Volume VII · Ethics and the Situation of Wild Animals · chapter 1
What Should We Do About Animals Living in the Wild?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
If we really care about animals, we will not limit our concern to harms caused by humans: for the animal, it makes no difference whether the harm comes from a human or from hunger, disease, and natural disasters.
If a dog is hungry, it does not matter whether someone took his food away or he got lost in the rain: he is just as hungry either way. People who love animals want to help in both cases.
It would be strange for someone to say: "I care about my friend, but only if a human hurts him; if it is an illness, that is not my problem."
- P1 We have reasons to prevent harms because they are bad for those who suffer them, and to seek benefits because they are good for them.
- P2 The strength of these reasons depends on the size of the harm or benefit, not on whether its origin is human or natural.
- P3 Wild animals suffer enormous harms from natural processes.
- C So we have strong reasons to try to prevent and reduce these natural harms.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “With wild animals, all we need to do is leave them alone.”
Answer Leaving them alone does not protect them from hunger, disease, and disasters. If what matters is their good, the origin of the harm does not change our reason to help.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 8 of the PDF edition · English translation
A common belief is that, as far as animals living in the wild are concerned, we should simply stop harming them and “leave them alone,” and help them only if they are harmed directly or indirectly by human practices. When animals are victims of natural processes such as natural disasters, hunger, thirst, and disease, according to this position we should “let nature take its course.”
This position has been increasingly challenged in recent years1. One possible challenge is to accuse it of speciesism, in the sense of maintaining an arbitrary moral standard depending on whether the victims are human or nonhuman, since when humans are victims of hunger, thirst, disease, and natural disasters, its proponents do not say “let nature take its course.”
Another challenge holds that limiting for animals to harms resulting from human practices is incompatible with truly caring about the good of animals. For example, it would be very strange to say, “I care about this person's good, but I would only save her from a fire caused by humans; in a naturally caused fire, I would let her burn to death.” In other words, the argument is that if we truly care about animals (and not about an ideal of supposed “human purity” – not doing harm but letting harm occur), we will hold that they should be helped regardless of whether they are victims of human practices or of .
At other times, it is acknowledged that we have reasons to prevent animals from being harmed by natural harms, but it is argued that these reasons are weaker than when the harms result from human practices. Here, however, the criticism would be the same: if we truly care about the good of the victims, and not about an ideal of “human purity,” our criterion for determining priority will be based on the magnitude of the harm, not on the origin of the harm. That is, we will prioritize preventing the most serious harms, regardless of whether they result from human practices or from natural processes.
These, in short, are the central arguments of the proposal to help animals who are victims of natural processes. In the rest of this book, we will address the debate surrounding this proposal.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
What common belief does the chapter question?
According to the central argument, the strength of our reasons to help depends on...
Food for thought
Would you help an animal injured by a car? And one injured by a storm? Why would there be a difference?
Author’s notes 1
Sources cited in this text 17
The full list for the volume is in the Volume VII references.
- BONNARDEL, Y. Contra o apartheid das espécies. Les cahiers antispécistes, v. 14, 1996.
- COWEN, T. Policing nature. Environmental Ethics, v. 25, p. 169-182, 2003.
- CUNHA, L. C. Razões para ajudar: o sofrimento dos animais selvagens e suas implicações éticas. Curitiba: Appris, 2022.
- CUNHA, L. C. Vítimas da natureza: implicações éticas dos danos que os ani- mais não humanos padecem em decorrência dos processos naturais. 2018. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) – Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis, 2018.
- FARIA, C. Animal Ethics Goes Wild: The Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2016.
- FARIA, C.; PAEZ, E. (orgs). Animals in Need: the Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3. n. 1, 2015a.
- FARIA, C.; PAEZ, E. (orgs). Animals in Need: the Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3. n. 2, 2015b.
- FINK, C. The Predation Argument. Between the Species, v. 13. n. 5, p. 1-15, 2005.
- HORTA, O. Animal Suffering in Nature: The Case for Intervention. Environmental Ethics, n.39, 2017. p .261–79.
- HORTA, O. Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild. Télos, v. 17, p. 73-88, 2010.
- JOHANNSEN, K. Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering. Abingdon: Routledge, 2020.
- MANNINO, A. Humanitarian Intervention in Nature: Crucial Questions and Probable Answers. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3, n. 1, p. 109-120, 2015.
- MCMAHAN, J. The Moral Problem of Predation. In: CHIGNELL, A.; CUNEO, T.; HALTEMAN, M. C. (org.). Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments About the Ethics of Eating. London: Routledge, 2015. p. 268-294.
- PEARCE, D. A Welfare State for Elephants? A Case Study of Compassionate Stewardship. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3, n. 2, p. 153-164, 2015.
- SAPONTZIS, S. F. Predation. Ethics and Animals, v. 5, p. 27-38, 1984.
- TOMASIK, B. The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3, n. 2. p. 133-152, 2015a.
- TORRES ALDAVE, M. The Case for Intervention in Nature on Behalf of Animals. A Critical Review of the Main Arguments against Intervention. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3, n. 1, p. 33-49, 2015.
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