Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics · chapter 8

The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 2)

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The second set of objections to helping wild animals denies our responsibility or questions practicality; the table answers each one and includes a simulated debate on altruistic killing and the debate on expanding nature.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XII, p. 28 of the PDF edition · English translation

In this section we will look at the last part of the most common objections to the proposal to reduce the suffering and deaths of that originate in , and the answers that have been given to them. We will now discuss objections that deny that we are morally responsible for doing something, or that question the practicality of such a proposal.

Objection How the objection has been answered

It is wrong to help, since humanity is morally responsible only for human practices (VII, ch. 21). Even if this were the case, it would mean only that there is no duty to help (and not that it is wrong to help). Helping could still be morally permissible, or even praiseworthy. Moreover, it could be said that we are morally responsible for a decision whenever it is decisive for the outcomes being one way or another, and this is not limited to human practices. For example, if doctors have an obligation to treat victims of naturally caused diseases, then it is false that we are morally responsible only for human practices.

We have no close relationship with these animals. Therefore, humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to help them. (VII, ch. 21)	The absence of a close relationship is insufficient to show that humanity has no obligation to allocate resources to help them, since our decision to help or not to help, even from a distance, directly influences their situation (the same happens with human victims of natural disasters in distant places, for example). We also have no close relationship with exploited animals, but this does not mean that we cease to have an obligation not to harm them, since our decision at a distance affects them directly. Yet the same is true of animals living in the wild.
There is a general duty to help, but not this cause in particular. (VII, ch. 21)	We will reject this position if we accept that we should prioritize causes in proportion to the number of victims, the total amount of suffering, and the degree to which the cause is neglected. By these criteria, the cause that aims to reduce the suffering of wild animals should receive a great deal of attention.
The proposal is too demanding. (VII, ch. 21)	Such a proposal would demand very little of each person, since the interventions would be carried out by professionals who already work in this field (such as biologists and ethologists). Each person would merely have the duty to draw attention to the importance of this question and to call for resources to be devoted to addressing it. Life-science professionals, in turn, would continue to do their work as usual, with the difference that their research would now be guided by a direct concern for the good of the animals.
Helping domesticated animals is the priority, since we owe them a historical debt because of domestication. Therefore, we should not help wild animals. (VII, ch. 22).	Even if helping domesticated animals were the priority, this would not support denying the duty to help wild animals (much less prohibiting helping them). Moreover, if priority depends on how serious the victims' situation is and on the number of victims, this does not necessarily coincide with the criterion of historical debt. Each wild animal also experiences extreme suffering, and they are vastly more numerous than domesticated animals. Finally, it could also be argued that we owe a historical debt to wild animals, since the benefits we enjoy arose from interventions in nature, and we have left wild animals subject to natural processes.

This proposal should be rejected because it would involve sterilization, and animals have a right not to suffer interference with their own bodies against their will. (VII, ch. 29).	Three answers. (1) There are ways to minimize natural harms that do not involve sterilization: vaccinating, treating diseases, providing water, food, shelter, rescue in natural disasters, not recreating the conditions for maximizing births, etc. (2) Respecting the alleged right not to be sterilized would result in much more suffering and death than not respecting it (since it would entail the maximization of beings who would be born only to suffer and die prematurely), and it would thus violate the physical integrity and the lives of (many) third parties. (3) The sterilization of animals such as dogs and cats (who have on average 4 or 5 offspring per litter) is widely accepted by animal advocates. In the case of wild animals who have thousands or millions of offspring per brood, we have much stronger reasons to justify sterilization.
There is nothing that can be done to help. (VII, ch. 26).	Animals are already being helped with vaccination and treatment of diseases, in fires and other natural disasters, with assistance to orphaned animals, the rescue of trapped animals, and programs to meet animals' basic needs³¹.
There is nothing that can be done on a large scale (VII, ch. 18, 24, 31, 36, 37).	Many things could be done on a large scale. For example, it could be studied which elements in the environment tend to reduce primary productivity (and, consequently, total suffering). In addition, the human practices that contribute to natural processes maximizing the number of births (and, consequently, suffering) could be avoided. This alone would enormously reduce the number of animals who would be born only to suffer.
There is no way to help them all. Hence, we should not help any. (VII, ch. 25).	Yes, it is true that there is no way to help them all. But for each animal helped, the help makes all the difference. There is also no way to help all domesticated animals, or all humans, but that does not imply that we should not help them. Something like this is said only in the case of helping nonhuman animals because of the prevalence of speciesism. None of us would refuse to be helped just because it is not possible to help everyone in need. Therefore, such a position violates impartiality.

We should first solve the problems that humans cause animals. If we cannot even solve the problems that humans cause animals, how much less can we solve the harms caused by natural processes. (VII, ch. 25).	If our goal is to help as efficiently as possible, we should not base ourselves on the origin of the harm (whether or not it is caused by humans), but on the amount of benefit that could be produced with each strategy. It is not necessary to solve all (or even any) of the problems caused by humans in order to do something for animals who are victims of natural processes. Helping animals who are victims of natural processes is not necessarily harder than helping animals who are victims of human practices. In fact, in some cases it may be easier, since there may be less resistance. What we should do is investigate where our resources, if applied, would produce the greater good (for example, would help more victims, or would help those in the worst situation, etc.), and not investigate whether the harm originated in human practices or in natural processes.
The problem has so many victims that, even if we managed to help on a large scale, it would still be a small percentage of the problem (VII, ch. 25).	The percentage does not matter; what matters is the actual amount of benefit we could produce. For example, suppose that with the same resource we can either help 90% of the animals in problem A or help to the same extent 0.1% of the animals in problem B (who are all in a situation as bad as that of the animals in problem A). If we are guided by the percentage, we will help the 90%. But suppose problem A involves a trillion animals and problem B a quadrillion. The point is: 90% of a trillion is 900 billion, whereas 0.1% of a quadrillion is a trillion. Solving 0.1% of problem B means helping 100 billion more animals with the same resource.
It is hard to predict long-term consequences. Helping could make things even worse. Better not to try to help. (VII, ch. 24).	If it is hard to predict long-term consequences, then we cannot know for certain that not helping has the best consequences. What we would have to do is research ever more thoroughly how interactions in ecosystems take place (among animals and between them and their surroundings). By doing so, our knowledge of the probability of long-term knock-on consequences would keep increasing, which would make it possible to plan ever safer and more efficient programs of help.

Nature already balances itself, and this coincides with what is best for animals. Better not to intervene. (VII, ch. 24).	In fact, populations naturally fluctuate enormously, almost always irregularly. Moreover, a situation can be stable and yet terribly bad for the animals affected. For example, situations in which, over generations, an average of only two offspring per brood survive are balanced in this sense, but, given the enormous size of the broods, it is also a scenario in which suffering and premature deaths are maximized.
But if there were less balance, there would be even more suffering (VII, ch. 24).	Not necessarily. Everything depends on how the degree of balance or imbalance would influence other factors that directly affect animals (such as the number of births and in which species, the availability of food and shelter, the amount of disease and conflict, etc.). Thus, if the goal is what is best for animals, we should investigate these factors directly, and not the degree of balance. Moreover, since ecosystems tend to settle into balance at high levels of plant and animal productivity, disturbances probably tend to reduce, rather than increase, suffering.
We should not help these animals because doing so would prevent the best-adapted genes from prevailing. (VII, ch. 23).	The traits most efficient at passing genes on do not necessarily benefit their bearers or their offspring. For example, the trait of maximizing the number of offspring is very efficient at maximizing genetic transmission, but being born a member of a species that reproduces in this way means having one's chances of survival drastically reduced. Moreover, the amount of natural suffering and death is so enormous that, even if helping animals meant that members of future generations would not have the best-adapted genes possible, this would still probably have a far less negative balance than letting nature take its course. Furthermore, various forms of intervention would not prevent the best-adapted genes from prevailing, as is the case with sterilization and with research into which kinds of elements in the environment result in fewer births in species whose members commonly have negative lives. Finally, if what the objection proposes were acceptable, all of us should be left to our own fate so that only the best-adapted humans would pass their genes on.

This proposal cannot be scientifically well informed. (VII, ch. 19, 27).	Data from the science of ecology have been used predominantly to achieve anthropocentric and environmentalist goals, but they could also be used to guide programs aimed at preventing animal suffering. Moreover, as the field of welfare biology³² developed (which would study animals in their environments from the standpoint of what affects them positively or negatively, and not as components of ecosystems or specimens of species), there would be more and more data that could scientifically inform programs of help.
We are in no position to know when a life is or is not worth living. We may think a life is not worth living and be mistaken. Hence, it is better not to intervene. (VII, ch. 32).	Imagine we were offered the chance to be reborn to live a life full of extreme suffering. If we could not judge that such a life is not worth living, we would be unsure whether or not it was worth accepting the offer. The situation of the vast majority of animals in the wild is of this kind. In response, it could be objected that, even if someone's life has been dreadful up to a certain point, it is still possible to improve it. This is true, but then it is a reason to try to help wild animals. Moreover, the goal of improving the lives of beings who already exist does not imply rejecting the goal of preventing new births. This is because the greater the number of births, the harder it is to improve the life of each of the individuals born.
If the lives of wild animals are full of suffering, helping them would merely prolong their agony. Better not to intervene. (VII, ch. 33).	The fact that their lives are full of suffering is due to their being in an environment where the conditions for surviving for long are completely unfavorable. If we create conditions for them to survive longer, the chances that they will have a meaningful life increase. Prolonging their lives results in something worse (than their dying) only if we do nothing to prevent other forms of suffering to which they will be subject. Moreover, what causes them suffering generally also causes their death. If we offer treatment for such ills, we will be prolonging their lives, but also increasing their levels of well-being. In addition, it is also false that all interventions prolong animals' lives: many merely prevent new births.

This proposal should be rejected because it would entail prohibiting the treatment of parasitism (since doing so would kill many to save just one). (VII, ch. 30).

When the parasites are not sentient and the host is, even if treating the parasitism results in more deaths, the resulting situation is better, since death is not a harm for such parasites. In the case of sentient parasites, it would have to be assessed whether their lives would be minimally meaningful. If they would not (and it is not possible to make them so), then death is not a greater harm for them than remaining alive. Even if in a given case the parasites would be more harmed by dying, and the right decision is not to treat the host, there could still be no objection whatsoever to preventing future cases of parasitism (for example, through sterilization), since failing to produce new beings is not the equivalent of killing beings who already exist. Moreover, not treating parasitism would probably result in a greater number of deaths and more suffering over time. Almost all parasites reproduce by maximizing the number of offspring. If they are sentient, the result is also the maximization of deaths and suffering for the members of those species themselves. Not treating the host will result in the parasites continuing to reproduce and infect new victims. This gives us reasons not only to treat victims of parasitism who are already infected, but above all to prevent parasitism in general. Thus, it is false that the proposal to prevent natural harms would prohibit treating cases of parasitism.

The situation may have a positive balance: the pleasure of the few animals who live long may outweigh the combined suffering of the vast majority. (VII, ch. 34).

Suppose the total balance were positive. The reasons to reduce suffering do not diminish because of this. For example, the reasons to help humans starving in poor countries do not weaken just because there are affluent humans in rich countries. Moreover, even those who believe that all that matters is the total balance have reasons to prioritize eliminating suffering, since an extra unit of resources produces greater increases in well-being the worse the situation of whoever would receive it. Thus, prioritizing improving the situation of those in a negative situation is more efficient for increasing the total balance.

The debate on the expansion of nature
The proposal that aims to prevent the suffering of wild animals arising from natural causes implies that expanding natural territory (forests, for example) is something negative. That is why it is absurd. We should expand natural territory because sentient beings need it as a resource. (VII, ch. 37).	Concern for sentient beings (of the current and/or future generations) would not approve of expansion, since the number of beings who would be born only to suffer would always be much greater than the number of those alive now or of those who would be born to have positive lives and would need the environment as a resource. The only way to defend expansion is from a view according to which a world history with a greater amount of suffering and premature deaths of sentient beings is better. But this is very hard to defend. It could be objected that expanding natural territory may be necessary to prevent the extinction of humans, who are the only ones who can prevent natural harms. This is an important concern, but it is also possible that the human presence will come to have a negative balance in the future. For example, if humanity develops space colonization in the future, it would recreate in many other places the natural processes that result in the maximization of suffering and deaths. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the human presence will have a positive or negative balance over the course of history. Moreover, even if we should prevent human extinction, this does not necessarily imply expanding natural territory, since there are ways to prevent climate change without creating new environments such as forests. One example is pursuing energy efficiency and renewable energy. In short, the cases in which expansion could be justified are those in which all the other options would result in something even worse. If such cases exist at all, they are a small fraction of the practices of expanding natural territory.

The debate on the expansion of nature

The proposal that aims to prevent the suffering of wild animals arising from natural causes implies that expanding natural territory (forests, for example) is something negative. That is why it is absurd. We should expand natural territory because sentient beings need it as a resource. (VII, ch. 37).

Concern for sentient beings (of the current and/or future generations) would not approve of expansion, since the number of beings who would be born only to suffer would always be much greater than the number of those alive now or of those who would be born to have positive lives and would need the environment as a resource. The only way to defend expansion is from a view according to which a world history with a greater amount of suffering and premature deaths of sentient beings is better. But this is very hard to defend. It could be objected that expanding natural territory may be necessary to prevent the extinction of humans, who are the only ones who can prevent natural harms. This is an important concern, but it is also possible that the human presence will come to have a negative balance in the future. For example, if humanity develops space colonization in the future, it would recreate in many other places the natural processes that result in the maximization of suffering and deaths. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the human presence will have a positive or negative balance over the course of history. Moreover, even if we should prevent human extinction, this does not necessarily imply expanding natural territory, since there are ways to prevent climate change without creating new environments such as forests. One example is pursuing energy efficiency and renewable energy. In short, the cases in which expansion could be justified are those in which all the other options would result in something even worse. If such cases exist at all, they are a small fraction of the practices of expanding natural territory.

Simulation of the debate on the destruction of nature
Does the proposal to reduce the suffering of wild animals imply altruistic killing? That is, does it imply destroying natural habitats (for example, through urbanization)? (VII, ch. 36).	There is disagreement among proponents of reducing wild animal suffering about whether or not there is such an implication. Below is a simulated debate summarizing the main arguments on each side.
Against destruction	For destruction
By destroying nature (for example, through urbanization), we will harm many animals. The ideal would be to reduce births, and to carry out vaccinations, treatment of diseases, etc.	Waiting for nonlethal solutions (which may take a long time, or may never come about) would entail the death and suffering of many more animals than altruistic killing.
Advocating altruistic killing would make people think that consideration for animals is absurd. The effect of this would be worse than the effect of waiting for nonlethal solutions, since it would lead humans to increase the harms they cause animals.	Even if advocating altruistic killing influenced humans to increase the harms they cause animals, the destruction of habitats would prevent much more suffering and death than the sum of all the harms that humans cause.
So far, the harms that humans cause are smaller than natural harms, but this may change in the future if humans expand natural territory on Earth or beyond it. If altruistic killing contributes to wild animal suffering being neglected even more, and this results in the expansion of nature, then altruistic killing would be worse than waiting for nonlethal solutions.	This shows only that we should not advocate altruistic killing, but not that it should not be carried out (for example, urbanization could continue). Moreover, if the greater risk is that humans will expand natural territory, then this risk is greater if we hold that it is always wrong to destroy natural territory. Altruistic killing makes it very clear that expanding natural territory is not something good.
If humanity already tends to expand urbanization, there is no need to advocate altruistic killing and, since advocating it also carries risks, it is better not to advocate it.	Perhaps, but we could still encourage research into which land uses are most likely to have a positive balance for animals. We could encourage these changes and also changes in consumption practices, as is done with regard to animal exploitation.

The idea behind altruistic killing is so far removed from common sense that it would hardly be accepted (it would only create rejection of the proposal to reduce the suffering of wild animals). That is why the risk of advocating it is so high. Thus, it is better to maintain an absolute rule against the destruction of natural habitats.	If we explain to the public that fewer habitats mean less suffering and death, this may reduce enthusiasm for conservationist policies and for policies expanding natural territory. Suspending such policies involves no expense and requires no activity at all, so it may be easier for the public to accept this than interventions to reduce suffering.
Proponents of destruction may be optimistically biased regarding the probabilities of the consequences of altruistic killing. They may be biased in this way because killing offers a quick solution. This may lead them to neglect the possible negative consequences arising from how it will influence the decisions of future agents.	An aversion to violent interventions may lead us to assess the probabilities of consequences in a biased way. Moreover, the harms in the case of altruistic killing would occur through action, and in the case of waiting for nonlethal solutions they would occur through omission (but they could be much greater). Thus, we should be suspicious of the preference for waiting for nonlethal solutions.

In chapters 6, 7, and 8 we have seen, in very summarized form, a general overview of the debate on the ethical implications of the harms animals suffer as a result of natural processes. As you will have noticed, it is a debate full of nuances, with questions that greatly challenge the common perception of this subject. That is why it is well worth thinking about these questions calmly and with an open mind before rejecting or accepting a given position. As mentioned, Volume VII of this collection discusses each of these topics in detail, and contains many other pointers to materials that expand the discussion even further.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume XII

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Why is the proposal not too demanding for each individual?

Among those who propose reducing wild animal suffering, altruistic killing is...

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What example of helping wild animals did you know of before reading this table?

Author’s notes 2

31 For a list of programs of help already being carried out, see (2023 [2020], p. 69-97). ↩
32 On welfare biology, see and (2020) and et. al. (2021). ↩

Sources cited in this text 2

The full list for the volume is in the Volume XII references.

FARIA, C.; HORTA, O. Welfare biology. In: FISCHER, B. (org.). The routledge handbook Of animal ethics. New York/London: Routledge - Taylor & Francis group, 2020, p. 455-66.
SORYL, A. A.; MOORE, A. J.; SEDDON, P. J.; KING, M. R. The Case for Welfare Biology. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, v. 34, n. 7, 2021.

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IDiscussing Speciesism IIConsidering Sentient Beings IIIAnimals and the Harm of Death IVThe Debate on Animal Exploitation VDifferences Between Environmentalism and Consideration for Animals VITo Whom Do We Owe Moral Consideration?VIIEthics and the Situation of Wild Animals VIIIEffective Activism IXEthics and the Future XBiases and Their Influence XIHow Do the Various Ethical Theories Approach the Animal Question?XIIThe Essentials of Animal Ethics

The Debate on the Proposal to Help Wild Animals (Part 2)

Objection How the objection has been answered

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