Does Concern for Species Justify Consuming Animals?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IV, p. 63 of the PDF edition · English translation

15.1. The claim that consumption preserves domesticated species

Consuming animals is sometimes defended on the grounds that these animals would not exist if they had not been bred to be consumed. This argument was discussed in chapter 7. In this chapter we will discuss a similar attempt, but one that appeals not to the supposed benefit to the exploited individual of having been born, but to a concern with preserving the species to which the exploited individuals belong.

This attempt points out that several of the species of typically exploited animals (such as chickens, cattle, pigs, etc.) exist only because of their domestication, and that the purpose of this domestication was to breed them to be consumed. Therefore, the argument concludes, it is essential that the consumption of animals continue; otherwise these species would no longer exist.

This argument has problems both with respect to the ethical principles it assumes and with respect to what it claims about the facts. Below we will look at each of these problems separately.

15.2. Do species matter in themselves?

Note that the argument in question does not advocate preserving these species because doing so would be good for the members of the species itself or of other species (for example, for humans). On the contrary: what is claimed is a concern for the species themselves. So the first problem with the argument is that it assumes (without explanation) that species matter in themselves. That is, it assumes that preserving species has something positive about it, even if it benefits no sentient being, and even if it only harms sentient beings. It is not impossible that species matter in themselves. But this is a highly controversial idea, and an argument would have to be offered in its defense. The argument we are discussing does not do this. Instead, it simply assumes that this is so, and that is that.

What is more, there are reasons against the idea that species matter in themselves. Species are nonsentient entities. What is more, they are abstract entities: they are categorizations of living beings according to a certain criterion (for example, being able to interbreed and produce fertile offspring¹⁵¹). There is no one who is the species. So there is no one there who would be benefited by continuing to exist or harmed by ceasing to exist.

The members of these species, on the other hand, being sentient, are indeed someone, and they can be harmed and benefited because they are capable of having negative and positive experiences. The consumption of animals brings them negative experiences and deprives them of positive experiences (since they are killed). Therefore, if the consumption of animals harms the members of these species, and species cannot be harmed, we have here a strong reason against such consumption.

One way of trying to get around this criticism is to claim that it depends on assuming that, for an entity to matter in itself, it must be capable of being harmed and benefited. Someone who rejects this view could say that species, although they cannot be harmed or benefited, have impersonal intrinsic value, in the sense that the world becomes worse if they disappear, even if no one is harmed by it (not even the species themselves).

This is a possible way out, but it would still have to be shown that this kind of value really exists and that species are bearers of this kind of value¹⁵². However, we do not need to enter into that discussion in order to discuss this defense of consuming animals, since it faces a greater problem, which would remain even if it were shown that species have intrinsic value. This problem will be discussed below.

15.3. Do species matter more than sentient beings?

Suppose it were shown that species matter in themselves. This does not necessarily imply that it would be justified to harm sentient beings, even if doing so were

necessary to preserve the species. For a simple reason: showing that something matters in itself is not showing that it matters more than something else.

So what the argument would have to demonstrate is two things:

(1) That species matter in themselves;

(2) That they matter so much more than the good of sentient beings that it would be justified, if necessary to preserve them, to cause extreme suffering and death to an enormous number of sentient beings.

As we have seen, if demonstrating the first claim is already a difficult task, demonstrating the second is even more so. In fact, regarding the second, we can give reasons for thinking exactly the opposite: even if species mattered in themselves, there would still be reasons to give priority to sentient beings in cases of conflict. The reason is the same one we have already seen, which will be recapitulated in more detail below:

Only sentient beings are someone, and therefore only sentient beings can be harmed or benefited. Sentient beings are capable of negative and positive experiences. So they are harmed if they suffer, since suffering is a negative experience. They are also harmed by death, since it prevents them from enjoying positive experiences. These are particularly serious harms that no nonsentient entity is capable of suffering. Here we have reasons to give priority to the good of sentient beings, even if it had been shown that species (or any other nonsentient entity) matter in themselves.

The argument has yet a third problem, concerning what it claims about the facts. We will discuss this problem below.

15.4. If the consumption of animals were abolished, would these species disappear?

Suppose it had been shown that species matter in themselves, and that they matter so much more than the good of sentient beings that it would be justified to harm an enormous number of sentient beings enormously if this were necessary to preserve them. Even so, the argument we are discussing would still not succeed, since the claim it makes about the facts is false.

The argument assumes that, because certain species of animals used for consumption arose through domestication aimed at using them for consumption, such consumption must continue so that these species do not disappear. But this is simply false: if the consumption of these animals were abolished, nothing would prevent them from continuing to reproduce. Therefore, these species would continue to exist even in the absence of such consumption.

Finally, it is curious that this argument is sometimes offered by the same people who argue that we should not abolish the consumption of animals because doing so would supposedly lead to overpopulation in these species, since one claim contradicts the other. The claim that in the absence of animal consumption there would be overpopulation in these species is also false, since, as we saw in chapter 11, there are only so many animals of these species because they are mass-bred for consumption. In short, both the claim that in the absence of animal consumption there would be overpopulation of these species and the claim that consuming them is necessary for these species to endure are false.

15.5. Conclusion

We have seen that the argument claiming that the consumption of animals is justified because it would supposedly be essential for the continuation of these species has three central problems:

(1) It assumes that species matter in themselves.

(2) It assumes that species matter more (in fact, much more) than the good of the sentient beings who are members of these species.

(3) It assumes that these species would disappear if the consumption of animals were abolished.

We have seen that the first assumption is highly controversial; that there are strong reasons to reject the second; and that the third is simply false (which would make the argument a bad one even if the other two assumptions had been proven). Therefore, there is no way for this argument to be sound.