Which Goals Should We Prioritize in the Long Term?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IX, p. 45 of the PDF edition · English translation

6.1. Different goals someone might want to achieve in the long term

Two people who agree that we should try to have the best impact on history from now on could disagree about what "having the best impact" means, depending on what they prioritize in terms of values.

For example, some people might have in mind preventing the extinction of the human species. Others, by contrast, might aim to prevent the future from containing astronomical amounts of suffering for sentient beings.

These are just two examples of goals someone might want to achieve in the long term. But there are many more possible goals. Here are some examples:

(1) Preventing suffering. (2) Preventing premature deaths. (3) Providing positive experiences to the beings who will exist. (4) Bringing about as many beings with positive lives as possible over time. (5) Preventing the extinction of humanity. (6) Maximizing human potential. (7) Preventing the extinction of sentient life.

Someone may consider that all of these goals should be pursued. However, it is also possible to think that only some of them should be pursued (or even only one of them).

Moreover, someone may believe that several of these goals (or even all of them) should be pursued, but with different degrees of importance. Below we will look at some arguments for prioritizing the first two (preventing suffering and preventing premature deaths). As should be clear, this does not necessarily mean discarding the other goals, since focusing on one goal rather than another may be a matter of degree.

What, then, does the choice to focus on this or that goal depend on? Below we will look at this discussion with respect to the focus on preventing suffering and, after that, we will discuss the focus on preventing premature deaths.

6.2. What does the focus on preventing suffering depend on?

6.2.1. Calculating how much to focus on preventing suffering

Consider the following questions:

(1) Should we place greater focus on preventing suffering? (2) If so, to what extent?

The answer to these questions depends on the answers we give to two other questions:

(1) Weight: what weight should we give to the goal of preventing suffering, compared with other goals? (2) Expectation: how optimistic or pessimistic should we be about the future?

The relationship between these two factors (weight and expectation) works as follows:

• The more optimistic someone is about the future, the more weight they have to give to the goal of reducing suffering in order to conclude that they should prioritize preventing suffering.
• Analogously, the more someone thinks the future has the potential to contain vast amounts of suffering, the less they need to have reducing suffering as their main goal in order to conclude that they should prioritize it.

One way to measure this is with the following formula⁵²:

• Degree of focus on suffering (DFS): WS x ES.
• WS (Weight of the goal of preventing suffering): the more we value preventing suffering

relative to other goals, the higher the WS.

• ES (Expectation of suffering): the more we think the future may be full of suffering, the higher the ES.

The higher the DFS result, whether because we give greater weight to preventing suffering (high WS) and/or because we are pessimistic about the future (high ES), the more we will focus on preventing suffering.

6.2.2. Applying the same reasoning to other goals

Although we have spoken above only of the focus on preventing suffering, the same reasoning applies to any other goal. It is always possible to multiply the weight we give to a goal by how much we expect that what it aims to prevent or achieve will occur.

For example, to know how much to focus on preventing premature deaths, we could multiply the weight we give to this goal compared with other goals by how many premature deaths we expect the future will probably contain.

Both examples above concerned focuses on preventing negative things (suffering and death). When the focus is on pursuing positive things (for example, providing positive experiences to sentient beings), although the weight axis remains the same (that is, the more weight we give to the goal of providing positive lives, the more we will focus on that goal), the expectation axis works the other way around (for example, the less we expect the future to contain positive experiences anyway, the more we will focus on that goal).

6.3. Who could accept the focus on preventing suffering?

One might think that, to accept a focus on preventing suffering⁵³, one must have the prevention of suffering as one's only concern (or, at least, regard the prevention of suffering as a trump over any other goal). However, as is evident from the calculation above, this is not so. The focus on preventing suffering can be accepted by a much larger number of views. Listed below are the views that can accept this

focus.

(1) People whose only goal is to prevent suffering.

(2) People who also pursue other goals, but for whom preventing suffering is a trump. For these people, no matter how large the gain in other goals from the use of a certain resource, using it to prevent suffering would always take priority.

(3) People who also accept other goals, but for whom preventing suffering carries greater weight (even if it is not a trump). Unlike the people in item 2, for these people the balance may tip toward focusing on other goals if the gain in them from the use of a certain resource is large enough. However, in most situations these people would tend to focus on preventing suffering (especially if they are pessimistic about the future).

(4) People who give equal weight to other goals may prioritize preventing suffering if they are pessimistic about the future.

(5) People who give greater weight to other goals may still recognize that reducing suffering is an important goal (and may even prioritize it, depending on how pessimistic they are about the future).

6.4. Some arguments for giving greater weight to the goal of preventing suffering

Below we will look at four arguments that have been offered for giving greater weight to the goal of preventing suffering compared with the goal of providing positive experiences⁵⁴. It is important to note that these arguments do not compare the goal of preventing suffering with other goals that also concern preventing something negative (such as the goal of preventing premature death, which we will address in section 6.6). Here are the four arguments.

6.4.1. The guarantee example (first version)

Imagine that we can guarantee one of these two things, but not both:

• If we are in extreme suffering, we will move to moderate suffering.
• If we are in moderate pleasure, we will move to extreme pleasure.

It seems more important to guarantee the first. This suggests that reducing suffering is more important than increasing pleasure.

6.4.2. The guarantee example (second version)

Imagine that we can guarantee one of these two things, but not both:

• If we are in moderate suffering, we will not move to extreme suffering.
• If we are in extreme pleasure, we will not move to moderate pleasure.

Again, it seems more important to guarantee the first. This suggests that preventing increases in suffering is more important than preventing decreases in pleasure.

6.4.3. The torture example

When someone is subjected to torture, they may end up turning against their loved ones or other innocents, betraying causes they believe in, or giving up their freedom or even their life. Yet many of these people would not do these same things in exchange for enormous pleasure. This suggests that suffering is far more unbearable than the lack of pleasure.

6.4.4. The argument that preventing suffering better maximizes the positive balance

This last argument is not an argument for giving greater weight to preventing suffering, but it suggests that prioritizing the prevention of suffering is more efficient for achieving the goal of maximizing the total positive balance (that is, the total aggregate sum of pleasure minus suffering).

There are views according to which an additional unit of well-being has the same degree of importance, whether it is an increase in the well-being of someone who is suffering or of someone who is already well off⁵⁵. According to these views, what we should do is try to maximize the total positive balance.

However, using a given amount of resources to improve the situation of those who are suffering is usually more efficient for maximizing the total positive balance⁵⁶. For example, if someone has only five kilos of rice, giving them an additional kilo will make a more positive difference to their well-being than giving it to someone who already has, say, twenty kilos of rice.

Thus, the worse someone's situation, the more an additional unit of resources makes a positive difference to their well-being. Therefore, even someone who gives equal weight to producing what is positive (compared with preventing suffering) still has reasons to prioritize preventing suffering, since this would be more efficient for maximizing the total balance.

6.5. How pessimistic about the future do we need to be in order to focus on suffering?

We will now discuss some arguments holding that we should be optimistic about the future⁵⁷. We will also see that, in order to prioritize preventing suffering, we do not need to be highly pessimistic about the future (we need only recognize that the possibility of the future containing vast amounts of suffering is not negligible).

6.5.1. The argument that technology will make causing suffering unnecessary

It is sometimes claimed that technology will make it easy to achieve what people want without needing to cause suffering. The idea is that, if people care at least a little about avoiding causing suffering, and the cost of avoiding it is low, they will avoid it. One example is the belief that cell-based meat will make animal exploitation obsolete, even if people do not care much about animals.

A first possible way to challenge this argument is to point out that perhaps the consideration most of these people give to animals is so low that they may not

be willing to pay the price of preventing animals' suffering, even if that price is minimal. For example, imagine that a point is reached at which cell-based meat is only slightly more expensive than conventional meat. Perhaps many people will not be willing to pay a few cents more for cultivated meat. And, even if cultivated meat becomes cheaper than conventional meat, perhaps many people will insist that they prefer the "original product." In short, the fact that someone does not aim at suffering for its own sake does not guarantee that they will try to prevent suffering, since the degree of moral consideration they give to those affected by their decisions may be very low, even if they do not aim at these victims' suffering.

Another way to respond to this argument is to point out that, even if it makes sense with respect to practices that produce suffering where the suffering is not aimed at for its own sake (such as the consumption of animals), technology can also increase the power of individuals whose goal is to cause suffering to others. Therefore, the possibility that technology may reduce the risks of unintended suffering is not enough for us to be optimistic about the future, especially since individuals with malevolent traits tend to seek and attain positions of power⁵⁸.

6.5.2. The argument that things tend to get better

Another argument for optimism about the future is the claim that things have tended to get better over the last few centuries: a decline in violence, improvements in health such as cures for diseases, increased life expectancy, and so on.

However, this judgment only makes sense from an anthropocentric point of view. For example, there has been a gigantic increase in the number of exploited animals since the industrial revolution. This number continues to increase greatly, especially in the case of aquatic animals and invertebrates.

As for the suffering of wild animals, it is uncertain whether it has increased or decreased over time. For example, replacing green areas with urban development usually causes suffering and death to the animals who live there but, given the way natural processes typically affect animals⁵⁹, urbanization also prevents a gigantic

number of animals from being born only to suffer in such places⁶⁰.

The point is this: taking into account all the sentient beings affected, we do not know whether things are getting worse or better overall.

6.5.3. The probability of s-risks is not negligible, and that is enough

To focus strongly on preventing suffering, we do not need a pessimistic view of the future. It is enough for us to believe that the probability of the future containing vast amounts of suffering is not negligible. This probability is far from negligible for three reasons⁶¹:

(1) Astronomical-scale suffering in the future could arise in many ways, and the future is very hard to predict. The probability that some of these ways will come about (including some we do not even envision today) is not negligible.

(2) Unless there is destabilization at a global level, technology is likely to keep developing. Those who hold power usually have insufficient (or even no) consideration for those affected by their decisions.

(3) So far, technologies have given us everything from cures for diseases to chemical weapons, nuclear bombs, and factory farming. So there is no guarantee that future developments will be used beneficially.

This has been a brief summary of the debate about focusing on the goal of preventing suffering. Next we will discuss the goal of preventing premature deaths.

6.6. The goal of preventing premature deaths

The discussion of preventing harm to future sentient beings usually revolves around the goal of preventing suffering. This is because several of the leading authors on this question

are also proponents of ethical theories focused on preventing suffering⁶². However, another possible goal is preventing premature deaths. What reasons are there in favor of this goal? How should it be weighed against the goal of preventing suffering? This is what we will discuss below.

6.6.1. How fortunate or unfortunate was someone in the life they had?

One of the reasons for thinking that preventing premature deaths is an important goal has to do with assessing how fortunate or unfortunate someone was in the life they had⁶³. What factors should we base such an assessment on?

A first factor that immediately comes to mind is to examine how much suffering the life in question contained. This is certainly a relevant factor. However, the following example suggests that it is not the only relevant factor:

Suppose we could measure the amount of suffering someone had during their life. This would be obtained by adding up the moments of suffering and multiplying them by the intensity of the suffering at each moment (with "s" as the unit for measuring suffering). Imagine that we assessed the lives of Ana and Bia and obtained the following result:

• Ana had 200,000s
• Bia had 400,000s.

If we look only at suffering, we will say that Bia was more unfortunate in the life she had than Ana. However, imagine that Ana's suffering accounted for more than 95% of the experiences she had during her whole life, whereas Bia's life, despite containing twice as much suffering, had many more positive experiences, to the point that Bia's suffering did not even reach 50% of the total experiences she had during her life.

This example suggests that, in order to assess how fortunate or unfortunate someone was in the life they had, it is important to take into account not only the amount of suffering they experienced but also the amount of positive experiences. In other words, if the

aim is to assess how good or bad a life was for the one who lived it, one has to take into account both the negative and the positive events, not just the negative ones.

However, it can be misleading to rely on the proportion between these two factors. What matters is the quantity of these events (something that depends on how long someone lived). To make this point clearer, consider the following example.

Imagine that, when we assess the experiences Clara and Dora had during their lives, we find the following, in terms of proportion:

• Clara: 70% positive experiences and 30% negative experiences
• Dora: 60% positive experiences and 40% negative experiences

If we rely only on proportion, we will say that Clara was more fortunate in the life she had than Dora. However, imagine that Clara lived 20 years and Dora lived 80. Then Clara's 70% of positive experiences amounts to far fewer than Dora's 60% of positive experiences. This suggests that the quantity of positive and negative experiences (something that depends on how much time someone lived) is relevant, not only the proportion between positive and negative events.

We are now in a position to understand why premature deaths are events we have strong reasons to prevent: the more premature the death, the less opportunity there is for positive experiences to occur. Of course, it only makes sense to want someone to have more lifetime if there is a possibility that this life will be at least minimally meaningful. For this reason, the goal of preventing suffering is always an extremely important goal. However, it also makes sense to say that, if there is a possibility of a life being meaningful, premature death is a factor that contributes to someone being highly unfortunate in the life they had⁶⁴.

6.6.2. Weighing the goal of preventing suffering against the goal of preventing death

We have seen that the goal of preventing deaths is directly related to the goal of providing

positive events. In section 6.4 we saw some examples suggesting that preventing suffering carries greater weight than obtaining positive experiences. However, it is important to note that those examples do not suggest that the goal of preventing suffering is a trump, since, depending on how much smaller the suffering is and how much greater the positive experience is, we might think it worth going through the suffering to attain the positive experience (learning to play a musical instrument is one example).

Moreover, the examples in section 6.4 weighed these two goals in situations that refer only to a given moment, asking us to imagine whether we would rather guarantee avoiding suffering or obtaining pleasure. Once we bring the time factor into the equation (which is directly related to preventing death), the weight of the goals of preventing suffering and obtaining positive experiences becomes more uncertain. Let us look at two examples of this.

• There are situations in which the suffering we would experience if we stayed alive is so great that we believe it is not worth continuing to live. This is the case, for example, of many terminally ill patients who ask to die in order to have their suffering relieved⁶⁵.
• On the other hand, there are situations in which we believe it is worth facing considerable (sometimes even very great) suffering if that is necessary to save our life (provided, of course, that there is a possibility of this life being at least minimally meaningful from then on).

These cases suggest that neither of these two goals (preventing suffering and preventing death) has priority over the other in all situations. They do suggest, however, that both goals are very important.

6.7. Conclusion

There are several goals someone might want to achieve in terms of having the best long-term impact. If the arguments we have seen make sense, then even though there may be several goals worth pursuing, there are reasons to give extra weight to the goals of preventing suffering and preventing the premature deaths of sentient beings.