Advanced level

If we really care about animals, we will not limit our concern to harms caused by humans: for the animal, it makes no difference whether the harm comes from a human or from hunger, disease, and natural disasters.

Saying that natural harms are not a matter of ethics because no one can hold nature responsible is a mistake: the question is about what we ought to do; even saying that helping is optional is already an ethical answer.

In nature, hunger, disease, parasites, cold, and predation are the rule; most species have enormous numbers of offspring, almost all of whom die soon after birth. The number of victims makes even exploitation look small.

The idea that the suffering of wild animals matters only if it affects humans or environmentalist goals is speciesist: whatever explains why the good of humans matters in itself implies that the good of any sentient being also matters, and to the same degree.

Three arguments ground helping: the argument from the existence of reasons (harm is bad whatever its origin), the argument from the strength of reasons (which depends on magnitude), and the argument from the weight of the criterion (even giving more weight to human-caused harms, the scale of natural harms would still give strong reasons).

The accusation of "playing God" does not hold up: we accept many interventions in nature to benefit humans or achieve environmentalist goals; those who make it are not against intervening, but against benefiting animals.

The proposal to help wild animals is not anthropocentric: being proposed by humans does not make it human-centered; animals have no interest in having their suffering maximized so that nature can take its course.

"The less human influence, the better" does not hold up: if the reason is the good of animals, each case must be evaluated on its own; if it is reducing influence even when that is worse for them, it remains to be shown why influence would be wrong in itself.

Calling the proposal to help wild animals "welfarist" confuses concern for well-being with regulating exploitation; whatever one's position on regulation, it does not prevent accepting the proposal.

Helping wild animals does not violate their freedom: it is the condition for them to exercise it, since they need to be alive and free from extreme suffering; restricting them at one moment (to vaccinate them) can secure their freedom later.

The accusation that helping would create dependence does not apply to most interventions (which reduce births), does not take away skills animals already have, and, even if it did create dependence, it would still be better than suffering more and dying soon.

Helping would only be paternalistic if animals preferred not to be helped when facing hunger, disease, or fire, which is not the case; and even if it were paternalism, it would be the justified kind, like the kind we apply to children.

Suffering has instrumental value only when it helps the individual increase their well-being, which does not happen for most wild animals; and even when it does, it is better to get the benefit without the suffering, as with anesthesia.

It is the idea that humans should not intervene in nature that sees them as separate from it; if we are part of nature, our actions are natural too, and no one accepts for themselves the thesis that they should not protect themselves from natural processes.

Natural suffering is not neutral just because nature is not evil or responsible: what gives us reasons to prevent it is how bad it is for the one who suffers, as in the case of a child who hurts someone without being to blame.

Nature being indifferent to suffering does not justify our being indifferent: ecosystems are also indifferent to human suffering; taking nature as a model means leaping from how things are to how they ought to be.

The idea that respecting each animal's "nature" requires leaving wild animals to fend for themselves fails the impartiality test: if respecting means benefiting, leaving them to their fate harms them; if it does not, there is no reason for it to count for more than preventing harm.

Intervening in conflicts between animals is not absurd: we already intervene in predation on a large scale to protect humans, exploited animals, and environmental goals; the question is whether and how to do it for the good of the animals, without making things worse.

Describing ecosystems is the job of ecology; deciding which goals to pursue (the good of sentient beings or environmentalist values) is the job of ethics. Those who say "just apply ecology" disguise a moral position as a neutral description.

In most cases, helping wild animals does not conflict with environmentalist goals, and some forms of help achieve both; when there is a conflict, there are reasons to prioritize sentient beings, as environmentalists themselves already do in the human case.

We are not responsible only for harms caused by humans: moral responsibility falls on decisions that determine outcomes, and the excuses ("we did not cause it," "it would exist without us," "we have no intention," "we are not close to them") do not hold up.

The arguments for prioritizing domesticated animals (historical debt, degree of dependence) do not justify denying help to wild animals: priority depends on the seriousness of the situation and the number of victims, and the dependence criterion even favors wild animals.

Refusing to help so that "the fittest genes prevail" should be rejected: genes that are efficient at being passed on do not necessarily benefit individuals, many forms of help do not interfere with this, and the same reasoning applied to humans would be abhorrent.

The fear of making things worse and the appeal to ecological balance do not justify not helping: if we cannot predict the long term, we also do not know that not helping is better; the answer is more research, and balance can coexist with enormous suffering.

Not being able to help everyone is no reason to help no one, and what matters is the actual amount of benefit, not the percentage of the problem solved; that is why focusing on wild animals can be very effective.

Helping wild animals already happens: there is vaccination (for example, against rabies), treatment of diseases (probiotics against mange and white-nose syndrome), rescues during disasters, and care for orphans; much more could be done.

Welfare biology would be an interdisciplinary field devoted to studying wild animals as sentient individuals, and not just as members of species; ideological obstacles, above all speciesism, hold back its development.

Technologies such as individual identification of insects, population modeling, thermal imaging, drones, and data analysis can help us understand and improve the well-being of animals in the wild, and their use will expand as awareness grows.

The objection that animals have a right not to be sterilized fails: there are other forms of help, respecting this supposed right would cause far more suffering to others, and the sterilization of dogs and cats is already widely accepted by animal advocates.

It is false that the proposal to prevent natural harms would forbid treating parasitism: nonsentient parasites are not harmed by death, the lives of many sentient ones would not be meaningful, and preventing new cases is not the same as killing.

The chapter examines the arguments about predation and concludes that there are good reasons to reduce it in the world, as long as doing so does not bring worse consequences, and that certain interventions, such as reducing primary productivity, would probably have a positive net result.

Saying that we cannot judge when a life is worth living does not justify not intervening: there are clear cases (extreme suffering and almost immediate death), not helping also presupposes judgments, and improving existing lives is compatible with preventing births.

The "prolonging the agony" argument fails: helping usually reduces suffering and extends life at the same time, since whatever causes suffering usually also causes death; and many interventions only prevent births.

Even if the balance of life in nature were positive (the pleasure of a few outweighing the suffering of many), the reasons to reduce suffering would not diminish; and even for those who look only at the balance, helping those who are worst off is the most efficient way to increase it.

Preventing natural harms does not mean rejecting veganism: veganism reduces the victims of exploitation and agriculture (first-degree harms), and its greatest potential lies in the ideal of consideration for all sentient beings that it helps to spread.

The chapter simulates the debate, among advocates for wild animals themselves, about "altruistic killing" (destroying habitats to reduce suffering), with arguments, replies, and rejoinders, and discusses who bears the burden of proof.

Expanding or restoring nature tends to increase the number of animals born to suffer; the justifications (future generations, environmental values, public acceptance, human extinction) are not enough, and there are ways to address the climate crisis without creating new habitats.

S-risks are risks of future suffering on a scale greater than all the suffering that has ever existed; they differ from x-risks (human extinction), their seriousness is severity times probability, and they can arise incidentally, agentially, or naturally.

Temporal impartiality means giving the same weight to a given suffering no matter when it happens; temporal bias and the idea that future beings are merely potential do not justify disregarding them. Concern for the future must reject speciesism, and vice versa.

Even those who deny a duty to bring new beings into existence have duties toward future beings, such as not causing them suffering; and the struggle for animals is already, in general, about future beings: those who would be born to suffer in exploitation.

Longtermism can be a goal (having the best impact on all of history) or a practical focus (acting with the long term in mind); there are good reasons for the practical focus, and even those who prioritize the present have reasons to accept the goal.

There are reasons to focus more on s-risks than on x-risks: attempts to justify focusing on x-risks because humanity is "essential" or because it attracts more resources tend to be speciesist; but one goal does not rule out the other.

Among the possible long-term goals, there are reasons to give extra weight to preventing suffering (and premature deaths): several theories accept this focus, and you do not need to be very pessimistic about the future to adopt it.

Focusing on s-risks does not mean focusing on a few specific scenarios: future suffering may come from the sum of many risks; collectively, we should cover a broad range, even if each person specializes.

Even without predicting the future in detail, we can identify risk factors for s-risks: advanced technology, aversion to technology, disregard for nonhumans, lacking or ineffective efforts, polarization, and lack of security against malevolent agents.

Broad strategies aim for a good impact in almost every scenario; targeted ones aim for a large impact in specific scenarios. Broad examples: increasing consideration for sentient beings; targeted examples: preventing new forms of exploitation, establishing welfare biology, aligning AI in a non-anthropocentric way.

How we will affect future beings is rarely discussed; promoting consideration for all sentient beings is central to preventing future suffering, but there are risks in how it is done, and we do not yet know the most effective way; we need to keep an open mind.

Dysfunctional politics increases s-risks; to improve it, we should reduce tribalism, raise the standard of debate (discussing arguments, not people; intellectual honesty), adopt broad-range approaches, protect democracy, and seek representation for all sentient beings.

Emerging technologies could multiply suffering: the chapter discusses shaping artificial intelligence with a focus on s-risks, avoiding indirect risks from AI, managing space colonization, and the risk of creating new forms of sentience.

The influence triad (an agent's intention, knowledge, and power) helps us assess the suffering that may result from decisions: agents who want to cause harm or are indifferent, and who have a lot of power, are the most dangerous; wanting to do good without knowledge or without power tends to be ineffective.

Value theory investigates what is good or bad, better or worse; it distinguishes intrinsic value from instrumental value, "better than" from "best of all," and what is good in a certain respect from what is good all things considered.

Theories of well-being investigate what makes someone's life go well (experiences, preferences, objective goods, or combinations of these); despite their disagreements, there is a minimal convergence: animals are seriously harmed in the situations they live in.

Evaluating a situation involving many individuals involves several aspects (total well-being, priority to the worse off, equality, sufficiency, desert), which can be seen as having intrinsic or instrumental value, and which sometimes conflict.

Value judgments are not necessarily subjective in the sense of "having no truth": every being who suffers experiences suffering as bad in itself; some things cannot be explained without their value, and we must not confuse value with ethics, or "everyone" with "some people."

Normative theories fall into consequentialism, deontology, and character-centered ethics, which differ in their focal point (consequences, rules, or character traits); even so, they converge a great deal, including on equal consideration for sentient beings.

Utilitarianism, maximin, prioritarianism, egalitarianism, sufficientarianism, their negative versions, pluralist approaches, Kantianism, discourse ethics, contractualism, and character ethics all imply, for different reasons, equal consideration for sentient beings, the rejection of exploitation, and reasons to help wild animals.

When a situation is good in one respect and bad in another, there are many ways to weigh the criteria: incommensurability, monism, pluralism with equal weights, trumps, fixed or variable weights, maximin, sufficiency, hybrid approaches, indeterminacy, and probabilistic aggregation, each with its own advantages and problems.