The Charge of Paternalism

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 34 of the PDF edition · English translation

The proposal to help wild animals is sometimes accused of being paternalistic²⁶, that is, of aiming to benefit the one affected, but against what they prefer²⁷. A paternalistic action occurs, for example, when a child wants to drive a car and we stop them in order to protect them. Hence the name paternalism, since it refers to the action of parents toward their children.

Given this definition of paternalism, however, helping animals in the wild is not paternalistic. It would be only if they preferred not to be helped in situations of starvation, parasitism, disease, accidents, fires, floods, etc. Of course, there are cases in which animals flee from attempts to help them. But this does not show that they prefer not to be helped. They probably flee because they do not understand that someone is there to provide help.

Moreover, the thesis that paternalism is always unjustified can be questioned. If every paternalistic action were wrong, the only appropriate way to raise and care for children would be to do everything they wanted. But it makes sense to accuse of negligence someone who did not stop a child from driving a car, or did not give them first aid just because the child did not want it. If so, then there are paternalistic actions that are justified.

What justifies paternalism in these cases is that the child in question lacks the relevant information about how satisfying the desire in question will affect their well-being as a whole. But that is the condition of nonhuman animals as well. Therefore, even if helping them were paternalistic, it would be of the justified kind.

The Objection That the Satisfaction of Desires Should Sometimes Weigh More

It could be objected that the satisfaction of desires should sometimes weigh more than the content of positive and negative experiences. For example, suppose someone is terminally ill and all that awaits her from now on is intense suffering, but she still has one last desire to satisfy, which is very important to her. Although such a person is harmed in a certain respect if she stays alive (the suffering), she seems to be harmed

to a greater degree if she dies without fulfilling her last desire. It seems wrong to kill such a person to prevent her suffering (since she does not want to die).

However, what such an example suggests is that “there are unjustified paternalistic actions,” not that “all paternalistic actions are unjustified.” There are countless examples suggesting that paternalism is sometimes justified. For example, it is justified in the case of a child who has a lethal disease that is fortunately very easy to treat, and who refuses to take the medicine. So what we need to investigate is whether helping wild animals in nature who are victims of natural harms, if it were a paternalistic action (and, as we saw in the first response, it is not), would be justified or unjustified paternalism.

It could be suggested that the greater someone's degree of autonomy, the more unjustified paternalism is, given that the likelihood of achieving their good is greater if they make decisions for themselves (even if we determine someone's good solely on the basis of the balance between positive and negative experiences).

Even if this is true, it could not be the basis for an objection to the proposal to help animals in the wild. First, because, as we have seen, such action is not paternalistic. And even if it were, almost all nonhuman victims of natural harms have no autonomy of any kind (since they are newborns and juveniles). If the greater the autonomy, the more unjustified paternalism is, then the lesser the autonomy, the more justified paternalism is. This is why we generally consider paternalism more appropriate toward children than toward adults.

It could be objected that paternalism toward children would be justified because it would not really be paternalism, since children are not full rational agents. If so, however, then we must hold the same with respect to nonhuman animals, since they are not full rational agents either. That is, even if there were some nonhuman animal who preferred to remain in a situation in which its suffering would be increased, it would very probably not be in a favorable epistemic position to see what is best for its well-being. Therefore, even if helping it were paternalistic, it would be the justified kind of paternalism.