An Introduction to the Central Distinctions in Value Theory

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XI, p. 10 of the PDF edition · English translation

1.1. Theories of value and theories of right action

Consider two kinds of question:

• How should we assess which situations are good/bad, better/worse?
• How should we assess which action is right?

Questions of the first kind are the object of study of value theory¹. Those of the second kind are the object of study of ethics (more specifically, of normative ethics)².

Theories of value do not study how people assess which situations are good/bad, better/worse, but rather how to assess them correctly. In the same way, theories of normative ethics do not study what people judge the right action to be, but rather how to judge it correctly. They are therefore essentially normative fields, and not psychological descriptions of what people think about these matters.

In ordinary language, when people speak of someone's values, what they usually mean are the principles that person follows when acting. However, as we have seen, although they are related (since the main function of judgments about value is to guide practice), the domains of value and of right action are two distinct domains of thought.

Whenever we make assessments of the kind good/bad, worse/better, we are in the domain of value. When we think about what we ought or ought not to do (and about what it makes no difference whether we do or not), we are in the domain of right action (that is, of ethics). Note that the term action is used broadly here, since it applies to the assessment of both acts and omissions. The debate in ethics therefore actually concerns the right decision. However, since the term action is already widely used in this field, we will keep it here. We must remember, though, that it also includes the assessment of omissions.

Normative ethics is a different field from that of normative theories of rational decision³. Although both fields are about what the right decision is, and both are normative, normative theories of rational decision aim to investigate how to choose the best means of achieving a given end (especially under conditions of uncertainty). In theories of normative ethics, by contrast, what is at issue in the first place is which ends we ought to adopt.

As we will see in Chapter 5, some theories of normative ethics determine the right action entirely on the basis of assessments of which situations are good/bad, better/worse, while others introduce further factors that function as constraints on the pursuit of the best situation.

In this chapter, however, we will speak only of the central distinctions in value theory.

1.2. Theories of value and the terminology used

The domain of evaluative judgments (that is, judgments about good/bad, better/worse) is very broad. Such judgments can be applied to situations, intentions, instruments (“is this a good hammer?”), etc., without necessarily being about right action. For reasons that will become clearer in later chapters, we will focus here on assessing the value of situations.

It is important to note that two kinds of terminology are used in this discussion, but they mean the same thing:

The fact that there are two terminological systems for saying the same thing can cause confusion. For this reason, we will try here to avoid both terminologies, and will speak only of good/bad/neutral and of better/worse.

1.3. Intrinsic value and instrumental value

A central distinction in value theory is between good/bad intrinsically and good/bad instrumentally⁴. When we say that something is intrinsically good, we are saying that it is already good without needing to lead to some other good thing. Similarly, if we say that something is intrinsically bad, we are saying that it is itself already bad without needing to lead to some other bad thing. On the other hand, when we say that something is good or bad instrumentally, we are saying that it leads to other good or bad things. Below we will look at some examples of both categories.

Suffering seems to be the most obvious example of something intrinsically bad. That is, suffering is already something negative in itself: it does not need to lead to anything else negative in order to be negative. Happiness, on the other hand, seems to be the kind of thing that is already positive in itself: it does not need to lead to anything else positive in order to be positive.

There are other things, however, whose value or disvalue depends solely on their leading to other good or bad things. For example, crossing the street does not seem to be good or bad in itself. It may be good if it leads us to find, on the other side of the street, something that benefits us; but it may be bad if we are hit by a car while crossing, for example.

In the vast majority of cases, however, a thing will be both intrinsically good or bad and instrumentally good or bad. Let us look at the possible combinations and an example of each:

(1) Something intrinsically good and also instrumentally good. Suppose we watch a movie we really like and this gives us a pleasant experience. This experience, being positive, seems to be already good in itself. Suppose also that the pleasure we feel watching the movie energizes us to the point that we manage to finish a task we had been

putting off. In this case, the pleasure was also instrumentally good, since it also led to something else good (assuming, of course, that the task in question produced something good).

(2) Something intrinsically good and instrumentally bad. Suppose we eat some very tasty food and, as a result, take immense pleasure in savoring it. The pleasure we feel seems to be already good in itself. Suppose, however, that this pleasure is so intense that it makes us overindulge, to the point that we get sick afterward. In this case, the pleasure, despite being intrinsically positive, was instrumentally negative (that is, it was good and led to something else bad).

(3) Something intrinsically bad and also instrumentally bad. Suppose I sprained my ankle and this caused me intense pain. Moreover, because I am in a lot of pain, I am out of the race I wanted to take part in. In this case, the pain I felt was both bad in itself (since pain is always a negative experience) and bad instrumentally (since it also prevented me from taking part in the race).

(4) Something intrinsically bad and instrumentally good. Suppose I touch a fire with my hand and the pain I feel makes me automatically pull my hand away. This pain was bad in itself: given the kind of experience it is, pain is always experienced as something negative. In this case, however, the pain was good instrumentally, since it prevented me from keeping my hand in the fire and burning myself even more⁵.

The distinction between good/bad intrinsically and good/bad instrumentally thus reminds us that:

(1) Something's being intrinsically good does not imply that it is necessarily instrumentally good. (2) Something's being intrinsically bad does not imply that it is necessarily instrumentally bad. (3) Something's being instrumentally good does not imply that it is necessarily intrinsically good. (4) Something's being instrumentally bad does not imply that it is necessarily intrinsically bad.

1.4. Modes of better/worse assessment: better/worse than and the best/worst of all

In the previous section we spoke of assessments of the good/bad kind. In this section we will speak of assessments of the better/worse kind. These assessments have two modes:

(1) Better/worse than (the comparative mode: better/worse than). (2) Best/worst of all (the superlative mode: the best/worst).

To understand this distinction, consider the following example. Imagine situations A, B, and C. Suppose that, from best to worst, we have: A > B > C. In this case, B is better than C, but it is not the best of the three. Likewise, B is worse than A, but it is not the worst of the three. Now, taking all three situations into account, A is the best and C is the worst.

Important: a situation's being better than another (or even being the best of all those being compared) does not guarantee that it is positive. Similarly, a situation's being worse than another (or even being the worst of all those being compared) does not guarantee that it is negative. Let us look at an example.

Suppose the value of the three situations above could be measured. A positive sign indicates that the situation is good, and a negative sign that it is bad. The numbers indicate how good/bad the situation is. Suppose we had: A=+3 > B=+2 > C=+1. Situation B's being worse than situation A does not imply that B is a negative situation (as we can see, it is positive). Not even situation C's being the worst of the three implies that it is negative.

Now imagine another case, in which A=-1 > B=-2 > C=-3. Situation B's being better than situation C does not imply that it is positive. Moreover, situation A's being the best of the three does not imply that it is positive either.

In short: while the concepts of good/bad tell us whether a situation is positive or negative, the concepts of better/worse (whether better/worse than or best/worst of all) do not give us that information.

1.5. Value: in a certain respect or all things considered?

Assessments of the good/bad and better/worse kind (“than” and “of all”) can refer to a situation as a whole (that is, all things considered) or only in a certain respect. Assessing the value of a situation all things considered is a matter of finding out whether, taking into account all the good and bad aspects of the situation, it is more positive or more negative, and how much more positive or negative it is. In section 1.5.1 we will see how this distinction operates in assessments of the good/bad kind. In section 1.5.2 we will see how it operates in assessments of the better/worse kind (whether “than” or “of all”):

1.5.1. Good/bad in a certain respect or all things considered?

Suppose I have a toothache and go to the dentist, who needs to perform a painful procedure on me to make the pain go away. I decide to undergo the procedure, which is carried out successfully. In this situation there are both bad aspects and good aspects. The bad aspect is that the procedure is painful. The good aspect is that the toothache goes away.

Now, when we assess the value of the situation all things considered, we have to weigh whether the good aspects outweigh the bad ones or vice versa. If I decided to undergo the procedure, it is very likely because I concluded that, although the treatment is painful, the harm it prevents is greater than the harm it causes. That is, this situation, despite having negative and positive aspects, is more positive than negative all things considered. My assessment would be the opposite if I realized that the pain the procedure causes is greater than the pain it would relieve/prevent.

Above we saw an example with the aspects causing pain vs. relieving pain. However, the distinction between good/bad in a certain respect vs. all things considered could apply to any other aspects we were taking into account (we will return to this topic in the following chapters).

1.5.2. Better/worse in a certain respect or all things considered?

Let us now see how the distinction in a certain respect vs. all things considered operates in assessments of the better/worse kind. Let us first take an example with the assessment “better/worse than.” Consider the following two situations:

Comparing these two situations, S1 is better in a certain respect: in it each victim suffers less. But S2 is better in another respect: in it there are fewer victims. From the standpoint of aggregate suffering (which involves multiplying the number of victims by the suffering of each victim), however, both are equally bad.

Now suppose we have to choose S1 or S2. To make that choice, we need to assess which of the two is better all things considered (it is not enough to assess only which is better in this or that respect). We will return to this question in section 1.6, when we discuss the question of commensurability.

Above we saw an example with the aspects number of victims vs. suffering per victim. However, the distinction between better/worse in a certain respect and better/worse all things considered could apply to any other aspects we were taking into account. We will return to this point in subsequent chapters.

1.5.3. Why is the distinction in a certain respect vs. all things considered important?

The distinction between the value of a situation in a certain respect and all things considered is important in reminding us of the following:

(1) If a situation is positive/negative or better/worse in a certain respect, this does not necessarily imply that it is positive/negative or better/worse all things considered. For example, a situation's being better in a certain respect does not necessarily imply that it is better all things considered (since it may have other, predominant negative aspects).

These possibilities are set out in the following table:

(2) If a situation is positive/negative or better/worse all things considered, this does not necessarily imply that it lacks negative/positive or worse/better aspects in certain respects. For example, a situation's being better all things considered does not necessarily imply that there is no respect in which it is worse.

These possibilities are set out in the following table:

1.6. How can we assess how good or bad a situation is all things considered?

As we saw in the previous section, a situation can be good/better in one respect and bad/worse in another. How, then, can we assess how good or bad a situation is all things considered⁶? This question is so much more complex that it will be the topic of the whole of Chapter 7. For now, we will look briefly at some possibilities. In Chapter 7 these possibilities will be explained in more detail and will also be compared in terms of their advantages and disadvantages.

As we will see in subsequent chapters, it will be necessary to make this kind of assessment whether we are examining the situation of each individual (which we will address in Chapter 2) or situations involving several individuals (which we will address in Chapter 3).

That said, some possible approaches to assessing how good/bad a situation is all things considered are:

1.6.1. Total incommensurability

This involves recognizing that there are several aspects that are good/bad in themselves, but holding that it makes no sense to compare them (or even to multiply or add them). According to this approach, the only circumstances in which it is possible to say, among several options, which is better all things considered are those in which there is one option that is better in every respect. In circumstances in which each option is better in some respect, this approach will say that it is not possible to say which of them is better all things considered.

1.6.2. Monism (general)

According to monist approaches, there is only one aspect that is good/bad in itself. All the others are seen as good/bad only instrumentally, depending on whether they increase or decrease what is seen as good/bad in itself. Thus, in monist approaches, how good/bad a situation is all things considered is determined solely by how good/bad it is in terms of a single aspect (namely, the one seen as having value/disvalue in itself). Although they share this common structure, the various monist approaches differ from one another according to which aspect is seen as good/bad in itself.

1.6.3. Aggregative monism (a specific application of general monism)

A common form of monism consists in determining how good/bad a situation is all things considered by aggregating what is seen as good/bad in itself. For example, suppose that what is bad in itself is suffering. Imagine that in situation S1 we have 20 victims, each with suffering of -5. In situation S2, by contrast, we have 10 victims, each with suffering of -10. According to this approach, the total disvalue of S1 is -100 (since it is - 5x20). The total disvalue of S2 is also -100 (since it is -10x10). That is, in this approach, neither the number of victims nor the severity of each victim's situation is seen as bad in itself (but rather only as bad instrumentally, insofar as they contribute to the total aggregate being negative). Thus, according to this approach, S1 and S2 are equally bad (the fact that S1 has more victims, and that in S2 each victim is suffering more, is not seen as relevant in itself).

1.6.4. Equal-weight pluralism

In this approach two or more aspects are recognized as good/bad in themselves, and how good/bad the situation is all things considered is determined either by multiplying these aspects (the multiplicative approach) or by adding them (the additive approach). What is characteristic of this approach is that each aspect is seen as equally important (hence they are multiplied or added, but both have the same weight). Note that, in a multiplicative variant of this approach, the result will be identical to the result obtained by an aggregative monist approach, which we saw in the previous section. Only the justification will be different: aggregative monism sees only one thing as good/bad in itself, while multiplicative equal-weight pluralism sees more than one thing as good/bad in itself. An additive variant, on the other hand, can generate results different from those generated by aggregative monism.

1.6.5. Pluralism with an absolute trump

In this approach two or more aspects are recognized as good/bad in themselves, but a hierarchy is constructed in which one factor is an absolute trump over those that come after it in the hierarchy. According to this approach, no increase in the secondary aspects, however large, can tip the balance to make the situation better all things considered if it represents a decrease in the main aspect, however small. That is, in this approach how good/bad a situation is all things considered is determined almost exclusively by the trump aspect (the secondary aspects serve only as a tiebreaker).

1.6.6. Pluralism with a trump up to a certain point

In this approach two or more aspects are recognized as good/bad in themselves; a hierarchy is constructed in which one factor is a trump over those that come after it in the hierarchy, but this trump is not absolute. Beyond a certain point (called the cutoff point or threshold), the hierarchy is reversed. Hence the name “pluralism with a trump up to a certain point.” For example, imagine that an approach of this kind holds that both the severity of each victim's situation and the number of victims are bad in themselves, and also holds that, when two situations are compared, the one in which the victims are in the worst condition is the worse situation all things considered, unless the other situation has at least ten times as many victims. In this case, the approach sees the severity of each victim's condition as a nonabsolute trump (since, depending on the number of victims, the priority is reversed).

1.6.7. Pluralism with fixed-weight aspects (without trumps)

In this approach two or more aspects are seen as good/bad in themselves, and they have different weights in calculating how good/bad the situation is all things considered – but without using the idea of trumps. The reasoning here is similar to what we saw in section 1.6.4 (equal-weight pluralism), except that here the weight of each factor is different. For example, suppose that factor A has twice the weight of factor B. In this case, the total value/disvalue of the situation will be determined by (2x.A) + (1x.B), if an additive method is used, or by (2x.A) x (1x.B), if a multiplicative method is used. The difference from the use of trumps is that here the influence of the factors is continuous and linear (with the use of trumps, it is discontinuous and nonlinear).

1.6.8. Pluralism with variable-weight aspects (without trumps)

In this approach two or more aspects are seen as good/bad in themselves, but there is no fixed weight between them: their weight is variable, decreasing proportionally as they are “filled” (which is why this approach is also called pluralism with diminishing returns). This approach is different from pluralism with a trump up to a certain point. Although they are similar in that, in both approaches, one factor can come to be more important than the other beyond a certain level (both are nonlinear), here the relationship is continuous, with each factor's importance gradually decreasing with each new unit filled (with a trump up to a certain point, the relationship is discontinuous, since the trump is reversed abruptly if a cutoff line is crossed).

1.6.9. Maximin/leximin priorities

In this method the idea is always to prioritize the worst individual case, then the second-worst case, then the third, and so on. This method resembles the idea of trumps, but whereas trumps are used to rank different aspects, in this method the aim is to rank the priority of individuals within one and the same aspect.

However, this method is also used to compare situations involving several individuals. For example, let us compare the following situations, where the letters represent individuals and the negative numbers their level of suffering (the larger the number, the more suffering).

Situation Individuals S1 A = -50 B = -30 S2 C = -49 D = -40 S3 E = -49 F = -39

According to this method, situation S1 would receive priority, since it is the one with the individual in the worst condition of all (A = -50). This is where maximin comes in, which prescribes maximizing the minimum level (and is, so to speak, the trump criterion). Now, imagine that we had to compare S2 and S3 to say which of them is more urgent. In this case, maximin does not help, since the victims in the worst condition in each of these situations are in an equally bad condition (C = -49, E = -49). In this case, leximin comes in as a tiebreaker, prescribing that we prioritize the second-worst case. Here, situation S2 would be considered the priority, since the second-worst case of all is D = -40.

1.6.10. Sufficiency

In this method an aspect matters in itself until it reaches a certain level of fulfillment established as sufficient. After that it ceases to count. If in an approach of this kind there are two or more aspects seen as good/bad in themselves, it may adopt any of the previous methods to commensurate them. However, what is distinctive about this kind of approach is that there comes a point at which the aspect is already sufficiently filled, and it then ceases to matter in itself.

1.6.11. Hybrid approaches

These combine one or more of the previous approaches. For example, they may use trumps (absolute or up to a certain point) up to a cutoff line and from there on use a continuous relationship (with fixed weight or variable weight).

1.6.12. Partial indeterminacy

This method holds that, in some cases, it is possible to assess which situations are better/worse all things considered, but that in other cases there is no correct answer (and so, in those cases, it would be as in the approach that defends incommensurability).

1.6.13. Probabilistic aggregation based on uncertainty

In this method several different approaches (or even all of those we have seen) are weighed on the basis of uncertainty about which of them is correct. In this method, one assesses how good/bad the situation would be all things considered according to each method taken into account, and multiplies each result by the degree to which one believes each method is correct. Then everything is added up, and one obtains the probabilistic aggregation based on uncertainty. In short, in this method a probabilistic mixture of several approaches is made, weighting how much one believes each of them is correct and aggregating these results.

1.7. Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen the main distinctions and inquiries in the field of value theory. From the next chapter on, we will apply this analysis to more specific questions. In the next chapter we will see how all of this appears in theories of well-being.