Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume III, p. 33 of the PDF edition · English translation

9.1. The appeal to psychological connectedness

It is sometimes argued that nonhuman animals (or at least many of them) are only slightly harmed by death because they allegedly lack strong psychological connectedness with their future. What is meant by psychological connectedness is the degree to which memories, character traits, beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., are retained.

However, we can ask: why, for someone to be greatly harmed by death, would they need strong psychological connectedness with their future? One explanation holds that it is because psychological connectedness determines someone's identity (that is, it is what makes someone the same individual over time). We have already seen the problems with this explanation in chapter 8. In this chapter we will discuss another explanation that is sometimes offered. This explanation claims that psychological connectedness is relevant to determining the strength of an individual's prudential reasons, even if it is not relevant to determining their identity⁴⁴.

9.2. The appeal to prudential reasons

What is meant by prudential reasons? They are the reasons someone has to avoid negative events and to pursue positive events that could happen to themselves. According to the position we are going to discuss, the strength of the reasons someone has to avoid or pursue a given event that would happen to them in the future would be determined by multiplying how good or bad that event is by the psychological connectedness they would maintain with their "future self"⁴⁵.

According to this approach, for this reason, if nonhuman animals have little psychological connectedness, they are not greatly harmed by death, even if it deprives them of having very satisfying experiences.

We saw in chapter 7 that one way of questioning this argument is to deny that nonhuman animals have little psychological connectedness with their future. In this chapter, however, we will address another kind of criticism: we will look at two counterexamples that challenge the idea that psychological connectedness matters for the strength of prudential reasons⁴⁶.

9.3. Does the strength of reasons to avoid negative events depend on psychological connectedness?

The first counterexample concerns the strength of reasons to avoid negative events.

The case of the greater evil

Imagine that Ana finds out that it is impossible to avoid Alzheimer's disease at the end of her life and that, after a year, the disease will have destroyed all psychological connectedness with who she is now. In addition, she also finds out that she will suffer from a second condition, which will cause her a great deal of pain. However, it is possible to choose when the second condition will occur: either after Alzheimer's has made her lose all her psychological connectedness, or before she has the disease, while she still retains strong psychological connectedness with who she is now. There is, however, one difference: if she chooses to have the second condition occur after she has completely lost psychological connectedness, the pain will be much more severe.

It seems that, from Ana's own point of view, it is preferable to choose to have the pain occur while she still has strong psychological connectedness with herself now, simply because the pain will be less. If the degree of psychological connectedness were relevant to determining the strength of the reasons someone has to try to avoid a negative event that would happen to them in the future, we would have to say that it is preferable for Ana to go through the much more intense pain, by choosing to have it occur after the total loss of psychological connectedness. If this is not the case, then it seems that the strength of prudential reasons to avoid a negative event does not depend on the degree of psychological connectedness.

9.4. Does the strength of reasons to pursue positive events depend on psychological connectedness?

The second counterexample aims to show the same thing, but with regard to the strength of prudential reasons to pursue positive events (and, consequently, to avoid death).

The case of the greater good

Imagine that Bia is still a five-year-old child and wishes to see the pyramids of Egypt. Imagine, however, that if she travels now, while she has strong psychological connectedness with who she is now, the trip will be pleasant, but that it will be much more pleasant if she travels when she is an adult. When she is an adult, however, she will have extremely weak psychological connectedness with who she is now (her memories, character traits, beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., will have changed a great deal).

It seems that Bia has prudential reasons to prefer to take the trip when she is an adult, simply because the trip will be much more pleasant. If this is correct, then psychological connectedness is not relevant to determining the strength of the prudential reasons someone has to pursue positive events either.

This suggests that an individual who has weaker psychological connectedness (or even one who retains no psychological connectedness at all) is not necessarily only slightly harmed by death, since missing out on the positive events that death would prevent is not, for that reason, only slightly harmful to them. Therefore, an appeal to psychological connectedness does not seem able to show that nonhuman animals are only slightly harmed by death.

9.5. Discussing responses to the examples

For the sake of simplicity, let us call the multiplicative approach the one holding that the strength of prudential reasons to pursue/avoid a given event should be determined by multiplying how good/bad the event would be by the degree of psychological connectedness someone would maintain between the present time and the moment at which the event would occur.

Dossena (2024b, p. 86-7) responds to the Case of the Greater Evil by arguing that, contrary to what it may seem, the multiplicative approach would not imply choosing to go through the more severe pain. According to the author, this would be so because such an approach would also take into account the future interests someone would have, provided that some degree of prudential unity relations (in this case, some degree of psychological connectedness) is maintained between the present moment and the future moment at which the interest will be frustrated, even if these prudential unity relations are weak. Below we will look at three problems with this response.

The first problem is that in the Case of the Greater Evil the stronger pain will occur after the disease has made the individual lose psychological connectedness with who they are now completely. Thus, in this case the condition suggested by the author ("provided there is some degree of prudential unity relations") is not met. But if the individual still has reasons to prefer to avoid having the pain occur in this condition simply because the pain will be more intense, then the degree of psychological connectedness is not relevant to the strength of prudential reasons (since in this case the degree of psychological connectedness is equal to zero).

The second problem is that both the Case of the Greater Evil and the Case of the Greater Good acknowledge that the multiplicative approach would take into account all the positive and negative events that would happen to the individual from then on (and would therefore take into account their future interests). However, it is important to remember, such an approach prescribes multiplying how good or bad the event would be by the degree of psychological connectedness the individual maintains between the present moment and the moment at which the event would occur, in order to determine the strength of prudential reasons. And it is in this sense that such an approach would have to say that we have very weak prudential reasons, whether to pursue a very good event or to avoid a very bad one, if such events are to occur at a moment when we no longer maintain strong psychological connectedness with who we are now. In the Case of the Greater Evil, where the individual retains no psychological connectedness with the present moment, such an approach would have to say that the individual has no reason at all to avoid the stronger pain.

The third problem is that if, as the author acknowledges, we have reasons to avoid the greater pain even if at the moment it would occur we would have little (or even no) psychological connectedness with who we are now, then the response the author offers to the Case of the Greater Evil, instead of showing that the degree of psychological connectedness matters for the strength of prudential reasons, emphasizes exactly the opposite (which is exactly what the Case of the Greater Evil aims to emphasize): that what matters for the strength of prudential reasons is how good or bad the event would be, and not the degree of psychological connectedness we would maintain between the present moment and the moment at which the event would occur.

The author acknowledges that his response is incompatible with the idea that the strength of prudential reasons is a function of the value/disvalue of the future event and the strength of prudential unity relations (in this case, the degree of psychological connectedness)⁴⁷. As a solution, he suggests recognizing that any negative or positive future event already provides significant prudential reasons, but that, if the degree of psychological connectedness between the present and that future is lower, these reasons would carry somewhat less weight⁴⁸.

The problem with this way out is that, if these reasons carried less weight, then we should not conclude that it is better to avoid the greater evil, since it would occur after we had lost all psychological connectedness. The lesser evil, by contrast, would occur while we still have strong psychological connectedness, and, according to the solution offered by the author, we would have to say that the reasons to avoid it would be stronger than those to avoid the greater evil.

Moreover, the response offered by the author does not explain the importance of the degree of psychological connectedness for the strength of prudential reasons. In fact, what the response suggests is that, if we maintain that the degree of psychological connectedness is much less relevant to the strength of prudential reasons, then we will not reach the conclusion that it is rational to choose to go through a much greater pain. But this is not to show that the degree of psychological connectedness is relevant to the strength of these reasons, not even to a lesser degree⁴⁹.

Dossena (2024a, 2024b) has made a very honest and thorough analysis both of the position defended here and of the position that the counterexamples I offered aim to criticize. However, as I understand it, the responses offered by the author come much closer to the position defended here than they rescue the degree-of-psychological-connectedness criterion. If so, then it seems that the thesis still stands that individuals (including nonhuman animals) can be seriously harmed by death because of factors that have to do solely with what they would miss out on enjoying if they died, regardless of the degree of psychological connectedness they would maintain over time.