Volume VII · Ethics and the Situation of Wild Animals · chapter 22
Attempts to Argue That Domesticated Animals Have Priority
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The arguments for prioritizing domesticated animals (historical debt, degree of dependence) do not justify denying help to wild animals: priority depends on the seriousness of the situation and the number of victims, and the dependence criterion even favors wild animals.
Some people say we have to help farm animals first, because we are the ones who locked them up. But animals in the wild are far, far more numerous and also suffer a lot. One does not have to rule out the other.
Owing a debt to a neighbor does not give you permission to ignore someone drowning in the street.
- P1 One position says we have a historical debt to domesticated animals and that they depend on us more.
- P2 Even if that gave them priority, it would not justify denying the duty to help wild animals.
- P3 Priority depends on the seriousness of the situation and the number of victims, and wild animals are vastly more numerous.
- P4 Wild animals are also highly dependent on the conditions that kill them.
- C So these arguments do not rule out helping wild animals.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “First let us free the animals on farms; wild animals can come later.”
Answer The two causes can move forward together. And, given the number of victims, the suffering of wild animals is immense.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 62 of the PDF edition · English translation
22.1. The historical debt argument
There is a position which holds that we have a historical debt toward domesticated animals that we do not have toward , since they are victims of exploitation, which in turn began with domestication66.
This claim is generally invoked in an attempt either to maintain that it is wrong to help wild animals or to deny the duty to help them. However, the claim cannot ground these conclusions, because if the historical debt criterion made sense, at most it would make helping domesticated animals a priority. Such a criterion would not serve to deny the duty to help wild animals (much less to prohibit helping them).
Moreover, even when used only as a criterion of priority, the historical debt criterion is problematic. For example, if priority depends on how serious the victims' situation is, then those victims toward whom we have no historical debt should have priority whenever they would be harmed to a greater degree if they were not prioritized.
Prioritizing domesticated animals could make sense if, because of exploitation and domestication, they were necessarily in a worse condition than wild animals. However, as we saw in Chapter 3, this is false. To think otherwise is to be unaware of what the typical life of animals in the wild is like.
The defender of the historical debt criterion could object that they are not arguing that the criterion is relevant because it indicates which animals are in a worse condition, but rather that it is relevant in itself: "our obligations depend on humanity's past acts, not on how well or badly off the animals we could help are." However, if so, then the historical debt criterion is motivated by personal purity, not by a real concern with improving the condition of individuals who are in a bad situation.
Moreover, the most reasonable explanation of why we would have a historical debt toward domesticated animals implies that we also have a historical debt toward wild animals. The most reasonable way to argue that we have a historical debt toward domesticated animals is the fact that we enjoy benefits that were only possible because of their domestication and exploitation. As a result of these activities, domesticated animals are today in an extremely bad situation.
However, if so, then we have exactly the same debt toward wild animals, given that the vast majority of the benefits we have enjoyed throughout history arose from interventions in nature to favor humans, and the fact that we did not intervene to benefit wild animals resulted in their being enormously harmed by . We chose to leave wild animals in the domain of those "subjected to the forces of nature": removing them from that category could equally be seen as a historical debt.
22.2. The degree of dependence argument
At other times it is said that wild animals have a certain independence that domesticated animals lack, which would make them less vulnerable: "they can fend for themselves!"67.
Again, even if this claim were true, at most it could ground our giving priority to domesticated animals. It would not serve to deny the obligation to help wild animals, much less to prohibit helping them.
Moreover, someone's having a certain degree of independence indicates that they normally do not need help in certain circumstances, but not in all of them. For example, suppose that a normal adult human (the most commonly cited example of an independent individual) gets lost in the jungle, or is suffering from cancer. The fact that they do not need help in other situations does not imply that they do not need help in this situation.
The same is true of wild animals who have some degree of independence. There are situations (many, as we saw in Chapter 3) in which their independence is of no use whatsoever
in freeing themselves from what harms them. Moreover (as we also saw in Chapter 3), the vast majority of animals who suffer intensely and die prematurely in the wild are young animals and therefore lack the independence the argument presupposes.
The idea that wild animals are independent seems to arise from the fact that, as we saw in Chapter 3, when most people think of animals in the wild, they tend to think of animals who are not representative of typical life in the wild: they think of large, adult animals, who are a tiny minority of the animals in the wild.
Thus, contrary to what the objection assumes, the degree of dependence criterion would give us extra reasons to try to investigate ways of helping wild animals.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
What does the criterion of degree of dependence suggest, when properly analyzed?
According to the chapter, priority depends on...
Food for thought
Does the idea of "debt" change how much you care about someone who is suffering?
Author’s notes 2
Sources cited in this text 3
The full list for the volume is in the Volume VII references.
- DONALDSON, S.; KYMLICKA, W. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. New York City: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- EVERETT, J. Environmental ethics, animal welfarism, and the problem of predation: a Bambi Lover´s respect for nature. Ethics and Environment, v. 6, n. 1, p. 42-67, 2001.
- SIMMONS, A. Animals, Predators, the Right to Life and the Duty to Save Lives. Ethics and the Environment, v. 14, n. 1, p. 15-27, 2009.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
Helping domesticated animals is the priority, since we owe them a historical debt because of domestication. Therefore, we should not help wild animals. (VII, ch. 22).
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