Volume I · Discussing Speciesism · chapter 3
Could Metaphysical Characteristics Justify Speciesism?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
An immortal soul, being made in the image of a deity, or other metaphysical traits don't justify speciesism: they can't be proven, they wouldn't apply only to humans, and above all they have nothing to do with being able to suffer.
Some people say animals don't matter because they have no soul. But nobody can show who has a soul and who doesn't. And even if someone had a soul, a pinprick would still hurt just the same for someone who doesn't.
It's like deciding who gets pain medicine based on their zodiac sign. Even if signs were real and mattered for something, they wouldn't change how much the pain hurts.
- P1 What is at stake in moral consideration is whether those affected can be harmed or benefited.
- P2 Having a soul or some other metaphysical trait doesn't change whether someone can be harmed or benefited.
- P3 Besides, these traits can't be proven.
- C Therefore, appealing to them doesn't justify disregarding animals.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Only human beings have souls, so we can use animals.”
Answer Even if we grant the soul, we still need to explain why it would make it acceptable to cause suffering to those who lack one. An animal's suffering doesn't stop existing for lack of a soul.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume I, p. 15 of the PDF edition · English translation
3.1. The appeal to metaphysical characteristics
It is sometimes argued that only humans should receive (or should receive it to a greater degree) because humans are allegedly the only beings that possess one of the following characteristics15:
(a) They were created in the image and likeness of a creator; (b) They have a special relationship with that creator; (c) They have an immortal soul; (d) They have dignity; (e) They belong to a higher ontological category.
The ideas of dignity and of a higher ontological category are generally used in a quite specific sense by the proponents of these positions. What they usually mean is that humans have a special value that implies they should be the only ones respected (or should be respected to a greater degree), and that the reasons we have to respect them have nothing to do with the possibility of harming or benefiting them, but rather with their possessing this special value.
3.2. Problems with the appeal to metaphysical characteristics
There are three main problems with all of these attempts to defend 16.
The first is that it is impossible to prove whether or not anyone meets these criteria. It is not only that it is impossible to verify empirically whether someone meets them: there also seems to be no way of showing in any other manner that humans satisfy these criteria and nonhuman animals do not.
The second problem is that none of these defenses explains why possessing any of those characteristics would be relevant to questions of moral consideration. They simply assume in advance that they are relevant.
The third problem is that there are reasons to think that whether or not one possesses these characteristics is irrelevant to questions of moral consideration. What is at stake in questions of moral consideration is the possibility that our decisions will harm or benefit those affected by them. So what seems relevant to knowing whom to give moral consideration to is knowing who can be harmed or benefited. Possessing those characteristics does not determine who can be harmed and benefited. What determines that is sentience (that is, being capable of having positive and/or negative experiences).
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
According to the chapter, what is the “main” problem with appeals to metaphysical traits?
Why does the appeal to the soul also face a problem of proof?
Food for thought
If we found out that some people have no soul, would it be fine to make them suffer? Why does your answer change, or not, when the being is an animal?
Author’s notes 2
Sources cited in this text 3
The full list for the volume is in the Volume I references.
- HARRISON, P. Theodicy and animal pain. Philosophy, v. 64, p. 79–92, 1989.
- HORTA, O. Un desafío para la bioética: la cuestión del especismo. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2007.
- REICHMANN, J. B. Evolution, animal ‘rights’ and the environment. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
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