Temporal Impartiality: What It Is and Why It Matters

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IX, p. 21 of the PDF edition · English translation

2.1. Introduction

The way our decisions may affect the sentient beings who will live in the distant future is still a greatly neglected question, though it has begun to receive attention²².

Below, we will look at one of the central reasons this question has been neglected (the presence of temporal bias) and at the reasons for adopting an approach centered on temporal impartiality²³. We will also see that, even if someone rejects temporal impartiality, this is not enough to justify dismissing a strong concern with how our decisions will affect future sentient beings.

2.2. Temporal bias

Cognitive biases are systematic patterns of flawed reasoning, or mental shortcuts that cloud our judgment. One of the factors that leads people to neglect the impact of their decisions on future beings is temporal bias, which consists in the tendency to give less importance to an event depending on how far from the present it lies.

To understand why this tendency is a bias, we need only remember that the moment that is now the present was once the future, and that the coming future moments will also come to pass, just as this moment did. An example of temporal bias would be to think that, 10 years ago, we should not have cared about ensuring that the moment we are living now would not be bad for us, merely because at that time it was far off in time.

How hard we should strive to bring about or avoid a certain event ought to depend on how good or bad it is, not on how near to or far from the present it is. Thus, rejecting temporal bias means accepting that no moment in time, in itself, has a higher or lower status (what matters is how good or bad the event would be). This can be better understood through the idea of temporal impartiality, which is an implication

of the more general idea of impartiality. We will look at these concepts below.

2.3. Impartiality

• Impartiality: the unbiased consideration of those affected by our decisions.

Impartiality²⁴ implies that harms and benefits of equal magnitude must be given the same weight, regardless of arbitrary factors such as the race, gender, or species of those affected by the decision, or any other factor that is the result of the natural lottery.

It also implies that someone is unfairly disfavored not only when they are disregarded entirely, but also when, on the basis of arbitrary factors, their good is given less weight.

As we will see below, temporal impartiality is one specific application of this general idea of impartiality.

2.4. Temporal impartiality

To understand the idea of temporal²⁵ impartiality, it helps to compare it with the idea of spatial impartiality.

We saw above that impartiality implies rejecting arbitrary distinctions, such as giving different degrees of moral consideration on the basis of the species, race, or gender of those affected by the decision. Another example of an arbitrary distinction would be to give different degrees of moral consideration depending on where someone happens to be. Thus, impartiality implies spatial impartiality:

• Spatial impartiality: the unbiased consideration of those affected by our decisions, regardless of where they are located.

One implication of spatial impartiality is that there is no justification for giving less weight to the good of a sentient being just because that being is far away from us.

Note that spatial impartiality is not an idea distinct from impartiality in general: it is merely an implication of it. However, impartiality also implies the same with respect to time:

• Temporal impartiality: the unbiased consideration of those affected by our decisions, regardless of the time in which they exist.

Thus, one implication of temporal impartiality is that there is no justification for giving less weight to the good of a sentient being just because that being will exist in the future (whether near or distant). The important practical conclusion is this: according to temporal impartiality, the fact that a harm will occur in the distant future does not weaken the reasons for preventing it.

Most people who aim to reduce suffering in the world think of the individuals alive today (one of the reasons for this, besides temporal bias, is that it is hard to empathize with individuals who will exist in the distant future). However, if what we have seen makes sense, giving someone less consideration depending on the time in which they will exist is analogous to discriminating against them on the basis of where they live, their species, skin color, gender, and so on.

This, in short, is the central idea of temporal impartiality.

2.5. The objection that future beings are merely potential beings

One objection to temporal impartiality holds that future individuals are, for now, mere possibilities that may never come to exist, unlike individuals who already exist. According to this objection, for this reason future individuals should either not count morally or be given less weight.

One response to this objection is to point out that our decisions can cause such possibilities to become real individuals in the future, and can also make their lives more positive or more negative. For example, even those who hold that there is no duty to bring new sentient beings into existence to have positive lives can recognize that there is a duty not to bring new sentient beings into existence to have negative lives. They can also recognize that, if a being will necessarily exist in the future regardless of what we decide, we should decide now in a way that avoids harming it and seeks to benefit it. These points will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Thus, there are at least two ways in which our decisions can affect future beings:

• Our decision may determine whether or not a future sentient being comes to exist, and whether it is born into a context in which it will probably have a predominantly negative or positive life.
• Our decision may not determine whether or not a future sentient being comes to exist, but may determine the number of negative or positive events it will have in its life.

A good part of animal advocacy is already about future beings. For example, veganism is mostly about trying to prevent more animals from being born to lead lives full of suffering, not about animals who already exist. This is also the goal of sterilization programs, whether for wild or domesticated animals. Regulations that try to make exploited animals suffer less, in turn, are about ensuring that beings who will necessarily come to exist suffer less during their lives. Finally, spreading a view that gives consideration to all sentient beings aims mainly at increasing, from then on, the likelihood that future sentient beings will have lives with more positive events and fewer negative ones. Of course, part of animal advocacy is about helping animals who already exist. Examples include programs for vaccinating animals and treating diseases, helping animals in fires and other natural disasters, caring for orphaned animals, rescuing trapped animals, and programs for meeting animals' basic needs. However, as we have seen, a good part of animal advocacy already stems from recognizing that future beings deserve consideration.

One way to see that it is arbitrary to give less weight to someone's good depending on how far into the future they will exist is to imagine what we would think if generations before ours had believed there was nothing wrong with actions that would harm us enormously, simply because at the time we did not yet exist.

The veil of ignorance thought experiment can also help ground the idea of temporal impartiality²⁶. Imagine that we had to decide which principles of justice people should follow, but without knowing in which era we would be born (knowing only that we would have to be born in some era). Under such conditions, it seems we would argue for giving equal consideration to all individuals who might be affected by agents' decisions, no matter in which era they would exist.

2.6. Does rejecting temporal impartiality justify disregarding future beings?

What we have seen above suggests that there are strong reasons to accept temporal impartiality and to give equal consideration to the beings who will exist in the future.

However, let us imagine that there were a justification for giving greater weight to the good of the sentient beings who exist now. Well, this would not show that there is a justification for disregarding future beings: there would only be a justification for giving them less weight.

And even if that were the case, we should still give enormous importance to the long-term future, to the point of prioritizing it over the present and the short-term future. This may sound strange at first. Below is an explanation of why this implication follows.

The future may last for many eons, and therefore the number of sentient beings who may exist over the course of the future would also be immense. The point is this: that number would be so immense that, even if we gave less and less weight to each sentient being depending on how far into the future it will exist, we would still have to conclude in favor of prioritizing concern for the long-term future, given the total number of individuals affected. This is one of the central arguments for a focus on the long term, which we will examine in Chapter 4.

2.7. Conclusion

If what we have seen above makes sense, then we must draw two important conclusions, if our goal is to make the world contain less suffering:

(1) We need to consider all sentient beings (including those of the distant future). (2) We need to give great weight to the long-term future.

Two factors have contributed greatly to the neglect of this important question. One of them, as we have seen, is temporal bias. The other is speciesism. The combination of these two factors contributes to the following result, which is a double neglect:

(1) Because of speciesism, when concern for the long-term future does appear, usually only future humans are taken into account.

(2) Because of temporal bias, those who already accept considering all sentient beings (for example, animal advocates) have usually disregarded future sentient beings.

If our goal is for there to be less suffering in the world, we need to reject this double neglect. Concern for the long term needs to reject speciesism and consider all sentient beings, and concern for sentient beings needs to reject temporal bias and take the long-term future into account²⁷.