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Volume X · Biases and Their Influence · chapter 1

Biases That Lead Us to Neglect the Problems with the Most Victims

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Biases are psychological tendencies that systematically lead to faulty reasoning; several of them (the identifiable victim effect, scope neglect, the collapse of compassion) make the problems with the most victims precisely the most neglected ones.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume X, p. 9 of the PDF edition · English translation

1.1. What biases are

A cognitive bias is different from a fallacy. A fallacy is a faulty piece of reasoning that appears to be correct. , by contrast, are the psychological tendencies that systematically lead to faulty reasoning.

In this book we will leave open the further question of which factor or factors cause biases to exist and/or persist. Some may be innate tendencies due to the way the brain operates. However, it is also possible that, at least for some biases, their existence (or at least their reinforcement and/or their content) is due to the influence of the environment, especially social influence. There is also the possibility that an agent deliberately feeds a bias even after realizing that it is a bias (for example, when the bias in question favors that agent). It is also possible that these three factors operate together1. In this book, however, we will not enter into that discussion. We will limit ourselves to identifying how various kinds of biases influence our perception of the situation of nonhuman animals and also our decisions that affect them.

1.2. The neglect of the problems with the most victims

The problems that affect the largest numbers of victims are widely neglected. Several tendencies contribute to the neglect of these problems. One of the main ones is anthropocentrism, which causes problems affecting nonhuman animals to receive little or even no attention. Since in the problems with the largest numbers of victims the victims are nonhuman animals, the presence of would explain (at least in part, as we will see below) the neglect of these

problems. However, even animal advocates and authors in the field of animal ethics tend to neglect the problems that affect the largest numbers of animals. In this chapter we will address other biases that contribute to this neglect.

Let us begin with an example. The following three problems are highly :

There are, of course, biases that specifically contribute to the neglect of one of the three situations above, but not the others. The other biases that specifically contribute to the neglect of the situation of as a result of natural processes will be the topic of Chapter 2, while those that contribute to the neglect of s-risks and of the long term will be the topic of Chapter 3. In this chapter we will focus on the biases that lead to the neglect of problems with large numbers of victims in general.

In short, the problems that affect the largest numbers of individuals are, curiously, the most neglected, even by those who recognize that they should be concerned about all sentient beings.

As we will see below, part of the explanation for this neglect lies:

(1) In the kinds of beings who are the victims in these situations;

(2) In the very fact that these situations affect the largest numbers of victims.

1.3. Biases related to the kinds of victims

Regarding the kinds of victims, a crucial factor in the neglect of these problems, as we have seen, is that in the first two problems none of them are human, and in the third problem the overwhelming majority are not. Thus, anthropocentric speciesism has a fundamental influence on the neglect of these issues5.

However, as we have seen, even animal activists tend to neglect these problems almost entirely. There are at least three tendencies related to the kind of being affected that contribute strongly to this picture, consisting in giving less importance: (1) to small animals6; (2) to animals considered unintelligent7; and (3) to animals that arouse less empathy in us (what is known as the empathy gap8).

In the case of invertebrates (such as insects and crustaceans) and fish, these three biases contribute jointly to the neglect of their situation, since they are usually small animals, seen as unintelligent, and generally do not arouse in us the

empathy aroused by mammals, for example. These animals are the overwhelming majority not only among those who are exploited, but also the overwhelming majority in the wild.

In the case of future suffering risks, too, the vast majority of the sentient beings who could come to be affected would not be human, nor would they be the animals on which most activists focus. Insofar as they are animals, they would probably also be invertebrates. However, a large share of the beings who could come to be affected would not be animals at all, but rather non-organic sentient beings9 (if non-organic sentience is possible and such beings come to exist). In this case, the empathy gap bias is one of the factors underlying the neglect of this issue, since it is possible that these beings, if they come to exist, will be very different from organic sentient beings (for example, they may not have faces, or move or scream when they feel pain, etc.). It is also possible that these beings will be disregarded because they are not organic10.

Moreover, the very fact that future beings do not yet exist contributes to the neglect of our decisions that could affect them. This is because it is difficult to feel empathy for beings who do not yet exist, but who will exist in the future and may suffer immensely.

One way of trying to reduce the influence of these biases is to practice, more and more, applying impartial ethical principles in our decisions. Consider principles such as equal consideration and impartiality. These principles will prescribe giving equal weight to harms and benefits of similar magnitude, and giving more weight to greater harms and benefits compared to smaller ones –— regardless of whether or not we feel empathy for those affected, of the degree of empathy we feel, of their size, of their level of intelligence, of whether or not they are organic, of whether they already exist or will exist in the future, and so on. At first, the application of these principles will probably have to compete with our biases, and the influence of the biases may be much stronger. However, as with any other activity, daily and persistent practice can come to overcome our instinctive inclinations, until our will is aligned with what we have concluded to be the right decision. Thus, practicing

the application of unbiased principles seems essential, both to reach where our empathy does not and to limit the arbitrariness of our empathy.

1.4. The number of victims and the collapse of compassion

We have seen that, ironically, the problems that affect the largest numbers of victims are also the most neglected. Curiously, the very fact that they involve enormous numbers of victims may be one of the reasons why these problems are neglected. Let us look at some biases that may underlie this effect.

1.4.1. The collapse of compassion and the identifiable victim effect

With regard to situations involving gigantic numbers of victims, we tend not to feel the empathy we feel in the face of individual cases of suffering. This bias is known as the collapse of compassion11. This is why campaigns that focus on individual cases tend to attract much more attention than campaigns that focus on situations with a gigantic number of victims.

The collapse of compassion bias can be explained by the identifiable victim effect, which is our tendency to feel greater empathy and a greater desire to help in situations in which tragedies befall identifiable victims (who are usually few in number) than when they befall anonymous victims (which is usually the case with tragedies affecting a large number of victims).

Because of these biases, when it is mentioned that trillions of animals are killed through exploitation every year, that there are quintillions of animals in the wild suffering at any given moment, or that the long-term future will contain "zillions" of sentient beings, people tend to think of the numbers (and therefore feel no desire to help), and not of the many suffering individuals the numbers represent12.

This does not mean that we should not mention these numbers, nor that we should focus on individual cases. What strategies we can employ to deal with these biases is something we will discuss in section 1.6.

1.4.2. Scope neglect

Another bias that can push in the same direction is scope neglect, also known as scope insensitivity. This bias consists in failing to perceive the difference in size between two quantities when we compare them. This happens especially when the quantities being compared are very large. This bias can lead us to think, for example, that 80 billion (the number of mammals and birds killed for consumption13) is only slightly smaller than 3 trillion (the number of fish killed for consumption14) or than 25 trillion (the number of shrimp killed for consumption15), when in fact it corresponds to only 2.6% of 3 trillion and 0.32% of 25 trillion.

This bias can also lead us to think that the number of animals in the wild is only slightly greater than the number of exploited animals. In fact, if we were to compare these quantities to the span of a year, the animals outside the wild would correspond to at most 14 seconds of the year. All the other 364 days, 23 hours, 59 minutes, and 46 seconds would be the animals in the wild.

For statistics on the number of animals in each situation, click here.

1.4.3. Proportion bias

Proportion bias inclines us to think, for example, that it is better to use a certain resource to help 10 victims of a problem with 100 victims (since that is 10%) than to use the same resource to help 100 victims of a problem with 2,000 victims (since that is 5%). In this case, the person would help 10 times fewer victims while thinking they were helping twice as many.

Since the three situations we mentioned (exploited animals, animals in the wild, and the long-term future) involve gigantic numbers of victims, proportion bias may incline us to think that these problems are not worth addressing. For example, it could lead us to think that, even if we could benefit a much larger number of individuals by focusing on these problems, we should not do so because they would still represent a small fraction of the total victims of these problems.

1.5. The bandwagon effect

Another reason why these problems remain neglected is the very fact that they are already widely neglected. This occurs because of the bandwagon effect, which is the tendency to adopt certain attitudes because many other people also have them. Since most activists and authors in animal ethics still neglect these issues, we tend to do the same, especially if we admire these activists and authors.

1.6. How should we deal with this?

How should we plan our activist strategies, taking into account that we (both we and the public) are subject to biases? What is the best way to deal with this?

One possible strategy is to try to "use" the public's biases as a bridge to get them to give importance to the very issues those biases lead them to neglect. For example, we have seen that the greater the number of victims, the less people tend to care about a problem, since they tend to think in terms of numbers rather than individuals. One possible strategy would be to use accounts of individual cases of suffering (since these tend to move the public) and emphasize that these individual cases are not exceptions, but examples of a much larger picture in which this individual case is repeated countless times.

One example would be to begin by telling an individual story of suffering of an animal for whom people usually feel empathy and then explain that, had we not begun with an account like this, fewer people would probably listen to what we have to say. This can be a doorway to then explaining what biases are and the reasons for trying to avoid them.

This is certainly a possible approach. It must be checked, however, whether by using a bias we are not also reinforcing it.

For example, there is also the risk that showing the individual case will contribute to people continuing to neglect the overall situation. This happens because of base rate neglect: when we receive information about specific cases along with general, statistical, and objective information (the base rate), we tend to attach greater value to the specific information and to ignore the general information completely.

However, there is also another approach that seems essential and does not carry this risk: informing the public of the existence of these and other biases (and trying to remember constantly that we, too, may constantly be influenced by biases). There are studies showing that, with regard to certain biases, the mere fact of becoming aware of their existence already motivates people to try to reduce their influence16. Unfortunately, other studies show that, with regard to other biases, this does not happen17. Regardless, however, in order for someone to be able to try to reduce the influence of a bias, they must realize that it exists. That being so, it is always positive to point out that such biases are influencing us without our noticing. This is what we have tried to do in this chapter.

1.7. Who will and who will not try to correct the influence of biases?

People who want to reason honestly will certainly want to combat the influence of biases. Whether or not they will achieve this goal in this or that case, and to what extent, depends on several factors, including how much they have practiced consistently to reduce the influence of the bias.

However, the following problem must be taken into account: many people have no desire to reason honestly. These people will not want to rid themselves of biases, especially those biases that benefit them and harm others.

This fact could discourage people who aim to be effective at reducing suffering in the world. They might think that this is, then, a lost cause, since we will never manage to

convince a large share of people. However, there is a mistake in this reasoning, namely the idea that, in order to reduce suffering in the world, we need to convince a majority of people. This idea is mistaken because each additional person working effectively to reduce suffering in the world a little already makes the world contain less suffering than it otherwise would, even if the vast majority of other people continue not to care about reducing suffering in the world.

We will waste our time and energy if we focus on people who do not aim to reason honestly. Our target audience should be people who want to reason honestly, especially those who already want to reduce suffering in the world.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume X
See the whole theme

Practice

Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.

According to the chapter, what is the difference between a bias and a fallacy?

Whom does the chapter recommend focusing persuasion efforts on?

Food for thought

What news story about many victims did you read and quickly forget? And which story about a single victim stayed with you?

Author’s notes 17
  1. 1 For example, in his work, (2012) points out that some biases are innate and occur in the same way universally, while others are also subject to cultural influence. Below is a list of biases classified as belonging to one group or the other, along with the chapters in which the author addresses them. Examples of innate and universal biases are the availability heuristic (ch. 12), loss aversion (ch. 26 and 28), the anchoring effect (ch. 11), hindsight bias (ch. 19), the halo effect (ch. 7), and the representativeness heuristic (ch. 14, 15). Among the biases that are innate but also culturally reinforced are overconfidence bias (ch. 20 and 21), the illusion of control (ch. 21), and optimism bias (ch. 24). The framing effect (ch. 34), in turn, is universal and innate, but the way it occurs in each individual depends on language and culture. Likewise, the illusion of causality (ch. 6) and the illusion of understanding (ch. 19) are also universal and innate, but their narrative contents are cultural. ↩
  2. 2 Animal exploitation was the topic of Volume IV of this collection. ↩
  3. 3 This was the topic of Volume VII of this collection. ↩
  4. 4 This was the topic of Volume IX of this collection. ↩
  5. 5 Speciesism is the topic of Volume I of this collection. ↩
  6. 6 By analogy with the term speciesism, the term sizeism is used to refer to discrimination against small individuals. For example, when faced with harms of similar magnitude, the attitude of giving less weight to the harm suffered by the smaller animal is an example of sizeism. On sizeism, see Morton (1998). ↩
  7. 7 By analogy with the term speciesism, the term intelligentism could be used to refer to discrimination against individuals who are (or are considered to be) less intelligent. For example, when faced with harms of similar magnitude, the attitude of giving less weight to the harm suffered by the less cognitively developed animal is an example of intelligentism. Intelligentism is discussed in chapter 8 of Volume VI of this collection. ↩
  8. 8 On this, see Miralles, Raymand and Lecointre (2019). ↩
  9. 9 On this possibility, see (2015). The risks related to this possibility are discussed on pages 18, 19, 85, and 86 of Volume IX of this collection. ↩
  10. 10 Just as speciesism is discrimination based on species, substratism is discrimination based on substrate. For example, just as anthropocentrism is a form of speciesism against those who are not human, carbonism is a form of substratism against those who are not organic. ↩
  11. 11 On this bias, see Butts et al. (2019). ↩
  12. 12 For a more detailed discussion of how this bias influences activism, see (2021, pp. 199-200). ↩
  13. 13 See (2018) and Sanders (2018). ↩
  14. 14 See (2019). ↩
  15. 15 See Waldhorn and Autric (2023). ↩
  16. 16 Caviola et al. 2014). ↩
  17. 17 Kahneman (2011). ↩
Sources cited in this text 10

The full list for the volume is in the Volume X references.

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