Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics · chapter 4
The Harm of Death and the Reasons Against Killing
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The attempts to justify killing animals painlessly (they do not understand death, have no desires about the future, have no intellectual pleasures, are replaceable, have weak psychological connectedness, would suffer anyway, have little time left, there is life after death) do not hold up.
Many people think killing an animal without pain is not a problem. This chapter shows that dying takes away all the good days the animal would have lived, and it answers the most common excuses.
Blowing out a candle early does not hurt the candle, but it stops giving light. A premature death takes away the light that was still to come.
- P1 Death deprives someone of the positive things they would have lived, whether or not they understand what death is.
- P2 This does not depend on desires about the future, intellectual pleasures, or psychological connectedness.
- P3 Replacing one animal with another does not make up for the harm to the one who died.
- C So killing animals, even painlessly, harms them.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Eating them benefits them, because it brings them into existence, and one animal's death is canceled out by another's birth.”
Answer If that justified killing, parents could kill their children as long as they had others. Killing those who already exist is more serious than not producing new beings.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XII, p. 16 of the PDF edition · English translation
A common position is that there is nothing wrong with killing certain kinds of animals, as long as death is painless15. Listed below are the main attempts to justify this position16 and the criticisms17 of these attempts:
| Attempt to justify killing certain animals | Criticisms of the attempted justification |
|---|---|
| Death does not harm them because they do not understand what death is. (III, ch. 2). | This confuses being harmed with being aware of the harm one will suffer. Death deprives someone of continuing to enjoy what would be positive for them, and this is independent of whether or not the individual understands what death is. |
| Death does not harm them because they do not have future-oriented desires. (III, ch. 2). | Death prevents someone from enjoying the positive things they would experience if they did not die, and this is independent of whether or not that someone has future-oriented desires. For example, suppose two children will have fun on an outing tomorrow, but only one of them is old enough to understand the concept of tomorrow and form a desire to go on the outing tomorrow. Nevertheless, if both die today, both are harmed. |
| They are only slightly harmed by death because they are not capable of intellectual pleasures, and these are more valuable. (III, ch. 4). | Even if this were the case, it would not support the conclusion. What would have to be shown to support the conclusion is that non-intellectual pleasures are not valuable (and not that intellectual pleasures are more valuable). Moreover, the thesis that every intellectual pleasure is more valuable is also questionable. For example, being reunited after 20 years with a missing loved one seems more valuable than many intellectual activities. |
| Eating them benefits them, since it brings them into existence, and the death of one is canceled out by the birth of another. (III, ch. 8 and 9; IV, ch. 7). | If this justified killing someone, then all parents would have the right to kill their children, as long as they brought others into existence to replace them. The wrong of killing someone who already exists is more serious than failing to produce new beings, since in the first case there is already an individual who is harmed, whereas in the second case there are only countless future possibilities of sentient beings. |
| They are only slightly harmed by death because they have weak psychological connectedness with their future (since their minds are simpler). The degree of psychological connectedness depends on the degree of memories, intentions, desires, etc. shared between two moments. (III, ch. 9). | Two criticisms: (1) The fact that their minds are simpler may imply greater psychological connectedness, since their mental contents would vary less, and so the proportion of mental contents shared across different moments would be greater (even if the quantity of shared contents may be smaller). (2) Having a high degree of psychological connectedness (or even any psychological connectedness) is not necessary for someone to be greatly harmed by death. For example, if someone has lived only briefly and would have ahead of them a future of very positive experiences, it seems that they are harmed to a high degree if they die (since death prevents these experiences), and this is independent of the degree of psychological connectedness they would have with their future self. |
| Death benefits them because their lives, whether in exploitation or in the wild, would be full of suffering. (IV, ch. 6). | This observation could never justify animal exploitation. On the contrary, it gives reasons to abolish it, since it produces new beings who will have lives full of suffering. Nor could it justify “letting nature take its course.” On the contrary, it gives reasons to try to prevent animals from being born in the wild in contexts in which their lives would be full of suffering. |
| Death does not harm them if they have little time left ahead of them (because they are old or because of their short lifespan). (III, ch. 10). | Someone having little time left to live does not imply that death will be only slightly harmful to them. The time they have left may be very valuable. This is already widely recognized in the human case. Moreover, it is possible that animals with smaller brains (such as insects) have a faster subjective perception of time. Thus, what seems to us a short life span may not be. |
| If there is life after death, death does not harm them, even if their life here is good. (III, ch. 13). | There is uncertainty: (1) about whether or not there is life after death; and (2) about whether, if there is, it will be worse or better than the present one. On the other hand, we know what the individual's life will probably be like if they stay alive. Thus, uncertainty about both points cannot justify killing animals who have a good life. |
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
Two children are going on an outing tomorrow, but only one understands the concept of "tomorrow." If both die today...
Does belief in life after death justify killing animals who have good lives?
Food for thought
If an animal has a good life ahead of them, what do they lose by being killed painlessly?
Author’s notes 3
Sources cited in this text 2
The full list for the volume is in the Volume XII references.
- CIGMAN, R. Death, Misfortune and Species Inequality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 10, n. 1, p. 47-64, 1981.
- HORTA, O. Un desafío para la bioética: la cuestión del especismo. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2007.
Go deeper on each point
The chapters the author points to in the tables above.
- Vol. III Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Not Harmed by Death
- Vol. III Are Those Incapable of Intellectual Pleasures Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
- Vol. III Discussing the Claim That Animals Are Replaceable
- Vol. III Are Nonhuman Animals Only Slightly Harmed by Death?
- Vol. IV Is Raising Animals for Consumption Justified Because It Brings Them into Existence?
- Vol. IV The Claim That Consuming Animals Puts an End to Their Suffering
- Vol. III The Claim That Having Little Time Left Makes Death a Small Harm
- Vol. III Further Reflections: Death, Annihilation, Rational Decision, and Probabilities
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