Lawrence Becker
American philosopher.
In The Priority of Human Interests (1983) he defends the priority of human interests on the basis of social ties and closeness.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.4
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Who's who
The authors and institutions cited in the collection: who they are and what they argue in the context of the discussion. It helps you see why each one is mentioned.
Context, not endorsement: many authors are cited precisely as examples of positions the collection criticizes. Each description sums up the position relevant to the debate, not the person's entire body of work. The numbers indicate volume and chapter.
Deny or reduce consideration for animals
John Benson
British philosopher.
In Duty and the Beast (1978) he accepts duties toward animals, but of lesser weight than duties toward humans.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.1
Peter Carruthers
British-American philosopher, contractualist.
In The Animals Issue (1992) he maintains that animals have no direct moral status, since they cannot take part in a moral contract; our obligations toward them would be only indirect.
Cited in 7 chapters: I.1, I.4, I.12, I.14, II.10, XI.6, XII.1
Ruth Cigman
British philosopher.
In Death, Misfortune and Species Inequality (1981) she argues that death is not a misfortune for animals because they supposedly lack categorical desires about their own future.
Philip Devine
American philosopher.
Discussed the moral basis of vegetarianism and argued that it is reasonable to give more weight to humans.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.5
Cora Diamond
American philosopher in the Wittgensteinian tradition.
In Eating Meat and Eating People (1978) she argues that our morality is shaped by relationships and by the idea of "fellow human beings," not by capacities; she accepts compassion for animals, but not equality.
Luc Ferry
French philosopher and former government minister.
In The New Ecological Order (1992) he criticizes deep ecology and antispeciesism, defending a humanism in which only humans have full dignity.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.4
R. G. Frey
British-American philosopher (1941–2012).
In Interests and Rights (1980) he denied that animals have interests in the moral sense because they lack language; he defended animal experimentation.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.4
Raimond Gaita
Australian philosopher.
In The Philosopher's Dog (2002) he explores the relationship between humans and animals, defending a view that sets apart the moral place of humans.
Michael Leahy
British philosopher.
In Against Liberation (1991), drawing on Wittgenstein, he denies that animals have a mental life rich enough to carry the same moral weight as humans.
Tibor Machan
Hungarian-American libertarian philosopher (1939–2016).
In Putting Humans First (2004) he argues that humans have moral priority because they are moral agents, and that animals have no rights.
H. J. McCloskey
Australian philosopher.
Argued that only those who can claim something for themselves can have rights, which would exclude animals.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.5
Mary Midgley
British philosopher (1919–2018).
In Animals and Why They Matter (1983) she criticizes the treatment of animals but argues that preferring one's own species is a natural bond, and to some extent a legitimate one.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.4
Jan Narveson
Canadian philosopher, libertarian contractualist.
Argues that morality is an agreement among those who can cooperate and retaliate; since animals cannot, they would have no rights (Animal Rights, 1977).
William Paton
British pharmacologist (1917–1993).
In Man and Mouse (1984) he defends animal experimentation for its medical benefits to humans.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.5
Lewis Petrinovich
American evolutionary psychologist.
In Darwinian Dominion (1999) he argues that favoring one's own species is natural and morally justified by evolution.
Richard Posner
American judge and legal theorist.
In a debate with Singer, he argued that it is legitimate to give preference to humans and to trust the intuition that humans matter more.
Roger Scruton
British conservative philosopher (1944–2020).
In Animal Rights and Wrongs (1996) he claims that rights belong only to members of the moral community, who are capable of duties; to animals we owe only a certain kindness.
Scott Wilson
American philosopher.
Argues that human status depends on the "species norm" (The Species-Norm Account of Human Status, 2005).
Environmental ethics and holism
Bernice Bovenkerk
Dutch philosopher (Wageningen).
Works at the intersection of animal ethics and environmental ethics, including the management of wild animals.
J. Baird Callicott
American environmental philosopher, the leading interpreter of the "land ethic."
Defends a holistic ethics: the good of the biotic community (ecosystems and species) is the ultimate criterion of value. In Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair (1980) he went as far as to claim that this good can outweigh that of individuals, humans included; he later softened his position.
Cited in 14 chapters: I.1, I.4, IV.15, V.1, V.2, V.7, V.8, VII.16, VII.20, XI.6, XII.1, XII.3, XII.5, XII.6
Robert Elliot
Australian philosopher.
In Faking Nature (1982) he argues that original nature has a value that restored nature does not recover.
Kenneth Goodpaster
American philosopher.
In On Being Morally Considerable (1978) he argues that being alive, not being sentient, is the criterion for moral consideration.
Eugene Hargrove
American environmental philosopher.
Grounds the value of nature in its aesthetic qualities.
Ned Hettinger
American environmental philosopher.
Defends the value of "wild" nature and discusses exotic species and respect for the autonomy of natural processes.
Holmes Rolston III
American environmental philosopher.
Attributes objective value to ecosystems and species, and argues that predation is part of the value of nature.
Cited in 8 chapters: IV.15, V.1, V.2, V.7, V.8, VII.23, XII.3, XII.5
Eric Katz
American environmental philosopher.
Criticizes restoration of and intervention in nature as forms of human domination over it.
Aldo Leopold
American ecologist and forester (1887–1948).
In A Sand County Almanac (1949) he formulated the land ethic: a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. The value lies in the whole, not in individual animals.
Pentti Linkola
Radical Finnish ecologist (1932–2020).
Placed the preservation of nature above the good of humans and other animals, going so far as to advocate a drastic, authoritarian reduction of the human population. He is cited as an extreme example of holistic environmentalism.
Arne Næss
Norwegian philosopher (1912–2009), founder of deep ecology.
Attributes intrinsic value to nature and to the diversity of life as a whole, not only to sentient beings.
Mark Sagoff
American environmental philosopher.
In Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce (1984) he argues that animal advocacy and environmentalism are incompatible.
Cited in 1 chapter: IV.15
Albert Schweitzer
Theologian, physician and philosopher (1875–1965).
Proposed "reverence for life": every living being deserves respect, an idea that inspired biocentrism.
Jo-Ann Shelton
American researcher.
Analyzes environmentalist programs that kill animals considered "out of place," such as introduced species.
Michael Soulé
American biologist (1936–2020), one of the founders of conservation biology.
Argued that biological diversity has value in itself and that conservation should protect species and ecosystems.
Paul W. Taylor
American philosopher (1923–2015).
In Respect for Nature (1986) he defends biocentrism: every living being has a "good of its own" and inherent value, whether sentient animals, plants or microorganisms.
Cited in 9 chapters: IV.20, V.1, VI.15, VI.17, VI.21, VII.18, VII.20, VII.31, XII.6
Gary Varner
American philosopher.
In In Nature's Interests? (1998) he argues that all living beings have "biological interests," although he gives priority to the interests of conscious beings.
Peter Wenz
American philosopher.
Proposes a "concentric circles" theory: stronger obligations toward those who are closer to us, within a pluralistic environmental ethics.
Defend consideration for sentient beings
Cheryl Abbate
American philosopher.
Applies virtue ethics to the animal question, showing that it too condemns harming animals unnecessarily.
Carol J. Adams
American ecofeminist writer.
In The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990) she links the oppression of women to that of animals; she is associated with the ethics of care.
Cited in 1 chapter: V.7
Paola Cavalieri
Italian philosopher.
In The Animal Question (2001) she extends human rights theory to animals; with Singer, she organized the Great Ape Project.
Cited in 1 chapter: III.4
Luciano Carlos Cunha
Author of this collection, PhD in ethics and political philosophy (UFSC).
In the works cited, he defends equal consideration for all sentient beings, including wild animals who are victims of natural processes.
Cited in 74 chapters: I.1, I.4, I.7, I.9, I.10, I.11, II.1, II.3, II.5, II.6, II.7, II.8, II.10, II.11 and 60 more
David DeGrazia
American philosopher.
In Taking Animals Seriously (1996) he defends serious consideration for animals, but allows different weights depending on mental complexity, especially regarding the harm of death.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.1
Daniel Dombrowski
American philosopher.
In Babies and Beasts (1997) he analyzes the history of the argument from species overlap.
Josephine Donovan
American feminist theorist.
Develops the ethics of care as applied to animals, centered on empathy and attention to suffering.
Jessica Ehnert
Philosopher.
Systematized the argument from species overlap (The Argument from Species Overlap, 2002).
Animal Ethics
International nonprofit organization that funded this collection.
Promotes moral consideration for all sentient beings, focusing on speciesism, wild animals and welfare biology.
Cited in 32 chapters: I.1, II.5, II.13, IV.6, IV.7, VI.10, VI.11, VI.12, VII.3, VII.21, VII.24, VII.26, VII.27, VII.28 and 18 more
Gary L. Francione
American legal scholar and philosopher.
Defends the abolitionist approach: the central problem is that animals are property; he proposes veganism as a moral baseline and criticizes welfarist reforms.
Cited in 9 chapters: II.1, IV.17, V.2, VI.1, VII.31, VIII.11, IX.13, XI.5, XI.6
Julian Franklin
American political philosopher (1925–2013).
In Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy (2005) he argues that Kant's categorical imperative, properly understood, requires treating all sentient beings as ends in themselves.
Lewis Gompertz
British writer and inventor (1783–1861).
A pioneer: in Moral Inquiries (1824) he advocated not using animal products and was already discussing helping animals against natural harms such as predation.
Oscar Horta
Spanish philosopher (University of Santiago de Compostela), cofounder of the organization Animal Ethics.
One of the leading authors on speciesism and on the suffering of wild animals; argues that natural harms matter just as much as those caused by humans.
Cited in 62 chapters: I.1, I.3, I.4, I.6, I.7, I.10, I.11, I.12, I.14, II.1, II.2, II.3, II.5, II.10 and 48 more
Dale Jamieson
American philosopher.
Writes on animal and environmental ethics, including zoos and climate change.
Hugh LaFollette
American philosopher.
With Niall Shanks, in Brute Science (1996), he questions the scientific validity of animal experimentation.
Cited in 1 chapter: IV.20
Jesús Mosterín
Spanish philosopher (1941–2017).
In ¡Vivan los animales! (1998) he criticizes cruelty to animals but allows hierarchies of consideration.
Carlos Naconecy
Brazilian philosopher.
Author of Ética & Animais (2006), an introduction to the debate in Portuguese.
Nathan Nobis
American philosopher.
Defends moral arguments for veganism and against the use of animals.
Martha Nussbaum
American philosopher.
Extends the capabilities approach to animals: each should be able to flourish according to its own form of life (Justice for Animals, 2023).
Cited in 1 chapter: VII.31
Ingmar Persson
Swedish philosopher.
Defends a basis for equality between species (A Basis for (Interspecies) Equality, 1993).
Cited in 1 chapter: I.1
Evelyn Pluhar
American philosopher.
In Beyond Prejudice (1995) she develops the argument from "marginal cases": if humans without certain capacities count, animals without them count too.
James Rachels
American philosopher (1941–2003).
In Created from Animals (1990) he defends "moral individualism": how we treat someone should depend on the characteristics of each individual, not on species.
Tom Regan
American philosopher (1938–2017).
In The Case for Animal Rights (1983) he argues that every "subject-of-a-life" has inherent value and rights, which rules out using them as mere resources.
Cited in 11 chapters: I.7, IV.15, VI.2, VI.9, VI.10, VI.13, VII.12, VII.31, XI.5, XI.6, XI.7
Bernard Rollin
American philosopher (1943–2021), pioneer of veterinary ethics.
Argued that animals have interests and a "telos" (a nature of their own) that must be respected, and discussed animal experimentation.
Mark Rowlands
British philosopher.
Applies Rawls's contractualism to animals: behind the veil of ignorance we would not know whether we would be human, so justice would include animals.
Cited in 11 chapters: I.11, I.14, II.1, II.10, II.11, III.12, IV.19, VI.1, VIII.12, IX.2, XI.6
Richard D. Ryder
British psychologist.
Coined the term "speciesism" in 1970 and later proposed "painism": what matters is each individual's pain.
Cited in 8 chapters: I.1, I.14, II.10, IV.19, VI.8, VII.3, XI.6, XI.7
Peter Singer
Australian philosopher, utilitarian.
In Animal Liberation (1975) he popularized the term "speciesism" and the principle of equal consideration of interests: suffering of equal intensity counts equally, no matter whose it is.
Cited in 31 chapters: I.1, I.5, I.6, I.11, II.2, II.3, II.5, II.6, III.2, III.4, III.6, III.8, IV.4, IV.7 and 17 more
Donald VanDeVeer
American philosopher.
Argued that Rawls's original position, applied consistently, should include animals (Of Beasts, Persons and the Original Position, 1979).
Wild animals and natural harms
Mikel Torres Aldave
Spanish philosopher.
Argues that animal ethics should address the natural harms suffered by wild animals.
Yves Bonnardel
French antispeciesist activist and writer.
Criticizes the idealization of nature and argues that antispeciesism must also take wild animals into account.
Stephen R. L. Clark
British philosopher.
In The Moral Status of Animals (1977) and in his article on "the problem of predation" he discusses whether we would have to intervene in nature.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.6
Tyler Cowen
American economist.
In Policing Nature (2003) he argues that, in principle, we have reasons to reduce predation when it is feasible.
Cited in 6 chapters: VII.1, VII.18, VII.31, VIII.12, IX.2, XII.6
Daniel Dorado
Spanish philosopher.
Writes about the ethics of intervening in nature on behalf of animals.
Jennifer Everett
American philosopher.
Discusses the "predation problem" at the intersection of environmental ethics and animal ethics.
Catia Faria
Portuguese philosopher, researcher at Animal Ethics.
Author of Animal Ethics in the Wild (2023); argues that we have reasons to help wild animals harmed by natural processes.
Cited in 23 chapters: II.8, III.7, IV.6, V.1, V.3, V.5, V.6, V.8, VI.11, VII.1, VII.10, VII.19, VII.21, VII.24 and 9 more
Kyle Johannsen
Canadian philosopher.
In Wild Animal Ethics (2021) he advocates research-based interventions to reduce the suffering of wild animals.
Adriano Mannino
Swiss philosopher and activist.
Defends suffering-focused ethics and concern for wild animals and for risks of future suffering.
Yew-Kwang Ng
Malaysian-Australian economist.
In Towards Welfare Biology (1995) he proposed "welfare biology" and argued that suffering prevails in nature because of mass reproduction.
Steve F. Sapontzis
American philosopher.
In Morals, Reason and Animals (1987) he defends animal liberation and argues that, in principle, we would have reasons to prevent predation when possible.
Cited in 13 chapters: I.1, III.1, III.2, III.4, VI.9, VI.10, VII.1, VII.15, VII.18, VII.31, VIII.12, XII.1, XII.6
Aaron Simmons
American philosopher.
Discusses animal rights in the face of predation and the duty of assistance.
Asher Soryl
Researcher in animal ethics.
Works on the well-being of wild animals and on the feasibility of interventions to help them.
Cited in 9 chapters: IV.6, V.3, V.6, VII.19, VII.24, VII.26, VII.27, IX.9, IX.13
Brian Tomasik
American essayist.
Author of Essays on Reducing Suffering; estimates the numbers of animals (especially insects) and advocates reducing the suffering of wild animals and the risks of future suffering.
Cited in 45 chapters: I.14, II.4, II.5, II.10, III.10, III.12, IV.6, IV.19, VI.3, VI.6, VI.15, VI.16, VI.19, VII.1 and 31 more
The future, s-risks and effective activism
Jacy Reese Anthis
American researcher, cofounder of the Sentience Institute.
In The End of Animal Farming (2018) he analyzes strategies for ending animal agriculture, including food technology and institutional change.
Cited in 5 chapters: VIII.1, VIII.2, VIII.11, VIII.12, XII.15
Tobias Baumann
German researcher, cofounder of the Center for Reducing Suffering.
Author of Avoiding the Worst (2022); the collection's main reference on s-risks (risks of suffering on an astronomical scale) and how to prevent them.
Cited in 22 chapters: VII.35, VII.36, VII.37, VIII.4, VIII.5, VIII.12, IX.1, IX.2, IX.4, IX.5, IX.6, IX.7, IX.8, IX.9 and 8 more
Nick Beckstead
American philosopher.
In his dissertation (2013) he argued for the enormous importance of shaping the distant future.
Nick Bostrom
Swedish philosopher.
Popularized the concept of existential risk and has written about artificial superintelligence.
Cited in 1 chapter: X.3
Lukas Gloor
Researcher at the Center on Long-Term Risk.
Has written about s-risks and about the asymmetry between suffering and happiness.
Hilary Greaves
British philosopher (Oxford).
Coauthor, with MacAskill, of The Case for Strong Longtermism.
William MacAskill
Scottish philosopher (Oxford), cofounder of effective altruism.
In What We Owe the Future (2022) he defends longtermism: giving great weight to how our decisions affect the distant future.
Cited in 1 chapter: XI.7
Gaverick Matheny
American researcher.
Defended utilitarianism applied to animals and was a pioneer in proposing cultivated meat as a way to reduce suffering.
David Pearce
British transhumanist philosopher.
In The Hedonistic Imperative (1995) he proposes using biotechnology to abolish the suffering of all sentient beings, including in nature.
Cited in 7 chapters: IV.6, VII.1, VII.18, VII.20, VII.31, VIII.12, IX.6
Magnus Vinding
Danish researcher at the Center for Reducing Suffering.
Author of Suffering-Focused Ethics (2020); argues for prioritizing the reduction of intense suffering, including in the future.
Cited in 7 chapters: IV.19, IX.5, IX.6, IX.11, X.2, X.6, XII.14
Corey Lee Wrenn
American sociologist.
Studies the animal advocacy movement and defends an abolitionist and intersectional approach.
Cited in 1 chapter: VIII.12
Ethical theory, value and well-being
Roger Crisp
British philosopher (Oxford).
Works on theories of well-being and defends a form of sufficientarianism based on compassion.
Joel Feinberg
American philosopher (1926–2004).
In The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations (1974) he argues that only those who have interests can have rights, and that animals have interests but plants do not.
Fred Feldman
American philosopher.
Argues that death is a harm because it deprives a person of the good they would have had.
Guy Fletcher
British philosopher.
Author of an introduction to theories of well-being (2016).
Jürgen Habermas
German philosopher.
Formulated discourse ethics: valid norms are those that everyone affected would accept in a free dialogue.
Cited in 1 chapter: XI.6
R. M. Hare
British philosopher (1919–2002).
Proposed two-level utilitarianism: intuitive rules for everyday life and critical calculation for hard cases.
John Harsanyi
Hungarian-American economist, Nobel laureate.
Grounded utilitarianism in impartial choice under uncertainty: what we would choose without knowing who we would be.
Nils Holtug
Danish philosopher.
Defends prioritarianism (benefits are worth more to those who are worse off) and has written about the harm of death.
Rosalind Hursthouse
New Zealand philosopher, a leading figure in virtue ethics.
Argues, from virtue ethics, that cruelty and indifference toward animals are vices.
Shelly Kagan
American philosopher (Yale).
Author of Normative Ethics (1998), used in the collection to explain the "focal point" of theories. In How to Count Animals (2019) he defends a hierarchical view: animals matter, but less than persons.
Christine Korsgaard
American Kantian philosopher (Harvard).
In Fellow Creatures (2018) she argues, starting from Kant, that animals are also ends in themselves, against the reading that only indirect duties would apply to them.
Jeff McMahan
American philosopher (Oxford).
In The Ethics of Killing (2002) he proposes that the harm of death depends on "time-relative interests" and on psychological connectedness with the future, which would make death less serious for many animals. He has also written about the moral problem of predation.
Cited in 14 chapters: I.1, I.14, III.3, III.6, III.7, III.9, III.12, IV.7, IV.20, VII.1, VII.18, VII.31, VIII.12, XII.6
Thomas Nagel
American philosopher.
In Death (1970) he argues that death is an evil of deprivation; in What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974) he discusses the subjectivity of experience.
Nel Noddings
American philosopher (1929–2022).
One of the founders of the ethics of care, centered on concrete relationships.
Cited in 1 chapter: XI.6
Robert Nozick
American libertarian philosopher (1938–2002).
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) he described the position "Kantianism for people, utilitarianism for animals," which the collection criticizes.
Derek Parfit
British philosopher (1942–2017).
In Reasons and Persons (1984) he analyzed personal identity, psychological connectedness and population ethics, topics used in the debate on the harm of death and on future beings.
Cited in 11 chapters: II.13, III.2, III.8, III.10, IX.2, IX.4, XI.2, XI.5, XI.6, XI.7, XII.13
John Rawls
American political philosopher (1921–2002).
In A Theory of Justice (1971) he proposed the veil of ignorance; he himself excluded animals from justice, but the impartiality test he proposed is used to include them.
W. D. Ross
British philosopher (1877–1971).
Proposed prima facie duties (fidelity, non-maleficence, beneficence, etc.); he denied that animals have rights, although he accepted duties toward them.
David Sobel
American philosopher.
Works on theories of well-being based on informed desires.
Larry Temkin
American philosopher.
A theorist of egalitarianism and of how to compare outcomes (Inequality, 1993; Rethinking the Good, 2012).
Mary Anne Warren
American philosopher (1946–2010).
Proposed a multi-criteria view of moral status that gives animals a lower status than persons.
David Wasserman
American philosopher.
Author of the entry on the concept of discrimination in the Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics.
Science of sentience, data and psychology
Andrew Barron
Australian neuroscientist.
With Colin Klein, he argued that insects have brain structures capable of subjective experience (2016).
Marc Bekoff
American ethologist.
Advocates "compassionate conservation," which tries to reconcile conservation with the good of each animal.
Jonathan Birch
British philosopher of science (LSE).
Led the report that led the United Kingdom to recognize the sentience of octopuses, squid, crabs and lobsters (2021); defends the precautionary principle.
Donald Broom
Animal welfare scientist (Cambridge).
Studies indicators of sentience and of well-being in many species.
Our World in Data
Data publication based at the University of Oxford.
Source of the global statistics on slaughtered animals.
EFSA
European Food Safety Authority.
Has published scientific opinions on the sentience and welfare of animals used in production.
Gail Eisnitz
American investigator.
In Slaughterhouse (1997) she gathered testimony from slaughterhouse workers about what happens to the animals.
Cited in 1 chapter: IV.1
Fishcount
British research project.
Estimates the number of fish caught and farmed each year worldwide.
Cited in 6 chapters: IV.1, IV.13, VIII.2, VIII.3, X.1, XII.10
Daniel Kahneman
Israeli-American psychologist (1934–2024), Nobel laureate in economics.
In Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) he describes the biases and heuristics that distort our judgments, the basis of Volume X.
Jennifer Mather
Canadian comparative psychologist.
Researches cognition and sentience in invertebrates, especially octopuses.
Lynne Sneddon
British biologist.
A pioneering researcher on pain in fish.
Frans de Waal
Dutch primatologist (1948–2024).
Showed empathy and prosocial behavior in other primates, discussing the origins of morality.
Cited in 1 chapter: I.12
Classics of philosophy
Aristotle
Greek philosopher (384–322 BCE).
Founder of virtue ethics; he saw animals as existing for human use, within a natural hierarchy.
Jeremy Bentham
British philosopher (1748–1832), founder of utilitarianism.
Wrote that the question is not whether animals can reason or talk, but whether they can suffer.
Epicurus
Greek philosopher (341–270 BCE).
Held that death is not an evil: "where death is, we are not." The collection discusses and rejects this view.
Cited in 1 chapter: III.1
Thomas Hobbes
English philosopher (1588–1679).
A contractualist: morality arises from an agreement among self-interested people to avoid the war of all against all.
Cited in 1 chapter: XI.6
Immanuel Kant
German philosopher (1724–1804), author of the ethics of the categorical imperative.
Held that only rational beings are ends in themselves; our duties regarding animals would be indirect (cruelty to them would make us cruel to humans). Contemporary Kantians such as Korsgaard argue that the theory itself implies considering animals directly.
John Locke
English philosopher (1632–1704).
Defined a person by a consciousness that extends over time, an idea used in the debate on identity and the harm of death.
Lucretius
Roman Epicurean poet and philosopher (1st century BCE).
Formulated the symmetry argument: we do not regret the time before we were born, so we should not regret the time after death.
Cited in 1 chapter: III.3
John Stuart Mill
British philosopher (1806–1873), utilitarian.
In the essay "Nature" he shows that "natural" does not mean "good": nature routinely does things we would condemn in humans.
Cited in 6 chapters: I.8, III.4, IV.19, VII.31, VIII.12, XI.7
Plato
Greek philosopher (c. 428–348 BCE).
In the dialogue Euthyphro he formulated the dilemma: is something good because the gods approve of it, or do the gods approve of it because it is good?
Cited in 1 chapter: I.13