Objections to the Account of the Harm of Death as the Prevention of What Is Positive

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume III, p. 15 of the PDF edition · English translation

3.1. The epistemological problem

One objection to the account of the harm of death as the prevention of what is positive is the so-called epistemological problem¹⁶: we cannot be certain whether the life someone would have ahead of them would be predominantly positive or negative, and so we can never know whether it is better to stay alive or better to die.

One response to this objection is to point out that, although we cannot be certain about these things, we can still make estimates in terms of the probability of what would happen. These estimates could be made on the basis of the individual's age, state of health, habits, the species to which they belong, the context in which they live, etc.¹⁷

3.2. The temporal asymmetry objection

Another objection to the account of the harm of death as the prevention of what is positive is based on the temporal asymmetry argument: we think we are harmed by death, but not that we are harmed by not having been born earlier¹⁸. According to this objection, if death were a harm because it prevents what is positive, we should be equally concerned about not having been born earlier, since that prevented us from experiencing many positive things.

One response to this objection is to maintain that, although in the logical sense it is possible to be born earlier, such a thing is not possible in real life. Our future existence, on the other hand, can be prolonged¹⁹. This, therefore, explains why it is rational to be concerned with avoiding death but not rational to be concerned with not having been born earlier. If we could make someone be born earlier and this increased their total of positive experiences, this would be just as desirable as delaying the arrival of death. For example, if we lived on a planet that will explode in six decades, but it were still possible for its inhabitants to have meaningful lives until then,

it would be better to be born as early as possible, because in that case it is the moment of birth, and not that of death, that can be changed²⁰.

3.3. The objection from potential beings

Another objection to the account of the harm of death as the prevention of what is positive claims that it implies that potential beings (that is, beings who could have existed but never came to exist) are also harmed by not having existed (provided the life that would have awaited them was worth living). Since this seems absurd, the objection concludes, the account of the harm of death as the prevention of what is positive is inadequate.

One possible response to this objection is to maintain that the statement “individual x was harmed by being prevented from enjoying what is positive” only makes sense with regard to already existing sentient beings, because only in that case do we have individuals (rather than various future possibilities of individuals). For example, if Luciano dies, then Luciano was harmed by not enjoying the positive things he would have experienced if he had stayed alive. On the other hand, if we do not yet have an individual, but countless possibilities of future individuals, it makes no sense to say that this or that possibility was harmed by not coming to exist. For example, suppose that, if a couple conceives a child this month, individual A will be born nine months from now, but that, if they wait until next month, another individual, B, will be born. It makes no sense to claim that, if they decide to wait until next month, they have harmed A, since individual A does not exist (has never existed and never will exist; A is only a possibility) – and vice versa with regard to B, should they decide not to wait until next month.

One objection to this response is to point out that, if no one is harmed by not coming to exist, then we have no reason to prefer a world in which sentient beings continue to be born to have positive lives over a world in which no more sentient beings are born. One response to this objection is to point out that we could still have reasons to prefer a world in which sentient beings continue to be born to have positive lives, but that these reasons would be impersonal. That is, they would not be reasons derived from the concern to avoid harming this or that future possibility of a sentient being, but rather reasons derived from the general goal of achieving the best outcome.