An Introduction to Theories of Well-Being

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XI, p. 23 of the PDF edition · English translation

2.1. What do theories of well-being aim to investigate?

Theories of well-being investigate what is good/bad, better/worse for individuals⁷. That is, they concern assessing whether an individual is faring well or badly, better or worse, and to what extent.

Note that the term well-being, as it is used in this debate, is much broader than the way the term is used in ordinary language. In this debate, the term concerns any and every circumstance in which an individual could be harmed or benefited. In ordinary language, the term well-being is used in a more specific sense, which concerns how good or bad someone feels. In the philosophical context the term includes this sense, but is not limited to it. For example, the harm of death is also discussed by theories of well-being, but it is usually understood as a harm that depends on how much it deprives the individual of positive things, and not on how good or bad they are feeling⁸. The harm of death is part of the discussion of well-being because it concerns what would harm or benefit an individual. Likewise, it may sound strange to frame the following question within the discussion of well-being: “is someone harmed if their preferences are not satisfied after they die?” (since the individual will already be dead). But it is important to remember: theories of well-being concern everything that could harm/benefit someone. It is in this broad sense that we will use the term in this work.

What theories of well-being aim to discover, first of all, is: which things are good/bad in themselves for individuals, and not merely good/bad instrumentally (that is, as a means)? This is so for obvious reasons: to know whether something is good or bad as a means, we first need to know whether the other things it produces/prevents are good or bad in themselves. That is, inquiry into which things are good/bad instrumentally only makes sense if we first know which things are good/bad in themselves.

There are three main aspects under discussion in the debate about which things are good/bad in themselves with regard to the well-being of individuals: experiences, preferences, and objective goods. Below

we will look at each of these aspects separately and then at the debate between the theories based on them. The debate revolves around which of these aspects matter in themselves for assessing well-being and, if more than one does, whether they can be commensurated, and how.

Whichever of these aspects a theory claims to be important in themselves for well-being, there are two general ways in which an individual can be benefited and two general ways in which an individual can be harmed, as set out in the following table.

Of course, the different theories disagree about which aspects are positive/negative for individuals. We will look at this debate from the next section on.

2.2. Aspects in assessing the well-being of individuals

2.2.1. Experiences

The most obvious aspect through which an individual can be affected for better or worse is through their experiences (that is, their mental states). In this sense, it is widely recognized that positive experiences (also referred to by the terms happiness, pleasure, enjoyment, etc.) are something good in themselves and/or that negative experiences (also referred to by the terms pain and suffering) are something bad in themselves.

With regard to this aspect, then, there are two basic ways in which someone can be harmed: when they have a negative experience (that is, when they suffer) and when they are prevented from having a positive experience (as when they die, for example). Similarly, there would be two basic ways in which someone can be benefited: when they have a positive experience (that is, when they feel pleasure) or when they are prevented from having a negative experience (when a pain is relieved or prevented, for example).

It is important to note that claiming that negative experiences are bad in themselves and that positive experiences are good in themselves is not to deny that negative experiences are sometimes good instrumentally (when they avoid something negative or lead to something positive) and that positive experiences are sometimes negative instrumentally (when they lead to something negative or prevent something positive). We have already seen examples of this in section 1.3 of the previous chapter.

Some views also hold that neutral experiences (that is, experiences that are felt neither as positive nor as negative) are also good in themselves. For example, some views hold that, if having neutral experiences is better than having no experience at all, then this is because neutral experiences are good in themselves (for example, it could be argued that being conscious is something good in itself)⁹. Another example is the views holding that the state of tranquility that accompanies neutral experiences is something good in itself¹⁰.

2.2.2. Preferences (desires)

Some views hold that another way in which individuals can be affected for better or worse is through the satisfaction or frustration of their preferences (understood as mental states in the form of desires). These views hold that the satisfaction of preferences is something good in itself (that is, regardless of whether satisfying them leads to positive experiences or avoids negative experiences) and/or that the frustration of preferences is something bad in itself (that is, that frustrating them is something bad, regardless of whether or not this results in negative experiences, and of whether or not it results in deprivation of positive experiences).

Views of this kind differ from one another according to the kinds of desires whose satisfaction they consider good in itself and/or whose frustration they consider bad in itself. Some hold that these are the actual desires individuals have. Others hold that they are ideal desires (that is, the desires individuals would have if they were rational and had access to the information relevant to their well-being).

2.2.3. Objective goods

Some views hold that certain things are objective goods, in the sense of being something good in itself, regardless of whether or not they generate positive experiences or accord with the preferences of whoever would have them. These views consider the presence of these things as something good in itself, and their absence as something bad in itself.

For example, some authors hold that true friendship, although it is preferred by most people and although it usually provides positive experiences, is good in itself (that is, it would be good even if no one preferred it and even if it did not provide positive experiences)¹¹.

Other items frequently listed as objective goods are knowledge and the development of one's talents. Each view of this kind draws up lists with different items.

2.3. Monist and pluralist theories of well-being

Depending on whether they assume that one or more of the three aspects above are relevant in themselves for determining well-being, theories can be classified as monist or pluralist.

The three best-known categories of theories of well-being are: experientialist¹² theories, preference-satisfaction¹³ theories (also known as desire-based theories), and objective list theories¹⁴. We will look at each of these categories below.

2.3.1. Experientialist theories

The label experientialist is given to any theory of well-being that claims that experiences are the only aspect through which an individual is harmed or benefited. They are therefore monist theories.

A very well-known experientialist theory is hedonism, which claims that what is good in itself is positive experiences, and what is bad in itself is negative experiences. For hedonism, the value of everything else is only instrumental to these things.

It is important to note that, in ordinary language, the word hedonist means something quite different from what this theory proposes. In ordinary language, a hedonist is someone who pursues momentary pleasures without worrying about their long-term well-being. The hedonist theory, by contrast, would say that such an individual is not acting rationally to maximize their well-being, since such behavior will probably cause their life to contain more negative experiences and/or fewer positive experiences.

Hedonism is not the only example of an experientialist theory. Another example is theories that hold that neutral experiences are something good in themselves, as is the case with tranquilism¹⁵. Some of these theories claim that neutral experiences are the only thing good in itself. Others claim that both positive and neutral experiences are good in themselves. In any case, they are all monist theories because they hold that only the aspect of experiences is relevant in itself for well-being.

2.3.2. Preference-satisfaction theories

For preference-satisfaction theories (also known as desire-based theories), what is good in itself is the satisfaction of desires, and what is bad in itself is the frustration of desires. The value of everything else is only instrumental to these things. As we saw earlier, these theories differ from one another according to the kinds of desires whose satisfaction they consider good in itself: the desires individuals actually have, or the desires they would have if they were rational and had access to the information relevant to their well-being. However, all of them hold that the only aspect relevant in itself for well-being is desires. They are therefore also monist theories.

2.3.3. Comparing experientialism and preferentialism

Let us compare these two categories of theories. Experientialist theories will maintain that satisfying desires is usually something good, but because doing so usually leads to positive experiences or avoids negative experiences. Similarly, preference-satisfaction theories will maintain that it is usually something good to promote positive experiences and

avoid negative experiences, but only because doing so coincides with what individuals desire.

However, these things do not always coincide. For example, someone may have a desire for something that will cause them suffering, or may not have a desire for something that would make them happy. In section 2.4 we will see examples of situations of this kind.

2.3.4. Negative versions of experientialist and preference-satisfaction theories

Experientialist and preference-satisfaction theories also have negative versions. According to the negative version of experientialism, negative experiences are bad in themselves, but positive experiences are not good in themselves. According to this version, what is good for individuals is only the absence of suffering. This view is slightly different from experientialist views that hold that neutral states have value in themselves. Negative versions of experientialism hold only that the absence of suffering is something good in itself (and not that neutral states are good in themselves). Thus, between having no experience at all and having neutral states, experientialist views that value neutral states in themselves would say that it is better to have neutral states, whereas negative versions of experientialism would say that it makes no difference, since in both cases there is an absence of suffering.

Similarly, according to the negative version of preferentialism, having frustrated desires is bad in itself, but having satisfied desires is not good in itself. According to this version, the satisfaction of desires is good only because it does not involve their frustration, but the best thing for the individual would be to have no desires, so as not to run the risk of not fulfilling them. It is important to note that, being a form of preferentialism, this version holds that having frustrated desires is something bad in itself, and not because it may cause suffering.

Everything we have seen so far consists of examples of monist theories of well-being, since they hold that there is only one aspect with value/disvalue in itself.

2.3.5. Objective list theories

Objective list theories hold that there are objective goods (which we saw in section 2.2.3), and they can be monist or pluralist. They will be monist when they draw up lists with a single item. Usually, however, they are pluralist, and claim that there are several items that have value in themselves independently (these items make up the various lists of the various objective list theories).

2.3.6. Other possible pluralist theories

It is important to remember that other kinds of pluralist views are also possible, combining some or even all of the aspects we saw earlier. One example would be to claim that both experiences (positive and/or neutral) and satisfied preferences are something good in themselves. Another example would be to claim that experiences (positive and/or neutral) and also certain objective list items are good in themselves. Or that satisfied preferences and also certain objective list items are good in themselves. Or else that experiences (positive and/or neutral), satisfied preferences, and objective list items are all good in themselves. There are many possibilities, set out in the following table:

In the debate on theories of well-being, most of the theories discussed are monist, and many of the criticisms that one monist school makes of another concern precisely the fact that one group of theories fails to take into account what the other group considers important. One way to avoid this problem is to adopt a pluralist theory. Of course, pluralist theories also face problems that do not arise for monist theories. One example is the greater difficulty of finding an adequate method for commensurating the different aspects. That is, a defender of monism could claim that its great advantage is its greater simplicity of application. A defender of pluralism, however, could claim that it is better to have greater difficulty of application than to fail to take into account all the factors that may be relevant in themselves.

2.4. Examples illustrating the differences between the approaches

Below we will look at examples that illustrate how the various theories of well-being would apply to particular situations. These examples are useful not only for seeing where these theories converge and where they diverge. They also help us reflect on: (1) whether an aspect is good/bad in itself, or good/bad only as a means, and (2) if it is good/bad in itself, what its weight should be relative to other aspects.

2.4.1. The case of the harmful preference

Suppose a child has a desire whose fulfillment will be harmful to her (it will result in her later suffering or even her death). Imagine, for example, that she wants to put a plastic bag over her head, covering her whole face, because she does not know that it will suffocate her.

Experientialist theories would say that, if this child's preference is fulfilled, she is not benefited in any respect, since such fulfillment will result in negative experiences and possibly in the deprivation of positive experiences (for example, if she dies).

As for preference-satisfaction theories, at first glance one might think they would have to say that the child in question is benefited if her preference is fulfilled, even if she suffers afterward (and even if she dies). However, a preferentialist could claim that, if the child has this preference satisfied, she will be benefited in a certain respect (she had one preference satisfied) but that, all things considered, she will be harmed much more than benefited, precisely because fulfilling her preference in this case either results in the frustration of other, more important preferences she has (such as not suffering) or even prevents the fulfillment of any other preference she might have (if she dies).

There is a preference-satisfaction theory that would maintain that this child would not be benefited in any respect if this preference were fulfilled. This variant claims that the preferences that matter for well-being are not those we actually have, but those we would have if the information relevant to our well-being were available to us. However, even with the information available, we may still have preferences that are irrational (because we have drawn mistaken inferences, for example). Therefore, this position holds that the preferences that matter for well-being are not those we actually have, but those we would have if we were rational and had available the information relevant to our well-being¹⁶.

Another possible approach is to maintain a pluralist perspective, according to which both positive experiences are considered good in themselves (and negative experiences bad in themselves) and the satisfaction of preferences is considered good in itself (and the frustration of preferences bad in itself). In this case, this pluralist view could even claim that the child in question was benefited in one respect (she had a preference satisfied) but that, all things considered, she was harmed much more (since she then had negative experiences or was prevented from having positive experiences, and also had other preferences she held frustrated, or the preferences she would have had if she were rational and had the relevant information available). This pluralist position, if it also included items from an objective list, could say that such a child would be harmed in this further respect as well, if fulfilling this desire prevented her from enjoying any of those items.

2.4.2. The case of the dying person's preference

Suppose someone is on the verge of death and has a last wish. Common wishes of this kind are, for example, wanting one's body to be cremated rather than buried, or vice versa. Imagine the following example: someone wishes that, after their death, their body be buried next to their parents' bodies.

According to views that say that only experiences are directly relevant to well-being, such an individual will not be benefited if this wish is satisfied, nor harmed if it is not. Since it is a wish that can only be fulfilled after they die, its fulfillment will not increase this individual's positive experiences, nor reduce their

negative experiences, nor will its frustration cause them any negative experience or prevent any positive experience (assuming here that there is no life after death¹⁷).

Views that hold that the satisfaction of preferences is something good in itself, by contrast, will say that the individual in question will be benefited in a certain respect if the wish in question is satisfied, and harmed if it is not, even though the individual no longer exists. For example, they could say that some preferences are future-oriented, and that the holder of these preferences is benefited if they are satisfied, even if he or she has already died when this happens. This applies both to views that hold that preferences are all that matters (as in preferentialism, which is a monist approach) and to those that hold that preferences also matter (as in pluralist views).

2.4.3. The case of the painful truth that someone does not want to know

Suppose a person finds out that someone they cared about very much has died. Imagine that this person suffers intensely on finding out the truth, and also wished they had not found it out.

Experience-centered theories and preference-centered theories (and also theories that combine both) would say that this person was not benefited in any respect by finding out the truth, since they only suffered on finding it out, and also wished they had not found it out.

Now, imagine that an objective list theory maintains that knowing the truth is good in itself. This theory would say that, in this case, the person was benefited in a certain respect: they found out the truth.

At first glance, we might think that such an objective list theory would necessarily have to claim that, all things considered, this person was benefited more than harmed by finding out the truth. However, this will be so only if the theory in question claims that the only thing that has value in itself is truth (or that knowing the truth is always more important than avoiding negative experiences or avoiding frustrating preferences).

However, imagine that the theory in question recognized that, in addition to finding out the truth, having positive experiences and having preferences satisfied are also good things in themselves. In this case, the theory would say that, although this person was harmed in two respects (they had a negative experience and had a frustrated preference), they were benefited in at least one respect: they found out the truth (which, in this theory, is seen as something good in itself).

Of course, in this case, whether finding out the truth was better or worse all things considered will depend on how the weight of the value of preferences, experiences, and objective list items is compared (and on whether this is possible). We have already briefly discussed how to commensurate different aspects in section 1.6, and we will return to this topic in Chapter 7.

2.4.4. The case of the unconscious violation

Imagine that someone is violated while completely unconscious. Because they are completely unconscious, this person had no negative experience while being violated. Imagine also that the fact of being violated will not prevent them from enjoying any positive experience, nor will it bring them negative experiences later. When they wake up, they will not even know they were violated. Of course, in real life, it is possible that, even while unconscious, going through something like this leaves trauma at a subconscious level. But, for the sake of argument, imagine that no trauma of this kind occurs in our example.

According to views that value in themselves only having positive experiences and avoiding negative experiences, such an individual was not harmed in any respect. In defense of such a view, its proponents could offer the following counterexample: imagine that aliens with super-advanced technology have been doing exactly this to us for many years every time we go to sleep. If none of this has harmed us so far, the proponents of this counterexample would say, it is because there is no way to harm someone without giving them negative experiences or preventing them from having positive experiences¹⁸.

Now, according to preference-centered views, the answer may vary. Those centered on the preferences the individual actually has would say that, if someone prefers that this not happen to them, then they will be harmed if it happens, even if it does not affect their experiences. However, they will also have to say that someone who has not yet formed a preference not to be violated while unconscious (for example, a small child) would not be harmed if this happened. On the other hand, those centered on the preferences someone would have if they had the relevant information and were rational could say that such an individual was harmed regardless of whether or not they had already formed a preference about this, since they would probably form a preference not to be violated if they knew what was going to happen to them.

Finally, as for views centered on objective items, the answer will depend on which items they value in themselves. If they value, for example, the autonomous decisions someone would make about what will happen to their own body, they would probably say that such an individual was harmed by not being able to choose in this case. However, they would have to say that individuals incapable of making autonomous decisions would not be harmed if this happened.

2.4.5. The case of the happiness machine

One of the thought experiments most often used against the idea that only experiences matter in themselves for well-being is known as the case of the happiness machine¹⁹. Below we will reconstruct the example and then discuss it.

The example consists in thinking that, if all that matters is having positive experiences and/or avoiding negative experiences, then we would be benefited if we could live in a world that gave us only wonderful experiences but was entirely virtual, as in the movie The Matrix. For example, you eat your favorite dessert and it tastes delicious, more delicious than in the real world, but the dessert in question is virtual.

The aim of this example is to suggest that, if we would not want to live in such a machine (that is, if we would prefer to live in a nonvirtual world, even with fewer positive experiences), then it is because we think it matters not only that the experiences be

positive, but that the stimulus giving rise to them be real. Below is a summary of the debate about this thought experiment.

A first way of responding to this thought experiment is simply to hold that we would be benefited if we had to live in such a machine. A counterexample that could be given in this sense is the following: imagine we find out that, from the time we were born until now, we have already been in such a machine. Everything we have experienced so far has been virtual. Imagine also that we find a way to leave this virtual reality and go to actual reality, but that actual reality will be much worse for us than our current virtual life: we will have only excruciating suffering. This suggests that, from our point of view, virtual reality is better.

One possible response to this counterexample is to hold that it shows only that it is more important to avoid negative experiences and seek positive experiences, but that it does not show that this is all that matters. In this sense, it could be argued that, if we could compare two realities, one virtual and the other actual, both equal in terms of positive and negative experiences, and it were better for us to choose actual reality, then it seems that experiences are not all that matters.

Again, one response to this second example is to say that, in this case, it makes no difference. Another counterexample that could be given in this sense is to think of the following: imagine your favorite dessert. Suppose you found out that the last time you ate it, it was virtual. The question is: from the point of view of your experience, does this make any difference? Was the experience any less good because of it? Was the dessert any less tasty because of it? It seems not.

One possible response to this counterexample consists in first acknowledging that the value of some things (many things, perhaps) seems to lie solely in the kind of experience they provide, but then arguing that this does not apply to all things. It may make no difference to know whether the dessert we eat is virtual or not, as long as it provides the same pleasure. However, suppose we found out that all the individuals we love are in fact not sentient: they are merely virtual simulations of the real individuals. Imagine that we also found out that the real individuals are in another reality, and that we can move there if we want. However, if we move, the price to pay for being with the real beings we love is having fewer positive experiences than we would have in the virtual world.

If we decide that it is better to have fewer positive experiences in order to be able to interact with the real individuals we love, rather than with simulations, then we not only value such interactions in themselves, but also value them to a greater degree than having the maximum of positive experiences. Of course, this does not mean that we will always value such interactions to a greater degree than experiences. For example, if the choice were between remaining in the virtual world and keeping positive experiences, or meeting the real beings we love but at the cost of having to suffer excruciating torments for a long period of time, we would then have doubts about what is better for us²⁰.

This was a brief summary of the debate about the example of the experience machine. This and the other examples we have seen above should not give the impression that the various approaches to well-being will always disagree. Below we will look at several points of convergence.

2.5. To what extent do these approaches diverge/converge?

What has been shown above may give the impression that the different approaches to well-being diverge fundamentally in every respect. However, this impression is mistaken: the degree of convergence is much greater than is usually imagined.

We have seen that most of the disagreements arise between views that see only one of the three aspects (experiences, preferences, and objective items) as relevant in itself for well-being. However, as we have seen, it is not necessary to adopt a view of this kind. It is also possible to consider several of these factors relevant in themselves. For example, even those who value

the satisfaction of desires or objective goods in themselves also usually recognize that suffering is bad in itself and that happiness is good in itself.

This is no accident. The fact that suffering is, in itself, a negative experience shows that suffering is bad in itself. Similarly, the fact that happiness is, in itself, a positive experience shows that it is good in itself²¹. This is something very strong in terms of proof²². For example, it is stronger than any proof we could give concerning descriptions of facts about the external world. We cannot prove that we are not mistaken in our belief that the external world actually exists (since, if it is a virtual simulation, we will have exactly the same experiences). By contrast, we cannot be mistaken when we say that suffering is already something negative in itself and that happiness is already something positive in itself, since in this case it is the very fact of experiencing them in this way that makes such experiences, respectively, negative or positive.

One criticism of this reasoning is to point out that it implies that the happiness a torturer feels when torturing his victims is something good in itself. Here, however, it is important to remember that we are talking about theories of well-being, and not theories of right action. All that theories of well-being would say is that the torturer in question was benefited by feeling such happiness (and that, obviously, his victims were harmed by being tortured). Such theories would not say that it is right for the torturer to do this, since they are not theories of right action: something's being good in itself for someone's well-being is not the same as its being an action that is right in itself.

Thus, although it is an open debate whether there are other things besides negative experiences that are relevant in themselves for well-being, such experiences are certainly relevant to well-being. Derek Parfit, a proponent of an objective list theory, puts the matter as follows:

On all theories, happiness and pleasure are at least part of what makes our lives go better for us, and misery and pain are at least part of what makes our lives go worse. These claims would be made by any plausible Objective List Theory. And they are

implied by all versions of the Desire-Fulfilment Theory. On all theories, the Hedonistic Theory is at least part of the truth²³.

Thus, at least on this point the various approaches to well-being can converge. Moreover, in most cases what prevents suffering and provides positive experiences accords with what someone prefers, and also helps to attain the things usually regarded as objective goods. Of course, as we have seen, these factors sometimes conflict. However, it seems that in most cases they converge.

Discussions of theories of well-being (or of any other philosophical topic) tend to focus on the disagreements between the various approaches. Noticing these disagreements is important for evaluating them. However, focusing on disagreements can also obscure the degree of convergence. We may think there is no degree of convergence at all even when there may be quite a large degree of convergence, as seems to be the case among the various approaches to well-being.

2.6. The minimum degree of convergence and its implications for the well-being of animals

If every plausible theory of well-being must recognize the disvalue of suffering and the value of positive experiences, then all of them must recognize that nonhuman animals are greatly harmed in the circumstances in which they normally find themselves.

Whether they are born into animal exploitation or born in the wild, the norm is for their lives to be full of suffering and for them to die prematurely. Suffering is, in itself, a negative experience. Premature death prevents the individual from enjoying positive experiences (and the more premature it is, the less the individual has enjoyed so far and the more they would have had ahead of them to enjoy). Each of these animals usually has a life in which suffering (generally extreme) vastly outweighs positive experiences.

Therefore, whichever theory of well-being we judge to be the most adequate, we must recognize that animals are greatly harmed by finding themselves in such situations.