Assessing How Good/Bad a Situation Containing Several Individuals Is

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XI, p. 39 of the PDF edition · English translation

3.1. Introduction

We saw in Chapter 2 that each theory of well-being differs from the others according to which aspects it claims are good/bad in themselves for individuals, and how these aspects are to be weighed against one another. In what follows, we will not assume any specific theory of well-being. For simplicity, we will speak only of the well-being of individuals.

Most situations involve not just a single individual but several. Thus, we need not only a theory of what constitutes the well-being of individuals (that is, a theory of individual well-being), but also a theory for assessing how good/bad a situation involving several individuals is (which, for short, we will call here collective well-being).

We will see in this chapter that the same kind of disagreement that arises among theories of well-being (“which aspects are good/bad in themselves?” and “what weight should each of these aspects have?”) appears in the assessment of collective well-being.

3.2. Aspects in assessing a situation with several individuals

There are several possible aspects on the basis of which we could assess how good/bad a situation involving several individuals is. Below is a table with a brief explanation of the main aspects. They do not exhaust the possible aspects that could be used to make this assessment. They are, however, the aspects that predominate most in debates on the subject²⁴:

Important: what follows are aspects, not theories. Theories incorporate one or more of these aspects to make the overall assessment. Thus, in the following table, it is important to note that the situation need not be assessed all things considered on the basis of a single aspect. It is possible to combine two or more of the aspects (or even all of them).

*The actions considered valuable vary according to each perspective, but common examples are respecting rights, telling the truth, and keeping promises.

**The relationships considered valuable vary according to each perspective, but common examples are relationships of friendship and mutual solidarity.

3.3. Monist and pluralist theories

In the previous section we saw several aspects that are frequently used to assess how good or bad a situation involving several individuals is. The various theories may see one or more of these aspects as valuable in themselves. If they see only one aspect as valuable in itself, and all the others are seen as having only instrumental value, they are monist. If they see more than one aspect as valuable in itself, they are pluralist.

Let us look at an example of this difference with the value of distributive equality (understood here as the distribution of total well-being among the individuals present in the situation). One view could maintain that distributive equality has value in itself. Other views could maintain that its value is merely instrumental. Even among the latter views, there may be disagreement about what its value is instrumental to. For example, one view could maintain that a more equitable distribution of value (that is, giving more to those who have less) has instrumental value for improving the situation of those who are worse off (and that this, indeed, is what has value in itself). Another view could maintain that reducing inequality is important only because it has instrumental value for maximizing the aggregate sum of well-being. This is so because the same amount of a given resource generally produces greater increases in well-being if it is given to someone who is worse off, and is therefore more efficient for maximizing the aggregate sum of well-being²⁵.

This does not happen only with distributive equality. Any of the aspects can be seen as having value in itself or only instrumental value. For example, some people hold that treating individuals as they deserve is good only instrumentally: because it motivates individuals to refrain from causing harm to

others. Other people hold that treating individuals as they deserve, besides having instrumental value, is also something good in itself. This debate (whether something has value in itself or merely instrumental value) can arise with any other aspect.

3.4. When the aspects conflict

Sometimes the different aspects conflict. Below are some examples with the aspects aggregate sum of well-being and distributive equality (the reasoning, however, would apply equally to any other combination of aspects). Consider the following two situations, with individuals A and B.

Suppose that neither of them did anything to deserve being better or worse off. If we consider S2 better than S1, it is because we consider that distribution has a value that is not merely instrumental to maximizing the sum, given that in both situations the total sum is the same. If we saw only the sum as having value in itself, we would say that S1 and S2 are equally good. Now consider situation S3, below.

Whoever claims that, all things considered, S3 is better than S1 is thereby claiming that distribution should sometimes carry more weight than the sum in assessing the value of the situation all things considered. However, contrary to what may initially appear, this does not mean that, in assessing things this way, we necessarily regard equality of distribution as something good in itself. That is possible, but it is also possible for us to hold that it is good because it improves the situation of those who are worse off (or for both reasons). There is, however, an aspect in which S1 is better than S3 (even if it is not better all things considered): in S1 the total sum of well-being is greater.

Saying that S3 is better all things considered than S1 does not commit us to maintaining that equality of distribution should always carry more weight than the total sum²⁶. For example, let us now consider S4, below.

Although S3 contains a little inequality, it seems better, all things considered, than S4. We could maintain that this is so because, even though both aspects (total sum and distribution) have value in themselves, the maximization of the sum should sometimes carry more weight than equality of distribution in determining the value of the situation all things considered (in this case, we would say that S3 is better all things considered, and that S4 is better only in a certain respect: in it, the total value is better distributed). Or else we could hold that the value of equality of distribution is merely instrumental to improving the situation of those who are worse off. In this case, we would say that S3 is better all things considered because in S4 there is no one who is better off than in S3 (but we would also say that S4 is not better than S3 in any respect).

These examples show the following: (1) Maintaining that a certain aspect has value in itself does not commit us to maintaining that it is the only aspect that has value in itself (nor that it is necessarily the most important aspect). (2) Maintaining that a certain aspect should carry more weight than others under certain conditions does not commit us to maintaining that it should carry more weight under any and all conditions (that is, as we saw in section 1.6, the weight of the different factors can be variable, and, even when it is not, there may be compensations in the other aspects that tip the balance the other way).

In Chapter 6 we will return to this topic and see how the various aspects in assessing how good/bad a situation involving several individuals is appear in various theories of normative ethics.