Volume VI · To Whom Do We Owe Moral Consideration? · chapter 15
Is Biocentrism Better Because It Includes a Greater Number of Beings?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
A broader criterion isn't necessarily better: it would have to be shown that the beings included can actually be harmed; and biocentrism excludes possible non-living sentient beings, discriminating against them.
A rule that let rocks vote would include “more people,” but it wouldn't be a better rule. What matters isn't how many get in, but whether it makes sense for them to get in.
An insurance policy that covered “everything, even clouds” wouldn't be fairer: clouds can't be harmed.
- P1 The argument says that if including more beings makes sentience better than anthropocentrism, then life is better than sentience.
- P2 What justifies including sentient beings is that they can be harmed, not the number.
- P3 It hasn't been shown that non-sentient living beings can be harmed.
- P4 And biocentrism would exclude non-living sentient beings, if any exist.
- C Therefore, biocentrism isn't better for being broader.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Biocentrism is more inclusive, so it's more ethical.”
Answer Inclusion isn't a value in itself. A good criterion includes those who can be harmed and excludes no one who can, which biocentrism fails to do with possible artificial sentient beings.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VI, p. 43 of the PDF edition · English translation
15.1. Criteria for Moral Consideration of Different Scope
Consider the following criteria for :
- The criterion prescribes giving moral consideration to all members of the human species.
- The criterion prescribes giving moral consideration to all beings capable of suffering and enjoyment.
- The criterion prescribes giving moral consideration to everything that is alive, regardless of whether or not it is sentient55.
It is sometimes claimed that if the sentience criterion is better than the anthropocentric criterion because it includes a greater number of beings in the sphere of moral consideration, then for the same reason the biocentric criterion is better than the sentience criterion, since it includes in the sphere of moral consideration both sentient beings and nonsentient living beings.
15.2. Does the Fact That a Criterion Is Broader Necessarily Make It Better?
One problem with this claim is that it fails to draw the following distinction. What explains why humans should be morally considered (the possibility of being harmed and benefited) implies that every sentient being should be as well. However, what explains why every sentient being should be considered (that is, the possibility of being harmed and benefited) does not imply that every living being should be too.
There is a difference between a criterion being more adequate because it includes beings who would be harmed if they were excluded, and a criterion including beings that cannot be harmed and/or benefited. The number of objects included is not, by itself, relevant.
For example, a theory that gives moral consideration to all living beings and also to tables and chairs includes a greater number of objects in the sphere of moral consideration. But that does not necessarily make it better. Likewise, even if biocentrism includes a greater number of beings, that does not necessarily make it better. What would have to be shown is that nonsentient living beings are harmed if they are not included. One could try to do this by offering other arguments (which we will discuss in the following chapters). For now, however, our conclusion is more specific: the fact that a criterion includes a greater number of beings does not show this.
15.3. Does Biocentrism Really Include All Sentient Beings and All Living Beings?
Furthermore, the claim that biocentrism would include a greater number of beings in the sphere of moral consideration than the sentience criterion is also questionable. The biocentric criterion is sometimes understood as giving moral consideration to all sentient beings and also to all nonsentient living beings. However, it is false that the biocentric criterion would give moral consideration to all sentient beings. This is because the biocentric criterion gives moral consideration only to living beings. For this reason, if nonorganic forms of sentience come to exist in the future (for example, sentient beings in digital media), these beings would be excluded by the biocentric criterion, since, not being organic, they would not be living beings56 (despite being conscious). However, since these beings would also be capable of suffering and enjoyment, they would be included by the sentience criterion. Therefore, it is not true that the biocentric criterion would be an “expansion beyond sentience,” since it would not even give moral consideration to all sentient beings. Moreover, it is possible that in the future nonorganic sentient beings will become very numerous, perhaps far more numerous than biological beings57. Thus, it is also not true that the number of beings included by the biocentric criterion is necessarily greater than the number of beings included by the sentience criterion.
Therefore, it makes sense to claim that the biocentric criterion discriminates against those who are not living beings, since it would exclude from the sphere of moral consideration beings who could in fact be harmed and benefited, since they would be capable of suffering and enjoyment even though they are not organic.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
According to the chapter, what explains why humans should be considered?
Whom could the biocentric criterion discriminate against?
Food for thought
What makes an inclusion criterion good, besides including a lot?
Author’s notes 3
- 55 For examples of proponents of the biocentric criterion, see (1978) and Taylor (1986). ↩
- 56 It could be objected that such beings would be alive because they would have a psychological life. However, the terms “psychological life” and “living beings,” although they refer to the same concept (life), refer to very different things. The term living beings refers to beings that maintain homeostasis, are composed of cells, undergo metabolism, are born, grow, age, die, etc. If nonorganic sentience is possible, then it is not necessary to be alive in order to have a psychological existence (that is, an existence as a sentient being). The biocentric criterion prescribes considering all living beings, not all beings capable of having a psychological existence. ↩
- 57 On the possibility of sentience in digital media, see (2015b). ↩
Sources cited in this text 3
The full list for the volume is in the Volume VI references.
- GOODPASTER, K. E. On Being Morally Considerable. Journal of Philosophy, n. 75, p. 308- 25, 1978.
- TAYLOR, P. Respect for nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- TOMASIK, B. Why digital sentience is relevant to animal activists. Animal Charity Evaluators. 03 fev. 2015b.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
The sentience criterion is better than the anthropocentric one because it includes a larger number of beings. For the same reason, the criterion of life is better than that of sentience. (VI, ch. 15).
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