Volume III · Animals and the Harm of Death · chapter 1
What Does the Harm of Death Consist Of?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
Against the Epicurean view that death is not a harm, the chapter argues that it harms by preventing the good things the individual would have lived; and even if Epicurus were right, this would apply equally to humans and animals.
Dying may not hurt, but it takes away all the good days still to come: playing, eating, resting in the sun. Losing those good things is a harm, even if the person or animal doesn't feel the loss.
If someone tears up your winning lottery ticket before you know you've won, you feel nothing at that moment, but you've lost a lot. Death is that kind of harm: it takes away what was coming.
- P1 Someone can be harmed by the presence of what's negative or by the absence of what's positive.
- P2 Death prevents the individual from enjoying the positive things they would have lived.
- P3 So death is a harm, even when it's painless.
- C And even if the Epicurean view were correct, it would deny the harm of death to everyone, humans included, not just to animals.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “If death is painless, the animal loses nothing.”
Answer He loses all the positive lifetime he would have had. Nobody thinks killing a human in their sleep, painlessly, doesn't harm them.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume III, p. 8 of the PDF edition · English translation
1.1. Introduction
The subject of this book is the and its magnitude. In general terms, it investigates what conditions must be met for individuals to be harmed by death and how to assess how much they are harmed. In specific terms, it addresses these questions with regard to the death of nonhuman animals.
Some people claim that only humans are harmed by death. We will discuss this position in chapter 2. In this chapter we will discuss the position that death never harms anyone, whether human or nonhuman. After that, in this same chapter, we will see what the idea that death is a harm is grounded on.
Before we begin, it is important to understand exactly what each of these views holds. The view that death is a harm does not claim that it is always better to stay alive than to die. This view claims only that, under certain conditions, if someone dies, they are harmed. This is compatible with recognizing that there are certain situations in which dying is less bad than staying alive (for example, if all that awaits the individual if they stay alive is excruciating suffering). On the other hand, the view that death is not a harm is not the view that it is sometimes better to die than to stay alive. Rather, it is the view that death never harms anyone. We will discuss both views below
1.2. The view that death is not a harm
The philosopher (341-270 BC) argued that death is not a harm on the basis of the following argument: when the individual exists, death does not exist; and when death arrives, the individual ceases to exist — therefore, the two will never meet1. What Epicurus meant by this is that death is not a harm because, unlike suffering, it is not a negative experience2. Epicurus defended this view with the aim of making people lose their fear of dying, and this view is often mentioned with the same aim.
If Epicurus's view is correct, there really is no reason to fear dying, because then death harms no one. However, if Epicurus is correct, there are two other implications that often go unnoticed3. The first is that dying sooner would be no worse than dying later. In fact, according to this view dying is not bad at all, whenever it occurs (what is bad is only any suffering there may be at the moment of death). Thus, according to this view there is no reason to avoid death, since it is not considered a harm. The second implication is that all the reasons against killing would come either from concern about the victim suffering at the moment of death or from respect for individuals other than the one who died (for example, the grief they would feel at the loss of the deceased). According to this view, as long as the victim is killed without being caused pain, nothing bad would be done to the victim.
Below we will look at some reasons for rejecting Epicurus's view of death. From these reasons we will be able to understand what the idea that death is a harm is grounded on.
1.3. Death as a harm by preventing what is positive
Underlying the conception that death is not a harm is the idea that the only possible form of harm is negative experiences. This is why Epicurus did not consider death a harm: if it is the cessation of experiences, it is obviously not experienced and therefore cannot be a negative experience, as suffering is.
The view opposed to the Epicurean view is that one can be harmed both by the presence of what is negative and by the absence of what is positive, and that death is a harm because it prevents what is positive4. According to this view, death is not experienced as an evil (as suffering is), but it is a harm because it prevents the enjoyment of what would be good5.
One argument in favor of this view is that, if someone is harmed by the presence of negative experiences because these are bad in themselves, then, analogously, someone is harmed by the absence of positive experiences because these are good in themselves.
According to this view, to know whether it is better to stay alive or better to die, we have to try to imagine what the life the individual would have if they stayed alive would be like (whether it would be more positive or more negative, and in what proportion) and assess whether this would be better or worse than dying. Thus, this account of the harm of death is compatible with claiming that, depending on how negative the life awaiting someone would be, staying alive could be even worse than dying. Therefore, this conception does not claim that dying is always a harm. Rather, it explains what the harm of death consists of and, on that basis, offers a criterion for knowing under what conditions death is a harm.
1.4. The magnitude of the harm of death and the moment at which it occurs
Contrary to the Epicurean view, it is also possible to explain why it makes a difference, in terms of the magnitude of the harm, whether death occurs sooner or later.
Suppose we have only two possibilities: (1) either to be born to live 15 very happy years and then die painlessly; (2) or to be born to live 70 equally happy years and then die painlessly. Suppose also that the amount of suffering experienced in 1 or 2 is the same (no extra suffering would be added in 2; only positive experiences would be added) and that whether we live life 1 or life 2 would be decided by lottery.
If the Epicurean conception of death were correct, it would make no difference whether we were drawn to live 1 or 2, since in both cases death is painless and the amount of suffering experienced is the same. But clearly, if we are drawn to live life 1 we have been unlucky, and if we are drawn to live life 2 we have been lucky, and the reason is simply that in life 2 the amount of positive experiences is greater.
1.5. Conclusion
Above we saw some reasons for rejecting the Epicurean view of death and maintaining that death is indeed a harm. Moreover, it is important to remember that, even if the Epicurean conception of the harm of death were correct, it would not provide grounds for the claim that only humans are harmed by death. According to the Epicurean view, no one is harmed by death. In the next section we will discuss some views holding that only humans are harmed by death.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
According to the Epicurean view...
Even if the Epicurean view were correct, would it support saying that only humans are harmed by death?
Food for thought
If you knew you were going to die tomorrow, painlessly, would you lose anything? What?
Author’s notes 5
Sources cited in this text 4
The full list for the volume is in the Volume III references.
- FELDMAN, F. Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death. Philosophical Review, v. 100, p. 205- 27, 1991.
- NAGEL, T. Death. In: NAGEL, T. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 1-10.
- SAPONTZIS, S. F. Morals, Reason and Animals. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.
- SUITS, D. B. Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died. American Philosophical Quarterly, [s.l.], v. 38, p. 69-84, 2001.
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