Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics · chapter 7
The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 1)
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The table answers the most common objections to helping wild animals: outside the scope of ethics, arrogance, anthropocentrism, less human influence, freedom, dependence, paternalism, the value of suffering, indifferent nature, ecology, and environmentalist goals.
This chapter gathers the main excuses for not helping animals in the wild and shows why they do not hold up. For example, "helping takes away their freedom" makes no sense, because a dead or sick animal has no freedom at all.
It is the frequently-asked-questions chapter of a new and difficult debate.
- P1 The objections claim that helping would be arrogant, anthropocentric, paternalistic, or contrary to freedom and ecology.
- P2 Many are self-contradictory or apply to animals what they would never apply to humans.
- P3 Helping is what allows animals to live and exercise their freedom.
- C So these objections do not justify failing to help.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “The proposal would mean intervening in conflicts between animals, and that is wrong even if it improves the situation.”
Answer This assumes that the right action can have worse consequences, without showing why. And when humans are the victims of animals, no one argues this: it is speciesism.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XII, p. 23 of the PDF edition · English translation
In this section we will continue to address the most common objections to the proposal to help and how these objections have been answered.
| Objection | How the objection has been answered |
|---|---|
| We should not minimize natural harms because this question lies outside the scope of ethics, since neither natural processes nor animals are accountable. (VII, ch. 2, 15, 16). | It is contradictory to claim that the question of natural harms lies outside the scope of ethics and then say that we should not minimize these harms. Moreover, the fact that natural processes and animals are not accountable is irrelevant, since the ones who have to decide are we, not they. When humans are the victims in similar situations, no one says that we should not rescue the victims just because natural processes and animals are not accountable. |
| Intervening in nature (that is, in natural territory and in natural processes) is always wrong, since it is an arrogant attitude. It amounts to “playing God.” (VII, ch. 6). | There are many interventions in nature that are accepted by almost everyone. For example, those made to benefit humans (medicine, agriculture, the construction of housing, schools, hospitals, libraries, etc.) and to achieve environmentalist goals (interventions to preserve rare species, to keep ecosystems in a certain configuration, etc.). If any of these interventions is justifiable, then it makes no sense to say that it is wrong to help wild animals just because it would involve intervening in nature. |
| It is wrong to influence the fate of these animals. (VII, ch. 6). | We will be influencing the fate of these animals either way, whether we decide to help or decide not to help. |
| The proposal is anthropocentric, since it comes from humans. (VII, ch. 7). | The fact that a proposal is anthropogenic (that is, comes from humans) does not mean that it is anthropocentric (that is, that its goal is centered on benefiting humans). The proposal in question aims to benefit animals. Therefore, it is not anthropocentric. |
| The less human influence, the better for animals. (VII, ch. 8) | Not necessarily. It would have to be assessed, case by case, whether acting or refraining from acting has the best results for animals. There is no basis for saying that refraining is always better. |
| We should reduce human influence on the world, even in situations in which reducing it would be worse for animals. (VII, ch. 8). | It is contradictory to say that we should reduce human influence because it harms animals, and then say that we should reduce it even when doing so is worse for animals. To support such a thesis, what would have to be shown is that human influence is wrong in itself, entirely independently of how animals are affected. However, the objection in question already assumes that this thesis is correct, instead of demonstrating it. |
| From our human perspective, we cannot know what is best for animals. Hence, what is best for animals is to let nature take its course. (VII, ch. 7). | It is contradictory to say, first, that we cannot know what is best for animals, and then say that we know that what is best for them is to let nature take its course. Moreover, in the situations in which the proposal to help wild animals aims to intervene, we do know what is best for the animals. It would be absurd to say that perhaps what is best for animals would be to have their bodies burned, to die of starvation or disease, to be born only to suffer, etc. |
| Helping would violate the animals' freedom. (VII, ch. 10). | On the contrary. Helping is the only way to ensure that they can exercise their freedom, since to do so they need to be alive and free from extreme suffering. It could be objected that the proposal sometimes requires interfering with their freedom (for example, to vaccinate them). But if the degree of freedom depends on how far someone can do what they want, restricting their freedom at a certain moment may be necessary to ensure that they can continue to exercise it. |
| Helping them may make them dependent on human care. Hence, we should not help them. (VII, ch. 11). | This objection does not apply to most interventions, since they aim to reduce the number of births, nor to the proposal to stop practices that make natural processes maximize suffering and deaths. Even interventions that help animals already born do not make them lose the abilities they already have, nor prevent them from acquiring them. It is not helping that would make animals unable to exercise the ability to seek food, or to acquire it, since they would die. Even if helping made animals dependent on human care, this would still be better for the animals than suffering more and dying soon. |
| The proposal to help them is paternalistic. Hence, we should not help them. (VII, ch. 12). | If an action is paternalistic when it aims to benefit the one affected but goes against what they prefer, then helping animals in the wild would be paternalistic only if they preferred not to be helped in situations of starvation, disease, accidents, fires, floods, etc. But this is not the case. Of course, animals sometimes flee from attempts to help them. But this does not show that they prefer not to be helped (they flee because they do not understand that someone is there to help). And even if there were some animal who preferred to remain in a situation in which its suffering would increase, it would very probably not be in an epistemic position favorable to seeing what is best for its well-being in the long term. Therefore, even if helping it were paternalistic, it would be the justified kind of paternalism. |
| We should not help them, since suffering has instrumental value (that is, it helps the individual avoid what would harm them). (VII, ch. 13). | In the case of the vast majority of animals who suffer in the wild because of natural processes, suffering, rather than helping them promote their well-being, only harms them (since they experience extreme suffering from birth until a very premature death caused by that suffering). Moreover, where suffering did help animals achieve something positive, there are reasons to research how to enable them to reach that positive state without having to suffer for it (that is why we prefer to receive anesthesia before surgery). |
| The proposal sees humans as something separate from nature. (VII, ch. 14). | On the contrary. It is the idea that humans should not intervene in natural territory that seems to see humans as something separate from nature. If we see humans as part of the natural world, then outcomes influenced by human practices do not cease to be (nor are they any less) natural. |
| Nature is neither good nor bad. Natural processes are not accountable agents. Therefore, we have no reasons to help. (VII, ch. 2, 15, 16). | It is true that natural processes are not accountable agents. But this does not mean that we have no reasons to prevent and minimize the negative effects resulting from natural processes (this is already widely accepted when humans are the victims of natural processes). Moral responsibility falls on us, in having to decide whether or not to help. |
| Nature is indifferent to the suffering of animals. Ecosystems arise, endure, and disappear with complete indifference to the suffering and death of animals. (VII, ch. 2, 15, 16). | Yes, but that does not justify our being indifferent as well. Ecosystems also arise, endure, and disappear with complete indifference to human suffering, but that does not justify our being indifferent to suffering. The objection in question assumes that the way natural phenomena happen should be a model for what we ought to do. In doing so, it makes an unjustified leap from describing how things are to prescribing how they ought (morally) to be. |
| We should respect the nature of wild animals, and this requires leaving them to their own fate. (VII, ch. 17). | We have to ask: why should we respect someone's nature? If the answer is “because doing so would benefit them,” then it is false that respecting the nature of wild animals requires leaving them to their own fate, since this would probably harm them. If, on the other hand, the answer is “just because, even when it would harm them,” then no reason is being given to explain why respecting someone's nature would be more important than avoiding harming them. |
| Intervening in conflicts between animals could make the situation even worse (for example, intervening in predation could cause a population explosion of prey). (VII, ch. 18, 31). | In any case where intervening has a good probability of making the situation even worse because of knock-on consequences, the proposal to help wild animals would prescribe not intervening. However, this does not mean that intervening will always have worse consequences. For example, by reducing primary productivity, the tendency is for populations in general to decrease, since it is a “bottom-up” kind of intervention in the food chain. |
| The proposal would entail intervening in conflicts between animals, and this is wrong even when doing so improves the situation. (VII, ch. 18, 31). | This objection assumes that the right action sometimes has worse consequences than other available courses of action. However, this thesis would have to be demonstrated, and the objection already assumes it to be correct in advance. Moreover, when humans are the victims of animals, this thesis is not defended. When humans are the victims, it is held that it is always right to help, regardless of the consequences. When animals are the victims, it is held that it is always wrong to help, even if the consequences of not helping are worse. This is speciesism. |
| This is a question for ecology to answer, not ethics. If we apply what ecology says, we will value species, ecosystems, and natural balance, and not this pursuit of avoiding the suffering and deaths of sentient beings. (VII, ch. 19). | Describing what happens in natural ecosystems is a task for ecology. However, which goals we ought to pursue (for example, whether the good of sentient beings or environmentalist values) is a question for the field of ethics. No descriptive science has the answer to this question. Animal advocates do not reject knowledge in ecology (indeed, they depend on it in order to help wild animals safely). But ecology would never prescribe that we should value species, ecosystems, biodiversity, or anything else, since it only describes – like any science, it is not about which goals we ought to aim at. Those who oppose helping wild animals and claim that they are “just applying what ecology says” are disguising an environmentalist moral position as a morally neutral description. |
| What matters is ecosystems and species, not animals. So, if all this suffering and death neither drives species extinct nor threatens ecosystems, we need not worry. (VII, ch. 20). | If the question of moral consideration exists because our decisions can benefit or harm those affected by them, then for someone to be morally considerable it is sufficient that they can be harmed/benefited. Every sentient being, because it is capable of experiencing certain states as positive and others as negative, can be harmed/benefited. If so, then each sentient being matters in its own right. The thesis that each sentient being matters in its own right is much less controversial than the thesis that species and ecosystems matter in themselves. |
| Even if animals matter, helping would conflict with environmentalist goals (such as keeping the ecosystem in certain configurations), and this makes helping wrong. (VII, ch. 20). | In the vast majority of cases there would be no conflict of goals, since programs to help wild animals would not alter the properties of ecosystems that environmentalism values: they would only mean less suffering for the inhabitants of these ecosystems. There are even several programs that would achieve both goals. For 30 example, vaccinating bees prevents an enormous number of animals from suffering from disease and also helps in the conservation of species. |
| But there are clearly cases in which helping would conflict with environmentalist goals. For example, environmentalists may want to keep only the native vegetation of a place, but it may be that introducing non-native vegetation would reduce the total suffering of the animals living there. In those cases, wouldn't it be wrong to help? (VII, ch. 20). | A conflict by itself is insufficient to support the conclusion that we should not help. It would have to be shown: (1) that we should abide by environmentalist goals, and (2) that these goals are more important than the basic interests of animals (such as not suffering and not dying). Even if point 1 were demonstrated, reasons could be raised for rejecting point 2. For example, it could be said that only sentient beings are harmed by suffering and death, and that these harms are particularly serious. Thus, whenever there was a conflict, there would be reasons to prioritize the basic interests of sentient beings. Environmentalists already accept this in the human case: they defend limiting the non-basic interests of humans (aesthetic, economic, recreational, etc.) to achieve their goals, but they do not hold that this justifies causing suffering and death to humans, or failing to help them when they are victims of natural processes. |
Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume XII
See the whole themePractice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
"We do not know what is best for animals, so the best thing is to let nature take its course." What is the problem?
Why does the proposal not see humans as separate from nature?
Food for thought
Which of these objections do you find strongest? Does the table's answer deal with it well?
Sources cited in this text 1
The full list for the volume is in the Volume XII references.
- RAUKKO, E. The first-ever insect vaccine PrimeBEE helps bees stay healthy. University of Helsinki, 31 out. 2018.
Go deeper on each point
The chapters the author points to in the tables above.
- Vol. VII How Not to Understand the Issue
- Vol. VII If Nature Is Not Evil, Is Natural Suffering Neutral?
- Vol. VII If Nature Is Indifferent to the Suffering of Animals, Why Help Them?
- Vol. VII Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Arrogant?
- Vol. VII Is the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Anthropocentric?
- Vol. VII The Less Human Influence in the World, the Better?
- Vol. VII Does the Proposal to Help Wild Animals Violate Their Freedom?
- Vol. VII The Charge of Creating Dependency
- Vol. VII The Charge of Paternalism
- Vol. VII The Objection That Suffering Has Instrumental Value
- Vol. VII Does the Proposal to Help Animals See Humans as Separate from Nature?
- Vol. VII Does Respecting the Nature of Wild Animals Require Leaving Them to Fend for Themselves?
- Vol. VII Isn't It Absurd to Intervene in Conflicts Between Animals?
- Vol. VII The Issue of Predation
- Vol. VII Which Fields Should Answer What to Do About Wild Animals?
- Vol. VII Must Environmentalists Oppose Helping Wild Animals?
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