The Debate on the Destruction of Nature

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 117 of the PDF edition · English translation

36.1. The context

Increasing the green areas on the planet (whether through their preservation, restoration or expansion) is almost always seen as something unquestionably positive, above all suspicion. This happens for two reasons: (1) most people hold anthropocentric and environmentalist views, which leads them to attach no importance to the impact each practice has on nonhuman animals. (2) Most people, including those who care about nonhuman animals, do not know that an increase in green areas means an increase in primary productivity and, consequently, in reproduction rates (which indirectly maximizes the amount of animal suffering and premature death).

As we saw in Chapter 3, the vast majority of animals in the wild reproduce by maximizing the number of offspring (in the thousands or even millions per brood depending on the species), and the average survival rate in stable populations is only two per brood. All the rest are normally born to lives full of suffering and a premature death, usually an extremely painful one. In short, the more green areas, the greater the total amount of suffering and premature death.

It could be objected that sentient beings also need green areas as a resource, and that reducing them could therefore harm the quality of life of many sentient beings. This is true, but given the gigantic reproduction rates, the amount of suffering and death caused by an increase in green areas would always be enormously greater than that prevented by such an expansion. In short, an increase in green areas is good from an anthropocentric or environmentalist point of view, but it has a gigantically negative balance if we take into account all the sentient beings affected.

36.2. Arguments in favor of altruistic killing

In this chapter we will discuss what we will call altruistic killing¹⁶³. According to this position, the best thing we can do to prevent natural harms is to reduce the number of natural ecosystems. This position acknowledges that, in doing so, we will kill and cause suffering to an enormous number of animals. However, it holds that, if we do not do so, the amount of suffering and death that will ensue will be immensely greater.

Defenders of this position acknowledge that the ideal would be to prevent the suffering and premature deaths of animals in the wild without having to cause suffering or death (for example, through a reduction in birth rates, vaccinations, disease treatment and so on). However, they argue that it may take a long time for such solutions to be applied on a large scale, and it may even be that this never happens. For this reason, they argue that altruistic killing is what has the best balance in terms of causing/preventing harm since, even if nonlethal solutions one day come to be applied on a large scale, the time it could take for this to happen would mean the deaths and suffering of many more animals than altruistic killing.

For example, the urbanization of green areas (such as the construction of roads and housing) results in the deaths and suffering of many of the animals living there. However, most of these animals reproduce by maximizing the number of offspring and, consequently, maximize the number of them who are born to experience suffering and die prematurely. Thus, urbanization, despite causing suffering and death, drastically reduces the total balance of suffering and death, whether compared with letting nature take its course or compared with waiting for nonlethal programs to reduce birth rates.

Tomasik (2016a) gives the following example to illustrate the issue. Suppose the world were full of human baby factories. These babies are eaten alive after weeks or months of life, but 1 in every 20 babies manages to live well until 3 years of age. Let us imagine that most people do not want to eliminate these factories and actually like them because, seen from the outside, they are very beautiful and almost no one notices the suffering and deaths that occur there. However, imagine that some people accidentally destroy

these factories while building houses and parking lots. This procedure kills the babies who are there, but prevents many more of them from being born to such a fate. Bearing in mind that the vast majority of humanity is not on your side, and that you have limited resources, you have a choice: (1) either promote economic activities that will destroy one hundred of these baby factories; (2) or close five factories, saving the babies in them, but this means that the other 95 you could have destroyed will continue to operate. The author argues that, if our goal is to reduce suffering and death as much as possible, we should choose 1.

36.3. Arguments against altruistic killing

To assess whether altruistic killing has better results than waiting for nonlethal solutions, it is useful to distinguish between first-order and second-order outcomes¹⁶⁴. First-order outcomes are all the outcomes (direct or indirect) of an action that do not depend on how it influences the decisions of other agents. Second-order outcomes depend on how the action influences the decisions of other agents (these decisions, in turn, also have first- and second-order outcomes, and so on).

On this basis it could be argued that altruistic killing, even if it has better first-order outcomes, could have second-order outcomes so negative (because of how it would influence the way humans see the cause of reducing wild animal suffering and consideration for animals in general) that it would be better to wait for nonlethal solutions. There are two main arguments along these lines, explained below.

The first argument is that the cause of reducing wild animal suffering is already widely rejected and, if its proponents advocate killing animals, this rejection will increase even further, especially among animal advocates. In short, advocating altruistic killing may lead people in general never to come to care about the suffering and deaths of wild animals.

The second is that, if altruistic killing is advocated, the public may come to understand that the good of animals does not matter, and this could lead to a further increase in the harms that humans cause to animals.

36.4. Replies from those who defend altruistic killing

Proponents of altruistic killing have offered the following responses to the arguments above:

(1) If altruistic killing is advocated by explaining that it is justified only if every other option would result in even more suffering and death, there is a low risk that this will encourage the public to support other practices that would increase the amount of suffering and death. In fact, it could positively influence the public's decisions, by encouraging people to reason carefully about controversial moral questions, to question the moral relevance of the distinction between acts and omissions, to be concerned about the total amount of suffering and death over time, not to be afraid to question entrenched intuitions (such as the intuition that preserving nature has a positive balance), and so on.

(2) Even if advocating altruistic killing influences humans to increase the harms they cause to animals, the destruction of habitats would prevent far more suffering and death than the sum of all the harms humans cause to animals.

36.5. Rejoinders from those who condemn altruistic killing

In response to the first reply, it could be pointed out that the public normally does not even read what the proponents of a position argue, much less read it with attention to nuance. Therefore, there is a high risk that the cause of reducing wild animal suffering will be rejected even more than it already is if altruistic killing is advocated.

In response to the second reply, it could be said that, so far, the total harm that humans cause to animals is much smaller than the total of natural harms, but that this may change in the future. This would be the case if humans come to restore or expand natural territory on Earth, or if they send life beyond Earth, colonize space and so on¹⁶⁵. In that case, humans would create the conditions for natural processes to maximize suffering and death far beyond anything that exists so far.

In short, this response argues that, if altruistic killing contributes to wild animal suffering being even more neglected, and this results in the expansion of nature, then altruistic killing would in the long run have worse results than waiting for nonlethal solutions to wild animal suffering.

36.6. A new reply from the defenders of altruistic killing

In the face of these new arguments, two new responses are available to proponents of altruistic killing.

The first is that all of their opponents' arguments, if sound, would show only that people who aim to prevent natural harms should not advocate altruistic killing, but they would not show that altruistic killing should not be carried out. For example, if it were carried out by people other than the proponents of preventing natural harms, or if it were carried out in secret, there would be no risks in terms of influencing the public's perception of the proposal to reduce natural harms or of the animal cause in general.

The second, more important, is that if the greater risk is that humans will maximize the harms they cause if they come to expand natural territory on Earth or beyond it, then what runs the greatest risk of leading to this is the idea that it is always wrong to destroy natural territory, not altruistic killing. Altruistic killing makes it very clear that expanding natural territory is not a good thing.

36.7. But won't humanity do this anyway?

Those who condemn altruistic killing could argue that, since humanity already automatically tends to expand urbanization, there is no need to advocate altruistic killing and, since advocating it also carries risks, it is better not to advocate it.

However, one could respond that research could be done on which land uses are most likely to have a positive balance for the sentient beings affected¹⁶⁶ and,

on that basis, we could encourage these changes and also changes in consumption practices (just as we do in the case of exploited animals). Just to cite one example, Tomasik (2016a) argues that palm oil cultivation probably reduces the total balance of suffering, and that we could therefore encourage its consumption or, at least, oppose campaigns against palm oil cultivation¹⁶⁷.

Another response along these lines points out that, if we explain to the public that less habitat means a lower total balance of suffering and death, this may make activists, legislators and the general public less enthusiastic about conservation policies and policies to expand natural territory. Since suspending such policies involves no expenditure of resources and requires no activity at all, it may be easier for the public to accept this proposal than to accept interventions to reduce the suffering of animals in the wild¹⁶⁸.

36.8. Who bears the burden of proof?

We saw above that both sides of the debate have arguments grounded in concern about long-term consequences. Given this, a central question is the following: who bears the burden of proof?

On the one hand, it could be suggested that the burden of proof lies with those who advocate lethal solutions to a problem. However, proponents of altruistic killing could respond that they meet this burden of proof by showing that waiting for nonlethal alternatives necessarily means more suffering and death than using lethal alternatives.

We saw that, in response to this, those who oppose altruistic killing argue that, because of the influence it could have on agents' decisions over time, it could mean more suffering and death than waiting for nonlethal solutions. This would be the case if it influences people not to have moral consideration for nonhuman animals and this ends up resulting, for example, in the expansion of natural territory on Earth or beyond it.

On the other hand, however, proponents of altruistic killing could suggest that, in this case, the burden of proof lies with those who condemn altruistic killing, to show that it really

would have these counterproductive implications, since it could be promoted by emphasizing that it is justified only when all other options cause even more suffering and death. As we have seen, those who are against altruistic killing argue that there is a risk that the public will misunderstand the message. But, again, proponents of altruistic killing could respond that the burden of proof lies with their opponents, to show that this risk is greater than the risk that natural harms will be maximized if altruistic killing is not carried out. Moreover, as we have seen, proponents of altruistic killing could point out that it is the view defended by their opponents (that it is always wrong to destroy natural ecosystems) that is more likely to be understood as implying that expanding nature is a good thing.

Finally, proponents of altruistic killing can point out that there are two other factors suggesting that the burden of proof lies with their opponents. One is the fact that we have an inclination to reject violent interventions, and this may lead us to assess the probabilities of consequences in a biased way. The other is the fact that the harms in the case of altruistic killing would occur through action, whereas in the case of waiting for nonlethal solutions they would occur through omission (but would be much greater). Since harms caused by action are more noticeable than those caused by omission, this is a reason to be suspicious of the preference for waiting for nonlethal solutions.

Thus, it seems that the burden of proof lies with the opponents of altruistic killing. However, it is important to stress that the concern that altruistic killing might be counterproductive could also come from a thorough analysis of the risks, and not only from the inclination mentioned above. In any case, in the next chapter we will discuss in detail another way of preventing natural harms on a large scale that could be accepted by both proponents and opponents of altruistic killing: not expanding natural territory.