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Arguments in logical form
The central argument of each chapter, laid out as premises and a conclusion. Study layer: a reconstruction of the author's reasoning, not the original text.
How to read them: if all the premises are true, the conclusion follows. Anyone who rejects the conclusion has to point out which premise is false, and why. That is exactly what the whole collection does with the objections.
Volume I · Discussing Speciesism
An Overview of the Debate on the Moral Consideration of Animals
- P1 Discrimination is unfavorable treatment that is unfair.
- P2 Giving less weight to harms of the same size just because the victim belongs to another species is unfavorable treatment.
- P3 Species alone doesn't explain why someone's harm should count for less.
- C Therefore, this treatment is discrimination: speciesism.
Is Species What Matters?
- P1 To justify treating someone worse, you have to point to a difference that is relevant to the treatment in question.
- P2 Saying “because they're human” or “because they're our species” only repeats the criterion being questioned.
- P3 Repeating the criterion instead of justifying it is begging the question.
- C Therefore, these appeals don't justify anthropocentrism.
Could Metaphysical Characteristics Justify Speciesism?
- P1 What is at stake in moral consideration is whether those affected can be harmed or benefited.
- P2 Having a soul or some other metaphysical trait doesn't change whether someone can be harmed or benefited.
- P3 Besides, these traits can't be proven.
- C Therefore, appealing to them doesn't justify disregarding animals.
Could the Possession of Capacities or Relationships Justify Speciesism?
- P1 If the lack of certain abilities in babies and in humans with certain disabilities doesn't justify treating them worse, the lack of those abilities in animals doesn't either.
- P2 The lack of these abilities in those humans doesn't justify treating them worse.
- P3 Moreover, what matters for consideration is being able to be harmed or benefited, not having these abilities.
- C Therefore, having certain abilities or relationships doesn't justify speciesism.
Could Humans' Supposed Potential Justify Speciesism?
- P1 Some humans don't even have the potential to develop those abilities.
- P2 We don't think it's fair to do to these humans what is done to animals.
- P3 The reasons not to cause a child suffering exist because suffering is bad, not because of her potential.
- C Therefore, potential doesn't justify disregarding animals.
Is What Matters Belonging to the Same Species as Those Who Have Certain Capacities?
- P1 The appeal to the group says humans without certain abilities count because their species typically has them.
- P2 This demands the abilities from animals but not from humans.
- P3 A criterion applied differently to each group is biased.
- P4 Moreover, neither species nor abilities are relevant to being able to be harmed.
- C Therefore, the appeal to the group doesn't justify speciesism.
If Species Are Not a Social Construct, Is Speciesism Justified?
- P1 Racism and sexism are unfair because they disadvantage individuals of certain groups in a biased way.
- P2 They would still be unfair even if race and gender were purely biological categories.
- P3 The same goes for species: being a biological category doesn't make it relevant to the weight of suffering.
- C Therefore, the distinction between biological and socially constructed doesn't justify speciesism.
If Speciesism Is Natural, Is Speciesism Justified?
- P1 If “natural” meant “justifiable,” everything that happens in nature would be acceptable for us.
- P2 Many natural things, like disease, infanticide, and violence, are clearly unacceptable when they affect us.
- P3 Therefore, being natural doesn't make something justifiable.
- C So speciesism being natural, if it were, wouldn't justify it.
Does the Fact That Speciesist Practices Are Traditions Show That We Should Respect Them?
- P1 Many past traditions, like slavery, were deeply unjust.
- P2 So being a tradition isn't enough to show that a practice is fair.
- P3 Traditions that exploit animals cause suffering and death to the victims.
- C If what matters is how individuals are affected, we have strong reasons to abolish these traditions.
If Ethics Is a Human Activity, Is It Just to Disregard Animals?
- P1 The beneficiaries of a practice don't need to be able to carry it out.
- P2 The ability to reflect on right and wrong is relevant to who can be held responsible, not to who can be harmed.
- P3 Many humans aren't moral agents either, and they are still considered.
- C Therefore, ethics being a human activity doesn't justify disregarding animals.
If Ethics Is an Invention, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
- P1 An activity having been invented doesn't imply that all positions within it are arbitrary.
- P2 In ethics, there are biased positions and positions that aren't, such as the principle of equal consideration.
- P3 Speciesism is a biased position.
- C Therefore, ethics being an invention doesn't justify disadvantaging animals.
If Ethics Was Invented for Self-Protection, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
- P1 The argument concludes that we should consider only those who can threaten us, because ethics supposedly arose from self-interest.
- P2 Describing the origin of an activity is not the same as justifying a position within it.
- P3 Moreover, if it held, the argument would permit disregarding defenseless humans.
- C Therefore, the appeal to self-interest doesn't justify speciesism.
Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Authorities
- P1 Either an authority approves of a practice because it is right, or the practice becomes right by being approved.
- P2 If the authority approves because it is right, what matters is the reasons, which anyone can evaluate.
- P3 If the practice becomes right just by being approved, the approval is arbitrary.
- P4 In neither case does the authority, by itself, justify the practice.
- C Therefore, the appeal to authority doesn't justify speciesism.
The Appeal to Differentiated Degrees of Moral Status
- P1 The Magnitude Thesis says the strength of our reasons depends on the size of the harm or benefit, not on species.
- P2 The Status Thesis says some have priority even when they would be harmed less.
- P3 A fair rule is one we would choose without knowing which group we'd be in.
- P4 Not knowing, we wouldn't choose to give one group a trump card against greater harms suffered by another.
- C Therefore, differentiated moral status is unfair.
Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Metaethics
- P1 Claiming “there's no right or wrong” is a metaethical thesis, not a reason in favor of a normative position.
- P2 If it were true, it would apply equally against speciesism and in favor of it.
- P3 Those who use it tend to apply it only when the victims are animals, which reveals a double standard.
- C Therefore, appeals to metaethics don't justify speciesism.
Volume II · Considering Sentient Beings
What Is Relevant to Knowing to Whom We Owe Consideration?
- P1 Moral consideration exists because our decisions can harm or benefit those affected.
- P2 So everyone who can be harmed or benefited should be considered.
- P3 Defenses of anthropocentrism just assume that their criteria (species, reason, language) are relevant, without explaining why.
- C Therefore, the relevant criterion is being able to be harmed or benefited, not these anthropocentric criteria.
What Is the Argument from Species Overlap?
- P1 The abilities and relationships used to exclude animals are not present in all humans.
- P2 Their absence in babies and in certain humans doesn't justify treating them worse.
- P3 If the absence of these traits doesn't justify treating humans worse, it doesn't justify treating animals worse either.
- C Therefore, these abilities and relationships don't justify disregarding animals.
What Is Sentience and Why Does It Matter?
- P1 To be harmed or benefited, things have to be able to be experienced as good or bad.
- P2 Sentience is the capacity to have those experiences.
- P3 So only sentient beings can be harmed or benefited.
- C Therefore, sentience is what matters for moral consideration.
Which Beings Are Sentient?
- P1 We have no direct access to the experiences of other beings, not even of other humans.
- P2 We infer sentience from indicators: a centralized nervous system, physiology, overall behavior, and evolutionary advantage.
- P3 Vertebrates and many invertebrates, such as octopuses, crustaceans, and insects, show these indicators.
- C Therefore, we have good reasons to consider them sentient.
Why Equal Consideration?
- P1 Harms and benefits of similar magnitude should be given the same weight.
- P2 Giving less weight to a harm just because of species violates this principle.
- P3 Speciesism can happen through exploitation, through failing to help, through lesser consideration, or against certain species of animals.
- C Therefore, equal consideration requires rejecting all these forms of speciesism.
Could Questions of Desert Justify Speciesism?
- P1 Someone deserves a harm only if they're an accountable agent and have broken some rule.
- P2 Nonhuman animals are not accountable agents.
- P3 So animals don't deserve the harms they suffer.
- C Therefore, desert doesn't justify failing to prioritize them when they suffer the greater harm.
Is the Rejection of Speciesism Compatible with Only One View of Ethics?
- P1 There are very different ethical theories: utilitarianism, maximin, egalitarianism, and others.
- P2 They disagree about many situations, but all of them require not being biased when considering the good of those affected.
- P3 Speciesism is a form of bias.
- C Therefore, rejecting speciesism is compatible with many ethical views, not just with utilitarianism.
If We Reject Speciesism, How Will We Decide Questions of Priority?
- P1 In most situations we can't help everyone.
- P2 There are priority criteria that don't depend on species: how serious the situation is, the number of victims, the size of the benefit, and future impact.
- P3 These criteria are compatible with equal consideration.
- C Therefore, it's false that, without species hierarchies, we'd have no guidance for deciding.
But Aren't Humans Capable of Suffering to a Greater Degree?
- P1 The thesis says humans always suffer more because they have more sophisticated cognition.
- P2 In many situations, those who understand less suffer more, because they don't grasp what's happening.
- P3 Moreover, lower cognitive capacity usually increases vulnerability.
- P4 And even if someone suffered less, that wouldn't justify disregarding them.
- C Therefore, a higher degree of cognition doesn't justify the treatment given to animals.
What Would We Decide Under Conditions of Impartiality?
- P1 A fair decision is impartial: it's the one we'd choose without knowing which position we'd occupy among those affected.
- P2 This test can include not knowing whether we'd be born human or animal.
- P3 Not knowing, we wouldn't choose animal exploitation or giving animals less weight.
- C Therefore, animal exploitation and speciesism are unfair.
Testing Whether an Attitude Is Speciesist
- P1 An attitude is speciesist if it treats sentient beings worse because of their species.
- P2 If the decision would change just by changing the species of those affected, or our own position, then species is weighing on the decision.
- P3 The practices that affect animals don't pass this test.
- C Therefore, besides being unjustified, these practices call on us to do something to change them.
How Much Importance Should We Give to the Situation of Animals?
- P1 A cause's priority depends on severity, the number of victims, and the degree of neglect.
- P2 Nonhuman victims are vastly more numerous, in a very serious situation, and much more neglected.
- P3 The view that humans should always come first only seems reasonable because of speciesism.
- C Therefore, under impartiality, the animal cause should receive very high priority.
Uncertainty About Sentience and the Benefit of the Doubt
- P1 We have no absolute proof of the sentience of any being other than ourselves.
- P2 If a being is sentient and we treat it as if it weren't, the harm is great; if it isn't and we treat it as if it were, the cost is small.
- P3 When one mistake is much more serious than the other, we should err on the side of caution.
- C Therefore, beings of uncertain sentience should be given the benefit of the doubt.
Volume III · Animals and the Harm of Death
What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of?
- P1 Someone can be harmed by the presence of what's negative or by the absence of what's positive.
- P2 Death prevents the individual from enjoying the positive things they would have lived.
- P3 So death is a harm, even when it's painless.
- C And even if the Epicurean view were correct, it would deny the harm of death to everyone, humans included, not just to animals.
Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death
- P1 Death harms by preventing the positive things the individual would have lived.
- P2 This doesn't depend on the individual understanding what death is or having future-directed desires.
- P3 Sentient animals can have a minimally meaningful life ahead of them.
- C Therefore, they are harmed by death.
Objections to the Account of the Harm of Death as the Prevention of What Is Positive
- P1 The objections point to uncertainty about the future, the asymmetry between the time before birth and after death, and the beings who could exist.
- P2 In general, we can estimate whether a life is likely to be positive.
- P3 The time of death can be changed; the time of birth typically can't, which explains the asymmetry.
- C Therefore, these objections don't overturn the account of the harm of death as deprivation.
Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
- P1 The argument says death harms only slightly those who are incapable of intellectual pleasures.
- P2 To show that, it would have to show that non-intellectual pleasures are of little value.
- P3 Showing that intellectual pleasures are more valuable doesn't show that.
- P4 Moreover, non-intellectual experiences, like being with those we love, can be as valuable as intellectual ones.
- C Therefore, animals are not only slightly harmed by death for lacking intellectual pleasures.
How Can We Assess How Much Someone Is Harmed by Death?
- P1 Death harms by what it prevents that is positive.
- P2 The greater the value someone is deprived of, the greater the harm.
- P3 That value depends on the lifetime lost and its quality, measured in QALYs.
- C Therefore, the magnitude of the harm of death can be estimated by the QALYs lost, for animals too.
Objections to Assessing the Magnitude of the Harm of Death on the Basis of QALYs
- P1 The objection says QALYs have counterintuitive implications, so they should be rejected.
- P2 Intuitions can reflect biases, like speciesism, and need to be tested.
- P3 The objection offers no alternative criterion grounded independently.
- C Therefore, until that happens, we have reasons to rely on QALYs.
Do Animals Have Weaker Psychological Connectedness?
- P1 The objection says animals have weak psychological connectedness to the future, and so are only slightly harmed by death.
- P2 Simpler minds tend to vary less, which can mean a greater proportion of contents in common.
- P3 Moreover, someone who has lived only briefly and would have a good future is greatly harmed by dying, whatever their psychological connectedness.
- C Therefore, psychological connectedness doesn't show that animals are only slightly harmed by death.
Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Replaceable
- P1 The thesis says killing an animal is offset by the birth of another with an equally good life.
- P2 If that held, it would permit killing children as long as others were born to replace them.
- P3 Killing someone who already exists harms someone; not creating a new being harms no one who already exists.
- C Therefore, animals are not replaceable.
Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
- P1 The appeal to psychological connectedness says that prudential reasons (reasons about our own future) depend on the degree of connectedness.
- P2 Examples show we have strong reasons to avoid bad events and pursue good ones, even with little psychological connectedness.
- P3 So the strength of these reasons doesn't depend on psychological connectedness.
- C Therefore, psychological connectedness doesn't show that animals are only slightly harmed by death.
The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a Small Harm
- P1 The claim says those with little time left are only slightly harmed by death.
- P2 This is already rejected in the human case: elderly and seriously ill people are still greatly harmed if killed.
- P3 Moreover, subjective time may pass differently for smaller animals.
- P4 Rejecting this for humans and accepting it for animals would require a special status, which isn't justified.
- C Therefore, having little time left doesn't justify killing.
What If Humans Were More Harmed by Death?
- P1 The chapter supposes, just for the sake of argument, that humans would be more harmed by death.
- P2 It doesn't follow that killing animals is permitted: being less harmed is still being harmed.
- P3 Nor does it follow that we may kill some to save others, or that the number of victims doesn't matter.
- C Therefore, even with this supposition, the usual conclusions about animals don't follow.
Differentiated Moral Status, the Harm of Death, and the Wrongness of Killing
- P1 Direct reasons against killing can depend on the harm of death (the Magnitude Thesis) or on a special status (the Status Thesis).
- P2 The two-tier approach gives certain individuals a protected status and treats the rest only by magnitude.
- P3 Under impartiality, we wouldn't choose to give this status to one group.
- C Therefore, the strength of the reasons against killing should depend only on the magnitude of the harm of death.
Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational Decision, and Probabilities
- P1 “Death” can mean the end of biological life or the annihilation of consciousness.
- P2 There's uncertainty about whether death is annihilation and, if it isn't, whether the afterlife would be better or worse.
- P3 On the other hand, we know how the current life would probably go on.
- C Therefore, the possibility of life after death doesn't justify killing individuals who have a good life.
Volume IV · The Debate on Animal Exploitation
How Do the Animals Exploited by Humans Live and Die?
- P1 Animal exploitation causes intense suffering and death to an enormous number of animals.
- P2 Treating humans this way would be considered unacceptable because suffering and dying like that seriously harms the victims.
- P3 Exploited animals are also seriously harmed by it.
- C Therefore, accepting for them what would be unacceptable for humans is an unjustified double standard.
Why Is Animal Exploitation Unjust?
- P1 For it not to violate equal consideration, it would have to be acceptable to do the same to humans facing similar harms.
- P2 We wouldn't accept exploiting humans who suffered similar harms.
- P3 Under impartiality, we wouldn't accept animal exploitation without knowing whether we'd be human or animal.
- C Therefore, animal exploitation is unjust, whatever its production model.
What Is Veganism?
- P1 Animals are exploited because there is demand for animal products and services.
- P2 Paying for these products causes more animals to be born to suffer and die.
- P3 Those who respect animals for their own sake have reasons not to contribute to this.
- C Therefore, veganism is the position consistent with respect for animals, and also a way of exposing the injustice they suffer.
What About Plants?
- P1 Being alive is not the same as being sentient.
- P2 The main indicator of sentience is a centralized nervous system, which plants don't have.
- P3 If plants were sentient, raising animals would kill even more plants, since animals eat lots of plants.
- C Therefore, the plant objection doesn't justify eating animals; if it held, it would lead to fruitarianism.
The Objection That Consuming Animals Is Natural
- P1 “Eating meat is natural” can mean it's possible, instinctive, done by other animals, or part of the food chain.
- P2 In none of these senses does being natural imply being justifiable.
- P3 Other animals also kill babies and steal, and we don't think that gives us permission to do the same.
- C Therefore, the naturalness objection doesn't justify consuming animals.
The Claim That Consuming Animals Puts an End to Their Suffering
- P1 The argument says killing animals is good for them, since it frees them from a life of suffering.
- P2 In exploitation, it's demand that causes animals to be born into conditions of suffering.
- P3 If the concern were real, the right thing would be to stop breeding animals to suffer, not to keep consuming.
- C Therefore, the argument is an excuse to keep consuming, not a real reason.
Is Raising Animals for Consumption Justified Because It Brings Them into Existence?
- P1 The argument says animal farming benefits animals because it makes them exist.
- P2 Most exploited animals have lives of intense suffering, in which being born isn't a benefit.
- P3 Even when it were, causing a benefit doesn't give the right to cause a harm.
- P4 And by the overall balance, replacement tends to generate more suffering over time.
- C Therefore, bringing animals into existence doesn't justify raising them for consumption.
Does It Matter What We Would Do on a Desert Island or in a Burning House?
- P1 The argument starts from what we would do in catastrophic situations.
- P2 What we would do isn't necessarily what's right.
- P3 Even if it's right in emergencies, our everyday situations are very different.
- C Therefore, desert island scenarios don't justify consuming animals in everyday life.
Is It Necessary to Consume Animal Products?
- P1 The argument says consuming animals is justified because it's necessary for health.
- P2 Bodies like the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics and the NHS recognize that well-planned vegan diets are healthy at every stage of life.
- P3 So consuming animal products isn't necessary for health.
- C Therefore, necessity doesn't justify consumption.
Is Veganism Only for the Rich?
- P1 The argument says veganism is out of reach because it's expensive.
- P2 The staple foods of a vegan diet are among the cheapest.
- P3 More expensive processed vegan products aren't necessary.
- P4 And if they were expensive, that would be a reason to increase demand and bring prices down.
- C Therefore, veganism isn't just for the rich.
If the World Went Vegan, Would There Be an Excess of Domesticated Animals?
- P1 Farmed domesticated animals exist in such numbers because they're bred to meet demand.
- P2 The world wouldn't go vegan overnight, but gradually.
- P3 With less demand, fewer animals would be bred.
- C Therefore, a vegan world would have far fewer domesticated animals, not a surplus.
Would Veganism Ruin the Economy and Cost Jobs?
- P1 The argument says we shouldn't be vegan because it would hurt the economy and jobs.
- P2 Economic benefits don't justify causing suffering and death to victims, just as they wouldn't with humans.
- P3 Moreover, demand for vegan products creates new job opportunities.
- C Therefore, the economic argument doesn't justify animal exploitation.
But Does Veganism Really Have a Practical Impact?
- P1 The impact of veganism should be measured by comparison with what would happen without it.
- P2 Each vegan reduces demand for animal products over their lifetime.
- P3 Less demand means fewer animals raised and killed.
- C Therefore, veganism has a practical impact, and not a small one.
But Doesn't Veganism Cause Even More Deaths Than Consuming Animals?
- P1 The argument says agriculture for vegan diets causes more deaths than consuming animals.
- P2 There's no evidence for this, and raising animals requires far more cropland for feed.
- P3 Even if it were true, the long-term consequences of advocating consideration for animals would be better.
- C Therefore, the argument doesn't justify rejecting veganism.
Does Concern for Species Justify Consuming Animals?
- P1 The argument presupposes that species matter in themselves.
- P2 It presupposes that they matter so much they would justify extreme suffering and death of sentient beings.
- P3 And it presupposes that these species would disappear without consumption.
- P4 The first is controversial, there are strong reasons against the second, and the third is false.
- C Therefore, the argument is not sound.
The Claim That the Struggle for Animals Should Be Put Off Until Later
- P1 The argument says we should leave the defense of animals to future generations.
- P2 Each person convinced makes a big difference to the animals affected by their decisions.
- P3 There's no proof that most people would reject the arguments in favor of animals.
- P4 Moreover, “the best way to help animals is to put humans first” may be disguised speciesism.
- C Therefore, there's no reason to postpone the struggle for animals.
Aren't Animals Already Protected by the Law?
- P1 Animal exploitation is legal and takes place within systems that legitimize it.
- P2 Animals have the legal status of property.
- P3 As long as they are property, they can't have legal rights that meaningfully protect their interests.
- C Therefore, the law doesn't protect animals from exploitation; changing this requires changing the way people see them.
The Claim That Animal Advocates Are Imposing Their Lifestyle
- P1 The argument holds that no rules should be imposed on how people treat animals.
- P2 At the same time, it accepts imposing extreme suffering and death on animals.
- P3 This is contradictory: it defends a right against impositions and a right to impose.
- C Therefore, the charge of “imposing a lifestyle” doesn't hold up.
The Exploitation of Insects and Why We Should Oppose It
- P1 There's growing evidence that many insects are sentient.
- P2 Insect exploitation kills trillions a year, in conditions of confinement, deprivation, and painful deaths.
- P3 If every sentient being matters, exploitation with so many victims is among the most important problems.
- P4 This conclusion holds even if each insect's good had less weight.
- C Therefore, we should oppose the exploitation of insects.
The Debate on Animal Experimentation
- P1 The defense of experimentation appeals to necessity, effectiveness, and greater weight for human interests.
- P2 There seems to be no justification for giving different weight to similar harms because of species.
- P3 We wouldn't accept equivalent experiments on non-consenting humans, even if they were useful.
- C Therefore, animal experimentation isn't justified; research should proceed by other means.
Volume V · Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals
Respect for animals and environmentalism: complementary or opposed?
- P1 Consideration for animals values the good of sentient beings in itself.
- P2 Environmentalism, in the sense used here, values non-sentient entities in themselves, such as species and ecosystems.
- P3 When these values conflict, environmentalism may prescribe harming animals.
- C Therefore, the two positions are not the same thing, nor are they always complementary.
The divergence concerns ends, not only means
- P1 Environmentalism and animal advocacy are often seen as having the same goal and differing only in means.
- P2 In fact, animal advocacy values sentient beings, and environmentalism values species and ecosystems.
- P3 Considering individuals is compatible both with saving the majority and with other positions; considering “the whole” isn't considering the majority.
- C Therefore, the disagreement is about ends.
Despite their differences, do animal advocacy and environmentalism converge in practice?
- P1 The argument says that since animals need the environment and environmentalism preserves it, the positions converge.
- P2 The environment can be preserved in very different configurations.
- P3 Environmentalism chooses configurations by criteria like originality, rarity, and biodiversity, not by animals' well-being.
- C Therefore, convergence happens in some cases, but not in others.
The divergence does not lie in a focus on the short or the long term
- P1 A common belief is that environmentalism thinks long-term and animal advocacy short-term.
- P2 Both can consider the long term.
- P3 Refusing to help for fear of causing more suffering later is a concern for sentient beings.
- C Therefore, the disagreement is about goals, not about time horizon.
Do ecological balance and biodiversity coincide with what is best for animals?
- P1 Ecological balance concerns the variation in population size; biodiversity, the variety of species.
- P2 Neither notion is based on what is best for sentient beings.
- P3 A population can be stable precisely because most of the young die early.
- C Therefore, balance and biodiversity don't indicate that animals are doing well.
Animal advocacy and environmentalism: the divergence is ethical, not scientific
- P1 Ecology describes how ecosystems work.
- P2 Which goals to pursue, such as animals' good or environmentalist values, is an ethical question.
- P3 Ecological knowledge can be used for any of these goals, including through welfare biology.
- C Therefore, animal advocacy can be as scientifically informed as environmentalism.
Why is respect for animals confused with environmentalism?
- P1 Animal advocacy and environmentalism have diverging and often conflicting goals.
- P2 Even so, they get confused for several reasons, including the confusion between environmentalism and ecology.
- P3 This confusion leads animal advocates to approve environmentalist practices that are very harmful to animals.
- C Therefore, understanding the difference is important so as not to act against what one defends.
What do environmentalist extermination programs aim at?
- P1 These programs are usually supported because people believe they prevent something worse for animals.
- P2 In several cases, they greatly increased suffering and deaths.
- P3 The real goal is to preserve valued ecological configurations, not the good of animals.
- P4 The people who approve of them do so only because they know they won't be the victims.
- C Therefore, extermination programs fail the impartiality test and are not just.
Is environmentalism anthropocentric?
- P1 Most environmentalists subordinate environmental goals to the good of humans, but not to that of animals.
- P2 That is anthropocentrism.
- P3 A few, like Linkola, would apply extermination to humans too, a purely environmentalist position.
- P4 Both positions sacrifice sentient beings for non-sentient entities, which isn't justified.
- C Therefore, there are good reasons to reject both.
Questioning environmentalist assumptions
- P1 Environmentalism presupposes that species and ecosystems have intrinsic value.
- P2 This hasn't been shown, much less that they're worth more than sentient beings.
- P3 Even if they had intrinsic value, that would allow limiting non-basic interests, but it wouldn't justify causing suffering and death.
- P4 Environmentalists themselves already accept this in the human case.
- C Therefore, environmentalist practices that cause suffering and death are unjustifiable.
Why are animal advocates reluctant to acknowledge the divergence?
- P1 Many animal advocates have supported environmentalist programs and organizations for years.
- P2 Acknowledging the disagreement would require revising beliefs and practices, which is hard because of biases.
- P3 Animal advocates ask others to overcome these biases regarding exploitation.
- C Therefore, they should also overcome them regarding environmentalism.
Volume VI · To Whom Do We Owe Moral Consideration?
What is relevant for knowing to whom we owe consideration?
- P1 A criterion is justified only if it's based on a distinction relevant to the question it's meant to answer.
- P2 The question of moral consideration is about who can be harmed or benefited by our decisions.
- P3 Being sentient is what makes someone capable of being harmed and benefited.
- C Therefore, sentience is the relevant criterion for moral consideration.
Is the criterion of sentience anthropocentric at bottom?
- P1 Anthropocentrism assigns value to animals according to how much they resemble humans.
- P2 The sentience criterion doesn't ask whether a being resembles humans, but whether it can be harmed or benefited.
- P3 Reason, unlike sentience, doesn't determine who can be harmed.
- C Therefore, the sentience criterion is not anthropocentric.
Does the criterion of sentience discriminate against those who do not belong to the animal kingdom?
- P1 The charge says the criterion discriminates against those who don't belong to the animal kingdom.
- P2 The criterion includes only sentient beings, and there are animals that are probably not sentient.
- P3 It would include sentient beings of any kingdom or substrate.
- C Therefore, the sentience criterion is not the same as “belonging to the animal kingdom.”
According to the criterion of sentience, is suffering the only problem?
- P1 A sentient being is harmed by the presence of what's negative and by the absence of what's positive.
- P2 Death is an example of harm through the absence of the positive.
- P3 So the sentience criterion recognizes harms that don't involve suffering.
- C Thinking otherwise is one of the most common misunderstandings about the criterion.
If sentience is what matters, why are there harms that do not affect experiences?
- P1 There are harms that don't change the amount of positive and negative experiences.
- P2 This may be an objection to hedonism, the theory that well-being comes down to experiences.
- P3 The sentience criterion says who can be harmed, and it's compatible with theories that include preferences.
- P4 Preferences also depend on sentience in order to exist.
- C Therefore, these cases don't refute the sentience criterion.
Does the criterion of sentience exclude insects?
- P1 The objection says the sentience criterion excludes insects and proposes replacing it with the criterion of life.
- P2 There's evidence of sentience in several insect species that have been studied.
- P3 The others haven't failed the test: they've just barely been studied.
- C Therefore, the sentience criterion includes many insects, and there's no reason to replace it with the criterion of life.
Does accepting the criterion of sentience imply assuming that values are subjective?
- P1 The objection says that by valuing beings with subjectivity, the criterion assumes values are subjective.
- P2 “Subjective” can mean “relating to consciousness” or “without objective truth.”
- P3 One doesn't imply the other: suffering can have objective disvalue even though it's a conscious experience.
- C Therefore, the criterion doesn't imply that values are subjective.
Are animals with simpler brains less sentient?
- P1 The view says simpler brains mean less sentience and therefore less consideration.
- P2 Sentience, valence, and degree of cognition are different things.
- P3 Experiences may even be more intense in beings or stages with less cognition.
- P4 Giving less weight because of cognition is intelligencism, a form of discrimination.
- C Therefore, giving less consideration to cognitively less capable beings isn't justified.
If there is a need for environmental ethics, is the criterion of sentience wrong?
- P1 The argument says: if environmental ethics is necessary and makes sense, non-sentient entities have intrinsic value.
- P2 We also need an ethics of income distribution, and income has no intrinsic value.
- P3 So the need for an ethics about something doesn't show that this something has intrinsic value.
- C An ethics of environmental management, guided by the good of sentient beings, can answer environmental questions.
Isn't a World with Less Suffering, but Managed by Humans, Absurd?
- P1 The objection says it's absurd to prefer a world with less suffering but managed by humans.
- P2 Imagine a modified ecosystem, indistinguishable from a natural one, and better for sentient beings.
- P3 Saying it's worse just because of human influence reveals a prejudice against human action.
- C Therefore, the objection doesn't refute a sentience-centered ethics.
If Sentient Beings Should Be Respected, Does Nature Have Intrinsic Value?
- P1 The argument says: if sentient beings should be respected and are part of nature, nature has intrinsic value.
- P2 Sentient beings are considered because they can be affected positively or negatively.
- P3 Nature as a whole doesn't have this feature.
- C Therefore, considering sentient beings doesn't imply giving intrinsic value to nature.
Does the Sentience Criterion Imply Accepting Environmentalist Goals?
- P1 The defense says that since some sentient beings want nature to take its course, the sentience criterion leads to environmentalist goals.
- P2 Taking an interest into account doesn't mean it should be fulfilled if it conflicts with stronger interests.
- P3 Fulfilling this interest would mean suffering and death for an enormous number of sentient beings.
- C Therefore, the sentience criterion doesn't imply accepting environmentalist goals.
Do Species Have Interests?
- P1 To have interests, one must be able to be benefited or harmed.
- P2 Species are abstract entities: categories created to group living beings by similarity.
- P3 There's no “someone” who is the species and who could be harmed by ceasing to exist.
- C Therefore, species don't have interests; sentient individuals do.
If Some Nonsentient Entity Had Intrinsic Value, What Would Follow?
- P1 Showing that something has intrinsic value isn't the same as showing that it should have priority.
- P2 Only sentient beings can suffer, and only for them does death prevent positive experiences.
- P3 These are especially serious harms, which no non-sentient entity can suffer.
- C Therefore, in conflicts, there are strong reasons to prioritize sentient beings.
Is Biocentrism Better Because It Includes a Greater Number of Beings?
- P1 The argument says that if including more beings makes sentience better than anthropocentrism, then life is better than sentience.
- P2 What justifies including sentient beings is that they can be harmed, not the number.
- P3 It hasn't been shown that non-sentient living beings can be harmed.
- P4 And biocentrism would exclude non-living sentient beings, if any exist.
- C Therefore, biocentrism isn't better for being broader.
Sentience and Life: What Has Value as an End and What Has Value as a Means?
- P1 The objection says that since life is necessary for sentience, life has intrinsic value, and sentience is only a means to sustain it.
- P2 Something being necessary for something else doesn't give it intrinsic value.
- P3 We value being alive because life makes valuable experiences possible.
- C Therefore, being alive has value as a means to meaningful experiences, and not the other way around.
Can Nonsentient Living Beings Be Harmed?
- P1 Biocentrism says non-sentient living beings can be harmed.
- P2 Ordinary language speaks of the “good” of plants, but also of cars and machines.
- P3 It's hard to conceive of valuing states without experiencing them as positive or negative.
- C Therefore, there are reasons to think only sentient beings can be harmed.
Does the Behavior of Certain Plants and Fungi Show That They Value Certain Things?
- P1 Certain non-sentient living beings show complex behaviors.
- P2 These behaviors can be explained by physicochemical reactions and reflexes.
- P3 The possibility of another explanation doesn't show that it's the correct one.
- C Without a physical structure that creates the conditions for experiences, behavior alone isn't enough to conclude that there's sentience.
Does Life Without Sentience Have Value?
- P1 Biocentrism says life has intrinsic value; the sentience criterion says it's valuable because of the experiences it allows.
- P2 In a total irreversible coma, there's life, but there doesn't seem to be anything of value for the person.
- P3 If we could remain sentient without being alive, our existence would still be valuable.
- C Therefore, value lies in sentience, not in biological life.
Does Every Living Being Have “Biological Interests”?
- P1 The argument says all living beings have biological interests, just as sentient beings do.
- P2 In sentient beings, the interest in satisfying biological needs is instrumental to their well-being.
- P3 It's experiences, not needs, that make something in someone's interest.
- C Therefore, having biological needs isn't enough to have interests in the moral sense.
If Plants Are Morally Considerable, Does It Make No Difference Whether We Eat Animals or Plants?
- P1 Respect for plants is used to say it makes no difference whether we eat animals or plants.
- P2 Even biocentrists, like Paul Taylor, recognize suffering as intrinsically negative for sentient beings.
- P3 Eating animals causes suffering and consumes far more plants.
- C Therefore, if plants were considerable, the implication would be fruitarianism, not eating animals.
Volume VII · Ethics and the Situation of Wild Animals
What Should We Do About Animals Living in the Wild?
- P1 We have reasons to prevent harms because they are bad for those who suffer them, and to seek benefits because they are good for them.
- P2 The strength of these reasons depends on the size of the harm or benefit, not on whether its origin is human or natural.
- P3 Wild animals suffer enormous harms from natural processes.
- C So we have strong reasons to try to prevent and reduce these natural harms.
How Not to Understand the Issue
- P1 The argument says natural harms are not a matter of ethics because neither nature nor animals can be held responsible.
- P2 The question is put to us: should we help, or not?
- P3 Even claiming that helping is optional is an ethical position, since ethics also deals with what is permissible.
- C So natural harms are indeed a matter of ethics.
How Do Natural Processes Typically Affect Wild Animals?
- P1 Most species reproduce by producing an enormous number of offspring.
- P2 In stable populations, on average only one offspring per adult survives.
- P3 The rest die young, usually painfully.
- P4 Even if many eggs never develop into sentient beings and the young suffered less, the number of victims would still be gigantic.
- C So the situation of wild animals is, in general, very bad.
The View That It Is Not a Problem Because the Victims Are Nonhuman Animals
- P1 The common view gives importance to the suffering of wild animals only when it affects humans or environmental goals.
- P2 What explains why the good of humans matters in itself is that they can be harmed and benefited.
- P3 That holds for any sentient being.
- C So the good of wild animals matters in itself, and as much as that of humans.
Foundations of the Proposal to Help Victims of Natural Processes
- P1 The reasons to prevent harms exist because harms are bad, whatever their origin (existence of reasons).
- P2 The strength of these reasons depends on magnitude, not origin (strength of reasons).
- P3 Even giving greater weight to human-caused harms, the scale of natural harms would still generate strong reasons (weight of the criterion).
- C So we have strong reasons to prevent and minimize natural harms.
Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Arrogant?
- P1 The accusation says that helping wild animals is arrogant because it intervenes in nature.
- P2 Almost everyone accepts interventions in nature to benefit humans or for environmentalist goals.
- P3 So intervening in nature is not, in itself, the problem.
- C The accusation reveals opposition to the goal of benefiting animals, not to intervention.
Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Anthropocentric?
- P1 The objection says the proposal imposes human values on animals.
- P2 The proposal aims at what is good for animals: less suffering and fewer premature deaths.
- P3 Animals have no interest in suffering so that nature can take its course; only some humans value that.
- C So the proposal is not anthropocentric; at most, it is anthropogenic.
The Less Human Influence in the World, the Better?
- P1 The phrase can mean that less influence is better for animals, or that it is better even when it is worse for them.
- P2 In the first sense, each case must be evaluated on its own, and staying out is not always better.
- P3 In the second, it would have to be shown that human influence is wrong in itself, which the objection merely assumes.
- C So the phrase does not justify rejecting the proposal to help.
Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Welfarist?
- P1 The word "welfarist" is used in several senses, usually tied to regulating exploitation.
- P2 The proposal to help wild animals regulates no exploitation at all: it aims to reduce natural harms.
- P3 Caring about well-being is not the same as being a regulationist.
- C So the proposal is compatible with any position in the debate about regulation.
Does the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Violate Their Freedom?
- P1 The objection says that helping violates animals' freedom.
- P2 To exercise freedom, one must be alive and free from extreme suffering.
- P3 Helping generally increases animals' ability to do what they want.
- C So helping does not violate animals' freedom; often, it protects it.
The Charge of Creating Dependency
- P1 The objection says that helping would take away animals' ability to survive.
- P2 Many interventions only reduce births, without creating dependence.
- P3 Helping animals who have already been born does not take away their skills; not helping is what kills them before they can use those skills.
- P4 Even if there were dependence, it would be better for them than suffering more and dying young.
- C So the accusation does not justify not helping.
The Charge of Paternalism
- P1 An action is paternalistic when it aims to benefit someone against their preference.
- P2 Animals do not prefer to remain in hunger, disease, or fire.
- P3 When they flee from help, it is because they do not understand the intention, not because they prefer to suffer.
- P4 Even if it were paternalism, it would be the justified kind, as in the case of children.
- C So the accusation of paternalism does not justify not helping.
The Objection That Suffering Has Instrumental Value
- P1 The objection says suffering is useful to those who suffer, so it should not be minimized.
- P2 It is useful only when the individual can use it to avoid greater harms.
- P3 Most animals in the wild suffer from birth until their premature death without that benefit.
- P4 When there is a benefit, it is better to obtain it without suffering.
- C So the usefulness of suffering does not justify failing to help.
Does the Proposal to Help Animals See Humans as Separate from Nature?
- P1 The objection says the proposal sees humans as separate from nature.
- P2 If humans are part of nature, the results of their actions are no less natural.
- P3 It is those who argue for "not intervening" who separate the human from the natural.
- P4 And no one accepts for themselves not protecting themselves from disease or disaster.
- C So the accusation turns back on those who make it.
If Nature Is Not Evil, Is Natural Suffering Neutral?
- P1 The objection says that, because it is natural, suffering is value-neutral.
- P2 What makes suffering bad is that it is bad for the one who suffers, not that someone is to blame.
- P3 Suffering caused by someone who is not responsible is still bad for the victim.
- C So we have reasons to prevent natural suffering, and all the more the greater it is.
If Nature Is Indifferent to the Suffering of Animals, Why Help Them?
- P1 Nature is indifferent to the suffering and death of animals.
- P2 It is also indifferent to human suffering, and we do not conclude that we should be indifferent to it.
- P3 From the fact that something happens, it does not follow that it ought to happen.
- C So nature's indifference does not justify ours.
Does Respecting the Nature of Wild Animals Require Leaving Them to Fend for Themselves?
- P1 The position says each animal's nature is defined by its territory, and the nature of wild animals requires not helping them.
- P2 If respecting someone's nature means benefiting them, leaving them to their fate does not respect it.
- P3 If it is not meant to benefit them, there is no explanation for why it would count for more than preventing harm.
- P4 Those who hold this view are on the domestic side; if they did not know which territory they belonged to, they would not accept it.
- C So the position is not justified.
Isn't It Absurd to Intervene in Conflicts Between Animals?
- P1 Large-scale interventions in predation have been practiced for decades to protect humans, exploited animals, or environmental goals.
- P2 So intervening in conflicts between animals is not absurd in itself.
- P3 If an intervention has a good chance of making things worse, the proposal itself advises against it.
- C As knowledge grows, more safe interventions may become possible.
Which Fields Should Answer What to Do About Wild Animals?
- P1 Describing what happens in ecosystems is the job of ecology.
- P2 Which goals to pursue is an ethical question that no descriptive science answers.
- P3 Ecological knowledge can be used for environmentalist goals or for the good of animals.
- C So saying that ecology prescribes not helping animals is disguising a moral position.
Must Environmentalists Oppose Helping Wild Animals?
- P1 Many ways of helping animals also achieve environmentalist goals, such as vaccinating bees.
- P2 Others do not conflict with those goals, since they do not alter the valued properties of ecosystems.
- P3 When there is a conflict, only sentient beings suffer and lose experiences through death.
- P4 Environmentalists already accept limiting the nonbasic interests of humans, but not causing them suffering and death.
- C So environmentalists need not oppose helping wild animals.
Are We Morally Responsible Only for Human Practices?
- P1 We are responsible for a decision when it determines the outcomes.
- P2 Deciding whether or not to help wild animals determines what happens to them.
- P3 Not having caused the harm, not having any intention, or not being close does not eliminate that responsibility, as human cases show.
- C So we have responsibility for natural harms, and not only for those caused by humans.
Attempts to Argue That Domesticated Animals Have Priority
- P1 One position says we have a historical debt to domesticated animals and that they depend on us more.
- P2 Even if that gave them priority, it would not justify denying the duty to help wild animals.
- P3 Priority depends on the seriousness of the situation and the number of victims, and wild animals are vastly more numerous.
- P4 Wild animals are also highly dependent on the conditions that kill them.
- C So these arguments do not rule out helping wild animals.
Would Helping Animals Prevent the Fittest Genes from Prevailing?
- P1 The objection says that helping would prevent the fittest genes from prevailing.
- P2 Traits that are efficient at passing on genes, such as having many offspring, do not benefit those who carry them.
- P3 Many forms of help, such as reducing births, do not interfere with this.
- P4 Applied to humans, the reasoning would be considered abhorrent.
- C So concern for genes does not justify failing to help.
Couldn't Helping Wild Animals Make Things Even Worse?
- P1 The objection says that helping may make things worse in the long run, or throw ecosystems out of balance.
- P2 If we cannot predict the long term, we also do not know that not helping has better consequences.
- P3 Ecological balance depends on arbitrary reference points and can coexist with enormous suffering.
- C So the solution is to thoroughly research the factors that affect animals' well-being, not to let nature take its course.
Objections That Question the Practicality of the Proposal to Help
- P1 The objection says that, since we cannot help everyone, we should help no one, or that we would only help a small fraction of the problem.
- P2 For each animal helped, the help makes all the difference.
- P3 What matters is the actual amount of benefit, not the percentage of the problem.
- C So focusing on the suffering of wild animals can be a very effective way to reduce suffering in the world.
What Is Already Being Done to Help Wild Animals?
- P1 The objection says the proposal is impractical.
- P2 Wild animals are already vaccinated, treated for diseases, and rescued from situations of need.
- P3 Some treatments have greatly increased survival, as in the case of bats with white-nose syndrome.
- C So the proposal is not impractical, and much more could be done.
What Else Could Be Done to Help: Establishing Welfare Biology
- P1 Wild animals are studied almost exclusively as members of species and components of ecosystems.
- P2 As a result, there is little data on what affects their well-being.
- P3 Welfare biology would study these animals as sentient individuals, bringing together several fields.
- C Challenging the ideological obstacles is crucial for it to develop and help animals.
What Technologies Could Be Used to Help Animals in the Wild?
- P1 New technologies make it possible to observe and measure things in the lives of wild animals that were impossible before.
- P2 This data can show what affects them positively or negatively.
- P3 With more awareness of the situation of wild animals, this use can expand.
- C So technology can help prevent and reduce natural harms.
Do Animals Have a Right Not to Be Sterilized?
- P1 Maximizing births contributes greatly to suffering and premature death in nature.
- P2 There are many forms of help that do not involve sterilization.
- P3 Respecting a supposed absolute right to reproduce would mean many beings being born only to suffer and die.
- P4 Sterilizing dogs and cats is already accepted by animal advocates, and in the case of broods in the thousands the reasons are even stronger.
- C So the rights-violation objection does not justify rejecting the proposal.
The Issue of Parasitism
- P1 The objection says that treating parasitism would kill many in order to save one.
- P2 When the parasites are not sentient, death is not a harm to them.
- P3 When they are, we need to assess whether they would have even minimally meaningful lives.
- P4 Preventing new cases is not the same as killing beings who already exist, and not treating produces more parasites and more victims.
- C So the proposal would not forbid treating parasitism; it would even give reasons to prevent it.
The Issue of Predation
- P1 Predation causes intense suffering and death to an enormous number of animals.
- P2 The objections (it is not an ethical matter, predators are not to blame, it is neutral, it is absurd, it is fascism, it is sentimentalism) do not hold up.
- P3 Interventions in predation are already widely accepted when they protect humans and exploited animals.
- P4 Interventions that worsen the consequences should not be carried out; but some, such as reducing primary productivity, probably have a positive net result.
- C So there are good reasons to reduce predation in the world, with caution.
Discussing Our Ability to Assess When Life Is or Is Not Worth Living
- P1 The objection says we are not in a position to judge when a life is worth living.
- P2 There are clear cases, such as lives of extreme suffering followed by almost immediate death, which is the case for most animals in the wild.
- P3 Those who argue for not helping also make judgments about which lives are worth living.
- P4 Improving existing lives does not rule out preventing births; fewer births make it easier to improve each life.
- C So the objection does not justify letting nature take its course.
The Prolonged Agony Argument
- P1 The objection says that helping would prolong lives of suffering.
- P2 Whatever causes animals in the wild to suffer usually also causes their death.
- P3 Treating those causes extends life and increases well-being at the same time.
- P4 Many interventions do not extend lives; they only prevent births.
- C So the argument from prolonging the agony does not justify not helping.
The Objection That the Balance of the Situation of Animals in the Wild May Be Positive
- P1 The claim says that the pleasure of a few animals may outweigh the combined suffering of the majority.
- P2 Even if that were so, the reasons to reduce the suffering of those who suffer do not diminish.
- P3 A unit of resources produces more well-being the worse off its recipient is.
- C So even those who care only about the total balance have reasons to prioritize eliminating suffering.
What Impact Does Veganism Have on the Situation of Wild Animals?
- P1 Veganism reduces the number of animals born to suffer in exploitation and the collateral deaths caused by agriculture.
- P2 It does not necessarily mean increasing green areas.
- P3 First-degree results do not depend on other agents; second-degree results depend on how others react.
- P4 The greatest potential of veganism lies in spreading consideration for all sentient beings.
- C So preventing natural harms does not mean rejecting veganism.
The Debate on the Destruction of Nature
- P1 It is almost always assumed that more green areas are positive, because of anthropocentric or environmentalist views.
- P2 For those concerned with sentient beings, more habitat can mean more animals being born to suffer.
- P3 Advocates of altruistic killing and their critics exchange arguments about consequences, public acceptance, and future risks.
- C The chapter argues that the burden of proof seems to fall on the opponents, but acknowledges that concern about counterproductive effects may come from a serious analysis of risks.
The Debate on the Expansion and Restoration of Nature
- P1 Discussing the expansion of nature sidesteps the usual objections, since it does not involve intervening with animals who already exist.
- P2 Most of the animals who would be born in these new habitats would have short lives full of suffering.
- P3 The justifications for expansion (future generations, environmental values, public acceptance, the risk of human extinction) are not enough or can be met in other ways.
- P4 There are ways to prevent climate change without creating new habitats, such as energy efficiency and renewable energy.
- C So expanding natural areas would be justified only when all the alternatives were worse.
Volume VIII · Effective Activism
How to Choose Which Causes and Problems to Prioritize and Which Strategies Are Best?
- P1 The resources for helping are limited, and there are many problems.
- P2 To do the most good possible, we should compare seriousness, tractability, size of benefit, long-term effects, and neglect.
- P3 Tackling causes tends to have a greater impact over time than treating only the symptoms.
- C So these criteria guide the choice of causes, problems, and strategies, even if they do not hand us ready-made answers.
How Does the Animal Cause Fare on the Priority Criteria?
- P1 The situation of each exploited animal is very serious, and the number of victims is gigantic.
- P2 The cause receives very few resources: 97% of donations in the US go to human causes.
- P3 A great deal of benefit is possible with the resources available.
- P4 Even if we give less weight to each animal, the number of victims keeps it a priority.
- C So the animal cause is a priority by the usual criteria.
Among the Problems Affecting Animals, Which Are the Most Important?
- P1 Speciesism leads us to prioritize human problems and, within the animal cause, the animals most similar to us.
- P2 Aquatic animals, invertebrates, wild animals, and future beings are victims in astronomically greater numbers.
- P3 These problems are highly neglected.
- C So there are twofold reasons to focus on them: they are among the most serious, and they are where we can make the most difference.
The Use of Anthropocentric and Environmentalist Arguments in the Animal Cause
- P1 Indirect arguments can lead people to cut back their consumption without considering animals.
- P2 Different motivations lead to different behavior when circumstances change.
- P3 They can reinforce the idea that harm to animals is not enough on its own and strengthen anthropocentric and environmentalist views.
- P4 A lack of consideration for sentient beings is one of the main sources of risks of future suffering.
- C So we should not postpone directly defending consideration for sentient beings.
The Total Approach and the Sufficient Approach
- P1 Some goals are compatible with a wide range of ethical and political views.
- P2 The sufficient approach shows this and broadens acceptance of those goals.
- P3 The total approach discusses the complete ideal, including controversial questions.
- P4 Using only one of them carries risks: either we never dare to discuss what matters, or we push away people who disagree about everything else.
- C So it is important to combine the two approaches.
Shifting the Focus in Debates: Why Is Speciesism Rarely Discussed?
- P1 People who defend practices that harm animals tend to keep the focus on things that have nothing to do with the harm to animals.
- P2 Animal advocates often accept the shift without noticing.
- P3 As long as speciesism is not discussed, people's view of animals does not change.
- C So there are no good reasons to accept the shift in focus.
Moral Beliefs, Motivation to Act, and the Role of Ethical Reflection
- P1 Some experts write against consuming animals and keep consuming them.
- P2 This can happen for several reasons: they do not think it is wrong, think it is only slightly wrong, lack sincerity, have a weak will, or decide not to act.
- P3 None of these explanations shows that moral beliefs do not motivate.
- P4 And abandoning rational persuasion does not solve anything, since other forms of persuasion have the same limits.
- C So ethical reflection still has a central role.
Normative Objections Disguised as Strategic Objections
- P1 A normative objection rejects the goal; a strategic one accepts the goal and doubts the means.
- P2 Sometimes a normative objection is disguised as a strategic one, so as not to expose the lack of good arguments against the goal.
- P3 Whoever claims that a goal is unachievable bears the burden of proving it.
- C So there are reasons to reject such claims when they are unsupported.
Focusing on Veganism versus Focusing on Reducing Consumption
- P1 We should evaluate strategies by their effects, not by our initial intuitions.
- P2 Many advocates of reduction and of veganism share the same goal: the end of exploitation.
- P3 Reduction may reach more people; veganism may make the injustice clearer and inspire more engagement.
- C So the disagreement is mainly strategic, and it should be treated as such.
Why the Term Welfarism Is Highly Ambiguous
- P1 The term welfarism is used for very different positions, in different debates.
- P2 There are at least seven meanings, such as accepting "humane" exploitation, advocating reforms, or caring about the well-being of any animal.
- P3 Each meaning concerns a distinct debate.
- C So accepting or rejecting a position called welfarist does not imply accepting or rejecting the others.
The Debate on Regulating Animal Exploitation
- P1 Some people argue that exploitation regulated to reduce suffering is acceptable.
- P2 Among those who want abolition, there is debate over whether regulation leads to it and whether it reduces suffering.
- P3 Anti-cruelty laws usually require hard-to-obtain proof and exempt industry practices.
- C Reforms need to be compared with other strategies, such as cultivated meat, antispeciesist education, and promoting veganism.
The Debate on Cultivated Meat
- P1 Cultivated meat is produced from cells, without raising and slaughtering animals.
- P2 The objections (it is not natural, the risks, sustainability, the impact on the poor, self-interested producers, it does not solve everything, it still harms animals, it reinforces speciesism) can be answered or are not enough to reject it.
- P3 It could enormously reduce exploitation even if people do not change their values.
- P4 But focusing only on technology has limits, since values decide how it will be used.
- C So cultivated meat is a promising strategy, to be combined with social change.
Volume IX · Ethics and the Future
Future Risks for Sentient Beings: An Introduction
- P1 New practices and technologies have already multiplied suffering enormously, as factory farming shows.
- P2 In the future, the number of sentient beings and the reach of technology could be astronomically greater.
- P3 Risks of suffering on that scale (s-risks) carry an enormous expected disvalue, even at a modest probability.
- P4 They are easy to ignore and rarely discussed.
- C So we need a broad debate about how to prevent them.
Temporal Impartiality: What It Is and Why It Matters
- P1 We have a bias that makes us give less weight to what happens later.
- P2 Suffering is no less bad because it happens in the future.
- P3 Impartiality requires not favoring anyone because of irrelevant factors, and timing is one of them.
- C So we should give the same weight to future sentient beings, human and nonhuman.
The Objection That Future Beings Are Merely Potential Beings
- P1 The objection says we should care only about beings who already exist.
- P2 Even if we deny a duty to create new beings, we have duties not to bring beings into existence to suffer and not to harm those who will exist.
- P3 The animal cause is already, as a rule, about preventing new animals from being born to suffer.
- C So it makes no sense to reject concern for the future on the grounds that it deals with future beings.
What Reasons Are There to Focus on the Long Term?
- P1 The future may contain far more sentient beings than the present.
- P2 It is not guaranteed to be better because of moral progress; that depends on what we do now.
- P3 Our decisions can have lasting effects on that future.
- C So there are good reasons to adopt a practical focus on the long term.
Should We Focus on Preventing S-Risks or X-Risks?
- P1 X-risks concern human extinction; s-risks concern astronomical suffering, including that of nonhumans.
- P2 Some defenses of focusing on x-risks appeal to speciesist ideas, such as prioritizing humans in order to obtain more resources.
- P3 Humanity's survival does not guarantee less suffering and could even expand it.
- C So there are reasons to pay more attention to s-risks, without excluding x-risks.
Which Goals Should We Prioritize in the Long Term?
- P1 People who want the best impact may disagree about which values to prioritize.
- P2 Several views (prioritarian, negative, pluralist) give greater weight to preventing suffering.
- P3 You do not need extreme pessimism about the future to adopt this focus.
- C So there are reasons to give extra weight to the goals of preventing suffering and premature deaths.
What Does the Focus on S-Risks Consist Of?
- P1 A focus on s-risks aims to reduce expected future suffering.
- P2 Even if future suffering is "heavy-tailed," it can come from the sum of many risks rather than a few.
- P3 So a focus on s-risks does not imply a narrow focus.
- C Individually, people can specialize; collectively, we should cover a broad range.
Identifying Risk Factors for S-Risks
- P1 It is hard to estimate the long-term consequences of each decision.
- P2 But, as in medicine, we can identify factors that increase the likelihood or severity of catastrophes.
- P3 Examples: advanced technology, disregard for sentient beings, polarization, malevolent agents with power.
- P4 Risks grow when several factors coincide, and prevention efforts reinforce each other too.
- C So reducing risk factors is a viable path to preventing s-risks.
Longtermist Strategies: Broad and Targeted
- P1 The future is uncertain, with many possible scenarios.
- P2 Broad strategies have a positive impact in almost every scenario, but a smaller one in each.
- P3 Targeted strategies have a large impact in the scenario they address, but may be useless in others.
- P4 Caution is needed: humility, attention to biases, and goals acceptable from many perspectives.
- C So we should combine both kinds of strategy, carefully.
Why Focus on Consideration for Sentient Beings and on the Future?
- P1 Disregard for sentient beings is one of the main causes of risks of future suffering.
- P2 Promoting consideration for all sentient beings tackles that cause.
- P3 There are risks, such as using anthropocentric and environmentalist arguments, which can reinforce other views.
- P4 We do not yet know the most effective way to prevent s-risks.
- C So we should promote consideration for sentient beings and keep an open mind about changing strategies.
Changing Public Debate, Forms of Activism, and Political Institutions
- P1 Politics (institutions and public debate) influences the likelihood of s-risks.
- P2 Tribalism creates the appearance of deep disagreement and prevents compromise.
- P3 Honest debate, broad-range approaches, and democracy reduce risks such as the rise of malevolent agents.
- P4 The current situation is so bad that even small improvements would make a big difference.
- C So improving politics is crucial for avoiding s-risks.
Shaping Emerging Technologies to Prevent Future Suffering
- P1 New technologies could give enormous power to people who do not care about those affected.
- P2 AI, space colonization, and the creation of new forms of sentience could generate astronomical suffering.
- P3 Shaping these technologies early, with non-anthropocentric values, reduces these risks.
- C Spreading consideration for all sentient beings as widely as possible helps both to avoid these technologies and to reduce the harm if they are created.
The Influence Triad and Future Suffering
- P1 New technologies could give great power to agents who do not care about those affected.
- P2 An agent's results depend on the combination of intention, knowledge, and power.
- P3 Power without knowledge risks causing harm even with good intentions; knowledge without power is ineffective.
- C So to prevent future suffering, we need to increase the knowledge and power of those who want to benefit sentient beings, and limit those of others.
Volume X · Biases and Their Influence
Biases That Lead Us to Neglect the Problems with the Most Victims
- P1 Biases are tendencies that systematically lead to faulty reasoning, and they are different from fallacies.
- P2 Several biases make our compassion shrink as the number of victims grows.
- P3 So the problems with the most victims tend to be the most neglected.
- C To correct this, we should learn about these biases and focus on people who want to reason honestly.
Biases That Incline Us to Neglect the Situation of Wild Animals
- P1 The situation of wild animals involves one of the largest numbers of victims.
- P2 Biases such as status quo bias, the just-world hypothesis, and agent detection incline us to see it as good or justified.
- P3 Other biases make us doubt that helping is feasible and underestimate how receptive the public is.
- C So this neglect is partly an effect of biases that we can learn to correct.
Biases That Contribute to the Neglect of the Long Term and of S-Risks
- P1 Biases incline us to give less importance to questions about the future.
- P2 Others make us ignore the expected value of scenarios that are unlikely but very serious.
- P3 Overconfidence in our intuitions reinforces these errors.
- C So to take s-risks seriously, we need an open mind and a willingness to change our position in the face of good reasons.
Cognitive Biases and Their Influence on Our Decisions That Affect Animals
- P1 Revising our beliefs about facts, ethics, and strategies requires overcoming several psychological tendencies.
- P2 Biases incline us to defend what already exists, to trust ourselves too much, and to accept bad arguments when they favor us.
- P3 They affect both people who consume animals and people who defend them.
- C So knowing about them is essential for discussing and deciding better.
Motivated Reasoning and Its Influence on the Evaluation of Arguments
- P1 People tend to demand more rigor from arguments against what they want to believe.
- P2 Many common objections, such as "plants feel too," are accepted with little rigor.
- P3 Sometimes the people who raise them do not even believe them, but use them as excuses.
- C So attempts to justify speciesism are rarely examined with the same rigor as the arguments against it.
Some Biases That Can Influence the Choice of Strategies and How the Public Receives Them
- P1 The same biases that affect the public affect activists when they choose priorities and strategies.
- P2 Biases such as negativity bias and serial position effects influence how a message is received.
- P3 Presenting the arguments for considering animals first changes how people evaluate the rest.
- C So taking these biases into account helps us plan better strategies.
Volume XI · How Do the Various Ethical Theories Approach the Animal Question?
An Introduction to the Central Distinctions in Value Theory
- P1 Questions about what is good or bad are different from questions about what we ought to do.
- P2 Something can have value in itself or only as a means to something else.
- P3 A situation can be good in one respect and bad in another.
- C So judging how good a situation is all things considered requires distinguishing and weighing these respects.
An Introduction to Theories of Well-Being
- P1 There are monist theories of well-being (a single aspect) and pluralist ones (several aspects).
- P2 They disagree in many cases, but they converge to a minimal degree.
- P3 The typical situations of exploited animals and wild animals are bad according to any of these theories.
- C So whichever theory of well-being we adopt, animals are seriously harmed in these situations.
Assessing How Good/Bad a Situation Containing Several Individuals Is
- P1 A situation involving many individuals can be evaluated in several respects: the total, priority, equality, sufficiency, and desert.
- P2 Monist theories consider a single aspect; pluralist theories consider several.
- P3 These aspects can be valued in themselves or only as means.
- C When they conflict, we have to decide how to weigh them.
Value Judgments, Descriptions of Facts, Objectivity, and Subjectivity
- P1 "Subjective" can mean "related to consciousness" or "without objective truth."
- P2 Everyone who suffers experiences suffering as negative in itself.
- P3 Some things cannot be explained without appealing to their value or disvalue.
- C So judgments like "suffering is bad" can have a high degree of certainty, even if there is disagreement about what to do.
Categories of Normative Ethical Theories
- P1 Consequentialism focuses on consequences; deontology, on rules; character ethics, on character traits.
- P2 They differ at the foundational level (why something matters), but often agree at the factoral level (what to do).
- P3 The arguments for equal consideration of sentient beings can be accepted from within any of these schools.
- C So the major theories tend to converge on equal consideration.
To What Extent Do Ethical Theories Agree About What We Owe Animals?
- P1 Goal-based theories (utilitarianism, prioritarianism, egalitarianism, sufficientarianism, maximin) do not give different weight to equal well-being because of species.
- P2 Theories that are not goal-based (Kantianism, discourse ethics, contractualism, virtue ethics, ethics of care), when applied consistently, also include sentient beings.
- P3 Desert and pluralist possibilities do not change this conclusion.
- C So the main theories imply equal consideration, the rejection of exploitation, and reasons to help wild animals.
Weighing Criteria
- P1 Situations can be good in some respects and bad in others.
- P2 There are many ways to weigh these respects, such as trumps, fixed weights, diminishing returns, and sufficiency.
- P3 Each way has advantages and problems, such as arbitrariness or difficulty of calculation.
- C So weighing criteria is a difficult task that requires making the chosen method and its reasons explicit.
Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics
Introduction
- P1 Animal ethics discusses many questions, each with arguments on both sides.
- P2 A schematic overview lets us understand what is at stake before going deeper.
- P3 Each table indicates where the topic is discussed in detail.
- C So this volume serves both people who are just starting and people who want to review.
Attempts to Justify Disregarding Animals
- P1 The default position says that the use of animals is fully justified.
- P2 Each justification appeals to a criterion: species, capacities, nature, tradition, authority, and so on.
- P3 None explains why that criterion would be relevant to whether someone can be harmed.
- C So the default position is not justified.
The Case for Considering All Sentient Beings
- P1 If lacking certain capacities does not justify treating humans worse, it does not justify treating animals worse either (species overlap).
- P2 What is relevant to consideration is being able to be harmed and benefited, which depends on sentience (relevance).
- P3 Equal harms and benefits should carry the same weight (equal consideration).
- P4 If we did not know whether we would be born human or animal, we would not accept the current treatment (impartiality).
- C So every sentient being should receive full moral consideration.
The Debate on the Sentience Criterion
- P1 The sentience criterion tells us which beings should be considered, not which ethical theory to adopt.
- P2 It is not anthropocentric, it is not animal-kingdomism, and it does not reduce harm to suffering.
- P3 It includes many invertebrates and does not imply that values are subjective.
- P4 The criterion of life does not show that nonsentient beings can be harmed.
- C So the criticisms of the sentience criterion have solid answers.
The Harm of Death and the Reasons Against Killing
- P1 Death deprives someone of the positive things they would have lived, whether or not they understand what death is.
- P2 This does not depend on desires about the future, intellectual pleasures, or psychological connectedness.
- P3 Replacing one animal with another does not make up for the harm to the one who died.
- C So killing animals, even painlessly, harms them.
Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals
- P1 The anthropocentric position wants the environment to be better for humans; the sentience-centered one, better for sentient beings; the environmentalist one, kept in certain configurations even if that is worse for them.
- P2 Environmentalist programs do not aim to save sentient beings, whether they are the majority or the minority.
- P3 Balance and biodiversity do not measure the well-being of animals.
- C So environmentalism and animal advocacy differ in their ends, not just in their means.
The Situation of Wild Animals and the Proposal to Help Them
- P1 Our reasons to prevent harm depend on its magnitude, not on whether its origin is human or natural.
- P2 Animals in the wild suffer enormous harms, and most are born only to die young.
- P3 Even discounting destroyed eggs, the number of victims is gigantic.
- C So the situation of wild animals is as important as it would be if the harms were caused by humans.
The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 1)
- P1 The objections claim that helping would be arrogant, anthropocentric, paternalistic, or contrary to freedom and ecology.
- P2 Many are self-contradictory or apply to animals what they would never apply to humans.
- P3 Helping is what allows animals to live and exercise their freedom.
- C So these objections do not justify failing to help.
The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 2)
- P1 The objections say that we are responsible only for human practices, or that the proposal is too demanding or impractical.
- P2 Responsibility comes from our decisions determining the outcomes, as with doctors and disasters.
- P3 Wild animals are already vaccinated, treated, and rescued, and there are paths to doing this on a large scale.
- P4 What matters is the actual amount of benefit, not the percentage of the problem solved.
- C So these objections do not justify failing to help.
What Criteria Should We Use to Help Efficiently?
- P1 Resources are limited, so where we apply them matters.
- P2 Seriousness, tractability, neglect, and size of benefit guide the choice.
- P3 Long-term effects can reverse what looks best in the short term.
- P4 Tackling causes, such as speciesism, has great potential over time.
- C So these criteria let us help more effectively.
Which Problems Affect the Largest Numbers of Animals?
- P1 Most campaigns cite 80 billion animals killed per year.
- P2 Adding fish, crustaceans, insects, and others, the figure is between 34 and 54 trillion.
- P3 Sentient animals in the wild are estimated at 1 to 10 quintillion at any given moment.
- C So the problems that affect the most animals are precisely the least remembered.
Key Concepts in the Debate on the Importance of the Future
- P1 The future may contain astronomical suffering (s-risks), including that of nonhumans and nonbiological beings.
- P2 The seriousness of an s-risk is its severity multiplied by its probability.
- P3 Substratism, like speciesism, could produce suffering in astronomical quantities.
- C So we should consider animals because they are sentient, not because they are animals or living beings.
Identifying Risk Factors for S-Risks
- P1 It is hard to predict the long-term consequences of each decision.
- P2 But risk factors increase the likelihood or severity of s-risks, even without determining them.
- P3 Among them: disregard for sentient beings, technological progress outpacing moral progress, polarization, and malevolent agents with power.
- C So reducing these factors is a viable way to prevent future suffering.
Longtermist Strategies: Broad and Targeted
- P1 Broad strategies have a positive impact in a great many scenarios, but a smaller one in each.
- P2 Targeted strategies can have a large impact, but only in the scenario they address.
- P3 Biases and overconfidence can distort the choice.
- C So we need to combine strategies, cultivate humility, and advocate goals that many can accept.
Changing Public Debate and Political Institutions
- P1 Dysfunctional politics encourages polarization and increases the risk of malevolent agents in power.
- P2 Thinking in nuances, evaluating arguments rather than people, and being intellectually honest reduce tribalism.
- P3 Democracy protects against the concentration of power and guarantees the freedom to raise ethical concerns.
- C So improving debate and institutions, even a little, greatly reduces the risks of future suffering.
Debates on Activism Strategies
- P1 There are many debates about how effective activist strategies are.
- P2 In each one, there are reasonable arguments on both sides.
- P3 Often the question is how much to focus on each strategy, not which one to use exclusively.
- C So we need to evaluate strategies carefully, and perhaps spread people across several of them.
Evaluating Different Strategies
- P1 Different strategies can be compared using several metacriteria.
- P2 It remains to be worked out which criteria to include, whether an overall result is possible, and how much weight to give each one.
- P3 We also need objective data to score the strategies.
- C So evaluating strategies is an open field, with a research agenda.
Conclusion
- P1 This volume has presented an overview of the main questions in animal ethics.
- P2 Many important questions were left out for reasons of space.
- P3 Even so, it offers a solid foundation for understanding these and other questions.
- C So it is a good starting point for going deeper into the other volumes.