Questão
de Ética PT

The collection

Full table of contents

All 186 chapters and their sections, as in the table of contents of each volume.

I Discussing Speciesism 15 chapters
  1. 1. An Overview of the Debate on the Moral Consideration of Animals
    1. 1.1. Views according to which nonhuman animals do not matter in themselves
    2. 1.2. Views that give consideration to animals, but to a lesser degree
    3. 1.3. Views that give equal consideration to all sentient beings
    4. 1.4. Speciesism and anthropocentrism
  2. 2. Is Species What Matters?
    1. 2.1. A double standard
    2. 2.2. Do humans matter more simply because they are human?
    3. 2.3. Should each of us favor members of our own species?
  3. 3. Could Metaphysical Characteristics Justify Speciesism?
    1. 3.1. The appeal to metaphysical characteristics
    2. 3.2. Problems with the appeal to metaphysical characteristics
  4. 4. Could the Possession of Capacities or Relationships Justify Speciesism?
    1. 4.1. The appeal to capacities
    2. 4.2. The appeal to relationships
    3. 4.3. Problems common to all these arguments
  5. 5. Could Humans' Supposed Potential Justify Speciesism?
    1. 5.1. The appeal to potential
    2. 5.2. Problems with the appeal to potential
  6. 6. Is What Matters Belonging to the Same Species as Those Who Have Certain Capacities?
    1. 6.1. The appeal to the group
    2. 6.2. Problems with the appeal to the group
    3. 6.3. The appeal to a combination of the species criterion and the capacities/relationships criterion
  7. 7. If Species Are Not a Social Construct, Is Speciesism Justified?
    1. 7.1. The appeal to the distinction between the biological and the socially constructed
    2. 7.2. Problems with the appeal to biological distinctions
  8. 8. If Speciesism Is Natural, Is Speciesism Justified?
    1. 8.1. The appeal to nature
    2. 8.2. Problems with the appeal to nature
  9. 9. Does the Fact That Speciesist Practices Are Traditions Show That We Should Respect Them?
    1. 9.1. A double standard depending on the victims' species
    2. 9.2. The appeal to tradition
    3. 9.3. The appeal to tradition could not justify anthropocentrism
    4. 9.4. Not every tradition is just
    5. 9.5. Discussing the defenses of the claim that traditions should be respected
    6. 9.6. Conclusion
  10. 10. If Ethics Is a Human Activity, Is It Just to Disregard Animals?
    1. 10.1. The appeal to ethics as a human activity
    2. 10.2. Is every human capable of moral agency?
    3. 10.3. Do the beneficiaries of a practice need to be capable of engaging in it?
    4. 10.4. Circularity
  11. 11. If Ethics Is an Invention, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
    1. 11.1. The claim that ethics is an invention
    2. 11.2. If an activity is an invention, is it necessarily arbitrary?
  12. 12. If Ethics Was Invented for Self-Protection, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
    1. 12.1. The appeal to self-interest
    2. 12.2. Could the appeal to self-interest justify speciesism?
    3. 12.3. Is the claim about ethics and self-interest correct?
    4. 12.4. The appeal to the origin of ethics
  13. 13. Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Authorities
    1. 13.1. A moral double standard
    2. 13.2. The appeal to authorities
    3. 13.3. How not to respond
    4. 13.4. The Euthyphro dilemma
    5. 13.5. The possible answers to the dilemma do not support the appeal to authority
    6. 13.6. It doesn't matter who said it: what matters is assessing the reasons
  14. 14. The Appeal to Differentiated Degrees of Moral Status
    1. 14.1. The Magnitude Thesis
    2. 14.2. The appeal to degrees of moral status
    3. 14.3. Is it just to assign differentiated degrees of moral status?
  15. 15. Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Metaethics
    1. 15.1. When metaethical claims are disguised normative claims
    2. 15.2. A moral double standard depending on the victims' species
    3. 15.3. When does the claim that there is no right/wrong in ethics come up?
    4. 15.4. Could metaethical claims justify positions in ethics?
II Considering Sentient Beings 13 chapters
  1. 1. What Is Relevant to Knowing to Whom We Owe Consideration?
    1. 1.1. A double standard
    2. 1.2. Attempts to justify anthropocentric speciesism
    3. 1.3. The argument from relevance
    4. 1.4. What is relevant for consideration and what is relevant for responsibility
  2. 2. What Is the Argument from Species Overlap?
  3. 3. What Is Sentience and Why Does It Matter?
  4. 4. Which Beings Are Sentient?
    1. 4.1. Why is it important to know which beings are sentient?
    2. 4.2. The presence of a centralized nervous system
    3. 4.3. Other physiological indicators
    4. 4.4. Behavior
    5. 4.5. Evolutionary advantage
    6. 4.6. What is the minimum degree of centralization?
    7. 4.7. The possibility of non-organic sentience
  5. 5. Why Equal Consideration?
    1. 5.1. Hierarchical views
    2. 5.2. The principle of equal consideration
    3. 5.3. Violations of the principle of equal consideration
    4. 5.4. Speciesism is not limited to exploitation
    5. 5.5. Speciesism is not limited to total disregard
    6. 5.6. Speciesism is not limited to anthropocentric speciesism
    7. 5.7. Other little-noticed forms of discrimination
  6. 6. Could Questions of Desert Justify Speciesism?
    1. 6.1. The principle of equal consideration
    2. 6.2. Questions of desert
    3. 6.3. The idea of desert depends on equal consideration
    4. 6.4. Two dimensions of roles in morality
  7. 7. Is the Rejection of Speciesism Compatible with Only One View of Ethics?
    1. 7.1. To reject speciesism, is it necessary to subscribe to a specific ethical theory?
    2. 7.2. The rejection of speciesism is compatible with various views of ethics
    3. 7.3. An example with three different ethical theories
  8. 8. If We Reject Speciesism, How Will We Decide Questions of Priority?
  9. 9. But Aren't Humans Capable of Suffering to a Greater Degree?
  10. 10. What Would We Decide Under Conditions of Impartiality?
    1. 10.1. The impartiality test
    2. 10.2. Does the impartiality test apply to our decisions that affect animals?
    3. 10.3. Impartially considering our decisions that affect animals
    4. 10.4. Conclusion
  11. 11. Testing Whether an Attitude Is Speciesist
  12. 12. How Much Importance Should We Give to the Situation of Animals?
  13. 13. Uncertainty About Sentience and the Benefit of the Doubt
    1. 13.1. Moral consideration and uncertainty about whether a being is sentient
    2. 13.2. The skeptical objection
    3. 13.3. The principle of the benefit of the doubt
    4. 13.4. Degrees of consideration according to the degree of confidence about sentience?
    5. 13.5. Conclusion
III Animals and the Harm of Death 13 chapters
  1. 1. What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of?
    1. 1.1. Introduction
    2. 1.2. The view that death is not a harm
    3. 1.3. Death as a harm by preventing what is positive
    4. 1.4. The magnitude of the harm of death and the moment at which it occurs
    5. 1.5. Conclusion
  2. 2. Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death
    1. 2.1. Views that deny that animals are harmed by death
    2. 2.2. To be harmed by death, must one understand what death is?
    3. 2.3. For death to be a harm, must it frustrate a future-oriented desire?
    4. 2.4. When are sentient beings harmed by death (and when are they not)?
  3. 3. Objections to the Account of the Harm of Death as the Prevention of What Is Positive
    1. 3.1. The epistemological problem
    2. 3.2. The temporal asymmetry objection
    3. 3.3. The objection from potential beings
  4. 4. Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
  5. 5. How Can We Assess How Much Someone Is Harmed by Death?
    1. 5.1. The magnitude of the harm of death: future and past aspects
    2. 5.2. Factors in assessing the magnitude of the harm of death: time and quality of life
    3. 5.3. Why past factors should also be taken into account
    4. 5.4. Establishing the relation between future and past factors
    5. 5.5. QALYs and comparisons between the harm of death for humans and nonhumans
    6. 5.6. How important is the question of the magnitude of the harm of death?
  6. 6. Objections to Assessing the Magnitude of the Harm of Death on the Basis of QALYs
    1. 6.1. The objection from absurd implications
    2. 6.2. Discussing the appeal to intuitions
    3. 6.3. Defending the QALY criterion
  7. 7. Do Animals Have Weaker Psychological Connectedness?
  8. 8. Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Replaceable
  9. 9. Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
    1. 9.1. The appeal to psychological connectedness
    2. 9.2. The appeal to prudential reasons
    3. 9.3. Does the strength of reasons to avoid negative events depend on psychological connectedness?
    4. 9.4. Does the strength of reasons to pursue positive events depend on psychological connectedness?
    5. 9.5. Discussing responses to the examples
  10. 10. The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a Small Harm
    1. 10.1. The claim that it is not wrong to kill animals who have little time ahead of them
    2. 10.2. Various ways of calculating the magnitude of the harm of death
    3. 10.3. Assessing the magnitude of the harm of death according to four formulas
    4. 10.4. Conclusion regarding the harm of death and the moment at which it occurs
    5. 10.5. What if the passage of time is different for animals of different species?
    6. 10.6. If someone has little lifetime ahead, does that justify killing them?
  11. 11. What If Humans Were More Harmed by Death?
    1. 11.1. Common views about killing and about saving lives
    2. 11.2. If one being is more harmed by death than another, what are the implications?
    3. 11.3. Does someone's being more harmed by death already justify killing others to save them?
    4. 11.4. Reasons to save lives, the harm of death, and the number of victims
    5. 11.5. Conclusions
  12. 12. Differentiated Moral Status, the Harm of Death, and the Wrongness of Killing
    1. 12.1. The harm of death and the wrongness of killing
    2. 12.2. Reasons against killing and for saving lives: direct and indirect
    3. 12.3. The debate on direct reasons: the magnitude thesis versus the status thesis
    4. 12.4. Direct reasons against killing as dependent on the harm of death
    5. 12.5. An example of an approach centered on privileged moral status
    6. 12.6. Would the two-tiered account justify the common view of animals?
    7. 12.7. How much should we trust intuitions?
    8. 12.8. How can intuitions be tested?
    9. 12.9. Does the two-tiered account pass the impartiality test?
    10. 12.10. Conclusions
  13. 13. Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational Decision, and Probabilities
    1. 13.1. The imprecision of the terms "death" and "life"
    2. 13.2. The harm of death and beliefs about whether or not death coincides with annihilation
    3. 13.3. Decision possibilities and their relation to the assessment of post-death scenarios
    4. 13.4. Further complications
    5. 13.5. Conclusion
IV The Debate on Animal Exploitation 20 chapters
  1. 1. How Do the Animals Exploited by Humans Live and Die?
    1. 1.1. Animal exploitation
    2. 1.2. The general situation of animals raised for consumption
    3. 1.3. The situation of hens, broiler chickens, and chicks
    4. 1.4. Diseases affecting animals exploited for consumption
    5. 1.5. The situation of sows
    6. 1.6. The situation of cows and calves
    7. 1.7. Procedures involving mutilation
    8. 1.8. Vulnerability to the decisions of workers
    9. 1.9. Transport to the slaughterhouse
    10. 1.10. How animals are killed in slaughterhouses
    11. 1.11. How animals are killed in fishing
    12. 1.12. The exploitation of insects
    13. 1.13. The exploitation of decapod crustaceans
    14. 1.14. Opposite attitudes, depending on the species of the victims
    15. 1.15. Can this double standard be justified?
  2. 2. Why Is Animal Exploitation Unjust?
    1. 2.1. It is unjust because it violates the principle of equal consideration
    2. 2.2. It is unjust because it fails the impartiality test
    3. 2.3. Conclusion
  3. 3. What Is Veganism?
  4. 4. What About Plants?
    1. 4.1. The "plants are alive too" variant
    2. 4.2. The "plants are sentient too" variant
  5. 5. The Objection That Consuming Animals Is Natural
    1. 5.1. The appeal to possibility
    2. 5.2. The appeal to instinct
    3. 5.3. The appeal to what animals do
    4. 5.4. The appeal to the food chain
    5. 5.5. Conclusion
  6. 6. The Claim That Consuming Animals Puts an End to Their Suffering
    1. 6.1. Is consuming animals right because it puts an end to their suffering?
    2. 6.2. Does the fact that consuming them would end their suffering justify consuming them?
    3. 6.3. Conclusion
  7. 7. Is Raising Animals for Consumption Justified Because It Brings Them into Existence?
    1. 7.1. Does consuming animals benefit them by bringing them into existence?
    2. 7.2. The argument does not apply to the vast majority of cases
    3. 7.3. Does conferring a benefit entitle one to inflict a harm?
    4. 7.4. The objection that some animals are hardly harmed by death
    5. 7.5. The objection that consuming animals could increase the total positive balance
    6. 7.6. Conclusion
  8. 8. Does It Matter What We Would Do on a Desert Island or in a Burning House?
  9. 9. Is It Necessary to Consume Animal Products?
  10. 10. Is Veganism Only for the Rich?
  11. 11. If the World Went Vegan, Would There Be an Excess of Domesticated Animals?
  12. 12. Would Veganism Ruin the Economy and Cost Jobs?
    1. 12.1. The objection that veganism would ruin the economy
    2. 12.2. The objection that those who work in animal exploitation would lose their jobs
  13. 13. But Does Veganism Really Have a Practical Impact?
  14. 14. But Doesn't Veganism Cause Even More Deaths Than Consuming Animals?
  15. 15. Does Concern for Species Justify Consuming Animals?
    1. 15.1. The claim that consumption preserves domesticated species
    2. 15.2. Do species matter in themselves?
    3. 15.3. Do species matter more than sentient beings?
    4. 15.4. If the consumption of animals were abolished, would these species disappear?
    5. 15.5. Conclusion
  16. 16. The Claim That the Struggle for Animals Should Be Put Off Until Later
  17. 17. Aren't Animals Already Protected by the Law?
  18. 18. The Claim That Animal Advocates Are Imposing Their Lifestyle
  19. 19. The Exploitation of Insects and Why We Should Oppose It
    1. 19.1. Are insects sentient?
    2. 19.2. The exploitation of insects
    3. 19.3. How insects are harmed in exploitation
    4. 19.4. Reasons to oppose the exploitation of insects
    5. 19.5. Responding to some objections
    6. 19.6. What is the important conclusion to draw on this question?
  20. 20. The Debate on Animal Experimentation
    1. 20.1. Introduction
    2. 20.2. The arguments from necessity and efficacy
    3. 20.3. Would giving greater weight to humans justify animal experimentation?
    4. 20.4. Kantianism for humans and utilitarianism for nonhumans?
    5. 20.5. Questioning the assignment of greater weight to human interests
    6. 20.6. What is really the ethical problem with animal experimentation?
    7. 20.7. Conclusion
V Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals 11 chapters
  1. 1. Respect for animals and environmentalism: complementary or opposed?
    1. 1.1. Basic differences in foundations
    2. 1.2. Variants of environmentalism
    3. 1.3. Animal ethics and environmental ethics
    4. 1.4. Environmentalist practices that involve exterminating animals
  2. 2. The divergence concerns ends, not only means
    1. 2.1. Different goals
    2. 2.2. What "considering individuals" and "considering wholes" mean
  3. 3. Despite their differences, do animal advocacy and environmentalism converge in practice?
  4. 4. The divergence does not lie in a focus on the short or the long term
  5. 5. Do ecological balance and biodiversity coincide with what is best for animals?
  6. 6. Animal advocacy and environmentalism: the divergence is ethical, not scientific
  7. 7. Why is respect for animals confused with environmentalism?
  8. 8. What do environmentalist extermination programs aim at?
  9. 9. Is environmentalism anthropocentric?
  10. 10. Questioning environmentalist assumptions
    1. 10.1. Do nonsentient entities have intrinsic value?
    2. 10.2. Do nonsentient entities have more value than sentient beings?
    3. 10.3. What if nonsentient entities do have intrinsic value?
    4. 10.4. Questioning environmentalist criteria for assigning value
    5. 10.5. Conclusion
  11. 11. Why are animal advocates reluctant to acknowledge the divergence?
    1. 11.1. The fear of going against environmentalism
    2. 11.2. The difficulty of revising beliefs and practices
    3. 11.3. Conclusion
VI To Whom Do We Owe Moral Consideration? 21 chapters
  1. 1. What is relevant for knowing to whom we owe consideration?
    1. 1.1. A double standard
    2. 1.2. Attempts to justify anthropocentric speciesism
    3. 1.3. The argument from relevance
    4. 1.4. What is relevant for considering and what is relevant for holding responsible
    5. 1.5. The criterion of sentience
  2. 2. Is the criterion of sentience anthropocentric at bottom?
  3. 3. Does the criterion of sentience discriminate against those who do not belong to the animal kingdom?
  4. 4. According to the criterion of sentience, is suffering the only problem?
  5. 5. If sentience is what matters, why are there harms that do not affect experiences?
  6. 6. Does the criterion of sentience exclude insects?
  7. 7. Does accepting the criterion of sentience imply assuming that values are subjective?
  8. 8. Are animals with simpler brains less sentient?
    1. 8.1. The view that there are degrees of sentience
    2. 8.2. Sentience
    3. 8.3. Valence
    4. 8.4. Degree of cognition
    5. 8.5. Intelligentism
    6. 8.6. Conclusion
  9. 9. If there is a need for environmental ethics, is the criterion of sentience wrong?
  10. 10. Isn't a World with Less Suffering, but Managed by Humans, Absurd?
  11. 11. If Sentient Beings Should Be Respected, Does Nature Have Intrinsic Value?
  12. 12. Does the Sentience Criterion Imply Accepting Environmentalist Goals?
  13. 13. Do Species Have Interests?
  14. 14. If Some Nonsentient Entity Had Intrinsic Value, What Would Follow?
  15. 15. Is Biocentrism Better Because It Includes a Greater Number of Beings?
    1. 15.1. Criteria for Moral Consideration of Different Scope
    2. 15.2. Does the Fact That a Criterion Is Broader Necessarily Make It Better?
    3. 15.3. Does Biocentrism Really Include All Sentient Beings and All Living Beings?
  16. 16. Sentience and Life: What Has Value as an End and What Has Value as a Means?
    1. 16.1. If Being Alive Is Necessary for Being Sentient, Does Being Alive Have Intrinsic Value?
    2. 16.2. Isn't Sentience Just a Means of Sustaining Life?
  17. 17. Can Nonsentient Living Beings Be Harmed?
  18. 18. Does the Behavior of Certain Plants and Fungi Show That They Value Certain Things?
  19. 19. Does Life Without Sentience Have Value?
    1. 19.1. Sentience or Life?
    2. 19.2. The Example of the Total Irreversible Coma
    3. 19.3. The Example of the Fraudulent Insurance Company
    4. 19.4. The Example of Sentience Without Life
  20. 20. Does Every Living Being Have “Biological Interests”?
  21. 21. If Plants Are Morally Considerable, Does It Make No Difference Whether We Eat Animals or Plants?
VII Ethics and the Situation of Wild Animals 37 chapters
  1. 1. What Should We Do About Animals Living in the Wild?
  2. 2. How Not to Understand the Issue
    1. 2.1. The Idea That It Is Not an Ethical Issue
    2. 2.2. Whatever You Think We Should Do, It Is an Ethical Issue
    3. 2.3. The Question Is Posed to Us, Not to Natural Processes or to Animals
  3. 3. How Do Natural Processes Typically Affect Wild Animals?
    1. 3.1. The Situation of Wild Animals
    2. 3.2. The Objection from Destroyed Eggs
    3. 3.3. The Objection That They Hardly Suffer
    4. 3.4. Conclusion
  4. 4. The View That It Is Not a Problem Because the Victims Are Nonhuman Animals
    1. 4.1. The Disregard for Nonhuman Animals
    2. 4.2. Why the Good of Nonhuman Animals Matters in Itself
    3. 4.3. Why the Good of Animals Matters as Much as That of Humans
    4. 4.4. Conclusion
  5. 5. Foundations of the Proposal to Help Victims of Natural Processes
    1. 5.1. Introduction
    2. 5.2. The Argument from the Existence of Reasons
    3. 5.3. The Argument from the Strength of Reasons
    4. 5.4. Implications of Both Arguments
    5. 5.5. The Argument from the Weight of the Criterion
  6. 6. Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Arrogant?
  7. 7. Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Anthropocentric?
  8. 8. The Less Human Influence in the World, the Better?
  9. 9. Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Welfarist?
  10. 10. Does the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Violate Their Freedom?
  11. 11. The Charge of Creating Dependency
  12. 12. The Charge of Paternalism
  13. 13. The Objection That Suffering Has Instrumental Value
  14. 14. Does the Proposal to Help Animals See Humans as Separate from Nature?
  15. 15. If Nature Is Not Evil, Is Natural Suffering Neutral?
  16. 16. If Nature Is Indifferent to the Suffering of Animals, Why Help Them?
  17. 17. Does Respecting the Nature of Wild Animals Require Leaving Them to Fend for Themselves?
  18. 18. Isn't It Absurd to Intervene in Conflicts Between Animals?
  19. 19. Which Fields Should Answer What to Do About Wild Animals?
  20. 20. Must Environmentalists Oppose Helping Wild Animals?
    1. 20.1. Introduction
    2. 20.2. Ways of Helping Animals That Would Also Achieve Environmentalist Goals
    3. 20.3. Ways of Helping Animals That Do Not Conflict with Environmentalist Goals
    4. 20.4. Reasons to Prioritize Sentient Beings over Environmentalist Goals
  21. 21. Are We Morally Responsible Only for Human Practices?
    1. 21.1. Moral responsibility and the origin of harm
    2. 21.2. "But we don't cause these harms"
    3. 21.3. "But these harms would exist even if we did not exist"
    4. 21.4. "But we don't intend to produce these harms"
    5. 21.5. "But we don't have a close relationship with these animals"
    6. 21.6. Isn't choosing whom to help optional?
    7. 21.7. Is the proposal to help wild animals too demanding?
    8. 21.8. If we are genuinely concerned about the victims, what will we conclude?
  22. 22. Attempts to Argue That Domesticated Animals Have Priority
    1. 22.1. The historical debt argument
    2. 22.2. The degree of dependence argument
  23. 23. Would Helping Animals Prevent the Fittest Genes from Prevailing?
    1. 23.1. The fittest genes argument
    2. 23.2. Do the fittest genes necessarily benefit those who carry them?
    3. 23.3. Does concern about the fittest genes justify not helping animals?
    4. 23.4. What the objection advocates is considered heinous when it affects humans
  24. 24. Couldn't Helping Wild Animals Make Things Even Worse?
    1. 24.1. Concern about long-term consequences
    2. 24.2. The appeal to ecological balance
  25. 25. Objections That Question the Practicality of the Proposal to Help
    1. 25.1. The objection that it is not possible to help everyone in need
    2. 25.2. Should we prioritize problems of which we would solve a larger share?
  26. 26. What Is Already Being Done to Help Wild Animals?
    1. 26.1. Introduction
    2. 26.2. Vaccination
    3. 26.3. Disease treatment
    4. 26.4. Treating animals in need
  27. 27. What Else Could Be Done to Help: Establishing Welfare Biology
    1. 27.1. What is welfare biology?
    2. 27.2. Welfare biology is a cross-disciplinary field
    3. 27.3. What distinguishes welfare biology from other fields?
    4. 27.4. Which animals would welfare biology study?
    5. 27.5. Creating the conditions for establishing welfare biology
    6. 27.6. Ideological obstacles that hinder the development of welfare biology
  28. 28. What Technologies Could Be Used to Help Animals in the Wild?
  29. 29. Do Animals Have a Right Not to Be Sterilized?
    1. 29.1. The rights violation objection
    2. 29.2. Three ways of responding to the rights violation objection
    3. 29.3. Discussing the defense of the right to reproduce
    4. 29.4. Would sterilization violate a right to bodily integrity?
    5. 29.5. The human sterilization objection
    6. 29.6. The objection that we should seek other means
    7. 29.7. The animal experimentation objection
    8. 29.8. Conclusion
  30. 30. The Issue of Parasitism
  31. 31. The Issue of Predation
    1. 31.1. The prevailing view
    2. 31.2. The idea that predation is not a matter for ethics
    3. 31.3. The idea that it is wrong to intervene because predators are not to blame
    4. 31.4. The claim that predation is neutral because it results from amoral agents
    5. 31.5. Absurd because impossible to accomplish
    6. 31.6. The accusation of fascism
    7. 31.7. The accusation of sentimentalism
    8. 31.8. Speciesism and interventions in predation
    9. 31.9. Is intervening in predation partial?
    10. 31.10. The appeal to the need to prey
    11. 31.11. The appeal to lesser harms to the predator
    12. 31.12. The appeal to the right to secure one's survival
    13. 31.13. Widely accepted interventions in predation
    14. 31.14. The appeal to animal behavior
    15. 31.15. The argument from the ability to avoid the threat
    16. 31.16. Concern about consequences
    17. 31.17. Existing cases and the prevention of new cases
    18. 31.18. The goal of reducing primary productivity
    19. 31.19. Conclusion
  32. 32. Discussing Our Ability to Assess When Life Is or Is Not Worth Living
    1. 32.1. The meaningful life argument
    2. 32.2. Are we not well placed to assess when a life is worth living?
    3. 32.3. Should we not try to assess when a life is worth living?
    4. 32.4. Doesn't the position against helping make assessments about when a life is worth living?
  33. 33. The Prolonged Agony Argument
    1. 33.1. The objection that extending lifespan is worse for animals
    2. 33.2. Is prolonging the lives of animals living in the wild always worse for them?
    3. 33.3. Does intervening to help animals in the wild always prolong their lives?
  34. 34. The Objection That the Balance of the Situation of Animals in the Wild May Be Positive
    1. 34.1. The claim that the overall balance may be positive
    2. 34.2. If the overall balance is positive, so what?
    3. 34.3. Which views could accept helping regardless of the overall balance?
    4. 34.4. Decisions in which the only option is to change the situation as a whole
    5. 34.5. Conclusion
  35. 35. What Impact Does Veganism Have on the Situation of Wild Animals?
    1. 35.1. The idea that preventing natural harms implies rejecting veganism
    2. 35.2. Does veganism necessarily imply an increase in green areas?
    3. 35.3. Distinguishing first-order and second-order harms
    4. 35.4. Conclusion
  36. 36. The Debate on the Destruction of Nature
    1. 36.1. The context
    2. 36.2. Arguments in favor of altruistic killing
    3. 36.3. Arguments against altruistic killing
    4. 36.4. Replies from those who defend altruistic killing
    5. 36.5. Rejoinders from those who condemn altruistic killing
    6. 36.6. A new reply from the defenders of altruistic killing
    7. 36.7. But won't humanity do this anyway?
    8. 36.8. Who bears the burden of proof?
  37. 37. The Debate on the Expansion and Restoration of Nature
    1. 37.1. A way of minimizing natural harms that escapes the common objections
    2. 37.2. Concern for future generations
    3. 37.3. Concern for the current generation
    4. 37.4. The appeal to environmentalist values
    5. 37.5. The concern about non-acceptance
    6. 37.6. The risk of human extinction
    7. 37.7. Concern for humans themselves
    8. 37.8. The idea that the human presence has a positive net balance
    9. 37.9. The risk that humanity will come to expand suffering
    10. 37.10. Is the expansion of nature really necessary to save humanity?
    11. 37.11. Conclusion
VIII Effective Activism 12 chapters
  1. 1. How to Choose Which Causes and Problems to Prioritize and Which Strategies Are Best?
    1. 1.1. Introduction
    2. 1.2. How serious is the situation?
    3. 1.3. How much of the problem can we try to solve?
    4. 1.4. Choosing the best solutions
    5. 1.5. To do the greatest good possible, we need to take the long term into account
    6. 1.6. Treating symptoms or causes?
    7. 1.7. How many people already care about the problem?
    8. 1.8. Conclusion
  2. 2. How Does the Animal Cause Fare on the Priority Criteria?
    1. 2.1. Introduction
    2. 2.2. Seriousness of each victim’s situation
    3. 2.3. Number of victims
    4. 2.4. There are so many victims that even speciesists would have to prioritize the animal cause
    5. 2.5. How many people already care about this issue?
    6. 2.6. Tractability and the amount of benefit that could be produced
    7. 2.7. Conclusion
  3. 3. Among the Problems Affecting Animals, Which Are the Most Important?
    1. 3.1. Introduction
    2. 3.2. Neglect of animals exploited for food
    3. 3.3. Neglect of the exploitation of aquatic animals and invertebrates
    4. 3.4. Neglect of animals in the wild who are victims of natural processes
    5. 3.5. Neglect of the future
    6. 3.6. Conclusion
  4. 4. The Use of Anthropocentric and Environmentalist Arguments in the Animal Cause
    1. 4.1. The strategy of using anthropocentric or environmentalist arguments
    2. 4.2. Some problems with the use of anthropocentric and environmentalist arguments
    3. 4.3. Why different motivations have different consequences
    4. 4.4. Do indirect arguments make it easier to accept considering sentient beings?
    5. 4.5. Risks of using arguments not centered on consideration for sentient beings
    6. 4.6. Conclusion
  5. 5. The Total Approach and the Sufficient Approach
    1. 5.1. Introduction
    2. 5.2. Ranges of compatibility: open and closed
    3. 5.3. Examples of views compatible with multiple views in ethics and politics
    4. 5.4. The total approach and the sufficient approach
    5. 5.5. Conclusion: it is important to combine both strategies
  6. 6. Shifting the Focus in Debates: Why Is Speciesism Rarely Discussed?
    1. 6.1. Shifting the focus
    2. 6.2. Falling into the trap
    3. 6.3. Why do animal advocates accept the shift of focus?
    4. 6.4. Conclusion
  7. 7. Moral Beliefs, Motivation to Act, and the Role of Ethical Reflection
    1. 7.1. The case of animal ethics experts who consume animals
    2. 7.2. Perhaps they do not consider consuming animals wrong
    3. 7.3. Perhaps they consider consuming animals only slightly wrong
    4. 7.4. Perhaps they are not being sincere about what they report
    5. 7.5. Perhaps they have a weak will
    6. 7.6. Perhaps they decide not to do what they feel motivated to do
    7. 7.7. Conclusion
  8. 8. Normative Objections Disguised as Strategic Objections
    1. 8.1. Normative objections and strategic objections
    2. 8.2. The claim that “this would be great, but it won’t work”
    3. 8.3. Examples in questions of animal ethics
    4. 8.4. One possibility: the real motivation is not the one stated
    5. 8.5. Is it possible to detect a disguised normative objection?
    6. 8.6. Why does this happen?
    7. 8.7. A common pattern in objections of this kind
    8. 8.8. Who bears the burden of proof?
    9. 8.9. Reasons for rejecting the claims
  9. 9. Focusing on Veganism versus Focusing on Reducing Consumption
    1. 9.1. Avoiding biases when assessing strategies
    2. 9.2. Understanding when the disagreement is about strategies and when it is about goals
    3. 9.3. The reasoning behind the focus on reduction
    4. 9.4. Arguments in favor of focusing on reduction
    5. 9.5. Arguments in favor of focusing on veganism
    6. 9.6. Conclusion and some additional questions
  10. 10. Why the Term Welfarism Is Highly Ambiguous
    1. 10.1. Introduction
    2. 10.2. Several positions called welfarist
    3. 10.3. Conclusion
  11. 11. The Debate on Regulating Animal Exploitation
    1. 11.1. Introduction
    2. 11.2. The debate over the causal relationship between regulation and abolition
    3. 11.3. The debate over the causal relationship between regulating and reducing suffering
    4. 11.4. Several additional points of discussion
    5. 11.5. Conclusion
  12. 12. The Debate on Cultivated Meat
    1. 12.1. Introduction
    2. 12.2. What cultivated meat is
    3. 12.3. Potential for acceptance/rejection of cultivated meat
    4. 12.4. Discussing the main objections to cultivated meat
    5. 12.5. The objection that it is not natural
    6. 12.6. The objection that it would pose risks to consumers
    7. 12.7. The objection that it is not yet sustainable
    8. 12.8. The objection that it harms the most vulnerable humans
    9. 12.9. The objection that the producers do not care about animals
    10. 12.10. The objection that cultivated meat does not solve every problem
    11. 12.11. The objection that the impact may be smaller than expected
    12. 12.12. The objection that cultivated meat is still of animal origin
    13. 12.13. The objection that cultivated meat still harms animals
    14. 12.14. The objection that cultivated meat reinforces speciesism
    15. 12.15. Advantages and disadvantages of focusing on changes in food technology
    16. 12.16. Conclusion
IX Ethics and the Future 13 chapters
  1. 1. Future Risks for Sentient Beings: An Introduction
    1. 1.1. The past, the present, and the future
    2. 1.2. What are s-risks?
    3. 1.3. Differences between s-risks and x-risks
    4. 1.4. Measuring the seriousness of an s-risk
    5. 1.5. S-risks and new technologies
    6. 1.6. Classification of s-risks according to how they arise
    7. 1.7. Other classifications
    8. 1.8. Some examples of s-risks
    9. 1.9. Conclusion
  2. 2. Temporal Impartiality: What It Is and Why It Matters
    1. 2.1. Introduction
    2. 2.2. Temporal bias
    3. 2.3. Impartiality
    4. 2.4. Temporal impartiality
    5. 2.5. The objection that future beings are merely potential beings
    6. 2.6. Does rejecting temporal impartiality justify disregarding future beings?
    7. 2.7. Conclusion
  3. 3. The Objection That Future Beings Are Merely Potential Beings
    1. 3.1. The objection that we should care only about beings who already exist
    2. 3.2. Should we care only about sentient beings who already exist?
    3. 3.3. The struggle for animals is usually already a struggle for possible future beings
  4. 4. What Reasons Are There to Focus on the Long Term?
    1. 4.1. What is longtermism?
    2. 4.2. What will we see in this chapter?
    3. 4.3. Why adopt a longtermist goal?
    4. 4.4. Reasons for a longtermist practical focus
    5. 4.5. The debate over the focus on the long term
    6. 4.6. Conclusion
  5. 5. Should We Focus on Preventing S-Risks or X-Risks?
    1. 5.1. S-risks and x-risks
    2. 5.2. Discussing a speciesist attempt to defend the focus on x-risks
    3. 5.3. The claim that humanity is essential for preventing suffering
    4. 5.4. The claim that we will obtain more resources if we prioritize humans
    5. 5.5. Reasons to focus more on s-risks
  6. 6. Which Goals Should We Prioritize in the Long Term?
    1. 6.1. Different goals someone might want to achieve in the long term
    2. 6.2. What does the focus on preventing suffering depend on?
    3. 6.3. Who could accept the focus on preventing suffering?
    4. 6.4. Some arguments for giving greater weight to the goal of preventing suffering
    5. 6.5. How pessimistic about the future do we need to be in order to focus on suffering?
    6. 6.6. The goal of preventing premature deaths
    7. 6.7. Conclusion
  7. 7. What Does the Focus on S-Risks Consist Of?
    1. 7.1. Introduction
    2. 7.2. How will suffering probably be distributed over the future?
    3. 7.3. The s-risk focus does not imply a narrow focus
  8. 8. Identifying Risk Factors for S-Risks
    1. 8.1. What risk factors are and why it is important to identify them
    2. 8.2. Advanced technology
    3. 8.3. Aversion to technology
    4. 8.4. Lack of consideration for nonhuman sentient beings
    5. 8.5. Lack of efforts to reduce s-risks.
    6. 8.6. Misguided or ineffective efforts to reduce s-risks
    7. 8.7. Polarization, conflict, and hostility
    8. 8.8. Lack of security against agents who aim to cause suffering
    9. 8.9. Interaction among various risk factors and among various ways of preventing them
    10. 8.10. Conclusion
  9. 9. Longtermist Strategies: Broad and Targeted
    1. 9.1. What broad strategies and targeted strategies are
    2. 9.2. Advantages and disadvantages of each kind of strategy
    3. 9.3. Examples of broad strategies
    4. 9.4. Examples of targeted strategies
    5. 9.5. Precautions when choosing longtermist strategies
  10. 10. Why Focus on Consideration for Sentient Beings and on the Future?
    1. 10.1. Why is the way we will affect future beings so rarely discussed?
    2. 10.2. Why it is important to promote consideration for all sentient beings
    3. 10.3. Risks in advocating consideration for sentient beings
    4. 10.4. Promoting concern about s-risks and about the future
    5. 10.5. Conclusion
  11. 11. Changing Public Debate, Forms of Activism, and Political Institutions
    1. 11.1. Politics and s-risks
    2. 11.2. The two-step ideal
    3. 11.3. Tribal nature and polarization
    4. 11.4. Raising the standard of public debate
    5. 11.5. The broad-range approach strategy
    6. 11.6. Improving institutions
    7. 11.7. Why even a small improvement would make a big difference
  12. 12. Shaping Emerging Technologies to Prevent Future Suffering
    1. 12.1. Introduction
    2. 12.2. Arguments for and against focusing on shaping artificial intelligence (AI)
    3. 12.3. An example of AI alignment focused on s-risks
    4. 12.4. Avoiding indirect risks related to AI
    5. 12.5. Space governance
    6. 12.6. The possibility of creating other forms of sentience
  13. 13. The Influence Triad and Future Suffering
    1. 13.1. Introduction
    2. 13.2. The influence triad
    3. 13.3. Relating the factors of the influence triad
    4. 13.4. When the intention is to harm
    5. 13.5. The indifferent agent
    6. 13.6. When the aim is to benefit
    7. 13.7. Comparison with situations in which there is no decision-making agent
    8. 13.8. What can we try to do?
    9. 13.9. Limitations of the analysis presented here and how to correct them in later analyses
    10. 13.10. Conclusions
X Biases and Their Influence 6 chapters
  1. 1. Biases That Lead Us to Neglect the Problems with the Most Victims
    1. 1.1. What biases are
    2. 1.2. The neglect of the problems with the most victims
    3. 1.3. Biases related to the kinds of victims
    4. 1.4. The number of victims and the collapse of compassion
    5. 1.5. The bandwagon effect
    6. 1.6. How should we deal with this?
    7. 1.7. Who will and who will not try to correct the influence of biases?
  2. 2. Biases That Incline Us to Neglect the Situation of Wild Animals
    1. 2.1. Introduction
    2. 2.2. Biases related to the status quo
    3. 2.3. Biases related to the kind of animal most affected
    4. 2.4. Biases related to the number of victims
    5. 2.5. Biases that induce the belief that the situation of wild animals is good
    6. 2.6. Biases that lead us to try to justify the suffering of wild animals
    7. 2.7. Biases that incline us to doubt the feasibility of helping wild animals
    8. 2.8. Biases that incline us to underestimate the public's receptiveness
    9. 2.9. Conclusion
  3. 3. Biases That Contribute to the Neglect of the Long Term and of S-Risks
    1. 3.1. Introduction
    2. 3.2. Biases that contribute to the neglect of issues related to the future
    3. 3.3. Biases that contribute to our failing to take expected value/disvalue into account
    4. 3.4. Reliance on intuitions
    5. 3.5. Biases that contribute to the neglect of s-risks
    6. 3.6. Conclusions
  4. 4. Cognitive Biases and Their Influence on Our Decisions That Affect Animals
    1. 4.1. Biases that contribute to resistance to revising beliefs and strategies
    2. 4.2. Moral licensing (moral credential effect)
    3. 4.3. Biases that incline us to refuse to listen to our interlocutors
    4. 4.4. Biases that incline us to defend the way things already are
    5. 4.5. The affect heuristic and the appeal to intuitions
    6. 4.6. Biases that exert influence through repetition and social pressure
    7. 4.7. Biases that incline us to resist changing strategy
    8. 4.8. Biases that incline us to think we know more than we do
    9. 4.9. The relationship between knowing less, having more conviction, and having more influence
    10. 4.10. Biases that incline us toward biased judgment
    11. 4.11. Biases that lead to the acceptance of bad arguments
    12. 4.12. The continued influence effect
    13. 4.13. Biases that lead to resistance to serious argumentation
    14. 4.14. Conclusions
  5. 5. Motivated Reasoning and Its Influence on the Evaluation of Arguments
    1. 5.1. Introduction
    2. 5.2. Why do people apply different levels of rigor when evaluating arguments?
    3. 5.3. Do people always believe the objections they raise?
  6. 6. Some Biases That Can Influence the Choice of Strategies and How the Public Receives Them
    1. 6.1. Introduction
    2. 6.2. Biases to watch for in ourselves when planning advocacy strategies
    3. 6.3. Biases that can influence how the public receives our message
XI How Do the Various Ethical Theories Approach the Animal Question? 7 chapters
  1. 1. An Introduction to the Central Distinctions in Value Theory
    1. 1.1. Theories of value and theories of right action
    2. 1.2. Theories of value and the terminology used
    3. 1.3. Intrinsic value and instrumental value
    4. 1.4. Modes of better/worse assessment: better/worse than and the best/worst of all
    5. 1.5. Value: in a certain respect or all things considered?
    6. 1.6. How can we assess how good or bad a situation is all things considered?
    7. 1.7. Conclusion
  2. 2. An Introduction to Theories of Well-Being
    1. 2.1. What do theories of well-being aim to investigate?
    2. 2.2. Aspects in assessing the well-being of individuals
    3. 2.3. Monist and pluralist theories of well-being
    4. 2.4. Examples illustrating the differences between the approaches
    5. 2.5. To what extent do these approaches diverge/converge?
    6. 2.6. The minimum degree of convergence and its implications for the well-being of animals
  3. 3. Assessing How Good/Bad a Situation Containing Several Individuals Is
    1. 3.1. Introduction
    2. 3.2. Aspects in assessing a situation with several individuals
    3. 3.3. Monist and pluralist theories
    4. 3.4. When the aspects conflict
  4. 4. Value Judgments, Descriptions of Facts, Objectivity, and Subjectivity
    1. 4.1. The idea that value judgments are subjective
    2. 4.2. Two senses of the term “subjective”
    3. 4.3. The activities of describing and evaluating
    4. 4.4. How can a value judgment be confirmed?
    5. 4.5. The example of aliens who have so far had only neutral experiences
    6. 4.6. Things that cannot be explained except in terms of their value/disvalue
    7. 4.7. The confusion between the domains of value and ethics
    8. 4.8. Comparing the degree of certainty for value judgments and descriptions of facts
    9. 4.9. The confusion between all and some
    10. 4.10. Conclusion
  5. 5. Categories of Normative Ethical Theories
    1. 5.1. Normative ethics and its categories
    2. 5.2. Consequentialism
    3. 5.3. Deontology
    4. 5.4. Character-centered ethics
    5. 5.5. The focal point
    6. 5.6. To what extent do these theories converge/diverge?
  6. 6. To What Extent Do Ethical Theories Agree About What We Owe Animals?
    1. 6.1. Introduction
    2. 6.2. Arguments that attempt to justify disregard for animals
    3. 6.3. The argument from relevance
    4. 6.4. Some consideration or equal consideration?
    5. 6.5. The moral consideration of sentient beings from the standpoint of various ethical theories
    6. 6.6. Utilitarianism
    7. 6.7. Number of beings with positive well-being, and average utilitarianism
    8. 6.8. Maximin
    9. 6.9. Prioritarianism
    10. 6.10. Egalitarianism
    11. 6.11. Sufficientarianism
    12. 6.12. Negative versions of utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and egalitarianism
    13. 6.13. Why all these theories imply equal consideration
    14. 6.14. The aspect of desert
    15. 6.15. Pluralist possibilities
    16. 6.16. Approaches not characterized by a goal
    17. 6.17. Kantianism
    18. 6.18. Discourse ethics
    19. 6.19. Contractualism
    20. 6.20. Character-centered ethics: virtue ethics and the ethics of care
    21. 6.21. Implications for animal exploitation
    22. 6.22. Implications for the situation of wild animals
    23. 6.23. Conclusion
  7. 7. Weighing Criteria
    1. 7.1. Introduction
    2. 7.2. Total incommensurability
    3. 7.3. Monism (general)
    4. 7.4. Aggregative monism (a specific application of general monism)
    5. 7.5. Equal-weight pluralism
    6. 7.6. Pluralism with an absolute trump
    7. 7.7. Pluralism with a trump up to a certain point
    8. 7.8. Pluralism with fixed-weight aspects (linear)
    9. 7.9. Pluralism with variable-weight aspects (diminishing returns)
    10. 7.10. Maximin/leximin of priorities
    11. 7.11. Sufficiency
    12. 7.12. Hybrid approaches
    13. 7.13. Partial indeterminacy
    14. 7.14. Probabilistic aggregation based on uncertainty
XII The Essentials of Animal Ethics 18 chapters
  1. Introduction
  2. 1. Attempts to Justify Disregarding Animals
  3. 2. The Case for Considering All Sentient Beings
  4. 3. The Debate on the Sentience Criterion
  5. 4. The Harm of Death and the Reasons Against Killing
  6. 5. Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals
  7. 6. The Situation of Wild Animals and the Proposal to Help Them
  8. 7. The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 1)
  9. 8. The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 2)
  10. 9. What Criteria Should We Use to Help Efficiently?
  11. 10. Which Problems Affect the Largest Numbers of Animals?
    1. 10.1. Exploited animals
    2. 10.2. Animals in the wild
    3. 10.3. The future
  12. 11. Key Concepts in the Debate on the Importance of the Future
    1. 11.1. What are s-risks?
    2. 11.2. Differences between s-risks and x-risks
    3. 11.3. How do we measure the seriousness of an s-risk?
    4. 11.4. Examples of s-risks
    5. 11.5. The concepts of speciesism and substratism
    6. 11.6. Classification of s-risks
  13. 12. Identifying Risk Factors for S-Risks
  14. 13. Longtermist Strategies: Broad and Targeted
  15. 14. Changing Public Debate and Political Institutions
  16. 15. Debates on Activism Strategies
  17. 16. Evaluating Different Strategies
  18. 17. Conclusion