The idea being debated
We've already seen the idea that animals would be only slightly harmed by death because they have little psychological connectedness with their future. Chapter 7 showed they can have strong connectedness. Now the author asks something else: why would connectedness matter?
The "prudential reasons" argument
Some say we only have strong reasons to care about our future to the extent that we're connected to it.
The author gives two examples that show this doesn't work.
Example 1: the bigger harm
Anna knows that late in life she'll have Alzheimer's, and the disease will erase every link to who she is today. She has to choose:
- feel a smaller pain now, while she's still "herself";
- or feel a bigger pain in the future, when she no longer has any connection to who she is now.
From Anna's own point of view, choosing the smaller pain seems better, even though it's now. In other words, the bigger pain in the future still matters a lot, even without psychological connectedness.
Example 2: the bigger good
Bella is five and dreams of seeing the pyramids of Egypt. She can travel now and enjoy it a little, or go when she's an adult and enjoy it much more, even though she'll be very different from the Bella of today.
It seems Bella has good reasons to prefer the more enjoyable trip, in the future. The size of the good counts more than psychological connectedness.
The conclusion
What matters is how much good or bad someone will live through, not how similar that person stays to themselves over time. So even if an animal had little psychological connectedness, losing its future would still be a big harm for it.
In short
- The examples of Anna and Bella show that the size of the good and bad counts more than connectedness.
- So the idea that animals lose little by dying doesn't hold up.
- Losing the future is a big harm for any being that would have had a good life.