The hidden assumptions
Many people think it's obvious that environmental extermination programs are justified. The author shows they depend on ideas that aren't obvious.
Idea 1: things that don't feel have intrinsic value
These programs assume that species, ecosystems, or biodiversity matter in themselves, regardless of how they affect those who feel.
Problems:
- it's very hard to show why something that feels nothing would matter for its own sake;
- this value can't be proven by experience.
The author doesn't say this is impossible, but that it's far from proven.
Idea 2: these things are worth more than animals
To justify killing animals, it's not enough for species and ecosystems to have value. You need one of two things:
- (A) that only these things matter, and the animals' good doesn't matter at all; or
- (B) that they're worth so much more that it justifies making huge numbers of animals suffer and die.
Idea A is hard to accept: if those who can really be harmed or helped don't matter, why would anything else matter? Idea B is even harder to prove.
What if these things did have value?
Even then, it would make more sense to limit some smaller interests of sentient beings to preserve them, rather than sacrificing the lives and basic well-being of huge numbers of animals.
Environmental standards can be questioned too
The author also questions the standards used to give something value, like being "native" or "natural." Why would having been in a place longer make a being more valuable?
In short
- Extermination programs assume that things without feelings have intrinsic value.
- And they assume that this value is greater than the lives of many animals.
- Neither of these ideas has been proven.