Volume V · Differences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals · chapter 8
What do environmentalist extermination programs aim at?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
Environmentalist programs to exterminate “invasive” species don't aim to reduce animals' suffering and deaths (sometimes they greatly increase them): they aim to maintain valued configurations. They fail the impartiality test.
In many places, lots of animals are killed just because they're “not from there.” Many people think this protects the other animals, but often the killing causes even more suffering. Nobody would accept it if it were done to people.
Imagine a city that decided to eliminate all residents who came from elsewhere in order to “keep the original population.” Nobody would call that caring for people.
- P1 These programs are usually supported because people believe they prevent something worse for animals.
- P2 In several cases, they greatly increased suffering and deaths.
- P3 The real goal is to preserve valued ecological configurations, not the good of animals.
- P4 The people who approve of them do so only because they know they won't be the victims.
- C Therefore, extermination programs fail the impartiality test and are not just.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Invasive species have to be eliminated to protect native ones.”
Answer Protect what, exactly? If the goal were to reduce suffering, many programs would have been canceled. Valuing “native” over the lives of those who feel is a criterion we would never accept for humans.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume V, p. 31 of the PDF edition · English translation
It is not uncommon for environmentalist programs around the world to carry out mass exterminations of animals of species classified as invasive57. These programs are often supported by the public because of the belief that their goal is to ensure that, from then on, something even worse does not happen to animals. We saw in previous chapters that this is not what such programs aim at, since reducing suffering and death is not one of the goals of . In this chapter we will investigate what such programs really aim at.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines an invasive species as "an alien species that becomes established in a natural or semi-natural ecosystem or habitat, is an agent of change, and threatens native biological diversity"58. Note that this definition is about the origin of the species, and not about the origin of its members. This means that an animal of an invasive species may have been born in the place where it lives (as we will see later, this is usually the case). Below we will look at an example of a case that illustrates what can be considered a threat to native biological diversity according to this definition (since this is one of the key factors for classifying a species as invasive).
The case of the program to exterminate ruddy ducks in southern Europe59 offers a good example to illustrate what environmentalism aims at with programs of this kind. The white-headed duck (Oxyura leucocephala) is a species native to Europe and is considered endangered. The ruddy duck (Oxyura jamaicensis), on the other hand, was introduced into Europe by humans in the 1950s and is not at risk of extinction. The only characteristic that distinguishes the members of these species is the color of the feathers on their heads. In this case, what motivated the killing policies was the fact that, over the years, Oxyura jamaicensis interbred with Oxyura leucocephala, and in the hybrid offspring the head-feather color of the species of American origin prevailed, rather than the color of the native species.
This was considered a threat to because hybridization was seen as contributing to the extinction of the native species. However, what was classified as a threat to biodiversity and as a contribution to extinction in this case was simply the fact that the color of the native species did not prevail in the offspring (and not, as might be understood at first glance, deaths of members of the native species). A program was then carried out to kill all the ducks of the species Oxyura jamaicensis and also all the hybrid ducks.
It is therefore very clear that the program was not aimed at reducing the suffering and deaths of animals. In fact, the program greatly increased suffering and the number of deaths. What, then, is the goal environmentalists sought to achieve with this extermination program? In this case, they could not appeal to a concern for , since the ecological function of the European, American, or hybrid ducks is exactly the same. Nor does this practice seem to make sense from the standpoint of biodiversity, since with only the European ducks there are fewer species than if the American and hybrid ducks are also present.
This point shows that the goal was to ensure that only the members of the species valued by environmentalism would be present in the area (for example, native species60, or those that exhibit characteristics admired by environmentalists61). The aim of the killing, in this case, was to prevent hybridization and keep the native species "pure". In the environmentalist view, this is a goal so important that it justifies killing an enormous number of beings.
Goals like this would be widely considered heinous if they were applied in the human case. For example, the Nazi extermination programs based on the ideal of racial purity are widely cited as a paradigmatic example of a heinous practice. In fact, the vast majority of environmentalists themselves strongly reject applying their measures to human beings, upholding them only when the victims would be nonhuman animals62. This shows that, in the vast majority of cases, environmentalists combine the environmentalist principle
with an principle, giving greater weight to the latter, so as not to have to accept for humans the implications of the environmentalist principles they uphold.
This strongly suggests that environmentalist practices involving the extermination of animals do not pass the impartiality test, since the people who approve of them do so only because they know they will not be their victims. Since is one of the central requirements of justice, this shows that there is no way such practices can be just.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
According to the chapter, extermination programs aim to...
Why would these practices fail the impartiality test?
Food for thought
What criterion would make it acceptable to kill an animal just because it's “out of place”? Would you accept that criterion for yourself?
Author’s notes 6
- 57 For examples, see note 19. ↩
- 58 See: https://www.cbd.int/invasive/terms.shtml. Accessed Mar. 5, 2022. ↩
- 59 For the extermination program, see Council of Europe (2020). For a critique of this type of practice, see (2004) and (2011, 2012). ↩
- 60 Consider another example. The government of New Zealand invested 790,000 New Zealand dollars in developing a new drone for the purpose of poisoning animals considered invasive exotics. The justification offered was to "restore nature so that native species can grow and thrive" (emphasis mine). On this, see Roy (2020). For a critique, see Genovez (2023). ↩
- 61 For example, (1999, p. 260-1) advocates killing animals that eat or graze on rare flowers. ↩
- 62 See, for example, (1990, p. 103; 1992, p. 146-7; 1998; 1999, p. 76; 2000, p. 211); (1994, p. 13-4); (2000 [1949], p. 135); (1989, p. 167, 170; 1999, p. 148); Rolston (1999, p. 260-1); (1991, p. 177); Warren (2000a, p. 228), and (1998, p. 308). ↩
Sources cited in this text 18
The full list for the volume is in the Volume V references.
- CALLICOTT, J. B. Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Albany: Suny Press, 1999.
- CALLICOTT, J. B. Moral Considerability and Extraterrestrial Life. In: HARGROVE, E. (org.). The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective. Albany: State University of New York, 1992, p. 137-150.
- CALLICOTT, J. B. The Case Against Moral Pluralism. Environmental Ethics, v. 12, p. 99- 124, 1990.
- CALLICOTT, J. B. The Land Ethic. In: JAMIESON, D. (org.). A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. 204-17.
- CALLICOTT, J. B. The Land Ethic: Key Philosophical and Scientific Challenges. Ideas Matter Lecture Series: The Legacy of Aldo Leopold. Corvallis: Oregon State University, 1998.
- COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Convention on the conservation of european wildlife and natural habitats: Recommendation on the eradication of the ruddy duck (oxyura jamaicensis) in the western palaearctic by 2020. Standing Committee 36th meeting Strasbourg, 15-18 nov. 2016.
- FARIA, C. Muerte entre las flores: el conflicto entre el ambientalismo y la defensa de los animales no humanos. Viento Sur, v. 125, p. 67-76, 2012.
- FARIA, C. Sobre o bem de tudo e de todos: a conjunção impossível entre ambientalismo e libertação animal. Agora: Papeles de Filosofia, v. 30, n. 2, p. 27-41, 2011.
- GENOVEZ, A. G. Metas ambientalistas vs. consideração moral dos animais não humanos: o que pensam ambientalistas quanto ao uso de tecnologias para intervir na natureza? Revista Peri, v. 15, n. 1, p. 76-96, 2023.
- HETTINGER, N. Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental Ethics: Bambi Lovers versus Tree Huggers. Environmental Ethics, v. 16, n. 1, p. 3-20, 1994.
- LEOPOLD, A. Una ética de la tierra. Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, 2000 [1949].
- NÆSS, A. An Answer to W.C. French: Ranking, Yes, But the Inherent Value is the Same. In: WITOSZEK, N.; BRENNAN, A. (org.). Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, p. 146-149.
- NÆSS, A. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- ROY, E. A.. Poison-laden drones to patrol New Zealand wilderness on the hunt for invasive pests. The Guardian, 14 mar. 2020.
- SHELTON. J. A. Killing Animals That Don´t Fit In: Moral Dimensions of Habitat Restoration. Between the Species, v. 13, n. 4, 2004.
- VARNER, G. No Holism Without Pluralism. Environmental Ethics, v. 13, p. 175-79, 1991.
- WARREN, M. A. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and other Livings Things. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000a.
- WENZ, P. S. Environmental justice. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
Environmentalism and animal advocacy both aim at the good of animals, but disagree about the means to achieve this goal: environmentalism agrees with killing a minority to save the majority, and animal advocacy disagrees. When environmentalist programs kill animals, they do so because this is the only way to save many animals from then on (that is their goal). (V, ch. 2 and 8).
Animal advocacy is centered on individuals, and environmentalism is centered on the “whole” (such as species and ecosystems). This means that environmentalism prioritizes saving the majority of sentient beings, even if this requires killing a minority (since it prioritizes the whole), and animal advocacy opposes this (since it prioritizes the individual). (V, ch. 2 and 8).
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