Categories of Normative Ethical Theories

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XI, p. 51 of the PDF edition · English translation

5.1. Normative ethics and its categories

Theories of normative ethics²⁷ investigate how we ought to act and why: which goals to pursue; which rules to follow; which character traits to cultivate; whether or not there are optional actions (that is, actions that should be neither required nor forbidden); whether or not there are actions that are praiseworthy but not obligatory, among other questions. In short, these theories do not describe how people act. Instead, they prescribe how they ought to act.

Although they too concern decisions that are open to rational assessment, normative ethical theories have an object of study that is different from the one studied by normative theories of rational decision²⁸. In the latter, the focus is on the means we should adopt to achieve a given end (that is, instrumental reason). What is at issue in normative ethics, by contrast, is the ends themselves. Of course, if we think we should pursue a certain end (for example, reducing the suffering in the world), we will need to investigate the best means of achieving it. That is, these domains of thought are related but distinct, even though both are normative (since they concern what we ought to do).

There are three main categories of normative ethical theories: consequentialism, deontology, and character-centered ethics. Within each of these categories there are many normative ethical theories. Below we will look at each of these categories. In Chapter 6 we will explore the main theories individually.

5.2. Consequentialism

5.2.1. What unites the various consequentialist theories?

There are many consequentialist theories, and they differ from one another in many ways²⁹. Which conditions must be met for a theory to count as consequentialist is a matter of controversy.

Horta, O’Brien, and Teran (2022) point out that all definitions of consequentialism accept the following condition:

(1) Outcome dependence: whether something (be it actions, decisions, rules, character traits, or anything else or any combination of things) is right or wrong (and to what extent) depends entirely on the outcomes that may occur.

However, there are other, additional conditions about which there is no consensus as to whether or not they are necessary for a theory to be consequentialist. They are listed below:

(2) Value dependence: whether something is right or wrong, and to what extent, depends entirely on how good/bad the outcomes that may occur are.

(3) Maximization: whether something is right or wrong, and to what extent, depends entirely on whether certain things are (or could be) maximized.

(4) Agent neutrality: what makes something right or wrong, and to what extent, is entirely independent of the point of view of any particular agent.

In this work we adopt a definition that incorporates all four features.

5.2.2. How does each consequentialist theory assess consequences?

The different consequentialist theories disagree with one another about how to assess “better consequences.” They can disagree at two levels:

(1) How to assess how well or badly off each individual is (that is, regarding individual well-being)

(2) How to assess how good or bad a situation involving several individuals is (that is, regarding collective well-being).

As we saw in previous chapters, there are many aspects that may be considered in each of these assessments. Below is a summary of some of the main ones.

The various consequentialist theories may disagree:

(1) About which of these factors they consider important in themselves for such assessments.

(2) About how much weight each of these factors should have in such assessments.

There are many possible combinations, both in terms of which of these factors to adopt/exclude and in terms of the relative weight of the factors adopted. This is one of the reasons why there are countless possible consequentialist theories.

5.2.3. An example: act consequentialism

The different consequentialist theories also disagree about what the focus of moral reasoning should be: acts, rules, character traits, or something else. In this section we will look at an example with consequentialism centered on acts. In section 2.4 we will see examples of the other types.

Although they differ in how they assess how good or bad a situation is, what unites all forms of act consequentialism is that, in all of them, it is impossible for an action to be right and yet produce a worse outcome than another available option.

Important: act-consequentialist theories prescribe that we choose the option that has the best consequences among all the available options. Thus, for an action to be right on these theories, it is not enough to show that it has better outcomes than another (or than others): it must be shown that it is the one with the best outcomes among all the available options (that is, that it is the best of all). This is because of the maximization feature: consequentialist views aim to increase as much as possible whatever they consider valuable (and to minimize as much as possible whatever they consider disvaluable).

For these theories, in cases where more than one option results equally in the best consequences, it is morally optional to choose any one of the best options. However, any option that is suboptimal (that is, that is not among the best of all the available options) will be considered wrong, even if its consequences have a positive balance.

5.2.4. Consequentialism: objective, subjective, or prospective?

One possible objection to consequentialism in general is that we can never know what the right action is, since we will never be certain what the consequences of each option will be. One response to this objection is to hold that the right option really is the one that in fact results in the best consequences, but that, given our limited knowledge, we should choose the one we believe results in the best consequences.

On this question, we can distinguish three types of approach³⁰:

(1) Objective consequentialism: the right action is to choose the option that results in the best consequences. For example, if A is the option that produces the best outcomes, the right action is to choose A, even if the agent has reasons to believe that another option would produce the best outcomes.

(2) Subjective consequentialism: the right action is the one that, given the evidence and knowledge available to the agent at the time of the decision, it is rational to believe is the option that will bring about the best consequences.

(3) Prospective consequentialism: the right action is to choose the option with the best expected consequences, calculated in probabilistic terms (and not merely in terms of subjective belief).

5.2.5. Is consequentialism the same as utilitarianism?

Utilitarianism³¹ is the oldest and best-known consequentialist theory. For this reason, it is not uncommon for utilitarianism to be confused with consequentialism as a whole. However, consequentialism is the category, and utilitarianism is one member of that category. There are many other consequentialist theories.

Another mistaken belief is that there are only two consequentialist theories: utilitarianism (which, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 6, gives equal consideration to everyone affected by the decision—that is, it is an impartial theory) and egoism (which, as the name itself says, places the agent above others). According to this belief, utilitarianism would then be the only impartial consequentialist theory. This too is mistaken. There are many other consequentialist theories (or theories that also have consequentialist versions) that are impartial, such as prioritarianism³², egalitarianism³³, and sufficientarianism³⁴.

Indeed, impartiality is such a central feature of consequentialism that some authors argue that, for a theory to be consequentialist, it must be impartial. According to these authors, theories such as egoism would be teleological (since they pursue a goal), but would not be consequentialist³⁵.

Let us now talk about utilitarianism. The different variants of utilitarianism differ from one another in many respects. For example: (1) with respect to the factors they consider relevant to individuals' well-being; (2) as to whether they focus on acts, rules, character traits, or something else; (3) with respect to the weight they give to avoiding what is negative versus promoting what is positive. There are many variants of utilitarianism.

What all variants of utilitarianism have in common is that they assess how good/bad a situation containing several individuals is solely on the basis of the aggregate sum of well-being (whether the total sum, as in the classical version, or only the sum of the negative part, as in negative utilitarianism, or the average, as in average utilitarianism). In any form of utilitarianism, all other aspects are seen as only instrumentally relevant (depending on whether they increase or decrease the aggregate sum).

Because utilitarianism is often confused with consequentialism as a whole, it is not uncommon to believe that consequentialism cannot regard other aspects (such as equality in the distribution of well-being, desert, justice, rights, etc.) as having value in themselves, let alone as carrying more weight than the aggregate sum of well-being. It is not uncommon to believe that this is possible only for non-consequentialist theories.

As we have seen, this confuses one member with the whole category. Consequentialism includes utilitarianism, but it is much broader, since it includes many other variants that assess “better/worse consequences” on the basis of aspects that utilitarianism does not take directly into account. For example, egalitarianism is a theory that has consequentialist versions. Egalitarianism assesses how good/bad a situation containing several individuals is on the basis of two aspects: maximization of the sum and distribution of the total sum among individuals (and it holds that, at times, distribution should carry more weight than maximization of the sum). Another example is prioritarianism, which also seeks to maximize the aggregate total sum, but for which an additional unit of well-being has greater value the worse off the one who would receive it is. The differences between these theories (and several others) and utilitarianism will be detailed in Chapter 6.

There are many other types of consequentialist theories since, as we have seen, there are many aspects that can be considered when assessing how good/bad a situation is, and also different weights that can be assigned to each of these aspects. Each change in one of these things (the number of aspects regarded as having value in themselves, and the relative weight of each aspect) gives rise to another consequentialist theory. That is why it is sometimes said that there are as many consequentialist theories as there are consequentialists.

5.2.6. Should the focus be acts, rules, both, or something else?

A criticism commonly made of act consequentialism is that it is very difficult to estimate how the consequences of each act will unfold. The longer the time frame, the harder it is to predict the probability that the outcome of our decisions will be this or that (since this involves many factors we have no knowledge of, including other individuals' reactions to our decision). Moreover, we do not have time to make this calculation for every act.

One way to defend act consequentialism against this criticism is to argue that the best we can do is to try as hard as we can to estimate the probabilities of the consequences of each available course of action, and that, even if this is a rough approximation, it is still better than not trying to make such estimates. It is true that we do not have time to do this for every decision (and trying to do so would not have good consequences). However, it is something we can try to do with our most crucial decisions.

Another way to try to get around that criticism is to abandon act consequentialism and adopt some rule-consequentialist³⁶ theory. These theories hold that, instead of investigating which courses of action have the best consequences in each act, we should consider which general rules have the best consequences if followed by everyone.

Thus, according to rule-consequentialist theories, it is possible for an action to be the right one while another course of action has better consequences, since what matters for rule consequentialism are the consequences of the general adoption of a rule, and not the consequences of each act.

For example, suppose that, on a given occasion, causing suffering to 10 innocents is the only way to prevent twice as much suffering to another 10 innocents. According to an act-consequentialist theory, however bad this may be, we should cause the suffering to the innocents, since it is the only way to prevent an evil twice as great. According to a rule-consequentialist theory, by contrast, what we would have to do is consider whether the rule “never cause suffering to innocents” has better or worse consequences if followed by everyone. If it does, then rule utilitarianism would condemn causing suffering to innocents, even if, on this particular occasion, the consequences of following this rule are worse.

One criticism of rule consequentialism is that it implies obeying rules even when complying with them results in worse consequences on a given occasion. What this criticism points out is that rule consequentialism is, then, not a genuine form of consequentialism, since the history of the world resulting from its adoption would not have the best possible consequences.

One way to try to get around the difficulties of act and rule consequentialism is to adopt two-level consequentialism³⁷, which applies the rule version in some contexts and the act version in others. According to this approach, in everyday life, when we do not have time to reflect deeply, we should apply the rules that seem to have good consequences in general (this is called the intuitive level of moral reasoning); on the other hand, when we have time to reflect deeply, we should apply act consequentialism and, if necessary, violate the rules that we realize do not, on a given occasion, lead to the best consequences (this is called the critical level of moral reasoning).

The discussion about whether consequentialist theories should focus on acts, rules, or both is a discussion about what the focal point of moral reasoning should be. There are other possible focal points besides acts and rules. For example, there are character-centered consequentialist theories³⁸. For these theories, the most important thing is to assess which character traits, if cultivated, would result in the best consequences (and not which acts or rules would bring about the best consequences).

Rule-consequentialist theories should not be confused with deontological theories (which also focus on rules). Likewise, character-centered consequentialist theories should not be confused with virtue ethics and the ethics of care (which are also character-centered). We will look at deontological theories in section 5.3 and at virtue ethics and the ethics of care in section 5.4.

5.3. Deontology

5.3.1. Deontological constraints: what they are, and examples

In contrast to consequentialist theories, there are deontological³⁹ theories. What all deontological theories have in common is the view that the course of action or the rule we should adopt does not always coincide with what results in the best consequences (however we happen to be measuring “best consequences”).

Deontological theories work with the notion of restrictions (in English, constraints) on the pursuit of the best consequences. These constraints may be prohibitions or requirements. Deontological theories hold that we should not violate these constraints, even if, by respecting them, the outcome is worse than the one that would result from violating them.

Each deontological theory sets out a different set of constraints. Among the most common constraints are: do not violate rights; do not harm innocents; act in accordance with what each person deserves; do not lie; keep promises; fulfill special obligations (for example, toward loved ones, or professional obligations); fulfill obligations to oneself, among others.

Some deontological theories hold that we bear greater responsibility for acts than for omissions. Others hold that, for us to have an obligation to avoid an act with negative consequences, we must intend those consequences. Still others hold that, if a demand is beyond a certain threshold of difficulty, fulfilling it is optional (that is, not required), but doing so may be praiseworthy (these are called supererogatory

acts). Others, in turn, hold that certain acts are optional even if they are not difficult to perform, and so on. There are many variants of deontological theories.

In short, what characterizes all deontological theories is that they introduce factors (whether to determine the right action or to determine which rules we should follow) that have nothing to do with assessing how good or bad the outcome of the decision is.

5.3.2. Deontological constraints: relative to the agent and to the time of the decision

Deontological constraints refer to the agent and to the moment at which he or she makes the decision. That is, they do not depend on how the decision will influence other agents' decisions, nor on how it will influence the agent's own future decisions. This does not mean that deontologists are unconcerned with pursuing the best consequences. It means that this concern holds only if it does not violate a given constraint.

Below we will look at some examples to understand the difference between deontological and consequentialist approaches (whether act consequentialist or rule consequentialist).

Differences from act consequentialism

Suppose we have to choose among courses of action C1, C2, and C3, and that C3 has the best outcomes. An act consequentialist will say that the right action is to adopt C3. A deontologist will say that the right action is to adopt C3, provided there are no constraints relative to the agent and to the time of the decision that would be violated by adopting C3.

For example, under normal conditions, both consequentialists and deontologists hold that we should not cause suffering to innocents. But let us imagine the following dilemma: either we cause suffering to an innocent, or that innocent will suffer twice as much at the hands of other agents (and there is no other way to prevent the greater suffering).

The consequentialist will say that, in this situation, bad as it is, we should cause the suffering to the innocent, since if we do not, the consequences will be even worse. Now, suppose a deontological theory for which not causing suffering to innocents is an agent-relative constraint. This theory will say that we should not cause suffering to the innocent, even if this results in more suffering for that innocent at the hands of other agents.

The same would happen if the dilemma were the following: if we do not cause a certain amount of suffering to innocents today, we ourselves will have to cause twice as much suffering to innocents tomorrow. Again, consequentialists would say that the right thing is to cause the suffering to the innocents today (given that this, bad as it is, has less bad outcomes than twice as much suffering for innocents tomorrow). Now let us imagine a deontological theory in which not causing suffering to innocents is a time-relative constraint (relative to the time of the decision). This theory will hold that we should not cause suffering to the innocents today, even if this results in our having to cause twice as much suffering to innocents tomorrow.

Differences from rule consequentialism

As we have seen, deontological theories are also centered on following rules. However, unlike rule consequentialism, deontological theories adopt these rules not because they are believed to result in the best consequences if followed by everyone, but for other reasons (for example, because they pass some test of universalizability or impartiality).

Some authors argue that rule consequentialism is basically a prescription to act, in practice, as a deontologist would act, but with a consequentialist grounding⁴⁰. However, what a deontologist and a rule consequentialist would do in practice does not always coincide. For example, deontological theories prescribe following certain rules even if the universal adoption of those rules does not result in the best consequences (something a rule consequentialist would never prescribe).

5.3.3. Deontological constraints: absolute or limited

Deontological constraints can be seen as absolute, or as applying only up to a certain point. For example, a deontologist who sees the constraint “do not cause suffering to innocents” as absolute would claim that we should not cause suffering to one innocent today, even if this means that the suffering of all other innocents is maximized throughout history for all eternity.

On the other hand, if he or she saw this constraint as moderate, he or she could admit that, depending on how bad the consequences of complying with a given constraint are, it would be right to violate it. For example, one could argue that we should not cause suffering to one innocent today even if this means the suffering of two or even ten innocents tomorrow, but that there would be a number of innocents beyond which the right thing would be to violate the constraint. This holds for any other constraint (do not lie, keep promises, etc.): all of them can be seen either as absolute or as holding only up to a certain point.

5.3.4. Is consequentialism centered on outcomes and deontology on actions?

It is sometimes said that the difference between consequentialism and deontology is that the former is centered on outcomes and the latter on actions. However, this is mistaken, because a given consequentialist theory may hold that what is valuable in itself is certain actions (for example, keeping promises or respecting rights) and not their effects. Recall that in section 5.2.2, in the table listing the different aspects that could be adopted by different consequentialist theories to assess how good/bad a situation is, one of the aspects is “types of actions.”

For this reason, there can be a consequentialist theory that prescribes that the right action is to pursue a world in which there are as many actions of this type as possible. These same elements (respecting rights, keeping promises, telling the truth, etc.) usually appear in deontological theories, but as constraints relative to the agent and to the time of the decision, and not necessarily as aspects for assessing how good or bad the situation is.

Let us look at an example to illustrate the difference between a consequentialist theory that valued the action of keeping promises as something good in itself (and not because doing so contributes to something else, such as making people happy) and a deontological theory in which keeping promises was a constraint relative to the agent and to the time of his or her decision.

Imagine the following situation: if we keep a certain promise, this will influence other agents to break many promises, and will also prevent us from keeping many other promises we have made. A consequentialist theory that sought to maximize the number of promises kept would say that the right thing to do, in this case, is not to keep the promise in question. A deontological theory in which keeping promises is a constraint relative to the agent and to the time of his or her decision, by contrast, would say that, even so, the right action is to keep the promise in this case. Again, an absolutist deontologist would say that this constraint must not be violated, no matter how many promises go unkept as a result of respecting it. A moderate deontologist, on the other hand, could admit that there is a certain number of promises beyond which the constraint would have to be suspended.

The same holds for rights. Although most theories of rights are deontological, there are two ways in which a consequentialist theory could incorporate respect for moral rights⁴¹: (1) either as something instrumentally good (since it would lead to other things the theory considers good in themselves, such as preventing harms and providing benefits to individuals); (2) or as something good in itself. The difference from deontological theories would be that such consequentialist theories would seek to maximize the number of rights respected, whereas, in deontological theories, respect for rights would appear as a constraint relative to the agent and to the time of the decision (absolute or moderate, depending on the variant).

In short, the main difference between consequentialism and deontology is that deontological theories give priority to what the agent himself or herself will do (compared with how other agents will be influenced to act because of the decision) and to the moment at which the decision takes place (compared with the agent's own future decisions). Consequentialist theories, on the other hand, give equal importance to what the agent or other agents will do, and also equal importance to decisions at the present moment and at the various future moments, since what matters for these theories is the resulting world, and not factors related to the agent.

5.4. Character-centered ethics

A third category of normative ethics is character-centered ethics. The central question for these theories is not “What is the right action?” but “Which character traits should we cultivate?” For these theories, in deciding how to live, we should consider not what would make the world a better place (as in consequentialism) or which norms we should obey (as in deontology), but what kind of moral agents we want to be. Character-centered ethics holds that ethics is more about the kind of person we should be than about what we should do. These theories set out models of the character traits a good person would have, and then argue that, if we cultivate these traits, we will know what to do in practice. Thus, in assessing how to act, according to character-centered ethics, we should ask: “What would a good moral agent do in such a situation?”

Two examples of character-centered ethics are virtue ethics⁴² and the ethics of care⁴³. In virtue ethics the aim is to cultivate character traits that make someone virtuous. Each virtue theory draws up lists of different virtues to be cultivated (for example: justice, generosity, compassion, rationality, impartiality, prudence, temperance, etc.). These theories are different from character-centered consequentialism, discussed in section 5.2.6. The main difference is this: for character-centered consequentialism, certain virtues should be cultivated because they result in better consequences; for virtue ethics, by contrast, the virtues should be valued in themselves.

The ethics of care, in turn, as its very name suggests, holds that the main character trait we should cultivate is the disposition to care for individuals who depend on us, especially those who are most vulnerable.

Character-centered ethics (whether virtue ethics or the ethics of care) usually emphasizes that these traits need to be exercised until they become a kind of second nature. That is, it emphasizes that it is not enough to read and study about these traits; one must train their

exercise in daily practice and reflect on which character trait or traits apply in each context (which is called practical wisdom).

5.5. The focal point

We saw above that, despite their many practical disagreements, the different schools of normative ethics often agree about what to do in practice, though for different reasons. Kagan (1998, ch. 6, 7) frames this distinction in terms of agreement at the factoral level and disagreement at the foundational level. The factoral level concerns what to do in practice (for example, which factors are relevant to the right decision—hence the term factoral). The foundational level, in turn, concerns why those factors are relevant (for example, whether they are relevant in themselves or only indirectly relevant—that is, a difference in the foundations, hence the term foundational). Kagan (1998) frames the difference at the foundational level in terms of what the focal point of each of the three major schools of ethical theory is: consequences, rules, or character traits. The following table summarizes these distinctions in terms of focal point and what they imply at the factoral level for each of the three schools.

5.6. To what extent do these theories converge/diverge?

Above we saw the basic differences between consequentialist, deontological, and character-centered theories. The debate among these theories usually centers on the points on which they disagree. Doing so is important for assessing the different foundations and the different practical implications of these theories. However, what often goes unnoticed is that there is also a great degree of convergence among these theories, despite their differences.

That is, there are many things on which these theories could agree, albeit on different grounds. One of these things is the equal consideration of all sentient beings. This is so for two reasons. First, there are arguments for the equal consideration of all sentient beings whose acceptance does not require committing oneself to a specific normative theory, or even to a specific school of normative theory. Second, there are specific arguments, coming from the vast majority of contemporary normative ethical theories (whatever school they belong to), for giving equal consideration to all sentient beings. We will look at these two points in more detail in the next chapter.