Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Metaethics

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume I, p. 48 of the PDF edition · English translation

15.1. When metaethical claims are disguised normative claims

In debates about ethical questions, the claim almost always comes up that in ethics there is no objective right and wrong. Unlike normative claims such as "act x is right/wrong," this claim is metaethical, that is, it is a claim about ethics (and not about which actions are right/wrong).

This text will argue the following:

• In many of the cases in which this claim is made (perhaps the vast majority), what is actually sought with it is to ground a normative claim (namely, that the position one is defending in ethics is justified).
• However, metaethical claims are incapable of doing any such thing.

This comes up in the debate over any ethical question. As an example, we will look at this discussion in the context of the debate about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals, explained below.

15.2. A moral double standard depending on the victims' species

Consider two situations involving nonhuman animals:

(1) Enormous numbers of nonhuman animals are exploited for the most diverse purposes: for consumption, in experiments, for clothing, entertainment, as workers and tools, and so on. This use usually involves killing them, as well as their having a life full of excruciating suffering, from beginning to end. Most people, however, seem to see nothing wrong with this. Yet if the victims were human, this would be seen as monstrous, to say the least.

(2) Wild animals, regardless of whether they are harmed by human practices, are also greatly harmed by natural processes, such as hunger, thirst, disease, natural disasters, accidents, hostile weather events, and so on. These conditions are the norm in nature, and have been since long before the human species appeared. In many cases it would be possible to prevent and minimize the suffering and deaths resulting from these events without thereby bringing about worse consequences in the long term. But the standard view is that, even so, what we should do is "let nature take its course." Yet, once again, if the victims were human, the standard attitude would be the opposite: it would be that we should help them.

These examples show that most people hold opposite attitudes depending on whether or not the victims belong to the human species.

15.3. When does the claim that there is no right/wrong in ethics come up?

Attempts are sometimes made to justify this double standard by claiming that there is no right and wrong in ethics: "in ethics, everything is relative," people say.

This claim usually does not come up at the beginning of a debate. On the contrary: people normally start by trying to show that there is some good reason to give full respect only to humans. It is only when they realize that none of the arguments they offer really justifies what they intend that they jump to the claim that there is no right and wrong in ethics.

But if they really believe there is no right and wrong in ethics, why were they trying until then to show that the position they defend is correct? This attitude is similar to that of someone who accepts the rules of the game while winning but, on seeing that they are about to lose, says they do not accept those rules.

So it seems that what actually happens is that these people realize they have not found any good justification for what they defend, but refuse to admit that they have "lost," and so start claiming that there is no right and wrong.

15.4. Could metaethical claims justify positions in ethics?

Debates usually begin on the ground of ethics itself, where reasons are offered for accepting or rejecting a given practice. Some people, when they see that they have no good reasons to defend what they defend, jump to the domain of metaethics, claiming that there is no right and wrong.

The question we should ask, then, is: can claims about metaethics ground conclusions about ethics (that is, conclusions about what to do in practice)? Below are some reasons to think this is not possible.

For the morality of each practice, there seem to be only three logical possibilities:

(1) Either we ought to do it; (2) Or we ought not to do it; (3) Or it makes no difference whether we do it or not.

These categories are usually expressed, respectively, by the terms required, forbidden, and permissible. For simplicity, I have included in the permissible category both acts that make no difference whether one does them or not and acts classified in some theories as praiseworthy but not required (also called supererogatory acts).

Whatever category someone claims a given practice falls into, it seems they are making that claim in objective terms (that is, they seem to be saying that whoever disagrees with placing it in the category in question is wrong). In other words, moral judgments seem to be objective by nature. Let us look at an example:

Sometimes, when someone says "there is no right and wrong in ethics" and intends thereby to justify a certain practice, what they seem to mean is that the practice in question should be permissible (that is, that it should be neither required nor forbidden). In other words, the person seems to mean that whoever wants to do it is justified, and that whoever does not want to is also justified.

But then they are claiming that there is an objective right and wrong regarding this practice. After all, they are claiming that the right thing is to consider it permissible, and that both those who think it should be forbidden and those who think it should be required are wrong. The same would apply if they were claiming that the practice in question should be required or forbidden. In any case, saying that "there is no right and wrong in ethics" adds nothing toward grounding the position being defended. On the contrary, it counts against it. Let us look at an example:

Suppose someone says: "practice X should be permissible." As we have seen, this seems to imply that the person is claiming that whoever thinks practice X should be forbidden or required is wrong. Suppose they add: "there is no right and wrong in ethics." What does this imply? Well, it implies that those who contradict what they are saying (that is, those who say practice X should be forbidden, and those who say it should be required) are not wrong (and it also implies that they themselves are not right in claiming that the practice should be permissible).

But that is not what these people usually mean. What they usually mean is that they themselves are right to make the judgment they make, and that whoever disagrees is wrong. But once they realize there is no good reason to defend what they defend, they claim there is no right and wrong in ethics. Yet, as we have seen, if that were so, then they could not say that those who disagree with them are wrong.

Important: we also add no reason in favor of what we are defending if we say "there is right and wrong in ethics," since this does not show that what we are defending is correct. In short, what counts are the reasons that can be put forward for and against a given practice (and, as we have seen, both saying that there is no right/wrong in ethics and saying that there is seem to add nothing to those reasons). That is why, it seems, claims about metaethics can serve as a basis neither for accepting nor for rejecting positions in ethics.

That being so, both asserting "there is no right and wrong in ethics" and asserting "there is right and wrong in ethics" offer no reason for (or against) speciesism. Therefore, appeals to metaethics are incapable of justifying speciesism.