Isn't It Absurd to Intervene in Conflicts Between Animals?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 45 of the PDF edition · English translation

In the wild, animals routinely engage in conflicts with animals of other species³³ (as in cases of predation and parasitism) and with animals of the same species³⁴ (as in disputes over food and territory, and also in sexual conflicts³⁵). It is sometimes claimed that the proposal to help wild animals is absurd because it implies intervening in such conflicts³⁶. In this chapter we will discuss the general question of conflicts between animals. The question of parasitism will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 30, and the question of predation in Chapter 31.

There are two variations of this objection. The first says that intervening in these conflicts is wrong because it could result in something even worse than doing nothing. For example, it is commonly pointed out that if we prevent cases of predation, prey animals could reproduce even more, and the result could be even more suffering and more deaths than if nothing were done (for example, through an increase in the number of deaths from starvation due to the increase in the number of births).

One problem with this first variation is that what the proposal to help advocates is researching ways to make the outcome over time better than if nothing were done. Therefore, such a proposal would not say to intervene in cases where doing so would have even worse results than doing nothing. Nor would it say not to plan interventions. Poorly planned interventions could certainly have even worse results than doing nothing. But this does not show that well-planned interventions would have worse results than doing nothing. For example, interventions that directly or indirectly reduced primary productivity (that is, the plants that form the base of the food chain) would tend to reduce the total number of births³⁷ and would therefore escape the objection that the intervention would risk increasing the number of births³⁸.

The second variation of the objection, by contrast, holds that even if doing nothing results in more suffering and deaths over time, the right thing is not to intervene. For example, it is sometimes said that the fact that predators and parasites need to attack other organisms in order to survive makes it wrong to intervene.

We will reject this variation if we reject the idea that an action can be right while having even worse results than other available options. Moreover, it could be pointed out that this variation is speciesist, since when the victims are human, predators and parasites also need to attack in order to survive, yet it is not said that this makes it wrong to rescue the victims.

Large-scale interventions in predation have been widely practiced for many decades³⁹. These interventions aim to protect humans or domesticated animals whom humans intend to exploit. At other times, they aim to achieve environmentalist goals, such as preserving rare species of animals or plants. This suggests that a double standard is commonly adopted: if the intervention has an anthropocentric or environmentalist goal, it is accepted without having to prove that it will have better results; if the intervention is centered on concern for the good of animals, it is rejected even if it has better results. This is the result of the predominance of speciesism.

It is sometimes argued that conflicts between animals do not raise an ethical problem because the animals themselves cannot be held responsible⁴⁰. But we already saw in Chapter 2 the problems with this kind of view: just as when humans are victims of natural processes, we have reasons to try to help the victims because suffering is negative, and it is negative regardless of whether or not it originated from a responsible agent⁴¹.

At other times it is argued that intervening would be taking sides and would therefore violate impartiality. However, this argument confuses neutrality with impartiality. What impartiality requires is not favoring or disfavoring anyone in a biased way. For example, impartiality implies that levels of harm and benefit of similar magnitude in different individuals receive the same weight. This does not imply that, if we do this,

we will conclude that we should not intervene in the situation. For example, if someone has taken into account all the affected animals, whether predators or prey, given equal weight to the good of each, and concluded that the right thing is to intervene because in this way there will be less suffering and fewer premature deaths over time, they are not being biased. On the contrary: they are doing exactly what they would do if they did not know who those affected were (thus meeting the requirement of impartiality). On the other hand, holding that it is right to intervene only if the victims are human is speciesist and therefore violates impartiality.

None of this necessarily means that, given the current state of knowledge, intervening in such conflicts would be the best thing to do to prevent the harms animals suffer in the wild (although it may mean that, as more knowledge about this issue becomes available, preventing such conflicts from occurring might become a promising way of reducing natural harms). It does show, however, that intervening in such conflicts is not wrong in itself.