The idea being debated
Some philosophers say: for death to be a big harm, a person needs a strong psychological connectedness with their own future. That is, the "me" of now needs to be very similar to the "me" of some time from now: same memories, tastes, and plans.
They say animals, having simpler minds, would have weak connectedness. For them, "it's almost as if the future they lose belonged to someone else." So death would barely harm them.
One way to criticize it
This text doesn't question whether connectedness matters (that comes in another chapter). It questions something else: is it true that simpler minds have less connectedness?
An example with numbers
Imagine two beings:
- A has a simple mind, with 10 mental contents (memories, desires, and so on). Some time later, it keeps 9 of them and swaps 1.
- B has a complex mind, with 100 contents. Some time later, it keeps 10 and swaps 90.
Which one is more connected to its future?
- Counting the number of things in common, B wins: 10 to 9.
- Counting the proportion, A wins: it kept 90%, while B kept only 10%.
Which way of measuring makes sense?
The idea of psychological connectedness is about how similar someone stays to themselves. For that, it makes more sense to look at the proportion. And by that standard, a simple mind can have a strong connection to its future.
In short
- Some say animals lose little by dying because they have little connection to the future.
- But connectedness is about how much someone stays similar to themselves.
- Measured by proportion, a simple mind can have strong connectedness.