If Nature Is Indifferent to the Suffering of Animals, Why Help Them?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 41 of the PDF edition · English translation

Nature is indifferent to the suffering and death of animals. Ecosystems arise, endure, and disappear with complete indifference to the fate of animals. Some people believe this fact shows that we should not help animals who are victims of natural processes. For example, the philosopher J. Baird Callicott holds that the proposal to help animals should be rejected because it involves not accepting that suffering and death are part of life: “it is a view that denies the way things are and always have been”³⁰.

But is it really the case that those who advocate helping animals who are victims of natural harms do not accept that suffering and death are part of life? None of these proponents denies that there are great amounts of suffering and death in life; that this has been so since time immemorial; and that nature is indifferent to suffering and death (whoever's they may be, including humans'). What they hold is that this fact tells us nothing about whether or not we should minimize natural harms. If they denied that suffering and death are part of life, they could not prescribe minimizing natural harms, since they would be denying that such harms exist.

It is possible, however, that what the objection means is that those who advocate helping animals do not accept that suffering and death should be part of life. In that case, the accusation may be true. But it is not an obvious truth that suffering and death should be part of life. For example, we consider it justified to avoid our own suffering and death, even knowing that such things are part of life, that nature is indifferent to this, and that ecosystems arise, endure, and disappear regardless of it.

The objection would have to present some other argument to defend the claim that suffering and death should be part of life, since simply asserting that such things are part of life does not provide that justification, given that the fact that something happens does not imply that it is good, just, desirable, or even acceptable. In other words, the objection makes the mistake of assuming that because something is, it necessarily ought to be. Moreover, if everything that happened were justified, one could not object to anything at all, including intervening in nature to help animals. Therefore, in addition, this argument is self-refuting.

It could be objected that the thesis “if something is part of life, it should not be prevented” should apply only to natural harms. But, again, it would have to be explained why the fact that natural harms occur in life implies that we should not prevent them, while the fact that anthropogenic harms occur in life does not imply the same thing. What this objection does is simply assume this thesis without explaining it. But that is exactly what the objection sets out to explain. The objection says we should not prevent natural harms because they occur in life, but when confronted with the fact that anthropogenic harms also occur in life, the objection says that this case is different, because the harms in question are not natural. But then we can ask again, “Why should we not prevent natural harms?”, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, the objection commits the fallacy of begging the question.

Accordingly, the fact that natural suffering is part of life does not imply that we should not prevent it.