Discussing Speciesism

There are three main positions on animals: they don't matter in themselves, they matter less than humans, or they matter equally when they suffer harms of the same size. Speciesism is giving someone less weight just because of their species.

Saying humans matter more “because they're human,” or “because they're our species,” justifies nothing: it just repeats the conclusion as if it were the reason.

An immortal soul, being made in the image of a deity, or other metaphysical traits don't justify speciesism: they can't be proven, they wouldn't apply only to humans, and above all they have nothing to do with being able to suffer.

Reason, language, a sense of justice, or political relationships don't justify disregarding animals: many humans lack them, some animals have some of them, and they're irrelevant to who can be harmed.

The appeal to potential fails because some humans have no potential to develop certain abilities, because potential isn't the same as having, and because a child's suffering matters now, not because of what she might become.

Saying what matters is belonging to the same species as those who have certain abilities is biased: it demands the abilities from animals but accepts humans without them just because of their group.

Even if species is a biological category and not a social construction, that doesn't make it fair to discriminate by species: enslaving people by height or skin color would also be based on biological traits, and it would be unfair.

From the fact that something is natural, common among animals, or instinctive, it doesn't follow that it's good or fair; there is no correlation between what is natural and what is justifiable.

A practice being traditional doesn't show that it's fair: many traditions have been unjust, and defending traditions because they benefit people or because they supposedly have intrinsic value doesn't justify harming the victims.

That only humans act morally doesn't show that only humans should be considered: confusing who can be held responsible with who needs consideration is like requiring a patient to be a doctor in order to be treated.

Even if ethics is a human invention, that doesn't make all positions equally arbitrary: math and science are also created activities, and in them some positions are better and some worse.

Even if ethics arose as self-protection, describing how an activity arose doesn't justify a view within it; and the idea that ethics is just self-interest doesn't even describe well how people act.

Appeals to authority, religious or otherwise, don't justify speciesism: by the Euthyphro dilemma, either the authority approves of something for good reasons, and then what matters is the reasons, or the approval is arbitrary.

The special status thesis, according to which some have a “trump card” that gives them priority even when they suffer less, fails the impartiality test: only those in the privileged group defend it.

Saying “there's no right or wrong in ethics” doesn't justify speciesism: this metaethical claim usually shows up only when the justifications run out, it's applied with a double standard, and whether true or false, it favors neither side.