Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics · chapter 3

The Debate on the Sentience Criterion

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The sentience criterion faces many criticisms (utilitarianism, anthropocentrism, animal-kingdomism, harms without suffering, invertebrates, biocentrism, the value of life, subjectivity, plants), and each one has been answered.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XII, p. 13 of the PDF edition · English translation

In the previous section we saw the main arguments in favor of a sentience-centered ethics. However, like any other view, sentience-centered ethics also receives many criticisms¹⁰. Below is a summary of the main criticisms¹¹ of the criterion, as well as the answers¹² its defenders have offered to these criticisms.

Criticism	How the criticism has been answered
There are things other than suffering/pleasure that affect well-being (such as the satisfaction of preferences and obtaining objective goods such as knowledge, special relationships, etc.). (VI, ch. 5; XI, ch. 2).	The sentience criterion says only which beings have a well-being. The criterion is not necessarily committed (although it is compatible) with the thesis that well-being comes down to suffering/pleasure. It is also compatible with the thesis that well-being also includes, for example, the satisfaction of preferences and objective goods.
The sentience criterion only makes sense in a utilitarian ethics. (II, ch. 7).	The sentience criterion says only which beings we ought to consider, without committing itself to a specific way of determining the right action. In fact, this criterion has been incorporated by the most varied theories and ¹³ currents of contemporary ethics.
The sentience criterion is anthropocentric, since it looks in animals for a similarity with humans (sentience). (VI, ch. 2)	The sentience criterion does not hold that we should consider sentient animals because they resemble humans, but because they can be harmed and benefited.
The sentience criterion discriminates on the basis of kingdoms, since it excludes those who do not belong to the animal kingdom (VI, ch. 3).	Being sentient is not the same as being an animal. There are nonsentient animals (such as sponges, for example), and in the future there may be sentient beings that are not animals (for example, if sentience in digital media is possible). The criterion prescribes considering all sentient beings, regardless of whether or not they belong to the animal kingdom.

There are harms that do not necessarily cause suffering, such as the harm of death. Hence, the sentience criterion is wrong. (VI, ch. 4).	Accepting the sentience criterion does not imply claiming that the only form of harm is suffering. For example, a sentient being is also harmed if prevented from experiencing what would be positive for it (which is what happens when it dies, for example).
There are harms that neither cause suffering nor prevent someone from enjoying something positive (as, for example, if someone is raped while unconscious and, on waking, remembers nothing). The sentience criterion would not take such harms into account. (VI, ch. 5).	The sentience criterion says that the beings capable of being harmed are those that are conscious, but it does not necessarily claim that all forms of harm either cause suffering or prevent positive experiences (although it is compatible with that view). The sentience criterion is also compatible with the view that a sentient being is harmed when its preferences are violated (whether those it actually has, or those it would have if it were rational and had the relevant information about what is happening).
The sentience criterion excludes invertebrates. (VI, ch. 6).	There are many invertebrates that meet the criteria for sentience, such as cephalopods, decapod crustaceans, many kinds of insects and arachnids, and perhaps ¹⁴ gastropods, bivalves, and even nematode worms.
The sentience criterion is better than the anthropocentric one because it includes a larger number of beings. For the same reason, the criterion of life is better than that of sentience. (VI, ch. 15).	The number of beings considered does not, by itself, show that one criterion is better than another. It would have to be shown that nonsentient living beings can, in fact, be harmed and benefited.
Nonsentient living beings can also be harmed, since they survive under certain conditions and perish under others. (VI, ch. 17 and 18).	The fact that an organism survives or perishes depending on conditions does not show that it is necessarily harmed or benefited depending on the condition it is in, since this by itself does not show that there is someone in that organism experiencing certain states as positive and others as negative.

Sentient beings use the sensation of pain to avoid what would kill them and, through positive sensations, they know which things contribute to their staying alive. Hence, sentience is merely a means of preserving life, which is what really has value in itself. (VI, ch. 16 and 19).	The fact that we aim to stay alive does not imply that biological life has value in itself. We normally think that being alive is good because it allows us to have valuable experiences. We do not see such experiences as having merely instrumental value for our staying alive. Rather, being alive is good because it allows these experiences. If we thought biological life had value in itself, we would maintain that there is something good about remaining a living body with no possibility of experiences (nor of having them again), and even when we could experience only extreme suffering and nothing else.
And what if the sentience criterion is wrong? If nonsentient entities (such as plants, ecosystems, species, etc.) are considerable, it is justified to harm sentient beings if that is necessary to preserve them. (VI, ch. 14).	Showing that an entity is morally considerable is not the same as showing that it should have priority. Even if nonsentient entities were considerable, there are reasons, in cases of conflict, to prioritize sentient beings. There are two main reasons: (1) only sentient beings are capable of experiencing suffering; (2) only in their case does death prevent positive experiences. These are particularly serious harms, which no nonsentient entity can suffer.
The sentience criterion values only beings that have a subjectivity. So it assumes that values are subjective (that is, that there is no right/wrong about values). (VI, ch. 7).	This confuses two senses of the term “subjective.” Something can be subjective in the sense of referring to consciousness. Something can be subjective in the sense that there is no objective truth about it. However, the one does not necessarily imply the other. For example, it could be said that happiness objectively has value in itself and that suffering objectively has disvalue in itself.
If plants are sentient, then it makes no difference whether we eat animals or plants, right? (VI, ch. 21).	If plants were also sentient, what would follow is fruitarianism, and not that it is right to eat both animals and plants. An analogy: the recognition that humans and other animals are sentient implies veganism, and not that it is right to eat both animals and humans.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume XII

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Practice

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Is the sentience criterion committed to utilitarianism?

Why does biological life not seem to have intrinsic value?

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Which of these criticisms have you heard before? Does the table's answer convince you?

Author’s notes 5

10 The debate on the sentience criterion is the subject of Volume VI of this collection . ↩
11 See, for example, (1980) and (1999). ↩
12 See, for example, Saponztis (1984), (2002 [1993], ch. 10), and (2021, p. 71-98). ↩
13 This was the subject of Volume XI of this collection . ↩
14 See (2019). ↩

Sources cited in this text 4

The full list for the volume is in the Volume XII references.

CALLICOTT, J. B. Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair. Environmental Ethics, v. 2, n. 4, p. 311-338, 1980.
CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021.
SAPONZTIS. J. Baird Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' (Review of an Article From Environmental Ethics 4 (1980), Pp. 311-38). Ethics & animals, v. 5, n. 4, p. 113- 121, 1984.
SINGER, P. Ética Prática. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002 [1993].

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