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Volume V · Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals · chapter 7

Why is respect for animals confused with environmentalism?

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Several factors explain the confusion between animal advocacy and environmentalism, such as the belief that both want what's good for animals and the confusion between environmentalism and ecology; it leads animal advocates to support practices that seriously harm animals.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume V, p. 26 of the PDF edition · English translation

We saw in the previous chapters that consideration for animals and have divergent goals that often conflict in practice. We also saw that, despite this, these perspectives are often confused with each other. In this chapter we will look at a summary of the various factors that contribute to this confusion.

(1) Most people are unaware of the foundations on which environmentalism rests and of what the goals of this position really are. This happens simply because they do not usually read what is proposed by the position they sympathize with. For example, most people are unaware that prominent representatives of various schools of environmentalism, such as 44, deep ecology45, and social ecology46, frequently take a stand against the of nonhuman animals47. They are also unaware that is typically defended by many of the leading environmentalist authors48 and by several of the leading environmental organizations49. In doing so, these environmentalist authors and organizations are not being inconsistent with the principles they uphold. Quite the contrary: they take a stand against consideration for animals because the environmentalist principles they uphold do not value the good of animals intrinsically.

In addition, there are other environmentalist positions that do not necessarily imply disregard for animals or a stance, but several of whose representatives have defended speciesist stances, as is the case with 50 and ecofeminism51. However, many people, because they do not read what the proponents of a position actually argue, tend to assume that these are necessarily positions that give full moral consideration to all beings.

(2) Environmentalists tend to frame the question in terms of "preserving or destroying the environment", which hides the fact that it is possible to preserve it in several different configurations. For example, we can aim to preserve the environment in the configuration that most benefits sentient beings (and, as we saw in chapter 3, this will not necessarily coincide with the configurations environmentalism aims at).

Framing things in terms of the false dichotomy "preserve or destroy", besides hiding the fact that it is possible to preserve the environment in the most varied configurations, can mistakenly suggest that, if we do not share environmentalist values, then we do not care about the effects of human practices on the environment. This is simply false. We can reject environmentalist values and care just as much about these issues because we are concerned with the impact on sentient beings.

(3) The mistaken belief that and necessarily coincide with the best situation for animals. As we saw in chapter 5, these concepts refer, respectively, to the variety of species and to an ecosystem's remaining within a range of variation that still allows it to return to an earlier point taken as a reference52. We also saw that none of these concepts indicates the levels of well-being of animals. In other words, it is possible for a situation to contain a high degree of biodiversity and balance and to have a highly negative balance for animals (and it is also possible for it to be worse for animals than another situation that contains less biodiversity or balance).

However, since environmentalist measures are often carried out in the name of biodiversity and ecological balance, and in common sense many people associate these concepts with a better situation for animals, this is one of the factors that can lead people to confuse environmentalism with consideration for animals.

(4) The confusion between ecology and environmentalism. As we saw in chapter 6, ecology is the science that describes how interactions take place in ecosystems. Environmentalism, on the other hand, is the normative position holding that certain nonsentient entities have intrinsic value. There is

a difference between descriptive knowledge and the normative goals that guide the application of existing knowledge and the search for new knowledge. To seek new knowledge in ecology (and to use existing knowledge), it is not necessary to adopt environmentalism as a normative stance. Such knowledge could be used with the goal of benefiting the animals themselves.

Since it is also possible to use knowledge from ecology to benefit animals, and since environmentalism is confused with ecology, this sometimes also contributes to the confusion between animal advocacy and environmentalism.

(5) Environmentalist interventions sometimes benefit some animals. This can suggest that environmentalism values the good of animals intrinsically. However, in these cases animals are helped by environmentalist programs only because doing so is a means to achieving other goals, such as preserving certain species or keeping the ecosystem in a certain configuration. The proof that the goal of environmentalism is not the good of animals is that, when animals are members of species that are not at risk of extinction, environmentalists usually see nothing wrong with killing them, and when they are members of species classified as invasive, environmentalists carry out extermination programs53.

Of course, there are many people who, in addition to being environmentalists, are also in favor of the moral consideration of nonhuman animals. These people therefore hold a hybrid position, one that combines environmentalist principles with sentience-centered principles. The fact that there are people who, in addition to being environmentalists, also consider animals can help get environmentalists to promote interventions that benefit animals and not to promote those that harm animals. However, this does not mean that environmentalism as such considers animals, for the reasons already seen. What happens in these cases is that these people are combining another idea (consideration for animals) with environmentalism.

(6) Often, when environmentalism carries out programs to exterminate animals, the public mistakenly understands that this is the only way to ensure that, from then on,

there will not be even more suffering and premature death of animals. In short, the public mistakenly understands that both animal advocacy and environmentalism have as their goal the best world for animals, but that they disagree about the means of achieving that result. As we saw in detail in chapter 2, the goal of environmentalism is not the good of animals.

One point that contributes to this confusion is that, as we saw in section 2.2, the statement that "animal advocacy focuses on the individual and environmentalism focuses on the whole" is often mistakenly understood to mean that animal advocates prioritize the good of one individual over a majority, and that environmentalism prioritizes the majority of sentient beings over a minority. According to this interpretation, environmentalist programs kill animals only because this is necessary to save an even greater number of animals. This interpretation is mistaken, since what the statement means is that animal advocacy is centered on consideration for individuals, sentient beings, and that environmentalism values intrinsically nonsentient wholes such as species and ecosystems (and not the members of species or the inhabitants of ecosystems). Environmentalist programs that kill animals do not aim to save sentient beings, whether the majority or the minority. In environmentalism, the center of moral consideration is nonsentient entities.

(7) When environmentalists carry out killings of animals belonging to species classified as invasive54, the public sometimes understands that these are animals that are invading some place (which does not justify the killing, but makes it easier for the public to accept it). However, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines an invasive species as "an alien species that becomes established in a natural or semi-natural ecosystem or habitat, is an agent of change, and threatens native biological diversity"55. That is, the term refers to the origin of the species, and not to the origin of its members. Therefore, an animal of an invasive species may have been born in the place where it lives. This is usually the case, since the introduction of the species into a place outside its natural range was usually done many generations ago. We will discuss this question in more detail in chapter 8.

(8) Environmentalists use terms that contribute to the animals that will be killed being seen as villains (for example, they are usually called pests or threats). In addition, they usually highlight the harms that the animals to be killed cause to other animals of the species that environmentalists value56. This can suggest that the environmentalist goal is to reduce the total rate of suffering and death. However, environmentalist rhetoric does not mention the harms caused by animals of the species environmentalists value, nor the harms suffered by the animals who will be the targets of the killing. If the concern were with the good of animals, harms of equal magnitude would be given equal weight, regardless of whether they are suffered or caused by members of a rare or abundant, native or invasive species, and so on. This is definitely not what happens in environmentalist interventions.

These are some of the main factors underlying the confusion between consideration for animals and environmentalism. This confusion often leads animal advocates to approve of environmentalist practices that are extremely harmful to animals, precisely because they think the goal of such practices is to benefit animals.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume V
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Practice

Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.

According to the chapter, what is one consequence of the confusion?

Which of these is cited as a factor in the confusion?

Food for thought

Where does your image of what it means to be an environmentalist come from?

Author’s notes 13
  1. 44 For examples, see (1980, 1990, p. 103, 1992, p. 146-7, 1998; 2000, p. 211) and (2000 [1949], p. 135). ↩
  2. 45 For examples, see Devall and Sessions (1985); Fox (1995) and (1989, p. 167, 170; 1999, p. 148). ↩
  3. 46 See, for example, the view defended by Bookchin (1994). ↩
  4. 47 For additional examples, see (1994, p. 13-4); (2009); (1999, p. 260-1); (1991, p. 177), and (1998, p. 308). ↩
  5. 48 For examples, see note 16. ↩
  6. 49 For examples, see notes 11 and 12. ↩
  7. 50 For examples, see (1962 [1923] p. 354) and Varner (2002, p. 79). ↩
  8. 51 For example, Plumwood (1993) and Warren (2000a, p. 220; 2000b) discuss anthropocentric speciesism but do not reject it, and the positions of Shiva (1992) and Holland-Cunz (1996[1994]) are centered on human interests in conserving certain ecosystems. Among the ecofeminists who do in fact question anthropocentrism, we can mention Adams (1994) and (2006). ↩
  9. 52 For the definition of these concepts, see Grimm and Wissel (1997) and Lévêque (2003). ↩
  10. 53 For examples, see note 19. ↩
  11. 54 See previous note. ↩
  12. 55 See: https://www.cbd.int/invasive/terms.shtml. Accessed Mar. 5, 2022. ↩
  13. 56 For a critical analysis of environmentalist rhetoric, see Genovez (2023). For examples of this rhetoric on the part of environmentalists, see Davis (2018) and also the position of Brent Beaven, coordinator of a program to exterminate exotic animals, interviewed by Roy (2020). ↩
Sources cited in this text 29

The full list for the volume is in the Volume V references.

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