Volume III · Animals and the Harm of Death · chapter 4
Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
Saying that those without intellectual pleasures are only slightly harmed by death doesn't hold up: intellectual pleasures aren't necessarily more valuable, and even if they were, that wouldn't make other pleasures of little value.
Reading a book is good. Hugging someone we love is really good too, and it isn't “intellectual.” A dog doesn't read, but he loves running, playing, and being petted. Losing all of that is losing a lot too.
Saying that because fine wine is better, water doesn't quench your thirst is confusing “more valuable” with “the only thing of value.”
- P1 The argument says death harms only slightly those who are incapable of intellectual pleasures.
- P2 To show that, it would have to show that non-intellectual pleasures are of little value.
- P3 Showing that intellectual pleasures are more valuable doesn't show that.
- P4 Moreover, non-intellectual experiences, like being with those we love, can be as valuable as intellectual ones.
- C Therefore, animals are not only slightly harmed by death for lacking intellectual pleasures.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “A pig doesn't read or listen to music; his life is worth less.”
Answer His life is worth something to him, because of the experiences he has. Seeing a loved one again after years isn't intellectual, and it can be worth more than many intellectual activities.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume III, p. 17 of the PDF edition · English translation
It is sometimes argued that the more cognitively sophisticated experiences are, the more valuable they are, and that, for this reason, someone is harmed to a greater degree if they cannot experience them21. This view is sometimes used to argue that, since nonhuman animals are not capable of the intellectual pleasures of which normal adult humans are capable, death would not deprive them of anything very valuable. According to this view, although nonhuman animals are harmed by death, it would be a small harm to them, and therefore there would be nothing very wrong with killing them or with failing to save their lives.
The first problem with this argument is that the claim that intellectual pleasures are necessarily more valuable is questionable. For example, it could be said that a nonarbitrary way of determining the value of a pleasure is in terms of its intensity and its duration, rather than assuming in advance that certain kinds of pleasures are necessarily more valuable than others.
In this sense, being close to someone one is very fond of (a nonintellectual experience) and playing a game of chess (an intellectual experience) may be equally valuable experiences for whoever has them, as long as they produce the same amount of satisfaction and last the same length of time. On the other hand, the conception according to which intellectual experiences are more valuable would have to say that, in this case, playing chess has more value, even if it produces the same satisfaction (and even if it produces less satisfaction!), which seems biased.
The second (and main) problem is that, even if intellectual pleasures were more valuable, this does not imply that nonintellectual pleasures are not valuable, or that they are of little value. Therefore, claiming that intellectual pleasures are more valuable cannot ground the conclusion that nonhuman animals are only slightly harmed by death. Their nonintellectual experiences can be, just as in the human case, extremely rewarding, and for this reason they can be harmed by death to a high degree by being prevented from enjoying them.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
What is the argument's “second and main” problem?
For the chapter, being close to someone you love and playing chess can be...
Food for thought
Which of the most valuable experiences in your life were not intellectual?
Author’s notes 1
Sources cited in this text 3
The full list for the volume is in the Volume III references.
- CAVALIERI, P. The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- MILL, J. S. Utilitarianism. In: MILL, J. S. Collected Works, vl. X. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969 [1861], p. 203-59.
- SAPONTZIS. F. In Defense of the Pig. Journal of Animal Ethics, v. 4, n. 1, p. 5-17, 2014.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
They are only slightly harmed by death because they are not capable of intellectual pleasures, and these are more valuable. (III, ch. 4).
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