Does the Proposal to Help Animals See Humans as Separate from Nature?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 37 of the PDF edition · English translation

The proposal to help wild animals is sometimes accused of seeing humans as something apart from nature. According to this view, if humans saw themselves as part of nature, they would advocate letting nature take its course, instead of trying to reduce the suffering and deaths of animals that result from natural processes.

One response to this objection points out that it is actually the position opposed to helping wild animals that seems to see humans as separate from nature, since it holds that if humans influence a situation, it ceases to be (or becomes less) natural.

At this point it could be objected that what is unnatural is the product of human actions, not humans themselves. On this conception, humans are part of nature, but an ecosystem that has undergone human interference is no longer natural. However, if a conception regards humans as part of nature, why would the product of human actions not also be a natural outcome? This shows that such a position is arbitrarily using two senses of the terms nature/natural. When it claims “humans are part of nature,” it defines nature as the physical world. When it claims “an ecosystem that has undergone human interference is no longer natural,” it defines natural as whatever is not the result of human practices. So, of course, on this conception the results of human practices will not be considered natural, since this has already been assumed to be true by definition.

It could be objected that, even if humans and the results of their actions are equally natural, it is a fact that the proposal to help wild animals goes against natural processes (such as hunger, thirst, disease, etc.). However, this implies that helping animals is wrong only if it is always wrong to go against natural processes. But there are good reasons to reject this thesis. The main one is the following. Natural processes are not someone. Therefore, they are not harmed if they are thwarted (since there is no one there to be harmed). On the other hand, the victims of these processes certainly are harmed if we allow the natural processes that harm them to take place.

Therefore, for us to have a duty not to thwart such natural processes, it would have to be shown that: (1) we have obligations toward entities that cannot be harmed or benefited; and that (2) these obligations are stronger than those we have toward individuals who can be harmed and benefited. Needless to say, these two theses are very difficult to ground.

In fact, no one accepts these theses for themselves. Someone who accepted them would have to try not to protect themselves from catching diseases, not to get treatment when they fell ill, not to wear clothes, not to live in a house, not to try to escape a natural disaster, not to protect themselves against parasites, and so on. The thesis that it is wrong to go against natural processes is defended only when the victims are nonhuman animals. This shows that such a position is unjust for at least two reasons. The first is that its proponents do not hold it for themselves. This by itself is already completely arbitrary. The second is that its proponents defend it only when nonhuman animals are the victims. This shows that such a position does not pass the impartiality test, since its proponents would not defend it if they did not know which species they belonged to.