Volume III · Intermediate level
Animals and the Harm of Death
An inquiry into the harm of death and its magnitude
About this volume
This book presents the main arguments in the debate on the harm of death for nonhuman animals. It investigates what the conditions are for death to be a harm and also what criteria we should use to assess the magnitude of the harm of death.
ISBN 978-65-01-35507-8 · 1st edition, February 2025. Original text by Luciano Carlos Cunha, translated into English.
In a nutshell
Is killing painlessly wrong? This volume investigates what the harm of death consists of, why it does not depend on understanding what dying is, and examines attempts to claim that death harms animals only a little: lack of intellectual pleasures, weak psychological connectedness, replaceability, short lifespans.
For kids
If someone blows out your candle too early, you lose all the good things you were still going to live, even if it does not hurt. It is the same with animals: dying young takes away the good days that were still to come.
You will learn
- Why death is a harm even when it is painless
- How to measure the size of the harm of death (QALYs)
- Why animals are not "replaceable"
- The difference between the harm of death and the wrongness of killing
It helps to have read: Volumes I and II.
Starting from scratch?
Every chapter has a simplified version, written for readers new to the topic. Read the simple version first, then the author’s full text.
- What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of?
- Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death
- Objections to the Account of the Harm of Death as the Prevention of What Is Positive
- Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
- How Can We Assess How Much Someone Is Harmed by Death?
- Objections to Assessing the Magnitude of the Harm of Death on the Basis of QALYs
- Do Animals Have Weaker Psychological Connectedness?
- Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Replaceable
- Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
- The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a Small Harm
- What If Humans Were More Harmed by Death?
- Differentiated Moral Status, the Harm of Death, and the Wrongness of Killing
- Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational Decision, and Probabilities
Chapters
- 1What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of?5 min
Against the Epicurean view that death is not a harm, the chapter argues that it harms by preventing the good things the individual would have lived; and even if Epicurus were right, this would apply equally to humans and animals.
- 2Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death6 min
Animals are harmed by death even without understanding what it is and without desires about the future: every sentient being with the prospect of a minimally meaningful life ahead loses something by dying.
- 3Objections to the Account of the Harm of Death as the Prevention of What Is Positive4 min
The chapter examines three objections to the idea that death is a deprivation harm (the epistemological problem, the temporal asymmetry, and the problem of potential beings) and shows that they don't overturn the account.
- 4Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?2 min
Saying that those without intellectual pleasures are only slightly harmed by death doesn't hold up: intellectual pleasures aren't necessarily more valuable, and even if they were, that wouldn't make other pleasures of little value.
- 5How Can We Assess How Much Someone Is Harmed by Death?8 min
The size of the harm of death depends on how much lifetime the individual loses and on the quality of that time, which can be expressed in QALYs; there are also reasons to take into account what they have already lived.
- 6Objections to Assessing the Magnitude of the Harm of Death on the Basis of QALYs7 min
The objection that measuring the harm of death by QALYs has absurd implications appeals to intuitions that may be biased; until another criterion is grounded independently, we have reasons to use QALYs.
- 7Do Animals Have Weaker Psychological Connectedness?3 min
Even if psychological connectedness to the future mattered for the harm of death, simpler minds may have proportionally greater connectedness, since their contents vary less; and strong connectedness doesn't even seem necessary for being greatly harmed.
- 8Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Replaceable5 min
The idea that animals are replaceable, that is, that killing one isn't wrong if another with an equally good life is born in its place, fails: it would permit parents to replace their children, and it confuses being qualitatively “the same” with being the same individual.
- 9Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?9 min
With examples like Bia's trip to the pyramids, the chapter shows that the strength of our reasons to pursue what's good and avoid what's bad doesn't depend on psychological connectedness; so connectedness doesn't show that animals are only slightly harmed by death.
- 10The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a Small Harm12 min
Having little lifetime left, whether from old age or from belonging to a short-lived species, doesn't make death a small harm; and animals with smaller brains may even perceive time more slowly.
- 11What If Humans Were More Harmed by Death?7 min
Even supposing humans were more harmed by death, that wouldn't justify killing animals for lesser benefits, or killing some to save others, or ignoring the number of victims.
- 12Differentiated Moral Status, the Harm of Death, and the Wrongness of Killing14 min
The wrongness of killing and the reason to save lives should depend on the magnitude of the harm of death; the “two-tier” approach, which gives a privileged status to certain individuals, fails the impartiality test.
- 13Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational Decision, and Probabilities7 min
Considering the possibility of life after death doesn't radically change the assessment: there's uncertainty about it and about what it would be like, while we know how the current life would probably go on; so it doesn't justify killing those who have a good life.