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Debunking objections
241 common objections to respecting animals and how to answer them: 58 from the Volume XII boxes, in the author's own words, and 183 short replies, chapter by chapter.
How to use it: open the objection you heard, read the reply and follow the link to the full chapter. To practice, use the flashcards mode. For an even bigger catalog of arguments, see the Guia de Argumentação pelos Animais (a guide to arguing for animals, in Portuguese).
From the Volume XII boxes original text
They sayThese animals do not belong to the human species. (I, ch. 2).
Reply
This does not explain why belonging to the human species is relevant to moral considerationGo deeper: Vol. I, ch. 2
They sayThese animals do not belong to the species we belong to. (I, ch. 2)
Reply
This does not explain the relevance of the species criterion. The species criterion may be arbitrary, as the criteria of race and gender are, for example.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 2
They sayThese animals do not have immortal souls and were not created in the image and likeness of a deity. (I, ch. 3).
Reply
It is not possible to prove these claims. But even if it were, the argument does not explain why meeting these requirements would be relevant to receiving moral considerationGo deeper: Vol. I, ch. 3
They sayThese animals lack certain capacities and relationships, and even the potential to develop them. For example, they have no notion of right and wrong, of justice, of rights, they have no political relationships with us, etc. (I, ch. 4 and 5).
Reply
The argument does not explain why possessing these characteristics would be relevant to moral consideration. For example, there are humans who also do not possess them (babies, for example) or who do not even have the potential to develop them (such as victims of certain diseases that are incapacitating throughout life), but this does not seem to justify disregarding them.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 4 · Vol. I, ch. 5
They sayThese animals do not belong to the same species as the beings who have those capacities and relationships (I, ch. 6).
Reply
This explains the relevance neither of the criterion of capacities/relationships nor of the species criterion. The argument already assumes both things in advance.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 6
They sayThe species criterion is fair because it refers to biological characteristics (whereas the criteria of race and gender would be unfair because they are social constructions). (I, ch. 7).
Reply
The fact that a criterion is based on biological characteristics does not make it fair. For example, a system of slavery based on height or skin color would be based on biological characteristics. Yet it would be just as unjust as any other form of slavery. The same goes for slavery based on species.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 7
They sayIt is natural and/or traditional to disregard animals (I, ch. 8 and 9).
Reply
From the fact that a behavior is natural or traditional it does not follow that it is necessarily good, fair, desirable, or even acceptable.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 8 · Vol. I, ch. 9
They sayEthics is a human creation. Therefore, all views are equally arbitrary, and we do not need to justify what we do. (I, ch. 11).
Reply
The fact that a field of knowledge was created does not imply that all positions in that field are arbitrary. In ethics, for example, there are positions that are biased in their consideration of the harms and benefits to the individuals affected, and others that are not.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 11
They sayEthics is a human activity. Since animals are not capable of acting morally, they should not be considered. (I, ch. 10).
Reply
The beneficiaries of a certain activity do not necessarily have to be capable of performing it as well. Requiring that, in order to receive moral consideration, someone must also be capable of acting morally is like requiring that, in order to be treated by a doctor, someone must also be a doctor.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 10
They sayHumans invented ethics to protect themselves. Therefore, it is justified to disregard those individuals who have no power to threaten us. (I, ch. 12).
Reply
It has not been proven that ethics arose out of self-interest. And even if it had, that would not imply that this conception of ethics is correct. It is one thing to describe how a certain activity arose. It is another to justify a certain view within that activity. For example, the first astronomers held certain convictions that, over time, turned out to be mistaken. The same goes for ethics.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 12
They sayHumans are capable of suffering to a greater degree, owing to their high degree of cognition. Therefore, the standard treatment given to nonhuman animals is justified. (II, ch. 9).
Reply
Even if this were the case, the fact that one kind of individual suffers to a greater degree does not imply that it is justified to disregard the individuals capable of suffering to a lesser degree. Moreover, it is also possible to question the thesis that a higher degree of cognition implies greater suffering. This will be so in certain situations (for example, only someone who understands that they will be killed in a few days will suffer in anticipation), but not in others (for example, an animal that is captured to be given medication and panics because it thinks it will be killed). Furthermore, a lower degree of cognition usually comes with greater vulnerability, which gives us reasons to give these 4 individuals greater protection.Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 9
They sayOnly ecosystems and species matter, not individuals. (V, ch. 10, VI, ch. 14).
Reply
What is at stake in questions of moral consideration is the possibility that our decisions positively or negatively affect those they reach. That is why individuals should be the center of moral consideration, since they are the ones who can be harmed and benefited.Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 10
They sayThere are moral authorities (religious or otherwise) that have approved of animal exploitation. Hence, animal exploitation is justified. (I, ch. 13).
Reply
The fact that an authority approves of a given practice does not imply that it is necessarily right. What would have to be analyzed are the reasons the authority in question offered in an attempt to justify the practice. However, these reasons will be plausible or implausible whether they were offered by an authority or by anyone else. An authority's will has no power to make a bad argument good. Therefore, it is completely irrelevant whether the person who offered an argument is an authority or not. What matters is whether the argument they offered is sound.Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 13
They sayThere are things other than suffering/pleasure that affect well-being (such as the satisfaction of preferences and obtaining objective goods such as knowledge, special relationships, etc.). (VI, ch. 5; XI, ch. 2).
Reply
The sentience criterion says only which beings have a well-being. The criterion is not necessarily committed (although it is compatible) with the thesis that well-being comes down to suffering/pleasure. It is also compatible with the thesis that well-being also includes, for example, the satisfaction of preferences and objective goods.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 5 · Vol. XI, ch. 2
They sayThe sentience criterion only makes sense in a utilitarian ethics. (II, ch. 7).
Reply
The sentience criterion says only which beings we ought to consider, without committing itself to a specific way of determining the right action. In fact, this criterion has been incorporated by the most varied theories and 13 currents of contemporary ethics.Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 7
They sayThe sentience criterion is anthropocentric, since it looks in animals for a similarity with humans (sentience). (VI, ch. 2)
Reply
The sentience criterion does not hold that we should consider sentient animals because they resemble humans, but because they can be harmed and benefited.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 2
They sayThe sentience criterion discriminates on the basis of kingdoms, since it excludes those who do not belong to the animal kingdom (VI, ch. 3).
Reply
Being sentient is not the same as being an animal. There are nonsentient animals (such as sponges, for example), and in the future there may be sentient beings that are not animals (for example, if sentience in digital media is possible). The criterion prescribes considering all sentient beings, regardless of whether or not they belong to the animal kingdom.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 3
They sayThere are harms that do not necessarily cause suffering, such as the harm of death. Hence, the sentience criterion is wrong. (VI, ch. 4).
Reply
Accepting the sentience criterion does not imply claiming that the only form of harm is suffering. For example, a sentient being is also harmed if prevented from experiencing what would be positive for it (which is what happens when it dies, for example).Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 4
They sayThere are harms that neither cause suffering nor prevent someone from enjoying something positive (as, for example, if someone is raped while unconscious and, on waking, remembers nothing). The sentience criterion would not take such harms into account. (VI, ch. 5).
Reply
The sentience criterion says that the beings capable of being harmed are those that are conscious, but it does not necessarily claim that all forms of harm either cause suffering or prevent positive experiences (although it is compatible with that view). The sentience criterion is also compatible with the view that a sentient being is harmed when its preferences are violated (whether those it actually has, or those it would have if it were rational and had the relevant information about what is happening).Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 5
They sayThe sentience criterion excludes invertebrates. (VI, ch. 6).
Reply
There are many invertebrates that meet the criteria for sentience, such as cephalopods, decapod crustaceans, many kinds of insects and arachnids, and perhaps 14 gastropods, bivalves, and even nematode worms.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 6
They sayThe sentience criterion is better than the anthropocentric one because it includes a larger number of beings. For the same reason, the criterion of life is better than that of sentience. (VI, ch. 15).
Reply
The number of beings considered does not, by itself, show that one criterion is better than another. It would have to be shown that nonsentient living beings can, in fact, be harmed and benefited.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 15
They sayNonsentient living beings can also be harmed, since they survive under certain conditions and perish under others. (VI, ch. 17 and 18).
Reply
The fact that an organism survives or perishes depending on conditions does not show that it is necessarily harmed or benefited depending on the condition it is in, since this by itself does not show that there is someone in that organism experiencing certain states as positive and others as negative.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 17 · Vol. VI, ch. 18
They saySentient beings use the sensation of pain to avoid what would kill them and, through positive sensations, they know which things contribute to their staying alive. Hence, sentience is merely a means of preserving life, which is what really has value in itself. (VI, ch. 16 and 19).
Reply
The fact that we aim to stay alive does not imply that biological life has value in itself. We normally think that being alive is good because it allows us to have valuable experiences. We do not see such experiences as having merely instrumental value for our staying alive. Rather, being alive is good because it allows these experiences. If we thought biological life had value in itself, we would maintain that there is something good about remaining a living body with no possibility of experiences (nor of having them again), and even when we could experience only extreme suffering and nothing else.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 16 · Vol. VI, ch. 19
They sayAnd what if the sentience criterion is wrong? If nonsentient entities (such as plants, ecosystems, species, etc.) are considerable, it is justified to harm sentient beings if that is necessary to preserve them. (VI, ch. 14).
Reply
Showing that an entity is morally considerable is not the same as showing that it should have priority. Even if nonsentient entities were considerable, there are reasons, in cases of conflict, to prioritize sentient beings. There are two main reasons: (1) only sentient beings are capable of experiencing suffering; (2) only in their case does death prevent positive experiences. These are particularly serious harms, which no nonsentient entity can suffer.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 14
They sayThe sentience criterion values only beings that have a subjectivity. So it assumes that values are subjective (that is, that there is no right/wrong about values). (VI, ch. 7).
Reply
This confuses two senses of the term “subjective.” Something can be subjective in the sense of referring to consciousness. Something can be subjective in the sense that there is no objective truth about it. However, the one does not necessarily imply the other. For example, it could be said that happiness objectively has value in itself and that suffering objectively has disvalue in itself.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 7
They sayIf plants are sentient, then it makes no difference whether we eat animals or plants, right? (VI, ch. 21).
Reply
If plants were also sentient, what would follow is fruitarianism, and not that it is right to eat both animals and plants. An analogy: the recognition that humans and other animals are sentient implies veganism, and not that it is right to eat both animals and humans.Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 21
They sayDeath does not harm them because they do not understand what death is. (III, ch. 2).
Reply
This confuses being harmed with being aware of the harm one will suffer. Death deprives someone of continuing to enjoy what would be positive for them, and this is independent of whether or not the individual understands what death is.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 2
They sayDeath does not harm them because they do not have future-oriented desires. (III, ch. 2).
Reply
Death prevents someone from enjoying the positive things they would experience if they did not die, and this is independent of whether or not that someone has future-oriented desires. For example, suppose two children will have fun on an outing tomorrow, but only one of them is old enough to understand the concept of tomorrow and form a desire to go on the outing tomorrow. Nevertheless, if both die today, both are harmed.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 2
They sayThey are only slightly harmed by death because they are not capable of intellectual pleasures, and these are more valuable. (III, ch. 4).
Reply
Even if this were the case, it would not support the conclusion. What would have to be shown to support the conclusion is that non-intellectual pleasures are not valuable (and not that intellectual pleasures are more valuable). Moreover, the thesis that every intellectual pleasure is more valuable is also questionable. For example, being reunited after 20 years with a missing loved one seems more valuable than many intellectual activities.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 4
They sayEating them benefits them, since it brings them into existence, and the death of one is canceled out by the birth of another. (III, ch. 8 and 9; IV, ch. 7).
Reply
If this justified killing someone, then all parents would have the right to kill their children, as long as they brought others into existence to replace them. The wrong of killing someone who already exists is more serious than failing to produce new beings, since in the first case there is already an individual who is harmed, whereas in the second case there are only countless future possibilities of sentient beings.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 8 · Vol. III, ch. 9 · Vol. IV, ch. 7
They sayThey are only slightly harmed by death because they have weak psychological connectedness with their future (since their minds are simpler). The degree of psychological connectedness depends on the degree of memories, intentions, desires, etc. shared between two moments. (III, ch. 9).
Reply
Two criticisms: (1) The fact that their minds are simpler may imply greater psychological connectedness, since their mental contents would vary less, and so the proportion of mental contents shared across different moments would be greater (even if the quantity of shared contents may be smaller). (2) Having a high degree of psychological connectedness (or even any psychological connectedness) is not necessary for someone to be greatly harmed by death. For example, if someone has lived only briefly and would have ahead of them a future of very positive experiences, it seems that they are harmed to a high degree if they die (since death prevents these experiences), and this is independent of the degree of psychological connectedness they would have with their future self.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 9
They sayDeath benefits them because their lives, whether in exploitation or in the wild, would be full of suffering. (IV, ch. 6).
Reply
This observation could never justify animal exploitation. On the contrary, it gives reasons to abolish it, since it produces new beings who will have lives full of suffering. Nor could it justify “letting nature take its course.” On the contrary, it gives reasons to try to prevent animals from being born in the wild in contexts in which their lives would be full of suffering.Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 6
They sayDeath does not harm them if they have little time left ahead of them (because they are old or because of their short lifespan). (III, ch. 10).
Reply
Someone having little time left to live does not imply that death will be only slightly harmful to them. The time they have left may be very valuable. This is already widely recognized in the human case. Moreover, it is possible that animals with smaller brains (such as insects) have a faster subjective perception of time. Thus, what seems to us a short life span may not be.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 10
They sayIf there is life after death, death does not harm them, even if their life here is good. (III, ch. 13).
Reply
There is uncertainty: (1) about whether or not there is life after death; and (2) about whether, if there is, it will be worse or better than the present one. On the other hand, we know what the individual's life will probably be like if they stay alive. Thus, uncertainty about both points cannot justify killing animals who have a good life.Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 13
They sayThere is no need to help animals in the wild: it is enough to stop harming them, since, if we let nature take its course, animals will generally have predominantly positive lives. (VII, ch. 3).
Reply
Animals in the wild are greatly harmed by natural processes. Malnutrition, hunger, thirst, disease, physical injuries, psychological stress, hostile weather events, natural disasters, and various kinds of conflict between animals are the norm in nature. In addition, the vast majority of animal species reproduce by maximizing offspring (in broods ranging from thousands to many millions, depending on the species). In periods of approximately stable population, it can be deduced that, on average, in each generation a single offspring per adult survives (that is, only two per brood). All the rest of the brood are generally born only to experience extreme suffering and die very 27 prematurely. Because of these factors, the number of animals who suffer and die as a result of natural processes is so enormous that it makes even the numbers of animal exploitation look small by comparison28.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 3
They sayMany eggs are destroyed before they develop into sentient beings. Thus, few animals are harmed. (VII, ch. 3).
Reply
Even if this happened to the vast majority of eggs, there would still be an enormous number of individuals born to live a life in which suffering greatly predominates. For example, even if 90% of the 2 million eggs laid by a cod were destroyed before developing into sentient beings, the remaining 10% would still be 200,000 individuals.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 3
They sayMost animals die very young, and at that stage they are still barely capable of suffering. Therefore, they are only slightly harmed by what happens to them. (VII, ch. 3).
Reply
There is no evidence that, because they are very young, they are barely capable of suffering. On the contrary, given that most of these animals are precocial, it is quite likely that their capacity to feel is very acute at this stage, since otherwise 29 such species would probably no longer exist. And even if they were barely capable of suffering, this does not mean they were only slightly unfortunate, since premature death aggravates the harm of death (they lived short lives full of suffering).Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 3
They sayWe should not minimize natural harms because this question lies outside the scope of ethics, since neither natural processes nor animals are accountable. (VII, ch. 2, 15, 16).
Reply
It is contradictory to claim that the question of natural harms lies outside the scope of ethics and then say that we should not minimize these harms. Moreover, the fact that natural processes and animals are not accountable is irrelevant, since the ones who have to decide are we, not they. When humans are the victims in similar situations, no one says that we should not rescue the victims just because natural processes and animals are not accountable.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 2 · Vol. VII, ch. 15 · Vol. VII, ch. 16
They sayIntervening in nature (that is, in natural territory and in natural processes) is always wrong, since it is an arrogant attitude. It amounts to “playing God.” (VII, ch. 6).
Reply
There are many interventions in nature that are accepted by almost everyone. For example, those made to benefit humans (medicine, agriculture, the construction of housing, schools, hospitals, libraries, etc.) and to achieve environmentalist goals (interventions to preserve rare species, to keep ecosystems in a certain configuration, etc.). If any of these interventions is justifiable, then it makes no sense to say that it is wrong to help wild animals just because it would involve intervening in nature.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 6
They sayIt is wrong to influence the fate of these animals. (VII, ch. 6).
Reply
We will be influencing the fate of these animals either way, whether we decide to help or decide not to help.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 6
They sayThe proposal is anthropocentric, since it comes from humans. (VII, ch. 7).
Reply
The fact that a proposal is anthropogenic (that is, comes from humans) does not mean that it is anthropocentric (that is, that its goal is centered on benefiting humans). The proposal in question aims to benefit animals. Therefore, it is not anthropocentric.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 7
They sayThe less human influence, the better for animals. (VII, ch. 8)
Reply
Not necessarily. It would have to be assessed, case by case, whether acting or refraining from acting has the best results for animals. There is no basis for saying that refraining is always better.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 8
They sayWe should reduce human influence on the world, even in situations in which reducing it would be worse for animals. (VII, ch. 8).
Reply
It is contradictory to say that we should reduce human influence because it harms animals, and then say that we should reduce it even when doing so is worse for animals. To support such a thesis, what would have to be shown is that human influence is wrong in itself, entirely independently of how animals are affected. However, the objection in question already assumes that this thesis is correct, instead of demonstrating it.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 8
They sayFrom our human perspective, we cannot know what is best for animals. Hence, what is best for animals is to let nature take its course. (VII, ch. 7).
Reply
It is contradictory to say, first, that we cannot know what is best for animals, and then say that we know that what is best for them is to let nature take its course. Moreover, in the situations in which the proposal to help wild animals aims to intervene, we do know what is best for the animals. It would be absurd to say that perhaps what is best for animals would be to have their bodies burned, to die of starvation or disease, to be born only to suffer, etc.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 7
They sayHelping would violate the animals' freedom. (VII, ch. 10).
Reply
On the contrary. Helping is the only way to ensure that they can exercise their freedom, since to do so they need to be alive and free from extreme suffering. It could be objected that the proposal sometimes requires interfering with their freedom (for example, to vaccinate them). But if the degree of freedom depends on how far someone can do what they want, restricting their freedom at a certain moment may be necessary to ensure that they can continue to exercise it.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 10
They sayHelping them may make them dependent on human care. Hence, we should not help them. (VII, ch. 11).
Reply
This objection does not apply to most interventions, since they aim to reduce the number of births, nor to the proposal to stop practices that make natural processes maximize suffering and deaths. Even interventions that help animals already born do not make them lose the abilities they already have, nor prevent them from acquiring them. It is not helping that would make animals unable to exercise the ability to seek food, or to acquire it, since they would die. Even if helping made animals dependent on human care, this would still be better for the animals than suffering more and dying soon.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 11
They sayThe proposal to help them is paternalistic. Hence, we should not help them. (VII, ch. 12).
Reply
If an action is paternalistic when it aims to benefit the one affected but goes against what they prefer, then helping animals in the wild would be paternalistic only if they preferred not to be helped in situations of starvation, disease, accidents, fires, floods, etc. But this is not the case. Of course, animals sometimes flee from attempts to help them. But this does not show that they prefer not to be helped (they flee because they do not understand that someone is there to help). And even if there were some animal who preferred to remain in a situation in which its suffering would increase, it would very probably not be in an epistemic position favorable to seeing what is best for its well-being in the long term. Therefore, even if helping it were paternalistic, it would be the justified kind of paternalism.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 12
They sayWe should not help them, since suffering has instrumental value (that is, it helps the individual avoid what would harm them). (VII, ch. 13).
Reply
In the case of the vast majority of animals who suffer in the wild because of natural processes, suffering, rather than helping them promote their well-being, only harms them (since they experience extreme suffering from birth until a very premature death caused by that suffering). Moreover, where suffering did help animals achieve something positive, there are reasons to research how to enable them to reach that positive state without having to suffer for it (that is why we prefer to receive anesthesia before surgery).Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 13
They sayThe proposal sees humans as something separate from nature. (VII, ch. 14).
Reply
On the contrary. It is the idea that humans should not intervene in natural territory that seems to see humans as something separate from nature. If we see humans as part of the natural world, then outcomes influenced by human practices do not cease to be (nor are they any less) natural.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 14
They sayNature is neither good nor bad. Natural processes are not accountable agents. Therefore, we have no reasons to help. (VII, ch. 2, 15, 16).
Reply
It is true that natural processes are not accountable agents. But this does not mean that we have no reasons to prevent and minimize the negative effects resulting from natural processes (this is already widely accepted when humans are the victims of natural processes). Moral responsibility falls on us, in having to decide whether or not to help.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 2 · Vol. VII, ch. 15 · Vol. VII, ch. 16
They sayNature is indifferent to the suffering of animals. Ecosystems arise, endure, and disappear with complete indifference to the suffering and death of animals. (VII, ch. 2, 15, 16).
Reply
Yes, but that does not justify our being indifferent as well. Ecosystems also arise, endure, and disappear with complete indifference to human suffering, but that does not justify our being indifferent to suffering. The objection in question assumes that the way natural phenomena happen should be a model for what we ought to do. In doing so, it makes an unjustified leap from describing how things are to prescribing how they ought (morally) to be.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 2 · Vol. VII, ch. 15 · Vol. VII, ch. 16
They sayWe should respect the nature of wild animals, and this requires leaving them to their own fate. (VII, ch. 17).
Reply
We have to ask: why should we respect someone's nature? If the answer is “because doing so would benefit them,” then it is false that respecting the nature of wild animals requires leaving them to their own fate, since this would probably harm them. If, on the other hand, the answer is “just because, even when it would harm them,” then no reason is being given to explain why respecting someone's nature would be more important than avoiding harming them.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 17
They sayIntervening in conflicts between animals could make the situation even worse (for example, intervening in predation could cause a population explosion of prey). (VII, ch. 18, 31).
Reply
In any case where intervening has a good probability of making the situation even worse because of knock-on consequences, the proposal to help wild animals would prescribe not intervening. However, this does not mean that intervening will always have worse consequences. For example, by reducing primary productivity, the tendency is for populations in general to decrease, since it is a “bottom-up” kind of intervention in the food chain.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 18 · Vol. VII, ch. 31
They sayThe proposal would entail intervening in conflicts between animals, and this is wrong even when doing so improves the situation. (VII, ch. 18, 31).
Reply
This objection assumes that the right action sometimes has worse consequences than other available courses of action. However, this thesis would have to be demonstrated, and the objection already assumes it to be correct in advance. Moreover, when humans are the victims of animals, this thesis is not defended. When humans are the victims, it is held that it is always right to help, regardless of the consequences. When animals are the victims, it is held that it is always wrong to help, even if the consequences of not helping are worse. This is speciesism.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 18 · Vol. VII, ch. 31
They sayThis is a question for ecology to answer, not ethics. If we apply what ecology says, we will value species, ecosystems, and natural balance, and not this pursuit of avoiding the suffering and deaths of sentient beings. (VII, ch. 19).
Reply
Describing what happens in natural ecosystems is a task for ecology. However, which goals we ought to pursue (for example, whether the good of sentient beings or environmentalist values) is a question for the field of ethics. No descriptive science has the answer to this question. Animal advocates do not reject knowledge in ecology (indeed, they depend on it in order to help wild animals safely). But ecology would never prescribe that we should value species, ecosystems, biodiversity, or anything else, since it only describes – like any science, it is not about which goals we ought to aim at. Those who oppose helping wild animals and claim that they are “just applying what ecology says” are disguising an environmentalist moral position as a morally neutral description.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 19
They sayWhat matters is ecosystems and species, not animals. So, if all this suffering and death neither drives species extinct nor threatens ecosystems, we need not worry. (VII, ch. 20).
Reply
If the question of moral consideration exists because our decisions can benefit or harm those affected by them, then for someone to be morally considerable it is sufficient that they can be harmed/benefited. Every sentient being, because it is capable of experiencing certain states as positive and others as negative, can be harmed/benefited. If so, then each sentient being matters in its own right. The thesis that each sentient being matters in its own right is much less controversial than the thesis that species and ecosystems matter in themselves.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 20
They sayEven if animals matter, helping would conflict with environmentalist goals (such as keeping the ecosystem in certain configurations), and this makes helping wrong. (VII, ch. 20).
Reply
In the vast majority of cases there would be no conflict of goals, since programs to help wild animals would not alter the properties of ecosystems that environmentalism values: they would only mean less suffering for the inhabitants of these ecosystems. There are even several programs that would achieve both goals. For 30 example, vaccinating bees prevents an enormous number of animals from suffering from disease and also helps in the conservation of species.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 20
They sayBut there are clearly cases in which helping would conflict with environmentalist goals. For example, environmentalists may want to keep only the native vegetation of a place, but it may be that introducing non-native vegetation would reduce the total suffering of the animals living there. In those cases, wouldn't it be wrong to help? (VII, ch. 20).
Reply
A conflict by itself is insufficient to support the conclusion that we should not help. It would have to be shown: (1) that we should abide by environmentalist goals, and (2) that these goals are more important than the basic interests of animals (such as not suffering and not dying). Even if point 1 were demonstrated, reasons could be raised for rejecting point 2. For example, it could be said that only sentient beings are harmed by suffering and death, and that these harms are particularly serious. Thus, whenever there was a conflict, there would be reasons to prioritize the basic interests of sentient beings. Environmentalists already accept this in the human case: they defend limiting the non-basic interests of humans (aesthetic, economic, recreational, etc.) to achieve their goals, but they do not hold that this justifies causing suffering and death to humans, or failing to help them when they are victims of natural processes.Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 20
Short replies, chapter by chapter study layer written for this site
Volume I · Discussing Speciesism
They say“I respect animals, I just think humans come first.”
Short reply
That's one of the three positions in this chapter: giving animals consideration, but to a lesser degree. If the lower weight comes only from species, and not from the size of the harm at stake, it is speciesist too.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 1: An Overview of the Debate on the Moral Consideration of Animals
They say“Humans are humans, animals are animals. Simple as that.”
Short reply
The question is precisely why that difference should change the weight of a pain or a death. Repeating that they're different doesn't answer it. Race and gender also mark real differences, and that doesn't justify discrimination.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 2: Is Species What Matters?
They say“Only human beings have souls, so we can use animals.”
Short reply
Even if we grant the soul, we still need to explain why it would make it acceptable to cause suffering to those who lack one. An animal's suffering doesn't stop existing for lack of a soul.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 3: Could Metaphysical Characteristics Justify Speciesism?
They say“Animals don't reason, don't talk, don't understand rights.”
Short reply
Neither do babies and some people with disabilities, and no one thinks that means they can be raised to become food. The ability to understand rights matters for having duties, not for being a victim.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 4: Could the Possession of Capacities or Relationships Justify Speciesism?
They say“Every human has the potential to be rational; no animal does.”
Short reply
Some humans with congenital conditions will never have that potential, and we don't accept exploiting them. And the reason not to make a child suffer is that suffering is bad, not what she might become in the future.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 5: Could Humans' Supposed Potential Justify Speciesism?
They say“Babies count because they belong to the rational species; animals don't.”
Short reply
That doesn't explain why what is typical of a species should decide the fate of each individual. Each one suffers in their own skin, not in the species average.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 6: Is What Matters Belonging to the Same Species as Those Who Have Certain Capacities?
They say“Race is a social construct, species is biology. That's why speciesism isn't like racism.”
Short reply
What makes racism unfair isn't that race is a social construct, but the biased treatment. A biological criterion can be just as arbitrary as a social one.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 7: If Species Are Not a Social Construct, Is Speciesism Justified?
They say“We're at the top of the food chain. It's the law of nature.”
Short reply
Nature also has the “law” of the strongest against weaker humans, and we reject it. Having the power to do something doesn't show it's right to do it.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 8: If Speciesism Is Natural, Is Speciesism Justified?
They say“Barbecues, rodeos, and fishing are part of our culture.”
Short reply
Culture can change, and it does: we've abolished many traditions once we saw the harm they caused. Culture can go on without animals' suffering, just as it went on without other unjust practices.
They say“Animals have no duties, so they have no rights.”
Short reply
Babies have no duties either, and they have the right not to be mistreated. Duties depend on the ability to act morally; being considered depends only on being able to be harmed.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 10: If Ethics Is a Human Activity, Is It Just to Disregard Animals?
They say“Morality was invented by humans, so we can do whatever we want with animals.”
Short reply
By the same reasoning, we could do whatever we wanted with other humans. Nobody accepts that. The origin of ethics doesn't tell us which positions within it are fair.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 11: If Ethics Is an Invention, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
They say“Morality exists to protect us from each other; animals aren't a threat.”
Short reply
Babies, frail elderly people, and people with disabilities aren't a threat either, and nobody concludes they can be mistreated. And the historical origin of ethics doesn't tell us what's right today.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 12: If Ethics Was Invented for Self-Protection, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
They say“It is written that animals were given to us for our use.”
Short reply
What matters is the reasons offered, and they can be examined on their own. Many religious readings were also once used to justify slavery, and today we reject them.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 13: Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Authorities
They say“Humans have dignity; animals don't. That's why humans always come first.”
Short reply
“Dignity” works here as a trump card no one has explained. If you didn't know whether you'd be born human or animal, would you accept a rule that ignores your suffering just because you don't hold that card?
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 14: The Appeal to Differentiated Degrees of Moral Status
They say“Morality is relative; for me, eating meat isn't wrong.”
Short reply
If morality were relative, condemning cruelty to dogs or children would also be “relative.” People who say this rarely accept that consequence, which shows the claim shows up only to end the discussion.
Go deeper: Vol. I, ch. 15: Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Metaethics
Volume II · Considering Sentient Beings
They say“Only those who can also act morally deserve consideration.”
Short reply
That's the confusion between being accountable and being considerable. To be treated by a doctor, nobody needs to be a doctor.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 1: What Is Relevant to Knowing to Whom We Owe Consideration?
They say“But those humans are exceptions.”
Short reply
The argument doesn't depend on how many humans are in that situation: it's enough that they exist and that, rightly, we don't accept mistreating them. Species “overlap” when it comes to these abilities.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 2: What Is the Argument from Species Overlap?
They say“But a tree can be harmed too when we cut it down.”
Short reply
Without experience, there's no one for whom the cutting is bad. A tree can be damaged the way a car is damaged, but not harmed in the moral sense.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 3: What Is Sentience and Why Does It Matter?
They say“Fish don't feel pain, it's just reflex.”
Short reply
Isolated reflexes don't prove sentience, but the chapter asks us to look at overall behavior, physiology, and evolution. Fish have nociceptors, learn to avoid what hurts them, and give up rewards to avoid pain.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 4: Which Beings Are Sentient?
They say“Equal consideration doesn't mean equal treatment; a pig doesn't need to vote.”
Short reply
Exactly, and the principle agrees: it asks for equal weight for equal interests. A pig has no interest in voting, but he does have an interest in not suffering and not dying.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 5: Why Equal Consideration?
They say“The greater harm shouldn't always come first: what if the victim deserved it?”
Short reply
Even if we accept desert, it applies to those responsible for their own actions. Animals, babies, and humans with certain disabilities don't deserve any harm, since they can't be held responsible.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 6: Could Questions of Desert Justify Speciesism?
They say“All this animal talk is a utilitarian thing.”
Short reply
The chapter shows the opposite: utilitarians, egalitarians, and defenders of maximin diverge in many cases, but they converge in rejecting speciesism. Criticizing utilitarianism doesn't rescue speciesism.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 7: Is the Rejection of Speciesism Compatible with Only One View of Ethics?
They say“If everyone counts equally, how will you decide whom to save?”
Short reply
The same way we do among humans: by severity, by the number of victims, by the size of the benefit. None of these criteria needs species.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 8: If We Reject Speciesism, How Will We Decide Questions of Priority?
They say“Humans suffer more because they understand what's happening to them.”
Short reply
Sometimes; sometimes it's the other way around. An animal caught to be given medicine may panic, thinking he's going to die. And suffering a little less would never justify suffering for nothing.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 9: But Aren't Humans Capable of Suffering to a Greater Degree?
They say“But I'm not an animal, so this hypothetical makes no sense.”
Short reply
The test doesn't ask you to become an animal; it asks you to judge without using your position in your own favor. That's how we evaluate rules among humans: without knowing whether we'll be rich or poor, men or women.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 10: What Would We Decide Under Conditions of Impartiality?
They say“I'm not speciesist, I love animals.”
Short reply
Liking animals isn't enough. The test is about decisions: would you keep every decision that affects animals if the victims were human, with harms of the same size?
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 11: Testing Whether an Attitude Is Speciesist
They say“Why worry about animals when there are so many humans who need help?”
Short reply
Nobody says the reverse (“why help humans when so many animals are suffering?”) because speciesism is the norm. And helping animals doesn't stop anyone from helping humans: many actions, like changing what we consume, barely compete with other causes.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 12: How Much Importance Should We Give to the Situation of Animals?
They say“There's no proof that insects or shrimp feel anything, so we can use them.”
Short reply
The lack of absolute proof applies even to other humans. The question is what to do under uncertainty: if there's a reasonable chance of sentience, the cost of being wrong at their expense is too high.
Go deeper: Vol. II, ch. 13: Uncertainty About Sentience and the Benefit of the Doubt
Volume III · Animals and the Harm of Death
They say“If death is painless, the animal loses nothing.”
Short reply
He loses all the positive lifetime he would have had. Nobody thinks killing a human in their sleep, painlessly, doesn't harm them.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 1: What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of?
They say“The animal doesn't even know he's going to die, so he loses nothing.”
Short reply
This confuses being harmed with being aware of the harm. A small child doesn't understand death either, and dying young harms her greatly.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 2: Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death
They say“There's no way to know whether the animal would have had a good life, so killing him doesn't harm him.”
Short reply
In most cases we know quite a lot: a healthy animal in good conditions is likely to have good days ahead. Uncertainty exists for humans too, and it doesn't permit killing them.
They say“A pig doesn't read or listen to music; his life is worth less.”
Short reply
His life is worth something to him, because of the experiences he has. Seeing a loved one again after years isn't intellectual, and it can be worth more than many intellectual activities.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 4: Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
They say“A chicken has a short life anyway, so killing him is a small harm.”
Short reply
Broiler chickens are killed at about six weeks old, when they could live for years. By QALYs, they lose almost their entire possible life.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 5: How Can We Assess How Much Someone Is Harmed by Death?
They say“If the calculation says an animal loses as much as a human, the calculation is wrong.”
Short reply
Saying it's wrong just because it goes against intuition is assuming in advance that animals matter less, which is exactly what's under discussion.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 6: Objections to Assessing the Magnitude of the Harm of Death on the Basis of QALYs
They say“Animals live in the present; they have no future “self.””
Short reply
Even so, he will have experiences in the future, and those are what death deprives him of. And living more in the present may even mean greater psychological continuity.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 7: Do Animals Have Weaker Psychological Connectedness?
They say“If I didn't eat them, these animals wouldn't even be born. One dies, another is born: it all evens out.”
Short reply
For the dead animal, nothing evens out: he loses his life. The same reasoning would let parents kill their children as long as they had others.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 8: Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Replaceable
They say“Animals have little psychological connection to the future, so they lose little by dying.”
Short reply
Even humans with little connection to their future selves (like young children) have a lot to lose. What matters is the good that was coming, not the degree of psychological similarity.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 9: Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
They say“An insect lives a few weeks; killing him takes away almost nothing.”
Short reply
For the insect, those weeks are his whole life, and they may be lived as longer than they seem to us. And we don't accept this reasoning for humans who have little time left.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 10: The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a Small Harm
They say“Human life is worth more, so I can kill animals.”
Short reply
Even granting that it's worth more, you still need to show that an animal's life is worth almost nothing. And what's at stake in most animal deaths are small human benefits, like taste.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 11: What If Humans Were More Harmed by Death?
They say“Killing a human is much more wrong than killing an animal.”
Short reply
Even if it were somewhat more wrong, killing an animal could still be extremely wrong. “More wrong” doesn't imply the other act isn't wrong.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 12: Differentiated Moral Status, the Harm of Death, and the Wrongness of Killing
They say“If the animal goes to a better place, killing him doesn't harm him.”
Short reply
We don't know whether there's such a place or whether it would be better. Nobody accepts this reasoning for killing happy humans.
Go deeper: Vol. III, ch. 13: Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational Decision, and Probabilities
Volume IV · The Debate on Animal Exploitation
They say“These days animals are raised and slaughtered humanely.”
Short reply
The chapter describes what is common and legal practice: confinement, mutilation without anesthesia, disease, long transport, and slaughter on a massive scale. And fishing, which kills most of the animals, has almost no rules at all.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 1: How Do the Animals Exploited by Humans Live and Die?
They say“The problem is capitalism and industry, not eating animals.”
Short reply
The chapter replies: the injustice lies in using and killing sentient beings as resources. It doesn't disappear if production is small, ecological, or outside capitalism.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 2: Why Is Animal Exploitation Unjust?
They say“Veganism is just a fad diet.”
Short reply
A diet is what you eat for health or appearance. Veganism is an ethical position about not harming animals; if the word meant any diet without animal products, we'd have no name for that position.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 3: What Is Veganism?
They say“Plants are alive too, and they feel too.”
Short reply
Living isn't feeling. And if they did feel, eating animals would be worse for plants, since an animal raised for meat eats far more plants than we would eat directly.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 4: What About Plants?
They say“Our canine teeth show we're made to eat meat.”
Short reply
Even if they were, being able to do something doesn't show it's right to do it. And replying “we're not carnivores” falls into the same trap: what's natural doesn't decide what's just.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 5: The Objection That Consuming Animals Is Natural
They say“In the wild they'd suffer more; fishing and hunting are actually a favor.”
Short reply
If it were out of concern for them, we'd look for ways to reduce that suffering, not to consume. And hunting and fishing don't reduce the number of births that produce the suffering.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 6: The Claim That Consuming Animals Puts an End to Their Suffering
They say“If it weren't for animal agriculture, these cows wouldn't even exist.”
Short reply
They exist to suffer and die young. No parent would have the right to kill a child on the grounds that, without the parent, the child wouldn't exist.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 7: Is Raising Animals for Consumption Justified Because It Brings Them into Existence?
They say“If you were on a desert island, you'd eat an animal.”
Short reply
Maybe, just as we might do terrible things to humans in an extreme situation. That doesn't authorize doing them outside the emergency, which is where almost all consumption happens.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 8: Does It Matter What We Would Do on a Desert Island or in a Burning House?
They say“We can't live without animal protein.”
Short reply
Legumes, grains, nuts, and seeds provide protein. Vitamin B12 is supplemented, as many foods already are. The major nutrition associations attest that a vegan diet is adequate.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 9: Is It Necessary to Consume Animal Products?
They say“Vegans only eat expensive stuff from fancy stores.”
Short reply
They can, but they don't have to. The basics are the cheapest food there is. And people who stop buying meat, cheese, and cold cuts usually spend less.
They say“If everyone goes vegan, what are we going to do with all those cows?”
Short reply
They wouldn't keep being born, because they're inseminated in order to be born. The transition would be gradual and the number would shrink bit by bit.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 11: If the World Went Vegan, Would There Be an Excess of Domesticated Animals?
They say“Think of how many jobs agribusiness creates.”
Short reply
Slavery also drove the economy, and that didn't justify it. And the money doesn't disappear: it's spent on other products, which also employ people.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 12: Would Veganism Ruin the Economy and Cost Jobs?
They say“It's pointless, the industry just keeps growing.”
Short reply
It would grow even more without vegans. The right comparison is with the scenario without them, not with the past.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 13: But Does Veganism Really Have a Practical Impact?
They say“Vegans kill too; mice and insects die during the harvest.”
Short reply
Animal agriculture needs far more cropland to feed the animals, on top of killing the farmed animals themselves. And only people who take animals into account will want to reduce these indirect deaths too.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 14: But Doesn't Veganism Cause Even More Deaths Than Consuming Animals?
They say“If we stop eating them, chickens will go extinct.”
Short reply
Species don't feel; individuals do. And there's no reason to suppose these species would disappear: many can go on existing without exploitation.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 15: Does Concern for Species Justify Consuming Animals?
They say“People don't even respect humans, let alone animals. Leave it for later.”
Short reply
The animals suffering today can't wait. And each person who changes their attitude already prevents a great deal of suffering, even if most people don't change.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 16: The Claim That the Struggle for Animals Should Be Put Off Until Later
They say“Animal cruelty is already a crime; nothing more is needed.”
Short reply
Cruelty laws protect very little and exclude whatever is “industry practice.” Confining, mutilating, and slaughtering on a mass scale is legal. The central problem is the property status.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 17: Aren't Animals Already Protected by the Law?
They say“Everyone eats what they want; vegans can't impose anything.”
Short reply
Eating an animal isn't a choice that affects only the one eating: there's a victim. Each person's freedom ends where harm to another begins.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 18: The Claim That Animal Advocates Are Imposing Their Lifestyle
They say“Eating insects is sustainable; it's the protein of the future.”
Short reply
Sustainable for whom? For the insects, it means trillions of deaths. If they feel, the moral cost is immense, and there are plant proteins with no victims.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 19: The Exploitation of Insects and Why We Should Oppose It
They say“Thanks to animal testing we have medicines and vaccines.”
Short reply
Benefits could also come from testing on non-consenting humans, and we ban it. The question isn't whether experimentation brings benefits, but whether it's fair to impose the costs on those who didn't consent.
Go deeper: Vol. IV, ch. 20: The Debate on Animal Experimentation
Volume V · Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals
They say“People who love animals also defend nature; it's all the same fight.”
Short reply
Sometimes they coincide, but the foundations are different. Programs that kill thousands of “invasive” animals show that environmentalism can sacrifice animals for the sake of other goals.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 1: Respect for animals and environmentalism: complementary or opposed?
They say“Environmentalism kills a few to save many animals; animal advocacy only thinks about the individual.”
Short reply
The goal of environmentalist programs isn't to save sentient beings, whether many or few, but to maintain certain configurations of ecosystems. And among animal advocates, some accept and some reject killing one to save many.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 2: The divergence concerns ends, not only means
They say“Protecting the forest is protecting the animals.”
Short reply
Sometimes. But a forest can be maintained in ways that maximize births that end in suffering and death. To know what's best for animals, we have to look at their well-being, as welfare biology would.
They say“Helping wild animals is short-sighted; environmentalism thinks about the future.”
Short reply
Aid programs motivated by concern for animals aim precisely at less suffering and fewer deaths from then on, which is what many people mistakenly imagine environmentalism aims at.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 4: The divergence does not lie in a focus on the short or the long term
They say“Balanced nature is healthy nature for animals.”
Short reply
Balance is a measure of numbers, not of well-being. In most species, balance is maintained by enormous mortality among the young, that is, by a great deal of suffering.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 5: Do ecological balance and biodiversity coincide with what is best for animals?
They say“Animal advocates are sentimental; environmentalists follow the science.”
Short reply
Science doesn't choose goals. Saying it “tells us” to preserve species is dressing up a moral position as scientific neutrality.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 6: Animal advocacy and environmentalism: the divergence is ethical, not scientific
They say“But everybody knows environmentalists are the ones who defend animals.”
Short reply
That's exactly the belief the chapter examines. Many programs supported as “pro-animal” have goals that don't include the good of animals.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 7: Why is respect for animals confused with environmentalism?
They say“Invasive species have to be eliminated to protect native ones.”
Short reply
Protect what, exactly? If the goal were to reduce suffering, many programs would have been canceled. Valuing “native” over the lives of those who feel is a criterion we would never accept for humans.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 8: What do environmentalist extermination programs aim at?
They say“Environmentalism isn't anthropocentric; it defends all of nature.”
Short reply
In practice, most environmentalists limit environmental goals when they would harm humans, but not when they harm animals. That is giving humans special weight.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 9: Is environmentalism anthropocentric?
They say“But nature has intrinsic value, regardless of who feels.”
Short reply
Maybe. Even so, environmentalists don't accept killing humans to preserve it; they only accept limiting interests like leisure and profit. The same should hold for animals.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 10: Questioning environmentalist assumptions
They say“Criticizing environmentalism weakens the animal cause.”
Short reply
What weakens the cause is mistakenly supporting practices that harm animals. Being consistent means applying to ourselves what we ask of others.
Go deeper: Vol. V, ch. 11: Why are animal advocates reluctant to acknowledge the divergence?
Volume VI · To Whom Do We Owe Moral Consideration?
They say“Everyone can pick whatever criterion they like to decide who matters.”
Short reply
Criteria have to be relevant to the question. Nobody would accept choosing surgeons by hair color; it makes no more sense to decide who can be harmed by species.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 1: What is relevant for knowing to whom we owe consideration?
They say“You only value sentience because humans are sentient.”
Short reply
It's the other way around: humans matter because they're sentient, and for the same reason all sentient beings matter.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 2: Is the criterion of sentience anthropocentric at bottom?
They say“Sentientism is just animalism in disguise.”
Short reply
Sponges and jellyfish are animals and are probably left out; digital sentient beings, if they exist, are in. The criterion is sentience, not kingdom.
They say“If what matters is not suffering, then painless killing is fine.”
Short reply
That's the misunderstanding the chapter corrects. Sentience tells us who can be harmed; death harms those who feel by taking away the good that was coming.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 4: According to the criterion of sentience, is suffering the only problem?
They say“There are harms that don't affect experience, so sentience isn't everything.”
Short reply
Those harms still fall on someone who feels and has preferences. The sentience criterion isn't committed to hedonism.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 5: If sentience is what matters, why are there harms that do not affect experiences?
They say“If you care about insects, you should adopt biocentrism.”
Short reply
There's no need: the evidence suggests many insects are sentient. The sentience criterion already includes them.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 6: Does the criterion of sentience exclude insects?
They say“If value lies in experiences, then everything is relative.”
Short reply
Value involving experiences doesn't make it opinion. One can hold that suffering is objectively bad, and that sentient beings merely recognize it.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 7: Does accepting the criterion of sentience imply assuming that values are subjective?
They say“A fish's brain is small; he barely feels anything.”
Short reply
Brain size and complexity don't measure the intensity of suffering. Because of selective pressure, pain may even be more intense in animals and stages with less cognition.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 8: Are animals with simpler brains less sentient?
They say“If environmental ethics exists, nature has value of its own.”
Short reply
Environmental ethics can deal with the environment in terms of what it means for those who feel, just as economic ethics deals with money in terms of what it means for people.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 9: If there is a need for environmental ethics, is the criterion of sentience wrong?
They say“Nature manipulated by humans isn't real nature.”
Short reply
It may not be “original,” but the question is whether it would be worse. For those living in it, less suffering is better, whether or not a human hand was involved.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 10: Isn't a World with Less Suffering, but Managed by Humans, Absurd?
They say“If you defend animals, you have to defend all of nature.”
Short reply
One doesn't imply the other. It's this confusion between “nature” and “animals” that makes it seem that preserving nature is always good for animals.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 11: If Sentient Beings Should Be Respected, Does Nature Have Intrinsic Value?
They say“Lots of people want nature left untouched; that's an interest of sentient beings too.”
Short reply
It counts, but it has to be weighed. On one side, an aesthetic preference; on the other, the suffering and death of countless animals.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 12: Does the Sentience Criterion Imply Accepting Environmentalist Goals?
They say“The species has an interest in surviving.”
Short reply
The one with an interest in living is each individual. The species is a classification; it doesn't feel its own extinction.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 13: Do Species Have Interests?
They say“If nature has value, we can sacrifice animals for it.”
Short reply
Having value isn't having priority. Not even environmentalists accept sacrificing humans for environmental goals; the same reasoning applies to animals.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 14: If Some Nonsentient Entity Had Intrinsic Value, What Would Follow?
They say“Biocentrism is more inclusive, so it's more ethical.”
Short reply
Inclusion isn't a value in itself. A good criterion includes those who can be harmed and excludes no one who can, which biocentrism fails to do with possible artificial sentient beings.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 15: Is Biocentrism Better Because It Includes a Greater Number of Beings?
They say“Pain exists only to keep us alive; what counts is life.”
Short reply
If biological life were valuable in itself, it would be worth going on as a living body without any experience, or with only extreme suffering. Almost no one thinks that way.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 16: Sentience and Life: What Has Value as an End and What Has Value as a Means?
They say“A plant “wants” light, so it has interests.”
Short reply
It grows toward the light through physicochemical reactions, like a mechanical sunflower. “Wanting,” in the sense of valuing, requires experience.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 17: Can Nonsentient Living Beings Be Harmed?
They say“Plants react to music and touch, so they feel.”
Short reply
Reacting to stimuli doesn't require experience, as thermostats and automatic doors show. They lack the structure that, in animals, generates experience.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 18: Does the Behavior of Certain Plants and Fungi Show That They Value Certain Things?
They say“All life is sacred, whether it feels or not.”
Short reply
The chapter's examples show that, when it comes to ourselves, what we want to preserve is experience. A living body with no experience at all, forever, isn't what we value.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 19: Does Life Without Sentience Have Value?
They say“If a fish has an interest in eating, a plant has an interest in water.”
Short reply
The fish has an interest in eating because eating makes him feel good and live well. The plant feels nothing; its “need” is a condition for functioning, not an interest.
Go deeper: Vol. VI, ch. 20: Does Every Living Being Have “Biological Interests”?
They say“If even plants matter, it doesn't matter what I eat.”
Short reply
If plants mattered, eating animals would be the worst of both worlds: animals suffer and consume enormous amounts of plants. The logical conclusion would be fruitarianism.
Volume VII · Ethics and the Situation of Wild Animals
They say“With wild animals, all we need to do is leave them alone.”
Short reply
Leaving them alone does not protect them from hunger, disease, and disasters. If what matters is their good, the origin of the harm does not change our reason to help.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 1: What Should We Do About Animals Living in the Wild?
They say“Nature is nature; ethics is a human thing.”
Short reply
Ethics is about the decisions of those who are able to decide. When animals are suffering, deciding to do nothing is also a moral decision.
They say“Wild animals live free and happy.”
Short reply
The few adults we see are the exception. The rule, for the vast majority, is to be born and die within a few days or weeks.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 3: How Do Natural Processes Typically Affect Wild Animals?
They say“I only worry about wild animals if they spread disease or are endangered.”
Short reply
That treats the animal as a resource or as a specimen of a species. Their suffering is bad for them, regardless.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 4: The View That It Is Not a Problem Because the Victims Are Nonhuman Animals
They say“We have a duty not to harm, but not a duty to help.”
Short reply
Even people who accept only strong duties not to harm usually admit reasons to help human victims of disasters. The scale of natural harms makes those reasons very strong in the case of animals.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 5: Foundations of the Proposal to Help Victims of Natural Processes
They say“Who are we to interfere with nature?”
Short reply
We are the same people who interfere all the time, with medicine, agriculture, and cities. And not helping also decides the fate of animals.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 6: Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Arrogant?
They say“Helping wild animals means humanizing them.”
Short reply
Not being hungry, cold, and sick is not a "human" value. It is what any animal seeks. Those who value the "course of nature" above that are humans.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 7: Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Anthropocentric?
They say“The best thing we can do for animals is to disappear from their lives.”
Short reply
Sometimes, yes; sometimes, no. For an animal trapped in a flood, "disappearing" means letting them die.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 8: The Less Human Influence in the World, the Better?
They say“Helping wild animals is welfarism, something for people who are not abolitionists.”
Short reply
Abolitionists also care about animals' well-being. The proposal does not regulate any exploitation.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 9: Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Welfarist?
They say“Wild animals should be free, not treated.”
Short reply
Free from what? From hunger, disease, and parasites? Often the "freedom" being defended is just the freedom to die young.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 10: Does the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Violate Their Freedom?
They say“If we help them, they will become dependent.”
Short reply
Dependence is better than death by starvation. And most of the help being proposed is reducing births, which creates no dependence at all.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 11: The Charge of Creating Dependency
They say“We have no right to decide what is good for them.”
Short reply
We are deciding one way or the other: not helping is also a decision about them. And it is not hard to know that no animal prefers to starve.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 12: The Charge of Paternalism
They say“Suffering is part of life and teaches animals how to survive.”
Short reply
For those who die young, it teaches nothing. And even we prefer to learn without suffering when we can.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 13: The Objection That Suffering Has Instrumental Value
They say“People who want to change nature think they are superior to it.”
Short reply
People who wear clothes, live in houses, and take medicine also "change nature" for themselves. Wanting the same for animals is not thinking you are superior.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 14: Does the Proposal to Help Animals See Humans as Separate from Nature?
They say“Nature is neither good nor evil, so natural suffering is not a problem.”
Short reply
Suffering is no less bad for the one who suffers because no one was to blame. Blame matters for judging agents, not for measuring the harm to victims.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 15: If Nature Is Not Evil, Is Natural Suffering Neutral?
They say“Suffering and death are part of life.”
Short reply
They are, just as diseases are part of human life. That has never been a reason not to treat them.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 16: If Nature Is Indifferent to the Suffering of Animals, Why Help Them?
They say“Wild animals should be wild; helping them disrespects their nature.”
Short reply
Why respect someone's nature? If it is for their good, letting them starve respects nothing. And those who argue this would never accept it for themselves.
They say“Wanting to stop the lion from hunting is absurd.”
Short reply
We already stop predators from hunting when the victim is human or livestock. The proposal is not to start intervening right now, but to study what would help without making things worse.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 18: Isn't It Absurd to Intervene in Conflicts Between Animals?
They say“That is a matter for ecology, not ethics.”
Short reply
Ecology describes; it does not say whether we should value species or the good of animals. That choice is ethical, and anyone who denies this has already made an ethical choice.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 19: Which Fields Should Answer What to Do About Wild Animals?
They say“Helping wild animals goes against conservation.”
Short reply
In most cases it does not: it only reduces the suffering of the inhabitants. When it does, the basic interests of those who can feel should take priority, as they already do in the human case.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 20: Must Environmentalists Oppose Helping Wild Animals?
They say“I did not cause it, so it is not my problem.”
Short reply
We did not cause diseases either, and we think it is right to treat them. Anyone who can prevent a serious harm at a reasonable cost has reasons to do so.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 21: Are We Morally Responsible Only for Human Practices?
They say“First let us free the animals on farms; wild animals can come later.”
Short reply
The two causes can move forward together. And, given the number of victims, the suffering of wild animals is immense.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 22: Attempts to Argue That Domesticated Animals Have Priority
They say“Helping weak animals interferes with natural selection.”
Short reply
Natural selection does not aim at anyone's good; it aims at passing on genes, even at the cost of immense suffering. And no one accepts abandoning vulnerable humans to "improve the species."
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 23: Would Helping Animals Prevent the Fittest Genes from Prevailing?
They say“Nature balances itself; better not to interfere.”
Short reply
Balance, here, means that almost all the young die and the population stays stable. It is stable, but it is not good for the animals.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 24: Couldn't Helping Wild Animals Make Things Even Worse?
They say“There are so many that we will never manage it. So there is no point.”
Short reply
We cannot manage to help every human in need either, and that has never been a reason to help none. Every individual helped counts.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 25: Objections That Question the Practicality of the Proposal to Help
They say“It is impossible to help wild animals.”
Short reply
It is already being done: rabies vaccination for foxes, probiotics for bats and frogs, rescues from fires. The biggest obstacle is not technical; it is a matter of priorities.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 26: What Is Already Being Done to Help Wild Animals?
They say“Conservation biology already takes care of wild animals.”
Short reply
Conservation takes care of populations and species. A field that studies the well-being of each animal barely exists yet.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 27: What Else Could Be Done to Help: Establishing Welfare Biology
They say“Even if we wanted to, we would have no way of knowing what happens to each animal.”
Short reply
Thermal imaging, sensors, drones, and data analysis already make it possible to estimate populations and identify individuals. Our knowledge is likely to grow.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 28: What Technologies Could Be Used to Help Animals in the Wild?
They say“Sterilizing wild animals violates their right to reproduce.”
Short reply
No one accepts that "right" when the offspring would be born only to suffer. And the same animal advocates who spay cats would have even stronger reasons in the case of species with thousands of young per brood.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 29: Do Animals Have a Right Not to Be Sterilized?
They say“If everyone matters, you would have to protect parasites too.”
Short reply
Nonsentient beings cannot be harmed. And even in the case of sentient ones, preventing new cases kills no one and prevents a great deal of suffering.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 30: The Issue of Parasitism
They say“Wanting to end predation is going against nature and destroying ecosystems.”
Short reply
No one is proposing interventions that make things worse. The proposal is to investigate careful approaches, such as reducing primary productivity, that lower the number of animals born to suffer.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 31: The Issue of Predation
They say“Who are we to say that a wild animal's life is not worth living?”
Short reply
We do not need to decide every case. We only need to recognize the clear ones: being born to starve to death in two days. And those who say "leave it as it is" are also judging that these lives are worth living.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 32: Discussing Our Ability to Assess When Life Is or Is Not Worth Living
They say“Saving a wild animal only prolongs their suffering.”
Short reply
Only if we do nothing about the other causes of suffering. Helping well means tackling the cause, such as hunger or disease, which is also what would kill them.
They say“In nature, on balance, there is more good than bad.”
Short reply
Even if that were true, and it is very doubtful, the pain of millions does not get smaller because of the joy of a few. Helping those who are worst off is what increases the balance the most.
They say“If veganism frees up land for forests, natural suffering will increase; so being vegan makes no sense.”
Short reply
Veganism does not necessarily mean increasing green areas; land use is a separate decision. And the ideal it spreads is what can lead people to protect wild animals too.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 35: What Impact Does Veganism Have on the Situation of Wild Animals?
They say“If you care about wild animal suffering, then you want to destroy the forests.”
Short reply
Not necessarily. There is disagreement among the advocates themselves. Many reject altruistic killing because of its risks and prefer reducing births, vaccinating, and treating diseases.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 36: The Debate on the Destruction of Nature
They say“Reforestation is always good for animals.”
Short reply
For the few who survive, maybe; for the vast majority who would be born only to die young, no. And there are other ways to protect the climate that do not multiply this suffering.
Go deeper: Vol. VII, ch. 37: The Debate on the Expansion and Restoration of Nature
Volume VIII · Effective Activism
They say“Everyone helps the cause they like; you cannot compare them.”
Short reply
You can compare them using criteria. Choosing by personal affinity can leave out problems with far more victims and far less help.
They say“Defending animals when so many people are in need?”
Short reply
If the goal is a world with less suffering, neglecting the cause with the most victims and the fewest resources works against that goal.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 2: How Does the Animal Cause Fare on the Priority Criteria?
They say“The priority is ending the abandonment of dogs and cats.”
Short reply
It is a real problem, but small in numbers compared with the trillions of fish, crustaceans, and insects who are exploited, and with animals in the wild.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 3: Among the Problems Affecting Animals, Which Are the Most Important?
They say“For the animals, the reason does not matter; what matters is that people stop consuming them.”
Short reply
In the short term, maybe. But someone who stopped only for their health goes back when a "healthy" product appears, and does not care about wild animals or the animals of the future.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 4: The Use of Anthropocentric and Environmentalist Arguments in the Animal Cause
They say“To defend animals, you have to accept my whole ideology.”
Short reply
You do not. Consideration for sentient beings can be accepted by people with very different ethical and political views. That makes the cause broader.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 5: The Total Approach and the Sufficient Approach
They say“But what about protein? What about the price? What about the climate?”
Short reply
Those questions can be answered, but they cannot take the place of the main one: is it fair to make animals suffer and die for this?
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 6: Shifting the Focus in Debates: Why Is Speciesism Rarely Discussed?
They say“Not even animal philosophers go vegan, so arguments are useless.”
Short reply
That shows arguments are not enough on their own, not that they are useless. And any other way of convincing people can be ignored too.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 7: Moral Beliefs, Motivation to Act, and the Role of Ethical Reflection
They say“A vegan world would be great, but it is a utopia.”
Short reply
If it would be great, it is worth asking what we can do to get closer to it. And anyone who says it is impossible needs to show why, since so many "impossible" changes have already happened.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 8: Normative Objections Disguised as Strategic Objections
They say“People who advocate reduction are not really on the animals' side.”
Short reply
Many advocate reduction precisely because they think it helps animals more. The question is empirical and strategic, not one of loyalty.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 9: Focusing on Veganism versus Focusing on Reducing Consumption
They say“That is welfarism, so it is wrong.”
Short reply
Which of the seven meanings? Rejecting "humane" exploitation does not commit you to rejecting concern for the well-being of wild animals, for example.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 10: Why the Term Welfarism Is Highly Ambiguous
They say“Just regulate exploitation and there will be no cruelty.”
Short reply
These laws usually require proof that the exploiter took pleasure in causing suffering, and they do not reach standard industry practices. Besides, killing is still a harm.
Go deeper: Vol. VIII, ch. 11: The Debate on Regulating Animal Exploitation
They say“Lab-grown meat is not natural, and it still comes from animals.”
Short reply
Being natural does not tell us whether something is good. And if it does not harm animals, that is what matters, not the label. The real problems, such as the use of fetal serum, are being overcome.
Volume IX · Ethics and the Future
They say“That is science fiction; we have real problems right now.”
Short reply
Factory farming would also have sounded like fiction a hundred years ago. An unlikely but gigantic risk may deserve more attention than a small, certain problem.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 1: Future Risks for Sentient Beings: An Introduction
They say“People who have not been born yet do not matter.”
Short reply
Once they are born, they will feel whatever we have left them. Our decisions today affect beings who will exist, and that is exactly why burying toxic waste is wrong.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 2: Temporal Impartiality: What It Is and Why It Matters
They say“Future beings are just possibilities, not real individuals.”
Short reply
The animals who will no longer be born on farms are also "possibilities," and they are precisely why veganism makes sense.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 3: The Objection That Future Beings Are Merely Potential Beings
They say“Moral progress will fix everything on its own.”
Short reply
That is not guaranteed. It depends on our spreading consideration for all sentient beings now. Technology may advance faster than ethics.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 4: What Reasons Are There to Focus on the Long Term?
They say“The most important thing is for humanity to survive; everything else comes later.”
Short reply
A humanity that survives by spreading suffering on an astronomical scale would not be a good outcome. And the idea that only humans count is speciesist.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 5: Should We Focus on Preventing S-Risks or X-Risks?
They say“It would be better to focus on creating as much happiness as possible.”
Short reply
That may be a worthy goal, but several theories agree that relieving extreme suffering is more urgent than increasing the happiness of those who are already well off.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 6: Which Goals Should We Prioritize in the Long Term?
They say“People who talk about s-risks only think about AI and science fiction.”
Short reply
The focus is broad: it includes animal agriculture, wild animals, new forms of sentience, politics, and much more. Each person can take care of one part.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 7: What Does the Focus on S-Risks Consist Of?
They say“It is impossible to predict the future, so there is no point in worrying.”
Short reply
We do not need to predict the exact future. We just need to recognize what increases the risks, as we do with health.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 8: Identifying Risk Factors for S-Risks
They say“We do not know which scenario will happen, so there is no point in planning.”
Short reply
That is exactly why there are broad strategies, which work in almost all of them. And targeted ones are worthwhile for high-risk scenarios.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 9: Longtermist Strategies: Broad and Targeted
They say“It is better to use health and environmental arguments, since they are more convincing.”
Short reply
They may convince people in the short term, but they do not teach people to consider sentient beings, and that is what protects against future suffering.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 10: Why Focus on Consideration for Sentient Beings and on the Future?
They say“Politics has nothing to do with animals.”
Short reply
Political institutions are what decide laws, technologies, and priorities. Animals and future beings cannot vote; they need someone to represent them.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 11: Changing Public Debate, Forms of Activism, and Political Institutions
They say“Machines do not feel; we do not need to worry about that.”
Short reply
Maybe today's machines do not. But if sentient digital minds are created, they could exist in enormous numbers and be easy to ignore, since they have no faces and do not scream.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 12: Shaping Emerging Technologies to Prevent Future Suffering
They say“Good intentions are enough to do good.”
Short reply
Good intentions without knowledge can cause harm, and without power they change nothing. All three factors need to go together.
Go deeper: Vol. IX, ch. 13: The Influence Triad and Future Suffering
Volume X · Biases and Their Influence
They say“If it were that serious, everyone would be worried about it.”
Short reply
How many people are worried does not track how serious a problem is: problems with more victims tend to stir up less compassion, because of well-known biases.
Go deeper: Vol. X, ch. 1: Biases That Lead Us to Neglect the Problems with the Most Victims
They say“Everything in nature has a purpose; suffering is part of the plan.”
Short reply
That impression has a name: teleological bias and the just-world hypothesis. Seeing purpose where there are only natural processes leads us to justify suffering we would never accept for ourselves.
Go deeper: Vol. X, ch. 2: Biases That Incline Us to Neglect the Situation of Wild Animals
They say“It is very unlikely, so it is not worth worrying about.”
Short reply
Unlikely is not impossible. When the scenario is gigantic, even a small probability can produce an enormous expected disvalue.
Go deeper: Vol. X, ch. 3: Biases That Contribute to the Neglect of the Long Term and of S-Risks
They say“I am rational; I am not influenced by biases.”
Short reply
Thinking you are immune to biases is itself a bias listed in the chapter: the bias blind spot. We are all influenced, animal advocates included.
Go deeper: Vol. X, ch. 4: Cognitive Biases and Their Influence on Our Decisions That Affect Animals
They say“If plants feel, then it makes no difference.”
Short reply
People who say this usually accept the idea without any evidence and never apply it to anything else. That is a typical sign of motivated reasoning: the conclusion came before the argument.
Go deeper: Vol. X, ch. 5: Motivated Reasoning and Its Influence on the Evaluation of Arguments
They say“What matters is having good intentions; the rest is just details.”
Short reply
Good intentions do not protect us from biases when we choose strategies. And the form and order of a message change how convincing it is.
Volume XI · How Do the Various Ethical Theories Approach the Animal Question?
They say“Value is a matter of taste; you cannot argue about it.”
Short reply
We can draw clear distinctions: intrinsic and instrumental value, one respect versus the whole. Without them, ethical discussions turn into confusion.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 1: An Introduction to the Central Distinctions in Value Theory
They say“Animals do not have life plans, so they do not really have well-being.”
Short reply
On hedonism, on preference satisfaction, or on many pluralist theories, suffering, being prevented from acting, and dying young are harms. You do not need "plans" to be badly off.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 2: An Introduction to Theories of Well-Being
They say“Just add up everyone's good.”
Short reply
Adding up is one possible standard, but not the only one: many theories give special weight to the worse off or to equality. And all of them include animals when they are sentient.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 3: Assessing How Good/Bad a Situation Containing Several Individuals Is
They say“Good and bad are just opinions.”
Short reply
About many things, yes. But the badness of suffering for the one who suffers is experienced by everyone who suffers, and it is among the things we are most certain of.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 4: Value Judgments, Descriptions of Facts, Objectivity, and Subjectivity
They say“Defending animals depends on being a utilitarian.”
Short reply
The chapter shows that consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists can reach the same conclusion by different paths.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 5: Categories of Normative Ethical Theories
They say“Every ethical theory says something different about animals; there is no consensus.”
Short reply
There is disagreement about the foundations, but the chapter shows a strong convergence in the implications: equal consideration, opposition to exploitation, and support for helping wild animals.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 6: To What Extent Do Ethical Theories Agree About What We Owe Animals?
They say“Just add everything up and see what comes out ahead.”
Short reply
Adding up is one of the options (aggregative monism), but it has problems, such as ignoring the worse off. There are many alternatives, and each one needs to be justified.
Go deeper: Vol. XI, ch. 7: Weighing Criteria
Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics
They say“Using animals is natural and traditional.”
Short reply
From the fact that a behavior is natural or traditional, it does not follow that it is good, fair, or even acceptable.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 1: Attempts to Justify Disregarding Animals
They say“The greater harm should not always take priority, for example if the victim deserved it.”
Short reply
To deserve a harm, one has to be morally responsible and to have broken a rule, which is not the case with animals.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 2: The Case for Considering All Sentient Beings
They say“If plants are sentient, it makes no difference whether we eat animals or plants.”
Short reply
What follows is fruitarianism, not eating everything; just as, from the fact that both humans and animals can feel, what follows is veganism, not eating both.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 3: The Debate on the Sentience Criterion
They say“Eating them benefits them, because it brings them into existence, and one animal's death is canceled out by another's birth.”
Short reply
If that justified killing, parents could kill their children as long as they had others. Killing those who already exist is more serious than not producing new beings.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 4: The Harm of Death and the Reasons Against Killing
They say“Environmentalism and animal advocacy want the same thing; they only disagree about the means.”
Short reply
They have different goals. Animal advocacy values the well-being of sentient beings; environmentalism values nonsentient entities such as ecosystems and species.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 5: Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals
They say“Wild animals live well if we leave them alone.”
Short reply
Malnutrition, disease, parasites, weather, and predation are the norm. With litters in the thousands, almost all the young die early.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 6: The Situation of Wild Animals and the Proposal to Help Them
They say“The proposal would mean intervening in conflicts between animals, and that is wrong even if it improves the situation.”
Short reply
This assumes that the right action can have worse consequences, without showing why. And when humans are the victims of animals, no one argues this: it is speciesism.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 7: The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 1)
They say“We cannot help them all, so we should not help any.”
Short reply
We cannot help all humans either, and that does not mean helping none. For each animal helped, the help makes all the difference.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 8: The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 2)
They say“It is always better to tackle the most serious problem.”
Short reply
Not always: if the resource helps many more victims in another problem that is just as bad, or if the benefit is much larger, it may be worth prioritizing that one.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 9: What Criteria Should We Use to Help Efficiently?
They say“About 80 billion animals are killed for food each year.”
Short reply
That number includes only mammals and birds. With fish, shrimp, insects, and cochineal insects, the estimate is hundreds of times larger.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 10: Which Problems Affect the Largest Numbers of Animals?
They say“Only flesh-and-blood beings can truly suffer.”
Short reply
If sentient digital beings appear, disregarding them because they are made of a different material would be substratism, just as arbitrary as speciesism.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 11: Key Concepts in the Debate on the Importance of the Future
They say“You cannot prepare for a future you do not know.”
Short reply
In health care we do this all the time: we avoid risk factors without knowing how each person's life will go.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 12: Identifying Risk Factors for S-Risks
They say“It is better to bet everything on a single solution.”
Short reply
With so much uncertainty, betting everything on one scenario is risky. Broad strategies protect us against the unexpected.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 13: Longtermist Strategies: Broad and Targeted
They say“If the argument came from the other side, it must be wrong.”
Short reply
That tendency prevents serious debate. The table suggests evaluating arguments without knowing who proposed them.
Go deeper: Vol. XII, ch. 14: Changing Public Debate and Political Institutions
They say“There is only one right way to be an activist.”
Short reply
The table shows reasonable arguments on both sides of each debate. It may be better to have different people working on different strategies.