.

Therefore, if what matters is the way individuals are affected, then we have strong reasons to abolish such traditions.

9.5.2. The defense that traditions are good in themselves

Another way to defend the claim that we should respect traditions is to argue that they have value in themselves, regardless of whether or not they benefit individuals. There are two problems with this defense. Let us look at each separately:

The difficulty of grounding the existence of this value

The first problem is managing to show that traditions really are good in themselves. For example, another possibility is that they have only instrumental value (that is, that their value depends solely on how they affect individuals). Yet another possibility is that they are bad in themselves. So, given these other possibilities, whoever holds that they are good in themselves would have to present an argument for this thesis, rather than simply assuming it as if it were obvious. A further difficulty for this position is that the attempt to establish that traditions have intrinsic value cannot appeal to the benefits they provide to certain individuals (since that would be showing their instrumental value, and showing that something has instrumental value is obviously not showing that it has intrinsic value).

A defender of traditions might say that their intuitions tell them that traditions are good in themselves. However, other people do not share this intuition, so the defender of traditions would have to explain with some other argument why it is their intuitions that are correct. Moreover, our intuitions may simply be the result of our prejudices.

The defender of traditions might point out that it has not been proven that traditions lack this value either. However, the burden of proof lies with the defender of traditions, since it is they who assert the existence of a value that cannot be verified (all the more so since these are practices that cause enormous amounts of suffering and death).

Even if this value existed, it would not follow that these traditions are justified

The second problem is the following. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it had been proven that traditions have intrinsic value. This would still be insufficient to establish that traditions that create victims are justified. To establish that conclusion, it would also have to be shown that the supposed value of traditions is more important than the victims' basic interests, such as not suffering and not dying. If, as we have seen, it is already difficult to establish that traditions have intrinsic value, it is even more difficult to establish that this value is so important that it justifies causing suffering and death in its name.

9.6. Conclusion

Everything discussed here seems to show that the fact that a practice is traditional does not show that it is just. Therefore, the fact that animal exploitation is traditional does not show that it is just either. In fact, it is quite possible that animal exploitation is also a highly unjust or even heinous practice, and that the very fact that it is traditional is one of the factors that keep this from being noticed, just as happened with human slavery, for example.