The explanation we're testing
In chapter 1 we saw that death is bad because it takes away the good things that were still to come. This text presents three objections to this explanation and the answers to them.
Objection 1: "you can't know the future"
We're never sure whether someone's life would be good or bad from here on. So how can we know if death would be a harm?
Answer: we don't need certainty. We can make estimates. A doctor doesn't know exactly how long a patient will live, but knows that treating a disease is usually worth it. Death is similar: we can judge what's most likely.
Objection 2: "then why don't we regret not being born earlier?"
If losing time alive in the future is bad, then losing time alive in the past (by being born later) should be bad too. But nobody regrets not being born earlier.
Answer: in real life, nobody can be born earlier. But the moment of death can change. That's why it makes sense to care about it. The text also shows that, if it were possible to choose, it would make sense to prefer having more time alive, whether it comes before or after.
Objection 3: "what about beings who were never born?"
If death is bad because it prevents good things, then someone who was never born would also have been harmed by not living. That seems strange.
Answer: it only makes sense to talk about harm for someone who already exists. Someone who never existed isn't someone who lost something. The author admits this answer also raises hard questions, for example about whether it's good for new happy beings to be born.
In short
- Even without certainty, we can estimate whether a life would be good.
- The moment of death can change; the moment of birth can't.
- Only someone who already exists can lose something by dying.