An Overview of the Debate on the Moral Consideration of Animals

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume I, p. 8 of the PDF edition · English translation

1.1. Views according to which nonhuman animals do not matter in themselves

According to some views, the good of nonhuman animals does not matter in itself. On these views, the reasons against harming them and for helping them have nothing to do with the possible harm or benefit the animals themselves would experience, but rather with the indirect impact those attitudes would have on other things (which, by contrast, are seen as important in themselves), such as human interests¹ and environmentalist goals², like conserving species or ecosystems.

One example is the claim that what is wrong with causing suffering and death to a nonhuman animal has nothing to do with the harm to the animal, but rather with the risk that it might serve as practice for later harming humans, or with the idea that whoever attacks the animal would be wounding humanity in themselves through brutalization³.

Another example along these lines is the claim that the problem with consuming animals lies not in the harm done to the animals, but in the risk to human health or in its possible negative impact on the environment.

1.2. Views that give consideration to animals, but to a lesser degree

Positions of a second type agree that the good of nonhuman animals matters directly, but hold that it matters less than the good of humans⁴. They recognize that the possibility that nonhuman animals will be harmed if we adopt a certain course of action is already, in itself, a reason to try to avoid that course of action. However, they maintain that these reasons are weaker than they would be if humans were at risk of suffering an equivalent harm (or even a lesser harm, according to some positions in this group).

In short, these views give moral consideration to nonhuman animals, but they build hierarchies with humans at the top. This does not mean, however, that such positions will necessarily favor animal exploitation or oppose helping animals. Everything will depend on the weight each variant of this type of position gives to the good of animals compared with the conflicting human interest.

This group includes both positions that give very little consideration to animals and positions that consider them to a greater degree. An example of the former would be asking, "why worry about nonhuman animals while there are still so many humans in need of help?" The latter, on the other hand, might even oppose animal exploitation out of concern for the animals themselves, and might also recognize that we have direct reasons to help them, even when what threatens them is not human practices (as when they are victims of natural processes such as hunger, thirst, disease, natural disasters, and so on). What all these positions have in common, however, is that they would hold that these reasons are weaker than they would be if humans were at risk of suffering an equivalent harm (or even a lesser harm, according to some positions).

Sometimes other positions build similar hierarchies, based not on the species of individuals but on their cognitive capacities⁵. According to these views, equivalent harms (or even harms of lesser magnitude) matter more if they are suffered by more cognitively complex beings⁶. An example of this type of view is the claim that equivalent harms matter more if they are suffered by adult humans than by children, or by mammals than by fish.

1.3. Views that give equal consideration to all sentient beings

Finally, other positions defend equal consideration for all sentient beings, that is, for all beings capable of having positive and negative experiences. These positions hold that harms and benefits of similar magnitude should be given the same weight, regardless of the individuals' species, physical characteristics, capacities, the degree of relationship they have with us, and so on.

According to these positions, the harm caused to animals is sufficient to make animal exploitation unjust, regardless of any other indirect harms it may cause to humans or to the environment. However, as we have seen, this could also be recognized by some positions that give some consideration to animals, though less than that given to humans. What is distinctive about positions that defend equal consideration is that they would maintain that animal exploitation is just as unjust as it would be if humans were being exploited, suffering harms of similar magnitude.

The same holds for the harms animals suffer not as a result of human practices, but as a result of natural processes (such as disease, hunger, thirst, natural disasters, and so on). For example, the situation of wild animals is already very bad as a result of natural processes themselves. Again, we have seen that some positions that give some consideration to animals, though less than that given to humans, could recognize that in these cases too the harm to the animals already gives us direct reasons to try to help them. But positions that defend equal consideration would go further: they would say that we should give as much importance to trying to improve the situation of these animals as we would if human victims were suffering harms of similar magnitude.

In short, positions that defend equal consideration argue that nonhuman animals are discriminated against not only when they receive no consideration at all, but also when they receive lesser consideration. We will see more about this below:

1.4. Speciesism and anthropocentrism

The use of nonhuman animals as resources is widely accepted and practiced. However, doing the same to humans is widely considered unacceptable. For example, if humans were being bred and killed to be turned into food, it would hardly be said that the reasons for not eating them have to do with concern for our own health or for the environment. Instead, it would be recognized that the injustice the victims suffer is reason enough. But because the actual victims are nonhuman animals, the discourse is the opposite: concern for the animals is placed last (when it appears at all), behind concern for human interests and environmentalist goals;

Anthropocentric attitudes are not limited to exploitation. For example, as we have seen, wild animals constantly suffer and die prematurely as a result of hunger, thirst, disease, and natural disasters⁷. The common view is that there are reasons to help them only if doing so is necessary to achieve environmentalist goals⁸ (preserving endangered species, ecosystems, biodiversity, ecological balance, and so on) or anthropocentric ones (for example, preventing them from transmitting diseases to humans). Beyond that, what is usually advocated is "letting nature take its course." The suffering and mortality of animals living in the wild could in many cases be prevented, but given the predominance of this kind of mindset, people usually choose not to help them. By contrast, when humans are victims of the same natural processes, the common view is that we should help them, out of concern for their own good and not for indirect reasons.

These two kinds of situations show that most people rely on a moral double standard, depending on whether or not the victims belong to the human species. Since the 1970s, several authors⁹ have accused this double standard of committing a form of discrimination analogous to racism: speciesism¹⁰. Discrimination can be defined as unfavorable treatment that is unjust¹¹. Speciesism, then, is discrimination against those who do not belong to a certain species (or species). Anthropocentrism is therefore a form of speciesism: it is the unjust unfavorable treatment of those who do not belong to the human species.