Questioning environmentalist assumptions

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume V, p. 36 of the PDF edition · English translation

Many people take it as obvious that environmentalist programs to exterminate animals are justified. As we saw in previous chapters, in the case of many of these people this is due to the mistaken belief that such programs aim to reduce the suffering and deaths of animals from then on. However, there are also people who know that the goal of such programs is not to benefit animals and who nevertheless take it as obvious that such programs are justified. In this chapter we will discuss the theses implicitly assumed by this second group of people.

10.1. Do nonsentient entities have intrinsic value?

The first is the thesis that nonsentient entities have intrinsic value (that is, that they have value entirely independently of how they affect sentient beings). This by itself is already highly controversial. First, because we can explain what these entities are (ecosystems, species, biodiversity, ecological balance, and so on) without necessarily having to say that they are something good in themselves. This shows that being good in itself is not a necessary characteristic of these things. Compare this, for example, with describing suffering and happiness. In that case it is impossible to explain what these things are without citing, as their central characteristics, their being, respectively, negative and positive in themselves.

Second, the alleged value of those nonsentient entities is not something we can verify by direct experience. Let us compare this again with the claim that suffering is bad in itself and that happiness is good in itself. Imagine that there were beings from other planets capable of experiencing suffering and happiness but who had never yet experienced them (until then all their experiences had been neutral). Suppose that these beings are therefore unsure which is negative and which is positive, suffering or happiness. In that case, to find out the answer, all they need to do is to become acquainted with (that is, to experience) each of them⁶⁷. By contrast, there is nothing equivalent with regard to nonsentient entities. Species, ecosystems, biodiversity, ecological balance: none of these has the property of being experienced as positive in itself once someone becomes acquainted with it.

What we have seen above does not show that the entities valued in environmentalism necessarily lack intrinsic value. It does show, however, that the burden of proof lies with those who claim that they have such value.

10.2. Do nonsentient entities have more value than sentient beings?

Those who approve of environmentalist programs to exterminate animals implicitly assume not only that the nonsentient entities these programs aim to protect have intrinsic value. They must also implicitly assume one of the following theses:

(A) Either that these entities are the only thing that has intrinsic value (that is, that the good of sentient beings does not matter in itself);

(B) Or that, even if the good of sentient beings matters in itself, the value of these nonsentient entities is so much greater that it justifies causing suffering and death to a gigantic number of sentient beings.

As we have seen, if the thesis that nonsentient entities have intrinsic value is already quite difficult to prove, these additional theses are even more so. In fact, in the case of these additional theses, there are strong reasons for us to reject both. Let us see:

The main reason for rejecting thesis A is that, if the beings who can literally be harmed and benefited do not matter in themselves, it is hard to explain why any other kind of entity would matter in itself. As for thesis B, there are reasons to think exactly the opposite of what it claims. That is, we have reasons to prioritize sentient beings over nonsentient entities. The main reason is that only sentient beings are someone, and only sentient beings are capable of experiencing suffering and of having death prevent them from continuing to have experiences. These are particularly serious harms (we need only remember how hard we ourselves try to avoid our own suffering and death) that no nonsentient entity can undergo. Thus, even if it had been proven that nonsentient entities have intrinsic value, there would still be reasons to prioritize sentient beings, at least on occasions when sentient beings would be at risk of suffering and/or dying.

It is for this reason that, in order to know that environmentalist practices involving the extermination of animals are unjustifiable, it is completely unnecessary to enter into the debate about whether the entities valued in environmentalism have intrinsic value. This is because, as we have seen, even if it had been shown that they really do have this value, there would still be reasons for us to prioritize protecting sentient beings from suffering and death.

10.3. What if nonsentient entities do have intrinsic value?

If it had been proven that the entities valued in environmentalism have intrinsic value, some interests of sentient beings would have to be limited in order to preserve those entities. However, as we have seen, this would not justify violating the basic interests of sentient beings, such as not suffering and not dying. This is already accepted by most environmentalists with regard to humans. They hold that certain human interests (such as recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests) should be limited in order to achieve environmentalist goals, but not that causing suffering and death to humans is justified. Thus, in the same way, if it had been shown that the nonsentient entities valued in environmentalism really do have intrinsic value, this would justify limiting only nonbasic interests of nonhuman animals in order to preserve those entities.

Moreover, it is important to note that nothing said above shows that we should therefore embrace this hybrid position that values both sentient beings and certain nonsentient entities, giving priority to the basic interests of sentient beings. What was said above is that this is the position that would follow if it had been proven that the nonsentient entities valued in environmentalism really do have intrinsic value. But until such proof emerges, we have reasons to adopt an ethics based exclusively on consideration for sentient beings.

10.4. Questioning environmentalist criteria for assigning value

It is also possible to question at least some of the criteria that environmentalism uses to determine whether or not an entity has intrinsic value, and to what degree. Below we will look at three examples.

One of the goals of environmentalism is to keep, in each place, animals of native species with the characteristics they exhibited before the first human intervention. We saw in chapter 8 that the reason a program to exterminate ruddy ducks was carried out in Europe is that the American ducks were interbreeding with the native ducks and the head-feather color of the non-native species was prevailing in the offspring. But then we could question several things: "why would it be valuable to keep native species the way they were before the first human intervention?"; "why would native species have more value than non-native species?"; "why would hybridization make a species lose value?"; "why not simply let the mixing happen?", and so on.

It could also be pointed out that environmentalism (at least in many of its forms) suffers from an anti-human bias, since what is usually aimed at is to have a species or ecosystem remain in (or return to) the state it was in before the first human intervention. It is curious, to say the least, that environmentalists hold that humans are part of nature, yet at the same time hold that human intervention in ecosystems makes them cease to be natural (or makes them less natural).

One could also ask: "if certain nonsentient entities have intrinsic value, would a world with no sentient beings at all, but containing these entities, really have value?".

In short, there are many ways of questioning the criteria environmentalism uses for assigning value. In fact, most people simply accept environmentalist criteria because they are usually presented as obvious, in no need of justification. But once we think clearly about these criteria, we see that they are highly controversial, to say the least. The tendency most people have not to reflect on whether the foundations of the views they adopt really make sense is one of the factors that explains the widespread adherence to environmentalism. Another factor, as we have seen, is the lack of clarity about what environmentalism really aims at.

10.5. Conclusion

Many people take it as obvious that environmentalist programs are justified, even when they involve exterminating sentient beings. As we have seen, for some people this is because they mistakenly believe that the goal of such programs is to prevent something even worse from happening to sentient beings. However, other people are clear that this is not the goal of such programs, but they nevertheless take it as obvious that such programs are justified.

But then these people are assuming that it is obvious not only that the nonsentient entities valued in environmentalism have intrinsic value, but also that this value is so much greater than the value of the good of sentient beings that it justifies causing them suffering and death. We saw that the first thesis is already highly controversial and that, in fact, there are many ways of questioning the criteria for assigning value adopted by environmentalism. Moreover, we saw that even if it had been shown that the nonsentient entities valued in environmentalism really do have this value, we would still have strong reasons to prioritize protecting sentient beings from suffering and death.

All of this leads us to conclude clearly that environmentalist practices that cause suffering and/or death to sentient beings are completely unjustifiable. In addition, what we have seen also gives us reasons, until proven otherwise, to adopt an ethics centered solely on sentience.