Is What Matters Belonging to the Same Species as Those Who Have Certain Capacities?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume I, p. 21 of the PDF edition · English translation

6.1. The appeal to the group

It is often argued that what makes it right to exploit nonhuman animals and not to help them when they are victims of disease, hunger, thirst, and so on, while at the same time making it wrong to do the same to humans, is the fact that humans possess certain capacities (for example, complex cognitive capacities) or certain relationships (of mutual solidarity, political relationships, power relationships, and so on).

One reply to this argument points out that it is simply false that all humans possess these capacities or relationships²⁶. For example, children up to a certain age and victims of certain diseases or accidents that affect mental capacities do not possess them. However, this does not seem to justify treating them worse (much less justify doing to them what is normally done to nonhuman animals). Quite the contrary: the lack of these capacities and relationships is seen as a reason to give them even greater care, since it makes them more vulnerable. But if so, then the lack of these capacities and relationships in nonhuman animals could not justify treating them worse (much less justify the terrible things done to them): on the contrary, it is a reason for them to receive even greater protection.

Some authors, however, think this reply does not work. In defense of anthropocentrism, they put forward what is known as the appeal to the group. The appeal to the group consists in saying that only humans matter (or matter to a greater degree) because all humans belong to a species whose normal members possess those capacities or relationships, regardless of the fact that many humans do not possess them (or do not even have the potential for them)²⁷.

Below we will look at some problems with this argument²⁸:

6.2. Problems with the appeal to the group

The first problem is that the appeal to the group commits the fallacy known as begging the question (it assumes what it sets out to prove). For example, imagine we ask: "Why do only humans matter?" and the answer is: "Because they possess a series of capacities or relationships." But imagine that, in response, we ask: "And what about the humans who do not possess them?" and the answer is "They matter equally, because they are human."

This reveals that the argument, although it sets out to explain why the species criterion is relevant to questions of moral consideration, already assumes in advance that belonging to the same species as the individuals who possess those capacities or relationships is what matters for questions of moral consideration. One could equally say, for example, that what matters is belonging to the same biological kingdom (rather than species) as the individuals who possess those capacities or relationships.

The second problem is that the argument does not explain why possessing those capacities or relationships would be relevant to whether someone should receive moral consideration or to how much consideration they should receive. This, too, is simply assumed in advance.

The third problem is that there are reasons to think that whether or not one possesses these capacities or relationships is irrelevant to questions of moral consideration. What is at stake in questions of moral consideration is the possibility that our decisions will harm or benefit those affected by them. So what seems relevant to knowing whom to give moral consideration to is knowing who can be harmed or benefited. Possessing those capacities or relationships does not determine who can be harmed and benefited. What determines that is sentience (that is, being capable of having positive and negative experiences). Moreover, possessing those capacities or relationships does not determine the degree of harms and benefits either. Therefore, it is also not relevant to determining the degree of consideration someone should receive.

The fourth problem with the appeal to the group is that it is arbitrary, since it would include within the sphere of moral consideration the humans who lack the characteristics cited to exclude nonhuman animals, and would exclude even those nonhuman animals who had those characteristics. For example, suppose we ask: "Why don't nonhuman animals matter?" and the answer is: "Because they do not possess a series of capacities or relationships." Imagine that we then ask: "And what if some nonhuman animal possesses those capacities or relationships?" and the answer is: "Even so, it does not matter, because it is not human." In short, the argument is highly biased.

6.3. The appeal to a combination of the species criterion and the capacities/relationships criterion

It is sometimes said that, for an individual to matter, they need to meet only one of these two criteria: either belonging to the human species or possessing certain capacities or relationships. This would avoid the fourth problem of the appeal to the group (since, in that case, if a nonhuman animal had any of those capacities or relationships, it would receive full moral consideration).

However, this combination still faces four similar problems:

The first problem is that it still begs the question. It aims to explain the relevance of the species criterion but, instead, assumes in advance that this criterion is relevant.

The second problem is that it still does not explain why possessing those capacities or relationships would be relevant to questions of moral consideration.

The third problem is that there are good reasons to think that possessing those capacities or relationships is relevant neither to knowing whom we should give consideration to nor to how much consideration we should give, since such capacities or relationships determine neither who can be harmed or benefited nor the degree of harm or benefit one would be subject to.

The fourth problem is that, although it avoids being biased in the way the previous argument is, it remains biased, only in a different way: it requires nonhuman animals to have some of those capacities or relationships in order to receive moral consideration, but does not require the same of members of the human species.