What Impact Does Veganism Have on the Situation of Wild Animals?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 114 of the PDF edition · English translation

35.1. The idea that preventing natural harms implies rejecting veganism

The main argument in favor of veganism, as far as diet is concerned, is that it reduces the number of animals who are born to suffer and be killed in exploitation. Moreover, it reduces the number of animal deaths that are a side effect of agriculture, since it requires a smaller area of cropland than animal exploitation needs to feed the same number of humans (since the animals who are killed are fattened on plants).

However, it could be objected that the need for a smaller area of cropland would in fact result in greater suffering and more deaths for animals. This would happen because more green areas would be left over, which would increase primary productivity and, consequently, the number of births of animals who maximize the number of offspring. As a result, the amount of suffering and death would be maximized with far greater efficiency than that present in animal exploitation or in the side effects of agriculture.

In short, according to this objection, the large-scale adoption of veganism, despite reducing the number of exploited animals and of animals who are victims of the side effects of agriculture, would increase the total amount of animal suffering and death by indirectly increasing the amount of reproduction in natural territory.

35.2. Does veganism necessarily imply an increase in green areas?

Curiously, the fact that certain forms of raising animals for consumption reduce green areas (for example, raising cattle on open pastures) is normally mentioned as a negative aspect of animal exploitation. However, as should be clear by now, this is perhaps the only respect in which animal exploitation probably prevents more suffering and death than it causes. This does not mean, of course, that animal exploitation is justified. As we will see below, there are other ways of achieving this same positive aspect without the harms that animal exploitation causes.

For example, the connection between veganism and an increase in green areas is not necessary. It could be a very likely result in a world where the vast majority of people hold environmentalist ideals. But let us suppose a future in which consideration for animals was widespread. People would want to pursue the abolition of their exploitation. However, they would also want to prevent their suffering and deaths resulting from natural processes. This shows that the increase in natural territory (and the resulting maximization of suffering and of the number of deaths) is not a necessary implication of veganism: it is an implication only of abstaining from consuming animals out of environmentalist and anthropocentric concerns¹⁶¹.

35.3. Distinguishing first-order and second-order harms

There is another important factor to consider: the way in which each practice influences other agents to act in one way or another. To illustrate this point, it is useful to distinguish between first-order and second-order outcomes.

First-order outcomes are all those direct or indirect effects of a practice that do not depend on the decisions of other agents. The suffering and deaths of animals resulting from their exploitation, or as a side effect of agriculture, or as a result of the increase in green areas, are all direct and indirect first-order effects. Second-order effects, by contrast, would depend on how each action influences other agents to make decisions. Thus, it is possible for a given practice to be less bad with respect to first-order outcomes (adding up direct and indirect outcomes), but to be worse overall because its worse second-order outcomes are much greater.

With this difference in mind, let us suppose for the sake of argument that animal exploitation had turned out to be less bad in terms of the resulting first-order harms (adding up direct and indirect harms). Even so, not consuming animals, provided it is promoted for reasons of consideration for animals (and not for environmentalist or anthropocentric reasons), could contribute to preventing much greater second-order harms, by spreading the ideal of consideration for sentient beings.

If not consuming animals with this kind of motivation were spread on a large scale, there would be no risk of maximizing suffering and death as a result of the increase in natural territory. Since consideration for animals implies preventing/minimizing

natural harms, vegans who were aware of this would want both that animals not be exploited and that they be prevented from being harmed by natural processes (which would imply not expanding natural territory).

The ideal of consideration for sentient beings could help prevent long-term harms not only from natural processes. It could also prevent the development and use of possible future technologies that had the potential to harm a gigantic number of sentient beings¹⁶².

Animal exploitation, on the other hand, even if it were less bad in terms of first-order harms, would have a negative impact in terms of second-order harms, since it reinforces the idea that animals are not morally considerable. Therefore, it would not influence people to avoid the harms that animals suffer as a result of exploitation, of other human practices, or of natural processes. It would also increase the probability of a gigantic increase in natural territory, thereby maximizing animal suffering and death extremely efficiently. Moreover, such a worldview would also increase the probability that future technologies will be used in ways that harm sentient beings in general, on a scale far greater than anything done so far.

35.4. Conclusion

Ironically, the potential that the practice of veganism has to bring about improvements for nonhuman animals lies much more in the kind of ideal it could help spread than in the results of the act of not consuming animals. However, this positive potential for animals exists only if not consuming animals is promoted with arguments in favor of the moral consideration of animals (with emphasis on the need to prevent/minimize natural harms). Otherwise, as we have seen, there is a risk that it will result in an increase in natural territory, which would mean the maximization of animal suffering and death. Thus, not consuming animals promoted for anthropocentric and, above all, environmentalist reasons, if adopted on a large scale, runs a high risk of having results even worse than animal exploitation. In this way, the proposal to minimize natural harms supports veganism, provided it is promoted out of consideration for animals.