What If Humans Were More Harmed by Death?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume III, p. 45 of the PDF edition · English translation

11.1. Common views about killing and about saving lives

The following two positions are commonly defended:

• (1) That it is right to kill nonhuman animals (for example, for consumption, in experiments, or for various other purposes).
• (2) That we should not use resources to save the lives of nonhuman animals (for example, when they are victims of diseases or of disasters).

In this chapter these positions will be referred to as the "two common positions".

These positions are often defended by claiming that nonhuman animals are less harmed by death than humans are. In previous chapters it was argued that humans are not necessarily more harmed by death than nonhuman animals. In this chapter, however, it will be argued that, even if they were, this would still be insufficient to ground those two positions.

11.2. If one being is more harmed by death than another, what are the implications?

Suppose that A is more harmed by dying than B. What does this imply? It implies only that we have stronger direct reasons⁵⁵ against killing and for saving the life of A. It does not imply that there are no direct reasons against killing and for saving the life of B. Nor does it even imply that these reasons are weak in B's case. They may in fact be extremely strong, only slightly less strong than the reasons against killing and for saving the life of A.

Thus, what would have to be shown to justify the two common positions is not that nonhuman animals are less harmed by death than humans are, but rather that nonhuman animals are hardly harmed by death at all. In chapters 4, 5, 8, 9, and

10 it was argued that every sentient being can be harmed by death to a high degree. This is enough for there to be strong direct reasons against killing them and for saving their lives in situations where they would be greatly harmed by death.

11.3. Does someone's being more harmed by death already justify killing others to save them?

One might think that, if A is more harmed by death than B, this would justify killing B if doing so saved A's life. However, if we look at examples involving humans, it becomes evident that this, by itself, is insufficient to justify such an act. Let us see:

The degrees to which different humans are harmed by death are also highly variable. Some have already enjoyed life a great deal; others have lived very little. Some have lived a meaningful life so far; others have lived predominantly in suffering. Some have the prospect of a meaningful life ahead; for others, all that awaits them if they stay alive is extreme suffering. Some would still have a lot to live; others would have little time ahead. In short, the harm of death also varies greatly in the case of different humans. However, this does not seem enough to justify killing a human just because doing so would save another human who would be more harmed by death. If that were so, it would be right to kill elderly people or older adults every time doing so made it possible to save the lives of younger humans.

One might think that what was said above only makes sense on ethical views based on inviolable rights, according to which it is always wrong to kill one individual to save another (or others). However, those who hold that it is right to violate rights if this is necessary to achieve the best consequences can also agree that the mere fact that A is more harmed by death than B is still insufficient to justify killing B to save A. This is explained in more detail below.

If what one seeks is the best consequences, and death is a harm, it would have to be shown that there is no less harmful way of saving A's life than killing B. It would also have to be shown that authorizing the killing of some to save others in the context in question produces the best consequences in the long run, taking into account how this act influences other people's future decisions. Of course, someone who seeks the best consequences would also take into account, in deciding, the fact that one individual is more harmed by death than another. However, it is not the only thing they need to take into account if their goal is to achieve the best consequences. Therefore, they would also have to recognize that the finding that one individual is more harmed by death than another is, by itself, insufficient to justify killing one to save another.

Thus, if the fact that B is less harmed by death than A is insufficient to justify killing B even if doing so saves A's life, it would be all the less sufficient to justify killing B for entirely unnecessary purposes, such as consuming them.

This does not necessarily mean that it is always wrong to kill, or that it is always wrong to fail to save a life. It means only that the fact that A is more harmed by death than B is insufficient to establish that it is right to kill B or that we have no obligation to save B's life.

11.4. Reasons to save lives, the harm of death, and the number of victims

Let us imagine for the sake of argument that it were proven that humans are more harmed by death than nonhuman animals. Would this imply that we must necessarily prioritize problems whose victims are human? No, because an important factor has not yet been considered: the number of individuals we could save. The relation between the number of individuals and the harm per individual will be explained below.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that each human were harmed by death 100 times more than each nonhuman animal. This is really granting a great deal. But even this would still be insufficient to conclude that we always have stronger reasons to save humans. For example, if the choice were between saving one human or saving 101 nonhuman animals, in that case the balance would already tip toward saving the nonhuman animals.

However much more someone said humans are harmed by death, there would always be a number of nonhuman animals beyond which we would have to prioritize saving nonhuman animals. That being so, even if nonhuman animals were less harmed by death than humans, this too would be insufficient to ground the conclusion that we should invest more resources in saving human lives.

It could be objected that we should save those who are more harmed by death, no matter how many more individuals we could save otherwise. However, this idea is far from obvious. Therefore, it would need to be justified, not merely assumed. Pointing out that postulating it would imply the conclusion one prefers is not showing that it is correct. Thus, until proven otherwise, we have reason to think that the number of victims we could save also matters, and, as we have seen, this factor can sometimes tip the balance toward saving those who would be less harmed by death.

11.5. Conclusions

It is often assumed that, if humans are more harmed by death than nonhuman animals, then it is right to kill nonhuman animals, and that we should not use resources to save the lives of nonhuman animals.

However, we have seen that, even if humans were more harmed by death than nonhuman animals, this would not imply that there are no reasons against killing and for saving the lives of nonhuman animals, nor that these reasons are weak.

Moreover, as we have seen, even if nonhuman animals were less harmed by death than humans, depending on the number of nonhuman animals we could save with a given amount of resources, there could still be reasons to prioritize saving them.

Important: in this chapter we assumed solely for the sake of argument that humans would be more harmed by death than nonhuman animals. The aim was only to show that, even if this were the case, it would not have the implications that are normally supposed. However, as argued in previous chapters, there seems to be no basis for grounding the claim that humans are necessarily more harmed by death than nonhuman animals⁵⁶. If so, then the reasons against killing and for saving the lives of nonhuman animals in situations where they would be harmed by death are even stronger than those described in this chapter.