If Species Are Not a Social Construct, Is Speciesism Justified?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume I, p. 24 of the PDF edition · English translation

7.1. The appeal to the distinction between the biological and the socially constructed

Nonhuman animals are exploited for the most diverse purposes. They are used for food, clothing, as test subjects, for entertainment and leisure, and as workers or tools. This use kills literally trillions of animals every year, usually after a life full of suffering. Animals living in the wild are also constantly victims of disease, hunger, thirst, natural disasters, and so on. In many of these cases, it would be possible to prevent their suffering and deaths. However, the standard view is that it is wrong to help them. It is commonly said that we should let nature take its course, even if the outcome is terrible for the animals.

In both kinds of situations, if the victims were human, such attitudes would be widely condemned. In fact, more than that: such attitudes would be considered monstrous, heinous. This moral double standard based on the victim's species has been accused of committing a form of discrimination analogous to racism and sexism: speciesism²⁹

However, there are people who disagree with this comparison. For example, it is sometimes said that using the species criterion for questions of moral consideration is not unjust because it is a criterion that refers to biological characteristics³⁰. According to this argument, racism and sexism, on the other hand, would be unjust because the very ideas of race and gender are allegedly social constructs. Let us look at some problems with this argument.

7.2. Problems with the appeal to biological distinctions

A first problem is that it does not explain why a criterion's being based on biological characteristics or on a social construct would be relevant to whether it is just

or unjust. This is simply assumed by the argument, without any explanation.

A second problem is that there are examples of criteria referring to biological characteristics that are clearly unjust. Imagine, for example, a system of slavery based on individuals' height. If the fact that this criterion is based on a biological characteristic cannot make it just, then the fact that the species criterion is based on a biological characteristic cannot make it just either.

Indeed, it seems that a criterion's being based on a biological characteristic cannot even make it less unjust than it would be if it were based on a social construct. This is because the injustice of a criterion depends on its treating individuals in a biased way, and not on whether the criterion it uses refers to social constructs or to biological traits.

Racism and sexism are unjust because they disadvantage individuals of certain groups in a biased way. If it were shown, for example, that races and genders are not social constructs, racism and sexism would remain just as unjust as they would be if races and genders are social constructs. Yet the same is true in the case of speciesism. The fact that the concept of species refers to biological characteristics does not make speciesism just, nor does it even make it less unjust than other forms of discrimination, such as racism and sexism.