Cognitive Biases and Their Influence on Our Decisions That Affect Animals

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume X, p. 47 of the PDF edition · English translation

4.1. Biases that contribute to resistance to revising beliefs and strategies

In this chapter we will address biases that can lead people to resist discussing new issues and revising their beliefs, whether these are beliefs about facts, about ethical questions, or about strategies for achieving a goal.

These biases influence not only people who have never had any contact with the animal cause, but also animal advocates themselves and authors in the field of animal ethics.

4.2. Moral licensing (moral credential effect)

The moral licensing effect occurs when someone who does something good allows themselves to be less good in the future.

This bias may underlie the resistance to veganism shown by people who focus on rescuing abandoned animals (and even the resistance to veganism among people in general, since people in general usually consider themselves good people).

However, this bias can also lead vegans to think that they do not need to concern themselves with other issues that affect animals, such as the differences between consideration for animals and environmentalism, the suffering of wild animals, and issues related to the long-term future.

In short, the fact that someone considers themselves a good person can, paradoxically, incline them to allow themselves to neglect important ethical issues.

4.3. Biases that incline us to refuse to listen to our interlocutors

Resistance to changing beliefs and attitudes is extremely common. For example, many people strongly resist accepting that animal exploitation is unjust. However, resistance to changing beliefs also affects animal advocates. For example, as mentioned, many advocates are reluctant to think about issues beyond veganism, such as the proposal to prevent the suffering of wild animals that results from natural processes, and concern for the long-term future. Resistance is common even in response to suggestions of a change in strategy.

In short, it is common for there to be resistance to arguments pointing out that we are doing something wrong. Very often this resistance arises even before the interlocutor's arguments have been heard. Below are some biases that may underlie the tendency to reject an idea even before hearing the arguments that support it.

The hostile attribution bias is the tendency to interpret other people's behavior as having hostile intentions, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign. This bias can incline people to see their interlocutor not as someone who wants us to correct a mistake, but as someone with a hidden malicious intention.

Reactive devaluation, in turn, refers to the tendency to belittle proposals made by others, especially if those others are seen as adversaries.

The ostrich effect, for its part, occurs when people avoid negative information, including information that could help them better monitor progress toward their goals.

In this section we have dealt specifically with biases that can lead us not to want to hear opposing arguments. The following sections will address biases that can lead us to resist abandoning our prior beliefs, even if we have heard the opposing arguments and agreed with them.

4.4. Biases that incline us to defend the way things already are

Often an idea is rejected not because we think there are good arguments against it, but simply because it proposes a change from the way we already think and/or act. The following biases, by themselves, tend to create resistance to revising our beliefs and attitudes (whether regarding ethical questions or strategies).

Status quo bias: the tendency to prefer that things stay as they already are, resulting in resistance to change⁵⁷.

System justification: the tendency to defend and reinforce the status quo, sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest.

Conservatism bias: the tendency to insufficiently revise one's beliefs when presented with new evidence.

Belief perseverance is the tendency to cling to the beliefs we already hold even in the face of contrary evidence, resulting in resistance to changing our minds.

Semmelweis reflex: the tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.

Default effect: the tendency to favor the default option when it is possible to choose among several options.

Anchoring bias causes us to rely heavily on the first piece of information we receive about a subject (the anchor). We interpret subsequent information in light of this anchor instead of seeing it objectively. This can distort our judgment and prevent us from updating our plans or predictions.

Commitment bias is the tendency to remain committed to our past behaviors, especially those displayed publicly, even when they do not produce desirable results.

Cognitive dissonance is the discomfort that arises from holding beliefs that conflict with one another, or attitudes that conflict with our beliefs. One way to deal with this dissonance is to assess which of the beliefs or attitudes we should reject and then act accordingly. However, the conflict is usually “resolved” by rejecting, discrediting, or avoiding the information that makes the inconsistency evident.

4.5. The affect heuristic and the appeal to intuitions

The affect heuristic describes how, when making decisions, we often rely on our emotions and intuitions rather than on concrete information⁵⁸. This allows us to decide more quickly and easily, but it can distort our thinking and lead us to suboptimal or even bad choices, sometimes very bad ones, whether in choosing strategies to achieve a goal or in assessing ethical questions.

The affect heuristic can lead us to defend the status quo, because our intuitions are shaped by both genetic and environmental factors. For example, the fact that we have believed something for a long time, and that everyone else does the same, will probably create a strong intuition that we are right (the belief that speciesism is right is a good example). Suppose that we later engage in careful reflection and conclude that our initial belief was completely unjustifiable. This new conclusion will very probably not generate (at least at first) a feeling as strong as the one the initial intuition generated.

This is why it is so risky to rely on intuitions when thinking about ethical questions, since they may be nothing more than our prejudices disguised as self-evident truth. Indeed, one of the main reasons biases exert so much influence on us is the very fact that they are highly intuitive, with an appearance of being correct, even though they often produce completely mistaken reasoning.

Of course, the fact that a belief is intuitive does not imply that it is necessarily wrong. However, far from showing that it is correct, the fact that it is intuitive is a reason to be suspicious of it and to subject it to scrutiny, since we may believe it not because it is reasonable but simply because it is intuitive.

Next, we will see more about how our beliefs are often shaped by repetition and social pressure.

4.6. Biases that exert influence through repetition and social pressure

Consider the following beliefs:

• That speciesism is justifiable.
• That environmentalism aims to secure the good of animals.
• That if we let nature take its course, this will be better for animals.
• That we should not intervene in what is natural.
• That any attempt to help animals in the wild will only make everything worse.
• That we are not morally responsible for natural harms.
• That we do not need to worry about the long-term future.

These are beliefs we have heard repeatedly since we were born. Moreover, they are prevalent in society. These two factors (repetition and social pressure) can incline us to resist questioning these and many other beliefs. The next two sections present some examples of biases connected to these two factors.

4.6.1. Biases that exert influence through social pressure

Social norms are collective beliefs about which behaviors are appropriate in a given situation. People commonly want to be accepted by society or by specific groups, and this leads them to accept social norms, often without stopping to evaluate those norms critically. Below is a list of factors related to this tendency.

The bandwagon effect is the habit of adopting certain behaviors or beliefs because many other people do the same⁵⁹.

Suggestibility: refers to how susceptible we are to changing our behavior based on other people's suggestions.

Pluralistic ignorance: occurs when we mistakenly believe that our opinions differ from those of the majority. This often leads us to suppress our own beliefs and behaviors so that they conform to what we take to be the social norm. For example, a person may be against speciesism but be embarrassed to say so because they think no one else will agree. However, many other people may also be against speciesism and be embarrassed to say so for the same reason.

4.6.2. Biases that exert influence through repetition

The mere exposure effect is the tendency to develop preferences for certain things simply because we are familiar with them.

A related bias is the availability cascade, which occurs when a collective belief gains more and more acceptance through its increasing repetition in public discourse, regardless of whether or not it is a plausible idea.

Another related effect is the illusory truth effect. People are more likely to identify as true statements they have heard before (even if they do not consciously remember having heard them), regardless of the statement's actual validity⁶⁰. In other words, a person is more likely to believe a familiar statement than an unfamiliar one. This is why, when we hear false information repeated many times, we commonly come to believe that it is true. Interestingly, this effect occurs even if we initially know that the information is false.

4.7. Biases that incline us to resist changing strategy

The following biases can incline advocates to persist with strategies they have used for a long time (even if they realize that these are not effective or that there are more effective ones) and to resist trying new strategies.

Mere exposure effect: the tendency to develop preferences for things simply because we are familiar with them. This bias can lead us not only to persist with the same strategies, but also to refuse to try new strategies and to address new issues.

Law of the instrument: overreliance on a familiar tool or on familiar methods, ignoring or undervaluing alternative approaches.

Functional fixedness: the tendency not to use an object in ways beyond its traditional use, which impairs the capacity to innovate and be creative in solving challenges.

Plan continuation bias: the failure to recognize that the original plan of action is no longer appropriate for the current situation.

Einstellung effect: occurs when we approach a problem in the way that worked in the past, even though a better solution now exists. This influences us not to consider other perspectives or options.

Choice-supportive bias: the tendency to remember one's past choices as better than they actually were.

Effort justification: the tendency to attribute greater value to an outcome depending on how much effort we put into achieving it, even if the outcome is not very good.

Escalation of commitment: occurs when one tries to justify increasing current investment on the basis of cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong.

Sunk cost fallacy: the tendency to carry on with a strategy if we have already invested in it, regardless of whether or not the costs outweigh the benefits.

Ambiguity effect: the tendency to avoid options for which the probability of a favorable outcome is unknown. This effect can incline us to an aversion to trying new strategies.

Bounded rationality: the tendency to seek a decision that is good enough, rather than the best possible decision.

4.8. Biases that incline us to think we know more than we do

The following biases can incline us to think that we know much more than we actually do, resulting in a lack of interest in evaluating our values, goals, and strategies. In short, these biases incline us to think that we are very intelligent, and this leads us not to consider the possibility that we are making mistakes. Often these biases also lead people to think that the audience they are communicating with is not very intelligent.

Egocentric bias: the tendency to rely too heavily on one's own perspective and/or to have a more positive opinion of oneself than reality warrants.

Illusion of validity: the tendency to be overconfident in the accuracy of one's own judgments⁶¹. This bias often produces the overconfidence effect, explained below.

Overconfidence effect: the tendency to have excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as “100% certain” turn out to be wrong 20% of the time⁶².

Illusory superiority: the tendency to overestimate one's own desirable qualities and to underestimate one's own undesirable qualities, compared with other people. It is also known as the “better-than-average effect” or “superiority bias.”

Naive realism: the tendency to believe that our perception of the world reflects it exactly as it is, without biases and without filters⁶³.

Bias blind spot: the tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people and to identify more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.

Naive cynicism: expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself.

Objectivity illusion: the tendency to believe that one is more objective and impartial than others. Indeed, people may be able to perceive when others are affected by the objectivity illusion, but they are usually unable to perceive it in themselves.

Illusion of explanatory depth: occurs when we think we understand more about things than we actually do. Often it is only when we are asked to explain a concept that we realize how limited our understanding of it is.

All of these biases are related to the Dunning-Kruger effect and to ultracrepidarianism, discussed in the next section.

4.9. The relationship between knowing less, having more conviction, and having more influence

The Dunning-Kruger effect is named after the researchers who discovered it. The effect occurs when a person's lack of knowledge and skill in a given area causes them to overestimate their own competence. This effect also leads people who are competent in an area to think that the task is simple for everyone, leading them to underestimate their own abilities. In short, this effect concerns the tendency of unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and of experts to underestimate theirs⁶⁴.

This tendency can mean that the less someone knows about a subject, the more they think they know a great deal and the more certain they are of their convictions (it may even incline them to think that they know more than the experts, and even that the experts are ignorant or stupid). Likewise, this tendency causes experts, because they know how complex the subject is, to think that they know very little and to be more uncertain about their convictions on the subject.

However, there are also criticisms of the methodology and conclusions of the studies conducted by Dunning and Kruger⁶⁵. According to these criticisms, Dunning and Kruger's studies show that people tend to consider themselves more competent than average, but they do not show that people who know little necessarily think they know a lot and vice versa, nor that this tendency is intrinsic to the way the human brain works.

However, even if this criticism is correct and there is no such tendency in general terms, there are certainly people who know little about a subject but think they know a lot. Since ignorance usually produces a feeling of certainty (precisely because one is unaware of the complexities of the subject in question), generally the more a person is ignorant of the complexities of a subject, the more certainty and conviction they speak with about it. However, the greater the conviction with which an idea is presented, the greater the tendency of the audience to believe it, even if it is not logical⁶⁶. Because of this, people who know less end up having an advantage in terms of influence.

The philosopher Bertrand Russell made this idea explicit in the essay The Triumph of Stupidity (in Portuguese, O Triunfo da Estupidez⁶⁷:

“The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt. Even those among the intelligent who are most convinced of something are filled with hesitation when it comes to acting. The stupid, on the other hand, having no doubts, are seized by a missionary zeal. As a result, the voices of intelligent people are lost

in the clamor of the ignorant, and causes that deserve support end up without defenders.”

In other words, the hesitation of the intelligent (because they recognize the complexity of the issues) leaves room for the ignorant, who have no doubts, to dominate public discourse.

4.10. Biases that incline us toward biased judgment

The following biases, which lead to biased judgment, can be present when we evaluate the arguments regarding a given ethical question and also when we evaluate the various possible strategies for achieving a goal.

Motivated reasoning consists in evaluating information and arguments with the aim of arriving at the conclusion we prefer. It produces a confirmation bias, which consists in noticing only what confirms our beliefs and hypotheses, while neglecting the information and arguments that run counter to what we already want to believe⁶⁸. In other words, it leads us to notice, focus on, and give greater credibility to the evidence and arguments that confirm our prior beliefs. At the same time, it leads us not to notice, not to give much weight to, or even to dismiss without analysis, the arguments and evidence suggesting that we may be wrong.

These biases can influence people, for example, to deny that animals suffer terribly in animal exploitation or in the wild as a result of natural processes, to deny that veganism has a practical impact, to deny the possibility of helping animals in the wild, or to claim that any attempt to help would only make things worse, without investigating whether these claims are really plausible.

A related and similar bias is the observer/experimenter bias (or expectation bias), which is the tendency to notice data that confirm our expectations and to discard data that conflict with those expectations .

Related to all of this is the take-the-best heuristic, which is a shortcut we use when choosing among alternatives in order to make decisions quickly without needing to

know all the information about each alternative. When we use this heuristic, instead of considering all the reasons why we might choose one alternative over another, we pick just one single reason and base our decision exclusively on it.

A classic example is the tendency to think that pointing out a single negative effect of a course of action we were initially unsympathetic to is enough to show that we should not adopt it. This attitude is biased, since it does not take into account the possible positive effects of that course of action, nor does it assess whether the other available options are even worse. For example, even if the course of action in question had only negative effects, it might still be the least negative course of action compared with the other available options.

Similarly, another example is the tendency to think that pointing out a single positive effect of a course of action we were initially sympathetic to is enough to show that we should adopt it. Again, this is biased, since it does not take into account the possible negative effects of that course of action, nor does it assess whether the other available options are even better. For example, even if the option we were initially sympathetic to had only positive effects, there might still be other, better options available.

These biases are also related to the affect heuristic⁶⁹. This heuristic is a mental shortcut by which we choose options based on whether they arouse positive or negative feelings in us, instead of trying to estimate their probable actual positive and negative effects. Often, even when we realize that we are doing this, instead of being suspicious of the initial intuition, we tend to rationalize it and to select information and arguments arbitrarily (and sometimes even distort them) so that they confirm the initial judgment.

4.11. Biases that lead to the acceptance of bad arguments

The following biases play a fundamental role in leading people to accept bad arguments.

Belief bias: an effect in which someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the fact that they believe the conclusion. This bias can lead us to accept and repeat arguments whose conclusions we accept (even if the arguments are bad) and to dismiss arguments that challenge our beliefs (even if the arguments are good). This is also related to the conservatism bias in belief revision, which we saw in section 4.4.

Illusory truth effect: the tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process, or if it has been stated multiple times, regardless of its actual truth.

Fluency heuristic: the more skillfully or elegantly an idea is communicated, the more likely it is to be taken seriously, whether or not it is plausible.

Rhyme-as-reason effect: rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful.

Authority bias: the tendency to trust the opinion of someone we regard as an authority on the subject and to be influenced by that opinion, regardless of whether or not the opinion is plausible. This effect occurs regardless of whether the person really is an authority on the subject (it is enough that we regard them as one).

4.12. The continued influence effect

The continued influence effect occurs when a mistaken belief continues to influence memory and reasoning even though it has already been corrected and we agree with the correction. A related bias is the misinformation effect, in which the original memory is affected by incorrect information received later.

In animal advocacy, two kinds of attitudes that seem to be examples of these biases are the following:

(1) It is not unusual for animal advocates to mention that 80 billion animals are killed for consumption worldwide each year. When they are told that this is only the number of mammals and birds killed, and that this represents at most 0.2% of the animals killed for consumption (the overwhelming majority are aquatic animals, both invertebrates and vertebrates, and terrestrial invertebrates), their reaction is usually to agree that it is essential to correct the statistic they were citing. However, their subsequent behavior is usually to keep mentioning that 80 billion animals are killed for consumption each year.

(2) It is not unusual for animal advocates to think that environmentalism values the good of animals in itself, and that it aims to preserve the environment as a resource for animals. When it is explained that exactly the opposite is the case — that is, that environmentalism values in themselves nonsentient entities such as ecosystems and species, and usually sees animals merely as resources for maintaining those entities — many advocates acknowledge that they were mistaken and that it is important to explain this to the public. However, afterward they usually continue to emphasize that the ultimate goal of environmentalism is the good of animals, and to support environmentalist measures that are very harmful to animals.

4.13. Biases that lead to resistance to serious argumentation

4.13.1. The relationship between biases and intuitions

In his classic work on biases, Kahneman (2012, ch. 1) distinguishes two modes of thinking, which he calls System 1 and System 2. System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2, by contrast, allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations; it takes longer to carry out its operations and invests more energy.

Biases arise primarily from the way System 1 operates, since they arise from unreflective automatic responses. However, System 1 generates impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2 (because of this, biases can “hide” at the root of System 2's beliefs and choices). The author emphasizes, however, that in spite of this there are circumstances in which System 2 manages to override the impulses and associations of System 1, and in those circumstances the agent is able to modify their beliefs and decisions on the basis of the deliberations carried out by System 2.

In psychology, biases are usually discussed in terms of leading to systematic errors of reasoning concerning descriptions of facts, calculations, and instrumental reasoning (that is, choosing the means to achieve a given goal). However, the influence exerted by System 1 also leads to biases when we think about ethical questions. We will see something about this below.

When we think about ethical questions, we tend to have automatic reactions. For any ethical question, we automatically tend to think: “this should be forbidden!”; “this should be optional!”; “this should be required!”; “this is praiseworthy, but it should not be required,” and so on. Most of the time, these automatic responses are accompanied by strong emotional reactions. This does not mean that the judgments arising from these automatic responses are necessarily mistaken. However, it does mean that we cannot infer that they are necessarily correct. For example, many of these intuitive judgments may simply be an expression of the prejudices we hold. We will only know whether or not this is the case if we critically examine these judgments (something that requires System 2 to be at work). However, the stronger the feelings associated with these automatic judgments, the harder it will be for someone to accept the possibility that their initial judgment may be mistaken (and, therefore, the greater their aversion to testing these judgments will be).

This is why we have reason to view with suspicion the very widespread idea that, to find out what the right attitude is on ethical questions, we should follow our intuitions and feelings. Until not long ago, the intuitions and feelings of most people leaned toward approving of human slavery. It is possible that our intuitions and feelings are currently inclining us to do a whole series of things that, if we reflected seriously on them, we would consider unjustifiable. And, again, the very fact that these judgments are intuitive and generate strong feelings is one of the main factors inclining us not to question them and to see them as self-evident. Therefore, the fact that a judgment is intuitive, far from justifying it, is a reason to be suspicious of it.

If people have an aversion to the possibility of being wrong in their moral judgments (because they have strong feelings about these questions), this may incline them not only to avoid testing these judgments, but also to claim that rational reflection in ethics is useless (not because they themselves think so, but because they know that such reflection may reveal that their judgments are mistaken). Or else, they may genuinely believe that rational reflection in ethics is useless simply because of their ignorance of the complexity of these questions. For example, they may say something like “this business of reflecting on what is right or wrong is for people who weren't born knowing what is right and wrong.” Paradoxically, it is their very ignorance of the argumentative debate surrounding the various ethical questions, and of their complexity, that makes them so certain that they are right in their moral judgments. In short, paradoxically, the fact that a person considers themselves very intelligent and/or morally upright is one of the main factors preventing them from correcting their cognitive and/or moral failings. This tendency explains much of the high degree of neglect (and even rejection) of ethical argumentation on the part of advocates (for the animal cause and for others).

When discussing ethical questions, people tend either simply to repeat what they already said before (without trying to offer any argument to support their position) or to rationalize their initial beliefs (that is, they try at all costs to present some argument to show that their initial belief is correct, without putting those initial judgments to the test). The result is that their discussion of particular ethical questions is generally conducted in a way that reflects the prejudices they hold.

Ethicists are not exempt from this kind of attitude. In fact, this attitude is very widespread among specialists. To confirm this, one need only look at the number of works in moral philosophy in which the author tries to build an argument aimed at justifying the initial belief he already held about a given question. It is less noticeable that ethicists also have the bias of trying to confirm what they already thought because, unlike the nonspecialist public, they have a greater ability to use words to conceal their biased attitudes. Of course, it may be that, after careful and impartial reflection, someone concludes that their initial beliefs about a given subject were plausible. However, this is different from starting one's reasoning with the aim of rationalizing the initial belief without putting it to the test. The most basic attitude in terms of intellectual honesty is to be prepared to change one's initial beliefs if reflection shows that they were mistaken. This does not happen when someone “takes the field” with the aim of proving their initial beliefs at all costs.

Another factor that inclines people to trust their intuitive judgments on ethical questions is that the work of System 2 involves a considerably greater expenditure of energy⁷⁰. This is expressed in everyday language as “thinking is hard work!” It is simply more comfortable not to put our judgments to the test. Moreover, avoiding critical evaluation is also a way of avoiding cognitive dissonance (that is, the uncomfortable feeling we have when we realize that we hold beliefs that conflict with one another or attitudes that conflict with our beliefs, or when we realize that we are wrong).

However, as we have seen, critical reflection (which is an operation of System 2) has the potential to correct the impulses of System 1. This is often difficult. It requires considerable effort and constant practice. It also requires the humility needed to accept the possibility that we are mistaken in our beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. This is why the more intelligent or morally upright someone judges themselves to be, the harder it is for that person to correct their failings, whether cognitive or moral.

The realization that thinking critically about ethical questions may show that we are mistaken, much more than the considerable expenditure of energy involved in deliberation, contributes to driving people away from reflecting on ethics. That is, the greatest virtue of critical reflection (being able to correct our mistakes) is also what most drives people away from it. However, this is not a defect of critical reflection. The defect lies with people themselves: they hate finding out that they may be mistaken, and this happens because they have an excessively positive image of themselves.

When a person's aversion to the possibility of being mistaken is very great, this can lead them not only to not want to reflect on ethical questions: they may want to emphasize that such reflection is a waste of time. In extreme cases (which are not, for all that, uncommon) they may even try to prevent other people from putting the discussion on the agenda (since they do not want even themselves to know that they may be mistaken, much less for others to know it). The angry reaction many people have against veganism, and also the angry reaction many vegans have against the proposal to reduce the suffering of wild animals, is in many cases simply this: a reflection of their discomfort with the possibility of being mistaken..

We saw above that three of the main factors inclining people not to examine their positions in ethics are: (1) aversion to the possibility of being mistaken; (2) failing to grasp the complexity of the questions; and (3) aversion to activities that require effort. However, these same factors also incline people not to examine their descriptive beliefs. If so, why is the neglect of testing moral beliefs generally greater than the neglect of testing descriptive beliefs? We will explore this question below.

First, it could be pointed out that, with regard to descriptive beliefs, we realize that in many cases, if we refuse to test them, we run the risk of being harmed by those beliefs. For example, if someone believes there are no piranhas in a lake, it is prudent to test that belief before getting into the water. In the case of moral beliefs, however, it is almost always others who are harmed by our refusal to examine those beliefs.

Moreover, most moral beliefs (though not all, as we will see below) generate stronger feelings than most descriptive beliefs. This is because moral beliefs have to do with how we evaluate ourselves as persons (for example, as people who do the right thing, as people of good character, in short, as good people). The stronger the feeling associated with the idea that a belief is correct, the harder it is to consider the possibility that it is wrong. For example, it is easier for someone to correct their initial belief that the North Pole is colder than the South Pole (in fact, the reverse is true) than to correct their initial belief that a certain behavior they have engaged in all their life is wrong – even if they have also believed all their life that the North Pole is colder than the South Pole.

Of course, some descriptive beliefs also generate strong feelings of aversion to considering the possibility that they are mistaken (one example is the belief that the world is just and is not full of suffering). These examples (and those in the previous paragraph) suggest that the main factor influencing how averse someone will be to testing their initial belief has less to do with whether the belief is moral or descriptive, or with how long someone has held it, than with how important that belief is to their worldview. For example, knowing which of the Earth's poles is colder does not play a central role in most people's worldview; the idea that nature is a paradise, on the other hand, does. The same is true of changes in behavior. For example, if someone has to change the side of the sidewalk where they put out their trash, this does not generate as much resistance as having to change what they eat (since many more factors linked to pleasure and emotional attachments are involved in the case of food).

4.13.2. The false consensus effect, rationalization, and aversion to discussing arguments

Animal advocates often claim that it is a waste of time to present the arguments for the moral consideration of sentient beings, to discuss speciesism, to talk about ethics, or even to discuss and seriously analyze any question at all. According to these people, it would be a waste of time “because nobody wants to read and seriously evaluate anything.”

However, this claim may be strongly influenced by the false consensus effect, which occurs when we overestimate the extent to which others share our beliefs, values, and behaviors. It leads people to project their personal attitudes and ideas onto others. Thus, this bias can lead advocates to think that, since they themselves are not interested in reading and seriously discussing these questions, nobody else will be interested either.

However, this attitude is not necessarily the result of the false consensus effect. For example, depending on the case, the claim that the public will not be interested in these questions may not be the real reason why someone wants to convince us not to discuss them. It may be that the person themselves is not interested in these questions but believes that other people would be. Perhaps, however, they are saying that other people would not be interested as an attempt to convince us not to discuss these questions (but because they themselves do not want these questions discussed, even though they say it is because other people would have no interest in the topic). When this is the case, we are dealing not with the false consensus effect but with a rationalization (claiming that the reason for a behavior is one thing when it is in fact another), and we are also dealing with a normative objection disguised as a strategic objection⁷¹.

4.14. Conclusions

We have listed some biases that can influence us to resist thinking about new questions and revising our positions, whether on ethical or descriptive questions or on strategies for achieving our goals. We have seen how these biases influence, in particular, our decisions that affect nonhuman animals.

Here we have confined ourselves to listing a series of biases without a more detailed analysis of how much influence each one exerts. Moreover, many biases have also been left out. And, obviously, much of what has been said in this text will need to be corrected, and further developments will need to be added. For example, one could investigate whether some of the biases mentioned are unavoidable tendencies of how the human brain operates, which would make it possible to assess which of them are easier to reduce in influence. However, the intention here is merely to kick off a discussion about the influence of biases on decisions that affect animals, a discussion that is rarely had and that needs to be had if our goal is to be effective in making the world a less bad place.