Volume III

References

Every work cited in “Animals and the Harm of Death”, as listed in the original edition. Click a year cited in the text to see the work; here you can see which chapters cite each one.

BELSHAW. Death, Pain, and Animal Life. In: VISAK, T.; GARNER, R. (orgs). The ethics of killing animals. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 32–50. Cited in: ch. 6
CAVALIERI, P. The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Cited in: ch. 4
CIGMAN, R. Death, Misfortune and Species Inequality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 10, n. 1, p. 47-64, 1981. Cited in: ch. 2, ch. 6
CUNHA, L. C. Razões para ajudar: o sofrimento dos animais selvagens e suas implicações éticas. Curitiba: Appris, 2022. Cited in: ch. 2, ch. 6, ch. 9, ch. 10, ch. 11
CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021. Cited in: ch. 6, ch. 10
DELAZARI-RADEK, K.; SINGER, P. The point of view of the universe: Sidgwick and contemporary ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Cited in: ch. 6
DOSSENA, F. A filosofia e o veganismo: uma resposta a Luiz Felipe Pondé. Medium, 23 mai. 2020. Cited in: ch. 6
DOSSENA, F. O dano da morte: uma análise de contraexemplos à abordagem dos interesses relativos ao tempo. Controvérsia, v. 20, n. 3, p. 70-90, 2024b. Cited in: ch. 9
DOSSENA, F. Uma introdução atualizada aos problemas da ética animal. Revista Peri, v. 16, n. 1, p. 125-132, 2024a. Cited in: ch. 6, ch. 9
EPICURO. Carta a Meneceo. In: EPICURO. Obras. Madrid: Tecnos, 1991. p. 57-65.
FARIA, C. Animal Ethics Goes Wild: The Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2016. Cited in: ch. 7
FERRÉ, F. Moderation, Morals and Meat. Inquiry, v. 29, p. 391-406, 1986. Cited in: ch. 8
HARE, R. M. Why I Am Only a Demi-Vegetarian. In: JAMIESON, D. (org.). Singer and His Critics. London: Blackwell, 1999, p. 233-246. Cited in: ch. 8
HARSANYI, J. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal compa- risons of utility. Journal of Political Economy, v. 63, p. 309-321, 1955. Cited in: ch. 12
HOLTUG, N. Prioritarianism. In: HOLTUG, N. & LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, K. (eds.). Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 125-156. Cited in: ch. 10
HOLTUG, N.; ADLER, M. D. Prioritarianism: A response to critics. Politics Philosophy & Economics, v. 18, n. 2, 2019. Cited in: ch. 10
HORTA, O. Igualitarismo, igualación a la baja, antropocentrismo y valor de la vida. Revista de Filosofía da Universidad Complutense de Madrid, v. 35, n. 1, p. 133-152, 2010. Cited in: ch. 2, ch. 5, ch. 10
HORTA, O. Un desafío para la bioética: la cuestión del especismo. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2007. Cited in: ch. 3, ch. 7, ch. 10
HORTA, O. Why the Concept of Moral Status Should Be Abandoned. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, v.20, p. 899-910, 2017. Cited in: ch. 9, ch. 12
FELDMAN, F. Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death. Philosophical Review, v. 100, p. 205- 27, 1991. Cited in: ch. 1, ch. 2
GRIFFIN, J. Well-Being. Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Cited in: ch. 2
KAHNEMAN, D. Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011. Cited in: ch. 6
LOCKE, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1694]. Cited in: ch. 8
LUCRECIO, T. De la naturaleza. Barcelona: Bosch, 1976 [55 a.C].
LUPER-FOY, S. Annihilation. Philosophical Quarterly, v. 37, 1987, p. 233-52. Cited in: ch. 2
MCMAHAN, J. Early Death and Later Suffering. In: GAMLUND, E.; SOLBERG, C. T. (orgs.). Saving People from the Harm of Death. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p.116-133 Cited in: ch. 6
MCMAHAN, J. Moral intuition. In: LAFOLLETTE, H.; PERSSON, I. (org.). The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2013. p. 103-120. Cited in: ch. 12
MCMAHAN, J. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Cited in: ch. 3, ch. 6, ch. 7, ch. 9, ch. 12
MCMAHAN, J. The Moral Problem of Predation. In: CHIGNELL, A.; CUNEO, T.; HALTEMAN, M. C. (org.). Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments About the Ethics of Eating. London: Routledge, 2015. p. 268-294. Cited in: ch. 6, ch. 12
MILL, J. S. Utilitarianism. In: MILL, J. S. Collected Works, vl. X. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969 [1861], p. 203-59. Cited in: ch. 4
NAGEL, T. Death. In: NAGEL, T. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 1-10. Cited in: ch. 1, ch. 2
NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY & SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Numbers of insects (species and individuals). Encyclopedia Smithsonian, 2008. Cited in: ch. 12
NOONAN, H; CURTIS, B. Identity. In: ZALTA, E. N. (org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2018 Edition.
OLSON, E. T. Personal Identity. In: ZALTA, E. N. (org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2021 Edition. Cited in: ch. 8
PARFIT, D. Equality or Priority? Kansas: University of Kansas, 1995. Cited in: ch. 10
PARFIT, D. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Cited in: ch. 2, ch. 8
RAWLS, J. A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1971]. Cited in: ch. 12
RIBEIRO, A. G. Magnitude do dano da morte considerando o prioritarismo. In: Encontro ANPOF, n. XX, 2024, Recife/PE, p. 438-9. Cited in: ch. 5, ch. 10
ROWLANDS, M. Animal rights: Moral, theory and practice. 2. ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 [1998]. Cited in: ch. 12
SAPONTZIS. F. In Defense of the Pig. Journal of Animal Ethics, v. 4, n. 1, p. 5-17, 2014. Cited in: ch. 4
SAPONTZIS, S. F. Morals, Reason and Animals. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987. Cited in: ch. 1, ch. 2
SCRUTON, R Animal rights and wrongs. London: Metro, 1996. . SINGER, P. Ética Prática. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002 [1993]. Cited in: ch. 8
SOBEL, D. Full-information Accounts of Well-being. Ethics, n. 104, p. 784-810, 1994. Cited in: ch. 2
SUITS, D. B. Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died. American Philosophical Quarterly, [s.l.], v. 38, p. 69-84, 2001. Cited in: ch. 1
TOMASIK, B. Do Smaller Animals Have Faster Subjective Experiences? Essays on Reducing Suffering, 21 jul. 2016. Cited in: ch. 10
TOMASIK, B. How Many Animals are There? Essays on Reducing Suffering, 07 ago. 2019. Cited in: ch. 12