The Objection That Future Beings Are Merely Potential Beings

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IX, p. 27 of the PDF edition · English translation

3.1. The objection that we should care only about beings who already exist

We saw in the previous chapter that one of the most common objections to concern for the long-term future is based on the idea that future sentient beings are merely potential beings, that is, beings who do not yet exist and who may perhaps never come to exist. According to this objection, for this reason we should care only about beings who already exist.

Now consider the following causes:

• Spreading veganism.
• Pursuing regulations to make exploited animals suffer less.
• Protecting abandoned animals.
• Working to reduce the suffering of wild animals.

According to the objection, fighting for these causes makes sense because "they are about helping those who already exist." By contrast, the objection maintains, concern for the long-term future makes no sense, because it concerns beings who may never even come to exist.

This objection is sometimes raised especially in connection with concern about the possibility that nonorganic sentient beings may emerge in the future. According to the objection, we should not worry about this because it is something that may never even happen. Organic sentient beings, on the other hand, the objection concludes, already exist, and so we should care about them.

Is this a plausible objection? That is what we will discuss in this chapter.

3.2. Should we care only about sentient beings who already exist?

A first way to challenge this objection is to question the assumption that we should care only about the sentient beings who have existed up to now. For example, it could be pointed out that, if the reason for caring about already existing sentient beings is the possibility that our decisions may affect them positively or negatively, then we have the same reason to care about sentient beings who do not yet exist but who may come to exist (since our decisions can also affect them positively or negatively).

It could be objected that, if no one has a duty to bring new sentient beings into existence, but we do have a duty not to kill those who already exist, this is because we have duties only toward individuals (and not toward future possibilities of individuals). Thus, the objection concludes, we have no obligations regarding how our decisions affect future beings.

However, someone could agree that we have no obligations toward future possibilities of individuals and still disagree that we have no obligations regarding how our decisions affect future beings.

First, someone could hold that we have a duty to make the history of the world from now on contain as many sentient beings with positive lives as possible. This duty would not be a duty toward this or that future possibility of a sentient being, but rather an impersonal duty to bring about the best consequences²⁸.

Second, and more importantly, even if someone denies the duty to bring new sentient beings into existence, we could still have at least two kinds of duties toward future beings:

• Not to bring new sentient beings into existence to live lives full of suffering.
• If a future sentient being will necessarily exist, to try to make its life contain less suffering than it otherwise would.

Both duties could be recognized even by those who reject a duty to make future possibilities of sentient beings come to be realized²⁹. And, contrary to what might seem at first, as will be explained in the next section, these two duties are

the central focus of veganism, of attempts to make exploited animals suffer less, of the protection of abandoned animals, and also of the cause that aims to reduce the suffering of wild animals.

3.3. The struggle for animals is usually already a struggle for possible future beings

We saw that the objection under discussion assumes that causes such as veganism, attempts to make exploited animals suffer less, the protection of abandoned animals, and the cause that aims to reduce the suffering of wild animals make sense because "they are about sentient beings who already exist." Meanwhile, the objection maintains, concern for the long-term future makes no sense because "it is about beings who do not yet exist (and who may never come to exist)."

However, this is mistaken. Each of those causes is also mostly about consideration for future beings. We will look at this point for each of them below:

The central goal of veganism is not to help animals who already exist, but rather to reduce the number of animals who would be born to lead lives full of suffering and to be killed. Veganism is therefore a recognition of the duty not to bring new sentient beings into existence to live lives full of suffering.

Now consider attempts to regulate animal exploitation so that animals suffer less. For the sake of argument, let us set aside the discussion of whether these regulations really reduce the suffering of such animals. Suppose they do. Even if that is the case, by the time a regulation comes into force, the animals who will benefit from it are generally not those who had already been born when the regulation was proposed. Of course, there may be some exceptions, as in the case of cows and sows who are exploited for several years. However, the vast majority of animals are killed within days or, at most, months. Thus, activists who pursue such regulations are recognizing a duty, if a sentient being will exist in the future, to try to make its life contain less suffering than it otherwise would.

Let us now consider the case of protecting abandoned animals, such as dogs and cats. Again, some actions may be aimed at benefiting animals who already exist, as in the case of providing food, shelter, medical treatment, vaccination, or responsible adoption. However, one of the main focuses of advocacy in this area is precisely sterilization, aimed at preventing more animals from being born into such situations. This focus is, again, a recognition of the duty to prevent the birth of new sentient beings who would have lives full of suffering.

The same holds for the cause that aims to reduce the suffering of wild animals³⁰. Again, in this case too, various actions aim to help animals who already exist, such as vaccinating animals and treating diseases, helping animals in fires and other natural disasters, caring for orphaned animals, rescuing trapped animals, and programs for meeting animals' basic needs. However, the vast majority of wild animals' suffering and premature deaths results from their enormous reproductive rates³¹. Most species of animals in the wild reproduce in broods containing anywhere from thousands to many millions of offspring. For example, a single clutch of a common frog contains around 25,000 offspring³²; that of octopuses, hundreds of thousands³³; those of salmon, cod, and tuna, millions³⁴; and that of the ocean sunfish reaches 300 million³⁵. Terrestrial invertebrates can also lay hundreds, thousands, or even millions of eggs at a time³⁶. In periods of roughly stable population, the average number of survivors from each brood is only two offspring (that is, one descendant per parent). All the rest are usually born only to experience the suffering of dying, without any positive experience. For this reason, the main focus of the proposal to reduce the suffering and premature deaths of wild animals is also to make fewer individuals be born into such conditions. It is, therefore, also a recognition of the duty to prevent new sentient beings from coming into existence to have lives full of suffering.

Thus, in all these struggles, the main focus is either to try to make beings who will exist in the future suffer less, or to try to prevent new sentient beings from coming to

exist to have lives full of suffering. In short, the animal cause is usually already about future beings. If so, then it makes no sense to claim that we should not care about the long-term future just because such concern would be about beings who do not yet exist and who may never come to exist. In concern for the long-term future, the goal is likewise to try to make beings who will exist in the future suffer less and to try to prevent new beings from coming to exist to have lives full of suffering (and, additionally, depending on the strand, to bring new beings into existence to have positive lives). This holds whether we are talking about possible future organic or nonorganic sentient beings.