Are We Morally Responsible Only for Human Practices?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 55 of the PDF edition · English translation

21.1. Moral responsibility and the origin of harm

Some people oppose the proposal to help wild animals who are victims of natural processes, claiming that we are morally responsible only for harms that result from human practices⁵⁴. According to this view, if humanity decides not to allocate any resources to researching ways of reducing the suffering that wild animals endure as a result of natural processes, nothing wrong is done. Below, we will look at some criticisms of this position⁵⁵.

A first criticism points out that, even if there were no obligation to help these animals, this would not show that it would be wrong to do so (doing so could still be permissible or even praiseworthy). For example, even those who deny that there is such an obligation could still claim that it is a good thing to do, since it could reduce enormous amounts of suffering and premature death. Therefore, denying the obligation to help does not imply that wild animals should not be helped, because denying an obligation is very different from grounding a prohibition.

A second criticism is that, even if we were morally responsible only for human practices, there are many human practices that create the conditions under which natural processes harm animals⁵⁶. Therefore, even by the criterion the objection adopts, there would be an obligation to help animals in all these cases and to prevent such cases from occurring in the first place (and the number of such cases is not small, as we will see in Chapter 37).

Finally, the third criticism asks: "why would we be morally responsible only for human practices?" For example, another possibility is that we are morally responsible whenever we play a decisive role in influencing how events unfold. Below we will look at an example to illustrate this thesis.

Imagine that two simultaneous situations occur that result in human victims. In the first, a fire breaks out as a result of human practices. In the second, a fire breaks out as a result of a natural phenomenon that has no connection whatsoever with human practices. Imagine that the government has the resources to rescue the victims in both cases (and that using those resources to save them will not compromise anything of greater importance). Suppose, however, that help is denied to the victims in the second case, and that it is claimed that there is nothing wrong with this, since the harms in question were not caused by human practices. If we disagree with this decision, then we reject the thesis that we are morally responsible only for human practices.

Moreover, the idea that the origin of a harm should not determine our moral responsibilities can be grounded in the principle of impartiality. For example, if we knew that we would necessarily be victims of one of the two fires above, but without knowing which one, we would want the people who were in a position to help not to limit themselves to acknowledging responsibility only for harms caused by human practices.

We therefore have good initial reasons to reject the thesis that we are morally responsible only for human practices. Nevertheless, below we will discuss some further attempts to defend this thesis.

21.2. "But we don't cause these harms"

According to a certain view, in order to be morally responsible for a situation, we must have been the cause of that situation⁵⁷. According to this view, it is wrong to consume animals (since this causes their deaths), but there is nothing wrong if humanity decides not to allocate any resources to helping wild animals who are victims of natural processes (such as hunger, thirst, disease, etc.), since in that case humans did not cause the situation that harms them (it existed long before humanity appeared). However, the following counterexample challenges the idea that, in order to be morally responsible for a decision, we must have caused the situation⁵⁸.

Imagine that a tree is falling naturally and will fatally strike Maria. Fortunately, Ana is witnessing the scene, and all she needs to do to save Maria's life is to warn her that the tree is about to fall, so that she can get out of the way in time. Imagine, however, that Ana decides not to warn her, and as a result Maria dies. In her defense, Ana says that she was not morally responsible for Maria's death, since she was not the one who caused the tree to fall: "It was the tree that caused her death, not me!" she says. If we think that Ana did something wrong by not warning the victim, then we do not accept that, in order to be morally responsible for a situation, we must have caused that situation.

In the case in question, Ana did not cause the process that ended in death, but her decision was crucial to the death occurring. But the same happens in the case of animals in the wild who are victims of natural processes. In cases where it is possible to help them, the decision whether or not to help is crucial in determining whether or not they will die as a result of natural processes, even if humans did not cause the situation that harms them. If so, then it seems that humanity does something wrong if it does not allocate resources to researching how to help animals living in the wild.

21.3. "But these harms would exist even if we did not exist"

It is sometimes argued that humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to helping animals who are victims of natural processes because such harms would exist even if we had never existed.

However, what seems relevant to whether we are morally responsible for a choice is not what would happen if we did not exist but, given that we do exist, what will happen depending on what we decide⁵⁹. If an outcome is in our hands, this seems to make us responsible for it.

For example, let us imagine that a doctor in a hospital claims that he has no obligation to treat victims of naturally caused diseases, since these would exist even if humanity did not exist. If we think the doctor is acting wrongly, then we do not accept the idea that we are not morally responsible for natural harms.

21.4. "But we don't intend to produce these harms"

At other times it is argued that humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to helping animals who are victims of natural processes because, in this case, unlike the case of animal exploitation, we do not intend to produce the harm (we may simply intend to do something else entirely and not concern ourselves with it) ⁶⁰.

The main criticism of this view is that it completely disregards the impact of our decisions on those who will be affected by them in determining whether or not we have an obligation. For example, drivers who exceed the speed limit intend only to get somewhere faster, not to run anyone over. However, this does not mean that they cease to have the obligation not to run anyone over⁶¹.

Consider another example. Someone who sees a child drowning in a bathtub and does not rescue her may not intend to kill her (they may simply intend to do something else and not concern themselves with it), but it seems that they do something extremely wrong by not rescuing her⁶². If so, then it is not necessary for us to intend to produce a harm in order to have an obligation to prevent it.

Thus, the fact that we do not intend to produce the extremely negative situation in which animals in the wild find themselves does not show that humanity does nothing wrong if it decides not to allocate resources to helping them.

21.5. "But we don't have a close relationship with these animals"

It is sometimes argued that humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to helping animals living in the wild because we do not have a close relationship with them.

A first important point to note about this view is that it could not mark a relevant difference with respect to animals who are victims of human practices. For example, we also do not have a close relationship with the animals who are killed in slaughterhouses, but this does not seem to relieve us of the obligation not to harm them, since our decision, made at a distance, affects them directly.

However, the same is true of animals in the wild. In many cases, it is already possible to help them⁶³. In others, it is always possible for humanity to invest resources in researching how to help them⁶⁴. The decision to do so or to set it aside directly determines their fate, from a distance.

21.6. Isn't choosing whom to help optional?

There are people who acknowledge a duty to help those in need but argue that, since it is impossible to help everyone who needs it, choosing whom to help is morally optional, and therefore humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to helping animals in the wild.

One problem with this view is that it is also impossible to avoid harming everyone, but it does not follow from this that choosing whom to avoid harming is morally optional: we should prioritize avoiding the greater harm.

Analogously, the fact that it is impossible to help everyone should lead us to conclude that we should prioritize the most serious problems (and, above all, those most serious problems that almost no one is concerned about), not that it makes no difference whom we choose to help. Since the situation of animals in the wild is very serious, and very few people are concerned about it, there are strong reasons for humanity to invest resources in researching ways to help them.

21.7. Is the proposal to help wild animals too demanding?

It is sometimes claimed that the proposal to help wild animals is too demanding⁶⁵ and that, for this reason, no one does anything wrong if they ignore what it proposes.

A first possible criticism of this objection is that, given the gigantic amount of suffering in the world, if a proposal demands a great deal of effort from people to reduce that suffering, this is a virtue of the proposal, not a flaw. Even if the fact that people have to make a great effort to help were a harm, it would still be a far smaller harm than the one the victims would suffer if this demand were not made.

The second criticism, in turn, observes that the proposal to help wild animals is not as demanding as it may seem at first glance. This is because research on how to help animals in the wild and practical programs to help them would be carried out by professionals in the relevant fields, not by ordinary people. The professionals in these fields, in turn, would continue to do their work as usual, with the difference that this time the goal would not be anthropocentric or environmentalist, but centered on concern for the animals themselves. Other people, for their part, could demand that the programs that currently harm wild animals be replaced by programs that help them, and could also spread the word about the importance of this issue, which is not a great demand. Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 37, it is possible to reduce the suffering of wild animals on a large scale merely by avoiding certain practices, and avoiding such practices is not difficult.

21.8. If we are genuinely concerned about the victims, what will we conclude?

We have seen that several reasons are put forward to argue that humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to helping wild animals who are victims of natural processes: "we are not the cause of these harms"; "these harms would exist even if humanity had never existed"; "we do not intend to cause these harms"; "we do not have a close relationship with these animals," etc.

There is a general criticism that can be made of all these views: they all focus on aspects related to the individuals who will make the decision, relegating to the background concern for those individuals whom we could harm or benefit. If we

are truly concerned about the animals affected by our decisions, there are two important implications:

The first is that we will not limit our concern to harms resulting from human practices, since animals are also harmed (to a high degree, as we saw in Chapter 3) by natural processes.

The second is that we will also reject the view that holds that reasons to help animals who are victims of natural processes exist, but are weaker than the reasons to help animals who are victims of human practices. If our concern is truly with the animals, we will determine the strength of the reasons to help them based on how much they would be harmed if they were not helped, not on whether the harm is natural or caused by human practices. This means that we have stronger reasons to prioritize preventing the greater harm, regardless of whether its origin is anthropogenic or natural.